Monday, July 24, 1876. A Sioux recount of Little Bighorn.

Some of the Sioux combatants had given their version of Little Bighorn to an Indian agent which passed them on to the Army post at Landing Rock in the Dakota Territory.  It was quite accurate

Headquarters USA Military Station

Landing Rock Dakota Territory July 24, 1876

To the Assistant Adjutant General

Department of Dakota

Saint Paul Minnesota

Sir

I respectfully report the following as having been derived from seven Sioux Indians just returned from the hostile camp (July 21st), some of whom were engaged in the battle of June 25th with the Seventh cavalry.

The agent, of course, makes no distinction between them and the other Indians at the agency. He sent them word to keep quiet and say nothing. To the other Indians, he sent or delivered personally the instruction that they must not tell the military of the return of Indians from the hostile camp, nor circulate reports of the operations in the late fight.

The Indian account follows: The hostile were celebrating their greatest of religious festivals -- the Sun dance -- when rumors brought news of the approach of cavalry. The dance was suspended, and a general rush, mistaken by Custer, perhaps, for a retreat -- for horses' equipment and arrows followed. Major Reno first attacked the village at the south end and across the Little Bighorn.

Their narrative of Reno’s operations coincide with the published accounts how his men were quickly confronted, surrounded, how he dismounted, rallied on the timber, remounted and cut his way back over the ford and up the bluffs, suffering considerable loss, and the continuation of the fight for some little time, when runners arrived from the north of the village, or camp with the news that the cavalry had attacked the north end of the river, three or four miles distance.

The Indians about Reno had not before this shown the slightest inclination of fighting at any other point. A force large enough to prevent Reno from assuming the offensive was left, and the remaining available force flew to the other end of the camp where finding the Indians there, successfully driving Custer before them; instead of uniting with them, they separated into 10 parties and moved around the flanks of his cavalry.

They report that he crossed the river but only succeeded in reaching the edge of the Indian camp. After he was driven to the bluffs, the fight lasted perhaps an hour. Indians have no hours of the day, and the time cannot be given approximately.

They report that a small number of cavalry broke through the line of Indians in their rear escaped, but was overtaken, within a distance of five or six miles and killed. I infer from this that this body of retreating cavalry was probably led by the missing officers and that they tried to escape only after Custer fell.

The last man that was killed by two sons of a Santee Indian "Red Top" whom was a leader in the Minnesota massacre of ’62 and ‘63.

After the battle, the squaws entered the field to plunder and mutilate the dead.

A general rejoicing was indulged in and a distribution of arms and ammunition hurriedly made. Then the attack on Maj. Reno was vigorously renewed.

Up to this attack, the Indians had lost comparatively few men, but now they say their most serious loss took place. They give no ideal of numbers but say there was a great, great many. Sitting Bull was neither killed nor personally engaged in the fight. He remained in the counsel tent, directing operations. Crazy Horse (with a large band) and Black Moon were the principal leaders on the 20th June.

Kill Eagle, chief of the Blackfeet at the head of some 20 lodges, left the agency about the last of May. He was prominently engaged in the battle of June 25 and afterward upbraided Sitting Bull for not taking an active personal part in the engagement. Kill Eagle has sent me word that he was forced into this fight, that he desires to return to the agency and that he will return to the agency if he is killed for it.

He is reported actually on the way back to get his father. The agent made confession to receive absolution for his defiant actions against the hand that has gratuitously fed him for three years. He is truly a shrewd chief, who must have discovered that he who fights and runs away may live to fight another day.

The Indians were not all engaged at one time; he says reserves were held to replace losses and renew attacks unsuccessfully. The fight continued until the end of day when runners, kept on the lookout for other units, reported a great body of troops (Gen. Terry’s column) advancing up the river.

Lodges having been previously prepared for a move retreated in a southerly direction followed toward and along the base of the mountains. They marched about 50 miles, went into camp and held a consultation where it was determined to send to all the agencies reports of this success and to call upon them to come out and share the glories that were expected in the future. Therefore we may expect an influx of overbearing and imprudent Indians to wage by force perhaps, a succession to Sitting Bull's demands.

There is a general gathering in the hostels camp from each of the agencies on the Missouri River, Red Cloud and Spotted Tails, as also a great many northern Cheyenne and Arapahos.

They report for the benefit of their relatives here that in the three (3) fights they have had with the whites, they have captured over 400 stand of arms, carbines and rifles (revolvers not counted) and ammunition without end, sugar, coffee, bacon. And hard bread. They claim to have captured from the whites this summer, over 900 horses and mules. I suppose this includes operations against soldiers, crow Indians and Black Hills miners.

The general outline of this Indian report coincides with the published reports. The first attack of Reno began well on the day, say the Indians. They report about 300 whites killed. They do not say how many Indians killed.

A report from another source says the Indians obtained from Custer’s command 592 carbines and revolvers.

I have since writing the above, heard the following from the returned hostile. They communicated as a secret to their friends here the information that a large party of Sioux and Cheyenne were to leave Rosebud reservation, or the hostile camp for this agency, to intimidate and compel the Indians here to join Sitting Bull, and if they refused, they are ordered [to] kill soldiers there and steal [their] ponies. Of course, any attempts by the military or whites will provoke an attack upon the post, although that secret, or so much of it has not been revealed to friends of the hostile.

I shall report any additional news received from reliable Indian sources as soon as obtained.

Very respectfully

Your obedient servant

J. L. Poland

Captain 6th Infantry

Brevt. Lieut. Col. USA

Commanding

Last edition:

Sunday, July 23, 1876. Custer insults Reno from the grave.

Labels: 1870s, 1876, Alfred Terry, Army, Battle of Little Big Horn, George A. Custer, George Crook, Great Sioux War, John Gibbon, Marcus Reno, Native Americans, Nebraska (Camp Sheridan), Wyoming (Ft. Fetterman), Yellowstone Expedition

Sunday, July 23, 1876. Custer insults Reno from the grave.

The commander of Camp Sheridan, Nebraska, Captain Henry M. Lazelle, wrote to his superiors stating:

While believing that there will be no trouble here with the Indians at this agency, two more companies should be sent to this post. The Indians are evidently much excited.

The post Little Big Horn blame game increased when the New York Herald published an article relating the supposed view of Custer, perhaps penned by him, that Reno had been cowardly in scouting the Tongue River and suggesting his court martial.  The article stated:

Letter from a Prominent Officer

Killed in Custer's Last Charge

Reno's Contempt of Orders

Something for Sherman and Sheridan To Investigate

Bighorn Expedition, on Yellowstone River

At the mouth of the Rosebud,

June 22, 1876

Gen. George Armstrong Custer MY LAST LETTER was sent from the mouth of Powder River and described our march from the Little Missouri. I fear it may not have reached its destination, or if it did it was in such a condition as to be illegible owing to a sad accident which befell our mail party. The latter consisted of a sergeant of the Sixth Infantry, Hazen's regiment, and two men of the same command. This party was to take the mail of this expedition on a small boat from the mouth of the Powder to Fort Buford at the mouth of the former. Just as the sergeant [Fox] with the mail bag on his arm stepped aboard the small boat and was about to push off the boat overturned, throwing all hands into the water. The sergeant at once disappeared below the surface and was never afterward seen. The other members of the party, being experienced swimmers, were, with the assistance of bystanders, rescued from a watery grave. When the sergeant disappeared in the water the mail sack went with him, but fortunately floated between the steamer and the shore, before sinking below the surface. By means of boat hooks the bag and its contents were recovered, but not until they had been under water several minutes. When opened on shore many of the letters were found opened by the influence of the water, and all the stamps displaced. Captain Grant Marsh, of the steamer Far West, the most popular steamboat captain on the Upper Missouri, took the mail in charge, and, with the aid of his assistants, devoted almost an entire night to drying and sealing the contents of the mail bag, a task they completed in time to start the mail on its journey at four o'clock the following morning. The sergeant who lost his life had been twenty-two years in the army, and had but recently returned from Washington, where he had been to file his application for appointment as ordinance sergeant, that appointment being considered the crowning ambition of the most faithful old soldiers.

Major Reno, whose departure with six companies of the Seventh Cavalry to scout up the Powder River was mentioned in my last letter, moved under written orders, which in substance directed him to scout up the Powder River as far as the mouth of the Little Powder, then across to the headwaters of Mizpah Creek, down that creek to near its mouth, then across to Pumpkin Creek, down that stream to its junction with Tongue River, then down Tongue River to its mouth on the Yellowstone, where he was informed the main part of the expedition would be by the time of his arrival at that point.

In the opinion of the most experienced officers it was not believed that any considerable, if any, force of Indians would be found on the Powder River; still there were a few, including Major Reno, who were convinced that the main body of Sitting Bull's warriors would be encountered on Powder River. The general impression, however, is and has been, that on the headwaters of the Rosebud and Little Bighorn rivers the "hostiles" would be found.

It was under this impression that General Terry, in framing the orders which were to govern Major Reno's movements, explicitly and positively directed that officer to confine himself to his orders and instructions, and particularly not to move in the direction of Rosebud River, as it was feared that such a movement, if prematurely made, might "flush the covey," it being the intention to employ the entire cavalry force of the expedition, when the time arrived, to operate in the valleys of the Rosebud and Bighorn Rivers. Custer and most of his officers looked with little favor on the movement up the Powder River, as, among other objections, it required the entire remaining portion of the expedition to lie in idleness within two marches of the locality where it was generally believed the hostile villages would be discovered on the Rosebud, the danger being that the Indians, ever on the alert, would discover the presence of the troops as yet undiscovered-and take advantage of the opportunity to make their escape.

Reno, after an absence of ten days, returned, when it was found, to the disgust and disappointment of every member of the expedition, from the commanding general down to the lowest private, that Reno, instead of simply failing to accomplish any good results, had so misconducted his force as to embarrass, if not seriously and permanently mar, all hopes of future success of the expedition. [Note: it is not true that Reno returned from the Powder River expedition "to the disgust and disappointment of every member of the expedition, from the commanding general to the lowest private." Neither Sgt. Dan Kanipe or Private John McGuire's accounts of the Powder River foray indicate any "disgust" at all.] He had not only deliberately, and without a shadow of an excuse failed to obey his written instructions issued by General Terry's personal directions, but he had acted in positive disobedience to the strict injunctions of the department commander. [Note: in his eagerness to wrap himself in the mantle of his commanding officer, Custer (or his mouthpiece) neglects to mention that Custer was himself arrested by Terry twice before the expedition got to the Powder River for trying to advance too far ahead of the main column, according to John McGuire.]

Instead of conforming his line of march to the valleys and water courses laid down in his written orders he moved his command to the mouth of the Little Powder River, then across to Tongue River, and instead of following the latter stream down to its mouth, there to unite with the main command, he, for some unaccountable and thus far unexplained reason, switched off from his prescribed course and marched across the country to the Rosebud, the stream he had been particularly cautioned not to approach.

He struck the Rosebud about twenty-five miles above its mouth, and there -- as Custer had predicted from the first -- signs indicating the recent presence of a large force of Indians were discovered, an abandoned camp ground of the Indians was found, on which 380 lodges had been pitched. The trail led up the valley of the Rosebud. Reno took up the trail and followed it about twenty miles, but faint heart never won fair lady, neither did it ever pursue and overtake an Indian village. Had Reno, after first violating his orders, pursued and overtaken the Indians, his original disobedience of orders would have been overlooked, but his determination forsook him at this point, and instead of continuing the pursuit and at least bringing the Indians to bay, he gave the order to countermarch and faced his command to the rear, from which point he made his way back to the mouth of Tongue River and reported the details of his gross and inexcusable blunder to General Terry, his commanding officer, who informed Reno in unmistakable language that the latter's conduct amounted to positive disobedience of orders, the sad consequences of which could not yet be fully determined. The details of this affair will not bear investigation.

A court-martial is strongly hinted at, and if one is not ordered it will not be because it is not richly deserved. The guides who were with Reno report that the trail where the latter was abandoned indicates that the Indian village of 380 lodges was moving in such deliberate manner and left so recently that Reno's command could have overtaken it in a march of one day and a half. Few officers have ever had such a fine opportunity to make a successful and telling strike and few ever failed so completely to improve their opportunities.

Gen. Alfred Terry, who assigned a scout, George herendeen, to watch Gen. George A. Custer. Of course there was but one thing to do and that was to remedy as soon as possible the effects of Reno's blunder. Custer's entire command, consisting of twelve companies of the Seventh Cavalry and a detachment of Indian scouts arrived at this point yesterday evening, where the steamer Far West, with General Terry and staff on board had already preceded them, General Terry having transferred his headquarters to the Far West before her departure from the mouth of Powder River. Gibbon's command was encamped on the left bank of the Yellowstone, opposite the mouth of the Rosebud.

Yesterday, Terry, Gibbon and Custer got together, and, with unanimity of opinion, decided that Custer should start with his command up the Rosebud valley to the point where Reno abandoned the trail, take up the latter and follow the Indians as long and as far as horse flesh and human endurance could carry his command. Custer takes no wagons or tents with his command, but proposes to live and travel like Indians; in this manner the command will be able to go wherever the Indians can. Gibbon's command has started for the mouth of the Bighorn. Terry in the Far West starts for the same point today, when with Gibbons force, and the Far West loaded with thirty days' supplies, he will push up the Bighorn as far as the navigation of that stream will permit, probably as far as old Fort C. F. Smith, at which point Custer will reform [rejoin?] the expedition after completing his present scout. Custer's command takes with it, on pack animals, rations for fifteen days. Custer advised his subordinate officers, however, in regard to rations, that it would be well to carry an extra supply of salt, because, if at the end of fifteen days the command should be pursuing a trail, he did not propose to turn back for lack of rations, but would subsist his men on fresh meat-game, if the country provided it; pack mules if nothing better offered. The Herald correspondent will accompany Custer's column and in the event of a "fight or a foot race," will be on the ground to make due record thereof for the benefit of the Herald readers. Upon the march from Powder to Tongue River, Custer, who was riding at the head of the column as it marched through a deserted Indian village of last winter, came upon the skull and bones of a white man. Near these was found the uniform of a cavalry soldier, as shown by the letter "C" on the button of the overcoat and the yellow cord binding on the dress coat. Near by were the dead embers of a large fire; showing, with attendant circumstances, that the cavalryman had undoubtedly been a prisoner in the hands of the savages, and had been put to the torture usually inflicted by Indians upon all white men falling into their hands as captives. Who the unfortunate man was and the sad details of his tragic death will never be known.

Court martials were nearly routine in the Frontier Army, with officers constantly leveling charges against each other.  Custer himself had been court martialed in 1867 and found guilty of being absent without leave, having abandoned his post to visit his wife, and for his harsh treatment of deserters.  He had been suspended from active duty for a year.

A courier from Crook's command arrived at Ft. Fetterman with details as to his actions. 

Last edition:

Tuesday, July 18, 1876. Vigilantes.

Labels: 1870s, 1876, New Mexico, New Mexico (Lincoln County)

Little Bighorn Equipment from the Civil War?

 

Thursday, July 13, 1876. Grant informs Congress of what is known.

Complying with a request from Congress, President Grant sent what information was known about the Battle of the Little Big Horn to Congress.

Last edition:

Monday, July 10, 1876. Lead founded.

Labels: 1870s, 1876, Battle of Little Big Horn, George A. Custer, Great Sioux War, Montana, Sioux, South Dakota, South Dakota (Lead), The written word

Best Posts of the Week of July 5, 2026. The post Independence Day, Donald Trump advances efforts to wipe out democracy while worrying about Iran doing to him, what he did to it, and while starting the war up again, because he 's a loser. edition.

The morning after, as it were, for Independence Day, and a week where King Donny went to Europe riding on Qatari 1, not a pony, and then switched planes as it lacks, well lacks.

He got ignored, resumed the war, and threatened the Iranians if they assassinate him, which they probably find horribly amusing as he's obviously scared.  Murdering your opponents leaders is flat out stupid, and he probably actually has reason to worry.

As an historical week a lot occurred.  The news that thirteen out of fourteen British Colonies in North America had declared themselves sovereign was a huge deal that they were getting out, even as they retreated from their invasion of the fourteenth that was having none of it.  Much earlier, a judicial travesty was referenced on the Maid of Orleans.  In 1876 the world of Custer's disaster at the hans of the Sioux, Cheyenne, a few Arapaho (and with some unsung Metis watching it all) was spreading.

A really notable event was the entry of the first women into service academies.

I've long been of the view that women do not belong in combat, and I still hold that view. But the misogyny and racism of the Trump Administration has really made me rethink a lot of my long held beliefs about such things. At the tender age of 13, when women were admitted, I knew it and thought it improper. I don't now.

I'm going to start with the most important threads of the week out of sink:

The 2026 Election, 15th Edition. Trump will attempt to steal the election.

He's going to try it.

And this:

CliffsNotes of the Zeitgeist 142nd Edition, 25th Amendment Watch, 22nd Edition. Worry.

Friday, July 5, 1776. Getting the word out.

Wednesday, July 5, 1876. Reno writes a report.

Monday, July 5, 1926. Coolidge's Sesquicentennial Address.

Friday, July 5, 1946. Introduction of the bikini.

250 Years Old

Thursday, July 6, 1876. Custer's defeat hits the New York Times.

Thursday, July 6, 1911. Taft saves from mining.

Tuesday, July 6, 1976. First women at Anapolis.

Eating like it's 1776, Haudenosaunee Style.

 

King Donald's War, Part 8 and CliffsNotes of the Zeitgeist 140th Edition, 25th Amendment Watch Nineteenth Edition: L'arche De La Défaite Édition

Monday, July 7, 1456. Joan d'Arc innocent.

Sunday, July 7, 1776. Declaring independence is one thing, winning it quite another.

Sunday, July 7, 1776. Declaring independence is one thing, winning it quite another.

I have to say, on the next item, this really sucks:

Sunday, July 7, 1901. McKinley opens more of Oklahoma.

And back when a saner pace of life meant a President could repair to the woods:

Wednesday, July 7, 1926. Coolidge heads for the Adirondacks.

In an era when it's popular for those on the right to throw rocks at immigrants, somebody to remember:

Sunday, July 7, 1946. Mother Cabrini canonized.

Wednesday, July 7, 1976. First women at West Point.

CliffsNotes of the Zeitgeist 143rd Edition. The Chopper Edition.

I like Kyla Scanlon's Vlog (even though I'd note, as an aside, she really needs to gain some weight) but her post here is one in which we Distributist often wonder why people don't take the logical next step in their analysis.

CityRX

Trump vs. algae is the feud we deserve Congrats, America.

Monday, July 8, 1776. Declaration of Liberty read.

Where we really started repeating old errors that would cause us to be a century behind where we should be.

Saturday, July 8, 1876. The Hamburg Massacre.

Saturday, July 8, 1911. Aspinwall rides into New York.

The Soviets gave the Germans in Austria the boots:

Monday, July 8, 1946. Germans ordered to go home.

Lex Anteinternet: Tuesday, July 6, 1976. First women at Anapolis. Not nothing the anniversary.

Why the crap can other countries be lead by people of a sensible age and we cannot?

CliffsNotes of the Zeitgeist 144th Edition. Just in case you've begun to think that being governed by an 80 year old demented dictator is somehow normal, here's. . .

Subsidiarity Economics 2026. The Times more or less locally, Part 6. The screwworm edition.

Tuesday, July 9, 1776. Troops read the Declaration of Independence.

No matter what you think of the justice of the cause, this was heroic in the extreme. . . with two out of the three heros being Irish immigrants.

Sunday, July 9, 1876. Carrying a dispatch from Terry to Crook.

Wars and Rumors of War, 2026. Part 7. La unión es la fuerza*

King Donald's War, Part 9. The paper tiger edition.

Rod Dreher worries about something he helped bring about.

‘ I’m Worried About Weimar America’

The 2026 Election, 14th Edition. The “If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor" edition.

Monday, July 10, 1876. Lead founded.

The Aerodrome: Air Force One, Aircraft boneyards, Arizona (Tucson), Boeing 747, Boeing VC-25B, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, RAF Mildenhall, United States Air Force, United States and Israel v. Iran

Leisure

Eating Exactly LIke Benjamin Franklin.

The 2026 Election, 16th Edition. The skeptical eye edition.

Last edition:

Best Post of the Week, the Feral Week, and the Agrarian Week of June 28, 2026.

Labels: Best Posts of the Week, The Agrarian Week, The Feral Week

Monday, July 10, 1876. Lead founded.

From far Montana’s canons,/ lands of the wild ravine, the dusky Sioux,  the lone-/some stretch, the silence,/ haply, to-day, a mournful wail/ haply, a trumpet/ note for heroes.

Walt Whitman, “A Death-Sonnet for Custer,”  July 10, 1876,

Lead, South Dakota founded.

Last edition:

Sunday, July 9, 1876. Carrying a dispatch from Terry to Crook.

Labels: 1870s, 1876, Alfred Terry, Army, Catholic, Christianity, Colombia, Colombian Civil War of 1876, George Crook, Great Sioux War, Heroes, Immigration, Ireland, Montana, religion, Wyoming

Saturday, July 8, 1876. The Hamburg Massacre.

An event in which two white farmers, on July 4, had tried to pass through African American drilling militia resulted in a court hearing on a complaint brought by the farmers on this day in Hamburg, South Carolina, a mostly black town..  There was a demand for disbandment of the militia, even though the charge was obstruction of a public road.

Bands of armed white men descended on the town, quite a few of which were members of local rifle clubs.  The militia mustered and took up positions in a stone warehouse.  A battle erupted.  The white besiegers deployed a cannon.  Ultimately the town was taken over them and ultimately six black men and one white farmer were killed, with four of the black militiamen executed.

The entire event would be used by white politicians, in spite of the lopsided black deaths, as a campaign issue in the fall in the state, which had a majority black population.

The War Department issued a report on Little Big Horn to President Grant.

To the PRESIDENT:

To enable you to answer the inclosed resolution of the Senate of July 7, I have the honor to submit the following brief statement of facts as exhibited by the records of this Department:

The Sioux or Dakota Nation of Indians, embracing various tribes, as the Yanktons, Yanctonnais, Brules, Ogallalas, Minneconjous, Sans Arcs, Two Kettles, &c., have long been know as the most brave and warlike savages of this continent. They have for centuries been pushed westward by the advancing tide of civilization, till in 1868 an arrangement or treaty was made with them by a special commission named by Congress, whereby for certain payments and stipulations they agreed to surrender their claim to all that vast region which lies west of the Missouri River and north of the Platte, to live at peace with their neighbors, and to restrict themselves to a territory bounded east by the Missouri River, south by Nebraska, west by the 104th meridian, and north by the forty-sixth parallel, a territory as large as the State of Missouri. The terms of this treaty have been liberally performed on the part of the United States, and have also been complied with by the great mass of Sioux Indians. Some of these Indians, however, have never recognized the binding force of this treaty, but have always treated it contempt, have continued to rove at pleasure, attacking scattered settlements in Nebraska, Wyoming, Montana, and Dakota, stealing horses and cattle, and murdering peaceful inhabitants and travelers.

On the 9th of November, 1875, United States Indian Inspector E. C. Watkins made an elaborate report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in which he uses this language:

"I have the honor to address you in relation to the attitude of certain wild and hostile bands of Sioux Indians in Dakota and Montana that came under my observation during my recent tour through their country, and what I think should be the policy of the Government toward them. I refer to Sitting Bull's band and other bands of the Sioux Nation under chiefs or "head-men" of less note, but no less untamable and hostile. These Indians occupy the center, so to speak, and roam over Western Dakota, and Eastern Montana, including the rich valleys of the Yellowstone and Powder Rivers, and make war on the Arickarees, Mandans, Gros Ventres, Assinaboines, Blackfeet, Piegans, Crows, and other friendly tribes on the circumference.

From their central position they strike to the East, North, and West, steal horses, and plunder from all the surrounding tribes, as well as frontier settlers and luckless white hunters or emigrants who are not in sufficient force to resist them."

After describing at great length their character and supposed numbers, given at a few hundred, he says:

"The true policy, in my judgment, is to send troops against them in the winter, the sooner the better, and whip them into subjection. They richly merit punishment for their incessant warfare, and their numerous murders of white settlers and their families, or white men wherever found unarmed."

The force estimated as necessary to whip them was one thousand men. This communication was submitted by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Hon. Edward P. Smith, to the honorable Secretary of the Interior, Z. Chandler, who in turn submitted it to the then Secretary of War, General Belknap, for his "consideration and action."

In subsequent communication of the Secretary of the Interior, of December 3, 1875, to the Secretary of War, occurs this language:

"I have the honor to inform you that I have this day directed the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to notify said Indians (Sitting Bull and others outside their reservation) that they must remove to the reservation before the 31st day of January, 1876; that if they neglect or refuse so to remove, that they will be reported to the War Department as hostile Indians, and that a military force will be sent to compel them to obey the orders of the Indian Office."

On the 1st day of February the Secretary of the Interior further notified the Secretary of War:

"The time given him (Sitting Bull) in which to return to an agency having expired, and the advice received at the Indian Office being to the effect that Sitting Bull still refuses to comply with the directions of the Commissioner, the said Indians are hereby turned over to the War Department for such action on the part of the Army as you may deem proper under the circumstances."

During all the stages of this correspondence, the General of the Army and his subordinate commanders were duly notified, and were making preparations for striking a blow at these hostile savages, an enterprise of almost insurmountable difficulty in a country where, in winter, the thermometer often falls to forty degrees below zero, and where it is impossible to procure food for man or beast. An expedition was fitted out under the personal command of Brig. Gen. George Crook, an officer of great merit and experience, which, in March last , marched from Forts Fetterman and Laramie to the Powder River and Yellowstone Valleys, struck and destroyed the village of Crazy Horse, one of those hostile bands referred to by Indian Inspector Watkins, but the weather was found so bitter cold, and other difficulties so great arose, that General Crook returned to Fort Laramie in a measure unsuccessful so far as the main purpose was concerned. These Indians occupy parts of the Departments of Dakota and Platte, commanded by Generals Terry and Crook, respectively, but the whole is immediately commanded by Lieutenant-General Sheridan, who has given the matter his special attention. Preparations were then made on a larger scale, and three columns were put in motion as early in May as possible, from Fort Abe Lincoln, on the Missouri River, under General Terry; from Fort Ellis, in Montana, under General Gibbon; and from Fort Fetterman under General Crook. These columns were as strong as could be maintained in that inhospitable region, or could be spared from other pressing necessities, and their operations are not yet concluded, nor is a more detailed report deemed necessary to explain the subject-matter of this inquiry.

The present military operations are not against the Sioux Nation at all, but against certain hostile parts of it which defy the Government, and are undertaken at the special request of that bureau of the Government charged with their supervision, and wholly to make the civilization of the remainder possible. No part of these operations are on or near the Sioux reservation. The accidental discovery of gold on the western border of the Sioux reservation, and the intrusion of our people thereon, have not caused this war, and have only complicated it by the uncertainty of numbers to be encountered. The young warriors love war, and frequently escape their agents to go on the hunt, or warpath, their only idea of the object of life. The object of these military expeditions was in the interest of the peaceful parts of the Sioux Nation, supposed to embrace at least nine- tenths of the whole, and not one of these peaceful or treaty Indians have been molested by the military authorities.

The recent reports touching the disaster which befell a part of the Seventh Regular Cavalry, led by General Custer in person are believed to be true. For some reason as yet unexplained, General Custer, who commanded the Seventh Cavalry, and had been detached by his commander, General Terry, at the mouth of Rosebud, to made a wide detour up the Rosebud, a tributary of the Yellowstone, across to the Little Big Horn and down to the mouth of the Yellowstone River. The wounded were carried back to the mouth of the Big Horn, in the Yellowstone River, which is navigable, and where there were two steamboats, one of which was sent down the river to Fort Abe Lincoln with the wounded, and to communicate these sad facts.

General Terry is therefore at the mouth of the Big Horn, refitting, and will promptly receive re-enforcement and supplies, and will resume his operations immediately.

Meantime, General Crook had also advanced from Fort Fetterman, and on the 17th of June, eight days before General Custer's attack, had encountered this same force of warriors on the head of the Rosebud, with whom he fought several hours, driving the Indians from the field, losing nine men in killed; one officer and twenty men wounded. General Crook reports his camp as on Tongue River, Wyoming. Re-enforcement and supplies are also enroute to him, and every possible means have been adopted to accomplish a concert of action between these two forces, which are necessarily separated, and are only able to communicate by immense distances around their rear.

The task committed to the military authorities is one of unusual difficulty, has been anticipated for years, and must be met and accomplished. It can no longer be delayed, and everything will be done by the Department to insure success, which is necessary to give even an assurance of comparative safety to the important but scattered interests which have grown up in that remote and almost inaccessible portion of our national domain.

It is again earnestly recommends that the appropriation asked for repeatedly by General Sheridan, of $200,000, be made, to build two posts on the Yellowstone, at or near the mouths of the Big Horn and Tongue Rivers.

Inclosed herewith please find copies of General Terry's report, just received by telegraph since the preparation of this letter.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. D. CAMERON, Secretary of War.

Gen. Terry issued a supplemental report.

Philadelphia, July 8, 1876

General W. T. Sherman, U.S.A.

War Department, Washington, D. C.:

Chicago, Ill., July 8.

General P. H. Sheridan,

Continental Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa.:

At the mouth of the Rosebud I informed General Custer that I should take the supply-steamer Far West up the Yellowstone to ferry General Gibbon's column over the river; that I should personally accompany that column, and that it would, in all probability, reach the mouth of the Little Big Horn on the 26th instant. The steamer reached General Gibbon's troops, near the mouth of the Big Horn, early in the morning of the 24th, and at 4 o'clock in the afternoon all his men and animals were across the Yellowstone. At 5 o'clock the column, consisting of five companies of the Seventh Infantry, four companies of the Second Cavalry, and a battery of Gattling guns, marched out to and crossed Tullock's Creek. Starting soon after 5 o'clock in the morning of the 25th, the infantry made a march of twenty-two miles over the most difficult country which I have ever seen. In order that scouts might be sent into the valley of the Little Big Horn, the cavalry, with the battery, were then pushed on thirteen or fourteen miles farther, reaching camp at midnight. The scouts were sent out. At half past four, on the morning of the 26th, they discovered three Indians, who were at first supposed to be Sioux, but when overtaken they proved to be Crows who had been with General Custer. They brought the first intelligence of the battle. Their story was not credited. It was supposed that some fighting, perhaps severe fighting, had taken place, but it was not believed that disaster could have overtaken so large a force as twelve companies of cavalry. The infantry, which had broken camp very early, soon came up, and the whole column entered and moved up the valley of the Little Big Horn. During the afternoon efforts were made to send scouts through to what was supposed to be General Custer's position, and to obtain information of the condition of affairs; but those who were sent out were driven back by parties of Indians, who, in increasing numbers, were seen hovering in General Gibbon's front. At twenty minutes before 9 o'clock in the evening the infantry had marched between twenty- nine and thirty miles. The men were very weary, daylight was failing; the column was therefore halted for the night at a point about eleven miles in a straight line above the mouth of the stream. In the morning the march was resumed, and after marching nine miles Major Reno's intrenched position was reached. The withdrawal of the Indians from around Major Reno's command and from the valley was undoubtedly caused by the appearance of General Gibbon's troops. Major Reno and Captain Benteen, both of who are officers of great experience, accustomed to see large masses of mounted men, estimate the number of Indians engaged at not less than 2,500; other officers think the number greater than this. The village in the valley was about three miles in length and about a mile in width; besides the lodges proper, a great number of temporary brushwood shelter was found in it, indicating that many men besides its proper inhabitants had gathered together there. Major Reno is very confident that there was a number of white men fighting with the Indians. It is believed that the loss of the Indians was larger. I have as yet received no official reports in regard to the battle, but what is stated herein is gathered from the officers who were on the ground there, and from those who have been over it since.

ALFRED H. TERRY, Brigadier-General.

R. C. DRUM, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Last edition:

Friday, July 7, 1876. Congress asks what's going on.

Labels: 1870s, 1876, 44th Congress, Alcohol, Battle of Little Big Horn, Colorado (Denver), Great Sioux War, The Press, U.S. Grant

Friday, July 7, 1876. Congress asks what's going on.

Congress made an inquiry:

The Rocky Mountain News told the tale.

Note the Budweiser advertisement.

Last edition:

Thursday, July 6, 1876. Custer's defeat hits the New York Times.

Labels: 1870s, 1876, Battle of Little Big Horn, cavalry, George A. Custer, Great Sioux War, Montana, The Press, Yellowstone Expedition

Thursday, July 6, 1876. Custer's defeat hits the New York Times.

 The New York Times and the Bismarck Tribune reported the disaster at the Little Big Horn.

Last edition:

Wednesday, July 5, 1876. Reno writes a report.

Labels: 1870s, 1876, Battle of Little Big Horn, cavalry, Great Sioux War, Marcus Reno, The Press, Yellowstone Expedition, Yellowtone River

Wednesday, July 5, 1876. Reno writes a report.

Reno wrote his official report of the recent disaster on the Little Big Horn.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH UNITED STATES CAVALRY,

Camp on Yellowstone River, July 5, 1876

E. W. Smith,

A. D. C. and A. A. A. Gen.:

The command of the regiment having developed upon me as the senior surviving officer from the battle of the 25th and 26th of June, between the Seventh Cavalry and Sitting Bull's band of hostile Sioux, on the Little Big Horn River, I have the honor to submit the following report of its operations from the time of leaving teh main column unitl the command was united in the vicinity of the Indian village:

The regiment leflt the camp at the mouth of the Rosebud River, after passing in review before the department commander, under command of Bvt. Maj. Gen. G. A. Custer, lieutenant-colonel, on the afternoon of the 22nd day of June, and marched up the Rosebud 12 miles and encamped; 23rd, marched up the Rosebud, passing many old Indian camps, and following a very large pole-trail, but not fresh, making 33 miles; 24th, the march was continued up the Rosebud, the trail and signs freshening with every mile, until we had made 28 miles, and we then encamped and waited for information from the scouts. At 9:25 p.m. Custer called the officers together and informed us that beyond a doubt the village was in the valley of the Little Big Horn, and in order to reach it it was necessary to cross the divide between the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn, and it would be impossible to do so in the day-time without discovering our march to the Indians; that we would prepare to march at 11 p.m. This was done, the line of march turning from the Rosebud to the right up one of its branches which headed near the summit of the divide. About 2 a.m. on the 25th the scouts told him that he could not cross the divide before daylight. We then made coffee and rested for three hours, at the expiration of which time the march was resumed, the divide crossed, and about 8 a.m. the command was in the valley of one of the branches of the Little Big Horn. By this time Indians had been seen and it was certain that we could not suprise them, and it was determined to move at once to the attack. Previous to this, no division of the regiment had been made since the order had been issued on the Yellowstone annuling wing and battalion organizations, but Custer informed me that he would assign commands on the march.

I was ordered by Lieut. W. W. Cooke, adjutant, to assume command of Companies M, A, and G; Captain Benteen of Companies H, D, and K. Custer retained C, E, F, I, and L under his immediate command, and Company B, Captain McDougall, in rear of the pack- train.

I assumed command of the companies assigned to me, and, without any definite orders, moved forward with the rest of the column, and well to its left.

I saw Benteen moving farther to the left, and, as they passed, he told me he had orders to move well to the left, and sweep everything before him. I did not see him again until about 2.30 p.m. The command moved down to the creek toward the Little Big Horn Valley, Custer with five companies on the right bank, myself and three companies on the left bank, and Benteen farther to the left, and out of sight.

As we approached a deserted village, and in which was standing one tepee, about 11 a.m., Custer motioned me to cross to him, which I did, and moved nearer to his column until about 12.30 a.m. [p.m. ?] when Lieutenant Cook, adjutant, came to me and siad the village was only two miles above, and running away; to move forward at as rapid a gait as prudent, and to charge afterward, and that the whole outfit would support me. I think those were his exaxt words. I at once took a fast trot, and moved down about two miles, when I came to a ford of the river. I crossed immediately, and halted about ten minutes or less to gather the battalion, sending word to Custer that I had everything in front of me, and that they were strong. I deployed, and, with the Ree scouts on my left, charged down the valley, driving the Indians with great ease for about two and a half miles. I, however, soon saw that I was being drawn into some trap, as tehy would certainly fight harder, and especially as we were nearing their village, which was still standing; besides, I could not see Custer or any other support, and at the same time the very earth seemed to grow Indians, and they were running toward me in swarms, and from all directions. I saw I must defend myself and give up the attack mounted. This I did. Taking possession of a front of woods, and which furnished, near its edge, a shelter for the horses, dismounted and fought them on foot, making headway through the woods. I soon found myself in the near vicinity of the village, saw that I was fighting odds of at least five to one, and that my only hope was to get out of the woods, where I would soon have been surrounded, and gain some high ground. I accomplished this by mounting and charging the Indians between me and the bluffs on the opposite side of the river. In this charge, First Lieut. Donald McIntosh, Second Lieut. Benjamin H. Hodgson, Seventh Cavalry, and Acting Assistant Surgeon J. M. De Wolf, were killed.

I succeeded in reaching the top of the bluff, with a loss of three officers and twenty-nine enlisted men killed and seven wounded. Almost at the same time I reached the top, mounted men were seen to be coming toward us, and it proved to be Colonel Benteen's battalion, Companies H, D, and K. We joined forces, and in a short time the pack-train came up. As senior, my command was then A, B, D, G, H, K, and M, about three hundred and eighty men, and the following officers: Captains Benteen, Weir, French and McDougall, First Lieutenants Godfrey, Mathey, and Gibson, and Second Lieutenants Edgerly, Wallace, Varnum, and Hare, and Acting Assistant Surgeon Porter.

First Lieutenant De Rudio was in the dismounted fight in the woods, but, having some trouble with his horse, did not join the command in the charge out, and hiding himself in the woods, joined the command after night-fall on the 26th.

Still hearing nothing of Custer, and, with this re- enforcement, I moved down the river in the direction of the village, keeping on the bluffs.

We had heard firing in that direction and knew it could only be Custer. I moved to the summit of the highest bluff, but seeing and hearing nothing sent Captain Weir with his company to open communication with him. He soon sent word by Lieutenant Hare that he could go no farther, and that the Indians were getting around him. At this time he was keeping up a heavy fire from his skirmish line. I at once turned everything back to the first position I had taken on the bluffs, and which seemed to me the best. I dismounted the men and had the horses and mules of the pack-train driven together in a depression, put the men on the crests of the bluffs, and which seemed to me the best. I dismounted, the men and had the horses and mules of the pack- train driven together in a depression, put the men on the crests of the hills making the depression, and had hardly done so when I was furiously attacked. This was about 6 p.m. We held our ground, with a loss of eighteen enlisted men killed and forty-six wounded, until the attack ceased, about 9 p.m. As I knew by this their overwhelming numbers, and had given up any support from that portion of the regiment with Custer, I had the men dig rifle pits, barricade with dead horses and mules, and boxes of hard bread, the opening of the depression toward the Indians in which the animals were herded, and made every exertion to be ready for what I saw would be a terrific assault the next day. All this might night the men were busy, and the Indians holding a scalp- dance underneath us in the bottom and in our hearing. On the morning of the 26th I felt confident that I could hold my own, and was ready, as far as I could be, when at daylight, about 2.30 a.m., I heard the crack of two rifles. This was the signal for the beginning of a fire that I have never equaled. Every rifle was handled by an expert and skilled marksman, and with a range that exceeded our carbines, and it was simply impossible to show any part of the body before it was struck. We could see, as the day brightened, countless hordes of them pouring up the valley from the village and scampering over the high points toward the places designated for them by their chiefs, and which entirely surrounded our position. They had sufficient numbers to completely encircle us, and men were struck from opposite sides of the lines from where the shots were fired. I think we were fighting all the Sioux Nation, and also all the deparadoes, renegades, half-breeds, and squaw-men between the Missouri and the Arkansas and east of the Rocky Mountains, and they must have numbered at least twenty-five hundred warriors.

The fire did not slacken until about 9.30 a.m., and then we found they were making a last desperate effort and which was directed against the lines held by Companies H and M. In this charge they came close enough to use their bows and arrows, and one man lying dead within our lines was touched with the coup- stick of one of the foremost Indiands. When I say the stick was only ten or twelve feet long, some idea of the desperate and reckless fighting of these people may be understood.

This charge of theirs was gallantly repulsed by the men on that line, lead by Colonel Benteen. They also came close enough to send their arrows into the line held by Companies D and K, but were driven away by a like charge of the line, which I accompanied. We now had many wounded, and the question ofwater was vital, as from 6 p.m. the previous evening until now, 10 a.m., about sixteen hours, we had been without.

A skirmish line was formed under Colonel Benteen to protect the descent of volunteers down the hill in front of his position to reach teh water. We succeeded in getting some canteens, although many of the men were hit in doing so. The fury of the attack was now over, and to our astonishment the Indians were seen going in parties toward the village. But two solutions occured to us for this movement; that they were going for something to eat, more ammunition, (as they had been throwing arrows,) or that Custer was coming. We took advantage of this lull to fill all vessels with water, and soon had it by camp- kettles full. But they continued to withdraw, and all firing ceased save occasional shots from sharp-shooters sent to annoy us about the water. About 2 p.m. the grass in the bottom was set on fire and followed up by Indians who encouraged its burning, and it was evident to me it was done for a purpose, and which purpose I discovered later on to be the creation of a dense cloud of smoke behind which they were packing and preparing to move their village. It was between 6 and 7 p.m. that the village came out from behind the dense clouds of smoke and dust. We had a close and good view of them as they filed away in the direction of the Big Horn Mountains, moving in almost perfect military order. The length of the column was full equal to that of a large division of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac as I have seen it in its march.

We now thought of Custer, of whom nothing had been seen and nothing heard since the firing in his direction about 6 p.m. on the eve of the 25th, and we concluded that the Indians had gotten between him and us and driven him toward the boat at the mouth of the Little Big Horn River. The awful fate that did befall him never occurred to any of us as within the limits of possibility.

During the night I changed my position in order to secure an unlimited supply of water, and was prepared for their return, feeling sure they would do som as they were in such numbers; but early in the morning of the 27th, and while we were on the qui vire for Indians, I saw with my glass a dust some distance down the valley. There was no certainty for some time what they were, but finally I satisfied myself they were cavalry, and, if so, could only be Custer, as it was ahead of the time that I understood that General Terry could be expected. Before this time, however, I had written a communication to General Terry, and three volunteers were to try and reach him. (I had no confidence in the Indians with me, and could not get them to do anything.) If this dust were Indians it was possible they would not expect any one to leave. The men started, and were told to go as near as it was safe to determine whether the approaching column was white men, and to return at once in case they found it so, but if they were Indians to push on to General Terry. In a short time, we saw them returning a note from Terry to Custer saying Crow scouts had come to camp saying he had been whipped, but that it was not believed. I think it was about 10.30 a.m. when General Terry rode into my lines, and the fate of Custer and his brave men was soon determined by Captain Benteen proceeding to the battle-ground, and where was recognized the following officers, who were surrounded by the dead bodies of many of their men; Gen G. A. Custer, Col. W. W. Cook, adjutant; Capts. M. W. Keogh, G. W. Yates, and T. W. Custer; First Lieuts. A. E. Smith, James Calhoun; Second Lieuts. W. V. Reily, of the Seventh Cavalry and J. J. Crittenden, of the Twelfth Infantry, temporarily attached to this regiment. The bodies of Lieut. J. E. Porter and Second Lieuts. H. M. Harrington and J. G. Sturgis, Seventh Cavalry, and Asst. Surg. G. W. Lord, U. S. A., were not recognized; but there is every reasonable probability they were killed. It was more certain that the column of five companies with Custer had been killed.

The wounded in my lines were, during the afternoon and evening of the 27th, moved to the camp of General Terry, and at 5 a.m. of the 28th I proceeded with the regiment to th battle-ground of Custer, and buried 204 bodies, including the following-named citizens: Mr. Boston Custer, Mr. Reed (a young nephew of General Custer,) and Mr. Kellog, (a correspondent for the New York Herald.) The following-named citizens and Indians who were with my command were also killed: Charles Reynolds, guide and hunter; Isaiah Dorman, (colored,) interpreter; Bloody Knife, who fell from immediately by my side; Bobtail Bull, and Stab, of the Indian scouts.

After traveling over his trail, it was evident to me that Custer intended to support me by moving farther down the stream and attacking the village in flank; that he found the distance greater to ford than he anticipated; that he did charge, but his march had taken so long, although his trail shows that he had moved rapidly, that they were ready for him; that Companies C and I, and perhaps part of E, crossed to the village or attempted it; at the charge were met by a staggering fire, and that they fell back to find a position from which to defend themselves, but they were followed too closely by the Indians to permit time to form any kind of a line.

I think had the regiment gone in as a body, and from the woods from which I fought advanced upon the village, its destruction was certain. But he was fully confident they were running away, or he would not have turned from me. I think (after the great number of Indians that were in the village,) that the following reasons obtain for the misfortune; His rapid marching for two days and one night before the fight; attacking in the day-time at 12 m., and when they were on the qui vire, instead of early morning; and lastly, his unfortunate division of the regiment into three commands.

During my fight with Indians, I had the heartiest support from officers and men, but the conspicuous services of Bvt. Col. F. W. Benteen I desire to call attention to especially, for if ever a soldier deserved recognition by his Government for distinguished services he certainly does. I inclose herewith his report of the operations of his battalion from the time of leaving the regiment until we joined commands on the hill. I also inclose an accuate list of casaulties, as far as it can be made at the present time, separating them into two lists: A, those killed in General Custer's command; B, those killed and wounded in the command I had.

The number of Indians killed can only be approximated until we hear through the agencies. I saw the bodies of eighteen, and Captain Ball, Second Cavalry, who made a scout of thirteen miles over their trail, says that their graves were many along their line of march. It is simply impossible that numbers of them should not be hit in the several charges they made so close to my lines. They made their approaches through the deep gulches that led from the hill-top to the river, and, when the jealous care with which the Indian guards the bodies of killed and wounded is considered, it is not astonishing that their bodies were not found. It is probable that the stores left by them and destroyed the next two days was to make room for many of these on their travois. The harrowing sight of the dead bodies crowning the height on which Custer fell, and which will remain vividly in my memory until death, is too recent for me not to ask the good people of this country whether a policy that sets opposing parties in the field, armed, clothed, and equipped by one and the same Government should not be abolished.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

M. A. RENO,

Major Seventh Cavalry, Commanding Regiment.

The Helena Daily Herald ran an editorial on the disaster.

Wednesday, July 5, 1876

EDITORIAL

The news received last evening of the defeat of Custer and the massacre of his entire command, fell upon the festivities of the day with a gloom that could not be shaken off. There is only toe much reason to believe that the facts given in the extras of last evening are literally true. The parties from whom the facts were received are too well known to leave a reasonable doubt.

BOZEMAN and HELENA, however, were not alone in beating the Bismarck Tribune, for on 5 July 1876, the Commanding Officer, Ft. Rice, near Bismarck, had news of the battle, and at once wired it to the Adjutant at St. Paul. The following extract from letter of Colonel Hugh F. Reed, Ret'd., dated 14 April 1926, tells the story:

"We officers at Fort Rice and the Post Trader made up a purse, and had a pony race on the Fourth of July. * * * The day after the pony race three Sioux Indians arrived at the post. One of them had a bow and half a dozen arrows. I bought them. * * * The Indian from whom I bought the bow and arrows said that he had pulled the arrows from the dead bodies of soldiers that the Indians had killed with Custer. This was our first news of a fight. The Indians said that a big force of Indians had killed Custer and all his soldiers. I then took the three Indians to Lieut. Humbert the post commander, and they repeated their story of the fight. * * * As Adjutant I wrote a message which Humbert signed and sent it by a courier thirty miles to Bismarck, the nearest telegraph office, to the Adjutant General, Dept. of Dakota, St. Paul. This was the first news sent of the fight. There was an old stockade south of the post buildings, and Humbert put his company in one bastion and I put my company in the other bastion, where we stayed all night on watch for an attack. The next day Capt. Grant Marsh with his steamer The Far West arrived at Bismarck. He had on board some wounded soldiers from Reno's battalion.

But why the telegraph operator at Bozeman failed to transmit Terry's report the afternoon of 3 July has never been explained: nor has it ever been explained why the editor of the Bozeman Times did not round up the operator and scoop the news himself. Certainly the opportunity was wide open.

It has been stated that the wires were down and that no message could be sent from Bozeman on that day; but Captain Benham's official report gives the lie to that assertion.

Perhaps the Bozeman telegraph operator had already commenced to celebrate the Glorious Fourth when Benham rode in with Terry's report. In the "good old days" many celebrants of Independence Day absorbed their patriotism from a bottle. Perhaps-but it is idle to speculate. Quien sabe!

Last edition:

Tuesday, July 4, 1876. The Centennial.