The U-977 surrendered at Mar del Plata, Argentina. It had left Kiel on April 13th and had sunk a Soviet ship in the Arctic before the end of the war, and the start of its really long journey.
The crew actually intended to defect to Argentina, freighted by a late war Goebbels broadcast which stated the Morgenthau plan intended to turn Germany into a "goat pasture" and that German men were to be sterilized. The commander, Oblt.z.S. Schäffer, allowed those who did not want to go to be put ashore in Germany, and sixteen were. The hopes were to integrated into Argentina's German community. He personally stated:
I left Kristiansand S. on 2 May 1945, normally equipped, and under orders to proceed to the Channel, (i.e. English Channel).
A few days later I picked up fragments of signals, which I suspected of being the work of enemy deception. When, however, these signals were not cancelled, I had to assume that the radio stations had fallen into enemy hands and that we had lost the war. The fact that the uncoded signals signed “Allied Committee” were coming through, convinced me that the orders contained in these signals were illegitimate and not in agreement with the German High Command. When we began our patrol, an official slogan had been posted on all Naval establishments and ships which said: The enemy shall find in Germany nothing but rats and mice. We will never capitulate. Better death than slavery.
It must be remembered that radio reception on board the U-977 was only sporadic since, for tactical reasons, we only occasionally came to Schnorchel depth. However, enough signals had been received so that I no longer had any superiors, and that I was relieved of my oath. In any case, I did not feel obligated without direct orders from my government to accept enemy orders.
I no longer considered my ship as a man-of-war, but as a means of escape, and I tried to act for the best interests of all aboard. I respected the wishes of members of my crew insofar as they did not imperil the ship or cause damage to it.
One of my main reasons in deciding to proceed to the Argentine was based on German propaganda, which claimed that the American and British newspapers advocated that at the end of the war, all German men be enslaved and sterilized. Another consideration was the bad treatment and long delay in return home suffered by German prisoners-of-war held in France at the end of World War I. Then again, of course, the hope of better living conditions in the Argentine.
It was absolutely my intention to deliver the boat undamaged into Allied hands, while doing the best I could for my crew. I felt that the ship’s engines might be a valuable adjunct to the reconstruction of Europe. I carried out these intentions and delivered the boat in perfect condition.
In fact they were extradited to the US where they faced charges of having sunk a Brazilian ship after the war, which the US, based upon Argentine information, concluded they could not have done, and then to the UK, where they were accused of having landed German officials in Argentina prior to surrendering, which they also did not do.
Schäffer wrote a book about the boat and its escape after the war. The entire event gave rise to long lasting rumors and myths as to what the boat was doing.
Hirohito issued a letter to the officers and men of the Japanese military.
TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE IMPERIAL FORCES:
Three years and eight months have elapsed since we declared war on the United States and Britain. During this time our beloved men of the army and navy, sacrificing their lives, have fought valiantly on disease-stricken and barren lands and on tempestuous waters in the blazing sun, and of this we are deeply grateful.
Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue the war under the present internal and external conditions would be only to increase needlessly the ravages of war finally to the point of endangering the very foundation of the Empire's existence
With that in mind and although the fighting spirit of the Imperial Army and Navy is as high as ever, with a view to maintaining and protecting our noble national policy we are about to make peace with the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and Chungking.
To a large number of loyal and brave officers and men of the Imperial forces who have died in battle and from sicknesses goes our deepest grief. At the same time we believe the loyalty and achievements of you officers and men of the Imperial forces will for all time be the quintessence of our nation.
We trust that you officers and men of the Imperial forces will comply with our intention and will maintain a solid unity and strict discipline in your movements and that you will bear the hardest of all difficulties, bear the unbearable and leave an everlasting foundation of the nation.
This is likely the message mentioned in yesterday's entry, but I'm noting it here, as this is the date I had for it.
Indonesia, where Japanese occupation had not been wholly unwelcome, declared independence the Netherlands. They'd have to fight for it.
The declaration was read by Sukarno, with a Japanese officer standing nearby. The Dutch had not reoccupied the islands.
Sukarno had been a pre war prisoner of the Dutch, and had been freed from incarceration by the Japanese. The Dutch, for that matter, were really hated colonial masters, and nobody was keen about their return, including the British.
The Battle of Tianmen was fought between warlord and Japanese troops turned Nationalist and the Communist in China. The Communists prevailed.
This was small battle, and 1/3d of the troops were Japanese.
Oppenheimer wrote Henry Stimson.
From: J R Oppenheimer
To: Henry Stimson, Secretary of War
Date: August 17, 1945
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The Interim Committee has asked us to report in some detail on the scope and program of future work in the field of atomic energy. One important phase of this work is the development of weapons; and since this is the problem which has dominated our war time activities, it is natural that in this field our ideas should be most definite and clear, and that we should be most confident of answering adequately the questions put to us by the committee. In examining these questions we have, however, come on certain quite general conclusions, whose implications for national policy would seem to be both more immediate and more profound than those of the detailed technical recommendations to be submitted. We, therefore, think it appropriate to present them to you at this time.
1. We are convinced that weapons quantitatively and qualitatively far more effective than now available will result from further work on these problems. This conviction is motivated not alone by analogy with past developments, but by specific projects to improve and multiply the existing weapons, and by the quite favorable technical prospects of the realization of the super bomb.
2. We have been unable to devise or propose effective military counter-measures for atomic weapons. Although we realize that future work may reveal possibilities at present obscure to us, it is our firm opinion that no military countermeasures will be found which will be adequately effective in preventing the delivery of atomic weapons.
The detailed technical report in preparation will document these conclusions, but hardly alter them.
3. We are not only unable to outline a program that would assure to this nation for the next decades hegemony in the field of atomic weapons; we are equally unable to insure that such hegemony, if achieved, could protect us from the most terrible destruction.
4. The development, in the years to come, of more effective atomic weapons, would appear to be a most natural element in any national policy of maintaining our military forces at great strength; nevertheless we have grave doubts that this further development can contribute essentially or permanently to the prevention of war. We believe that the safety of this nation – as opposed to its ability to inflict damage on an enemy power – cannot lie wholly or even primarily in its scientific or technical prowess. It can be based only on making future wars impossible. It is our unanimous and urgent recommendation to you that, despite the present incomplete exploitation of technical possibilities in this field, all steps be taken, all necessary international arrangements be made, to this one end.
5. We should be most happy to have you bring these views to the attention of other members of the Government, or of the American people, should you wish to do so.
Very sincerely,
J. R. Oppenheimer
The latest edition of Yank was out.
A new book was also out.
Orwell's Animal Farm was published.
I'll confess, I have not read it.
The British government announced the intent to introduce socialized medicine. It also announced that 38,000 British soldiers and 112,000 British civilians were being held by the Japanese as prisoners.
Last edition: