Showing posts with label Army. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Army. Show all posts

Thursday, July 9, 2026

Sunday, July 9, 1876. Carrying a dispatch from Terry to Crook.

Conservatives rebelled in Colombia over the Liberal government's attempts to secularize education.

This is a little hard to grasp in a modern context, but European Liberals at the time were deeply hostile to the Catholic Church and that attitude carried on into liberals in Latin America.  Therefore, the liberals in charge in Colombia were hostile to the Church, and many Colombians were opposed to them.

Gen. Terry determined to coordinate his forces with Crooks and authored a letter to that effect.  Three soldiers volunteered to carry the message,  Irish born Pvt. James Bell, Irish born William Evans, and Benjamin F. Stewart.  All three men would receive the Medal of Honor for their efforts, which were successful and which took three days. 

They traveled mostly by night.

Bell was a carrier soldier, married in 1888, and spent his retirement in Chicago where he died in 1901.  Stewart was remarkably suffering from injuries at the time and was discharged from the Army later that month for medical reasons.  Evans was also a career soldier and apparently died while still in the service in 1881.

That two out of the three of the men were Irish was fairly typical for the Army at the time.

Last edition:

Saturday, July 8, 1876. The Hamburg Massacre.

Tuesday, July 9, 1776. Troops read the Declaration of Independence.

Continental Army soldiers on Lower Manhattan were assembled under orders of Gen. Washington to hear the Declaration of Independence read, the first they would have been aware that they were fighting for an entity that had declared itself independent of the United Kingdom.

British troops were being assembled on Staten Island for an offensive.

That evening a gilded lead statute of King George III was toppled in Bowling Green, New York, and melted into musket balls.

Last edition:

Monday, July 8, 1776. Declaration of Liberty read.

Tuesday, July 7, 2026

Sunday, July 7, 1776. Declaring independence is one thing, winning it quite another.

Being a Sunday, Congress did not meet. 

Philadelphia July 7, 1776

I have this Moment folded up a Magazine, and an Evening Post and sent it off, by an Express, who could not wait for me to write a single Line. It always goes to my Heart, to send off a Packett of Pamphletts and News Papers, without a Letter, but it sometimes unavoidably happens, and I suppose you had rather receive a Pamphlet or News Paper, than nothing.

The Disign of our Enemy, now seems to be a powerfull Invasion of New York and New Jersey. The Hallifax Fleet and Army, is arrived, and another Fleet and Army under Lord How, is expected to join them. We are making great Preparations to meet them, by marching the Militia of Maryland, Pensilvania, and New Jersey, down to the Scene of Action, and have made large Requisitions upon New England. I hope for the Honour of New England, and the Salvation, of America, our People will not be backward in marching to New York. We must maintain and defend that important Post, at all Events. If the Enemy get Possession there, it will cost N. England very dear. There is no danger of the Small Pox at New York. It is carefully kept out of the City and the Army. I hope that your Brother and mine too will go into the Service of their Country, at this critical Period of its Distress.

Our Army at Crown Point is an Object of Wretchedness, enough to fill a humane Mind, with Horror. Disgraced, defeated, discontented, dispirited, diseased, naked, undisciplined, eaten up with Vermin -- no Cloaths, Beds, Blanketts, no Medicines, no Victuals, but Salt Pork and flour. A Chaplain from that Army, preached a Sermon here the other day, from "cursed is he, that doth the Work of the Lord, deceitfully."

I knew better than he did, who the Persons were, who deserved these Curses. But I could not help myself, nor my poor Country any more than he.

I hope that Measures will be taken to cleanse the Army at Crown Point from the small Pox, and that other Measures will be taken in New England, by tolerating and encouraging Inoculation, to render that Distemper less terrible.

I am solicitous to hear, what Figure, our new Superiour Court made in their Eastern Circuit. What Business they did? Whether the Grand Juries, and petit Juries, were sworn. Whether they tried any Criminals? or any civil Actions. How the People were affected at the Appearance of Courts again. How the judges were treated, whether with Respect, or cold Neglect &c.

Every Colony, upon the Continent will soon be in the same Situation. They are erecting Governments, as fast as Children build Cobb Houses. But I conjecture they will hardly throw them down again, so soon.

The Practice We have hitherto been in, of ditching round about our Enemies, will not always do. We must learn to Use other Weapons than the Pick Axe and the Spade. Our Armies must be disciplined and learn to fight. I have the Satisfaction to reflect, that our Massachusetts People, when they have been left to themselves, have been constantly fighting and skirmishing, and always with success. I wish the same Valour, Prudence, and Spirit had been discovered every where.

John Adams to Abigail Adams, on this day. 

Concerned about the spread of smallpox amongst the retreating American army which had invaded Quebec and the dore strategic situation,  Major General Philip Schuyler, commander of the Northern Department of the Continental Army, convened a council of war at Crown Point, New York, to assess the military situation following the American retreat from Canada and the disastrous situation of the troops. In attendance was Major General Horatio Gates who was the newly appointed commander of American troops that had invaded Quebec. That army's attrition had been so high, much of it recently due to disease, that it really didn't exist.

Smallpox was a major topic of the meeting.  A decision was made to make a stand at Champlain where the LaChute River empties into the lake.

Last edition:

Saturday, July 6, 1776. President Hancock sends a letter.

Saturday, June 27, 2026

Tuesday, June 27, 1876. Terry and Gibbon arrive.

Alfred Terry.

Terry's column arrived at the Little Big Horn.  He wrote his report to Gen. Sheridan on Last Stand Hill.

It is my painful duty to report that day before yesterday, the 25th instant, a great disaster overtook General Custer and the troops under his command. At 12 o'clock of the 22nd instant he started with his whole regiment and a strong detachment of scouts and guides from the mouth of the Rosebud; proceeding up that river about twenty miles he struck a very heavy Indian trail, which had previously been discovered, and pursuing it, found that it led, as it was supposed that it would lead, to the Little Big Horn River. Here he found a village of almost unlimited extent, and at once attacked it with that portion of his command which was immediately at hand. Major Reno, with three companies, A, G, and M, of the regiment, was sent into the valley of the stream at the point where the trail struck it. General Custer, with five companies, C, E, F, I, and L, attempted to enter about three miles lower down. Reno, forded the river, charged down its left bank, and fought on foot until finally completely overwhelmed by numbers he was compelled to mount and recross the river and seek a refuge on the high bluffs which overlook its right bank. Just as he recrossed, Captain Benteen, who, with three companies, D, H, and K, was some two (2) miles to the left of Reno when the action commenced, but who had been ordered by General Custer to return, came to the river, and rightly concluding that it was useless for his force to attempt to renew the fight in the valley, he joined Reno on the bluffs. Captain McDougall with his company (B) was at first some distance in the rear with a train of pack mules. He also came up to Reno. Soon this united force was nearly surrounded by Indians, many of whom armed with rifles, occupied positions which commanded the ground held by the cavalry, ground from which there was no escape. Rifle-pits were dug, and the fight was maintained, though with heavy loss, from about half past 2 o'clock of the 25th till 6 o'clock of the 26th, when the Indians withdrew from the valley, taking with them their village. Of the movements of General Custer and the five companies under his immediate command, scarcely anything is known from those who witnessed them; for no officer or soldier who accompanied him has yet been found alive. His trail from the point where Reno crossed the stream, passes along and in the rear of the crest of the bluffs on the right bank for nearly or quite three miles; then it comes down to the bank of the river, but at once diverges from it, as if he had unsuccessfully attempted to cross; then turns upon itself, almost completing a circle, and closes. It is marked by the remains of his officers and men and the bodies of his horses, some of them strewn along the path, others heaped where halts appeared to have been made. There is abundant evidence that a gallant resistance was offered by the troops, but they were beset on all sides by overpowering numbers. The officers known to be killed are General Custer; Captains Keogh, Yates, and Custer, and Lieutenants Cooke, Smith, McIntosh, Calhoun, Porter, Hodgson, Sturgis, and Reilly, of the cavalry. Lieutenant Crittenden, of the Twelfth Infantry, along with Acting Assistant Surgeon D. E. Wolf, Lieutenant Harrington of the Cavalry, and Assistant Surgeon Lord are missing. Captain Benteen and Lieutenant Varnum, of the cavalry are slightly wounded. Mr. B. Custer, a brother, and Mr. Reed, a nephew, of General Custer, were with him and were killed. No other officers than those whom I have named are among the killed, wounded, and missing.

It is impossible yet to obtain a reliable list of the enlisted men killed and wounded, but the number of killed, including officers, must reach two hundred and fifty. The number of wounded is fifty-one. The balance of report will be forwarded immediately.

 Benteen walked the ground of Last Stand Hill.  He later recounted:

I went over the battlefield carefully with a view to determine how the battle was fought. I arrived at the conclusion then, as I have now, that it was a rout, a panic, until the last man was killed ...

That there was no line formed on the battlefield. You can take a handful of corn and scatter it over the floor, and make just such lines, there were none. The only approach to a line was where 5 or 6 horses found at equal distances, like skirmishers. Ahead of those 5 or 6 horses there were 5 or 6 men at about the same distances, showing that the horses were killed and the riders jumped off and were all heading to get where General Custer was. That was the only approach to a line on the field. There were more than 20 killed there to the right. There were 4 or 5 at one place, all within a space of 20 to 30 yards. That was the condition all over the field and in the

I think, in all probability, that the men turned their horses loose without any orders to do so. Many orders might have been given, but few obeyed. I think that they were panic stricken; it was a rout, as I said before.

Last edition:

Monday, June 26, 1876 Day two of the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Reno fights to hold his positions and against thirst, Gibbon marches south, Crook camps on Goose Creek.

Thursday, June 25, 2026

Sunday, June 25, 1876. The Battle of the the Little Big Horn.


Today In Wyoming's History: June 25

June 25


1876  The legendary Battle of the Little Big Horn occurs in southeastern Montana. On this date, in 1876, a large combined group of Cheyennes, Sioux, Arapaho and maybe even a few Metis, defeated an assault by the 7th Cavalry in southern Montana, resulting in the complete elimination of one prong of a split assault, and the retreat and desperate defense by two other elements of the command. The 7th's effort was part of a summer 1876 campaign on the northern plains, which had seen a the defeat of a combined unit of elements of the 2d & 3d Cavalry, 4th and 9th Infantry, and Crow and Shoshone scouts in southern Montana several days earlier. Both Plains Indians victories marked the high water mark, and the rapidly receding tide, of Indian power on the northern plains.

Little Big Horn is by far the most famous of American Indian battles, and almost defines them for the average person. It remains one of the most written about of all American historical events. It was a huge shock to the American psyche at the time, and resulted in the Army being expanded by 2,500 men for Plains service.

In terms of actual casualties, the 7th suffered about 52 percent casualties of the force that was deployed, in a battle that saw fighting at widely separated points, several miles distant, including 16 officers and 242 enlisted men killed. One officer and 51 enlisted men survived the battles with wounds. The battle is mostly remembered due to the fact that the every man in Custer's immediate command was killed, which makes up the bulk of the casualties. This may be a bit unfair, as it somewhat discounts the effective defense put up by Reno and Benteen's men in a separate location.

Of interest, 22% of the 7th Cavalry was detached prior to the expedition on other duties, a fairly common occurrence. 166 men and officers therefore were not present on the campaign, and missed the battle.

Some may wonder why I have included this even in a Wyoming daily history blog, as I included an item about Colorado's Sand Creek Massacre yesterday, but these are all regional events, which had an enormous impact on Wyoming at the time.  For the Indians in particular, the territorial borders did not exist.
The battle remains the greatest single defeat, and the greatest single loss of life in a single battle, in the post 1865 Indian Wars.  It is not, however, the U.S. Army's worst day during the long struggle with Native Americans.  That day was the Battle of the Wabash in 1791 in which the Northwestern Confederacy of Native Americans decisively defeated the U.S. Army with the Army loosing 656 men to the Natives 21 in spite of the forces being evenly matched.  It was by some measures the worst day in American military  history.

This is also the most written about even in American military history of all time.  Only the Battle of the Bulge and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor rival it, which shows what a major psychologic impact it had on American culture and historical memory.  There are, of course, a number of reasons for that which remain worth considering for a number of reasons.

To start off with the battle was, of course, a major shock at the time that it occurred, although it was no unprecedented.  Fetterman's detachment being wiped out on December 21, 1866 outside of Ft. Phil Carney provided an earlier example which its always temping to draw analogies too.  That particular battle, which resulted in the loss of 81 soldiers and armed civilians at the hands of some of the same combatants, and at the hands of the same tribes, actually had a more dire immediate effect on the survivors in that the post was so remote it was in serious danger of being overrun, had the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho bothered to attempt it, which they did not.  81 men, of course, is considerably less than 242.

A big part of the shock was due to the early press reporting.  In spite of the Fetterman Fight, the press and the public was not prepared for such a singular defeat at the hands of Plains Indians, even though Custer's detached command was considerably outnumbered at the time of the attack.  Custer was thought of as a real Indian Fighter, which he in fact was not, and the result was nearly inconceivable, resulting in a lot of fanciful speculation.  To add to this the surviving officers had a built in incentive not to be responsible for what occurred, and indeed in the 7th Cavalry's case, they really were not.  That didn't keep, however, some from trying to blame them just as Custer was elevated to an absolute hero.  As time went on it was fairly clear to the U.S. Army what had happened, even if it wasn't necessarily to civilian writers.  Early histories, moreover, assumed a level of knowledge about certain things, particularly horses, that later historians lacked, resulting in both of them omitting them.  All of this contributed to a sense of romantic mystery that endures to the present day.

Evan as that mystery has endured, however, Custer became a symbol for the entire American effort against the Native Americans, from 1620 through Wounded Knee, a fact that his peculiar character lent itself to.  Hated by many of his men, and detested by many of his fellow 7th Cavalry officers, he made a ready and easy scapegoat that further allowed some historians to assign personal blame to him for what occurred on this day in 1876.

In truth, what occurred at Little Big Horn is really obvious if a person is actually familiar with the conditions of frontier campaigning, which unfortunately many of the post 1930 or so historians have not been.

Alfred Terry had detached Custer's command on June 22, 1876, because it was a cavalry command and he needed a force to cover vast distances quickly.  Cavalry suited that purpose.  But even as it did, it was saddled with certain distinct limitations, the most pronounced being the very thing that gave it mobility, the horse.

American cavalrymen, like European cavalrymen, and the cavalrymen of ever modern army (and yes this was a modern army) assigned one mount per man.  Officers often had a second.  This was not, it might be noted, the historical norm.  Mongols, for example, had multiple mounts per man.  

In fact, Native Americans had multiple mounts per man.  And so did cowboys when working cattle, in spite of what the movies may have falsely told us.  The cowboy norm was seven mounts per man.  The Native American situation depended upon his personal wealth, often measured in horses, but to be an effective warrior he needed more than one.  Indeed, the entire culture of horse raiding is explained by this.

The reason for this is that horses "break down".  In a campaign, at first, this is not a factor.  But by June 21, 1876, when Custer's command was detached, his troopers, and their horses, had been in the field for weeks.  By that time the horses were undoubtedly fatigued.

Moreover, American cavalrymen were mounted on American Horses, big cavalry mounts that were strong and adept at covering ground, but also horses bread for more temperate conditions.  In the East, there was always plenty of feed, but that was not true in the West.  As a result, horses "broke down" quickly.  Once a mount "broke down", a cavalryman was converted into a foot soldier for the rest of the campaign, attached to the baggage train.

The Army was well aware of this problem and studied it constantly  One solution was to pick up local mounts, like those the Indians were using, and like those used by cowboy.  "Range horses" were really ponies, but were tough and acclimated to their conditions.  Like any horse, they would break down, but they'd endure much more than American Horses would.  In some commands cavalry units going West swapped out American Horses for Range Horses, much like Marines deploying to combat during part of the Vietnam War swapped their M16s for M14s.

The Army had also long attempted to address this by severely limiting the weight load of a horse.  Cavalrymen themselves were limited in height and weight.  They were short, generally not being taller than 5'6", and the were light, generally not weighing more than 140 lbs.  The McClellan saddle they used was very light weight.  They carried very little. Even at that, however, they were faced with the problem of horse fatigue.

Indeed, while cavalry was critical, the problems it faced were so severe that at one point one Army commander lobbied for only having infantry.  That was extreme, but it shows the difficulty that could exist.  In contrast, Crook routinely mounted his infantry on the pack trains mules, mounting them on the mules, a double tough animal that wasn't as fast as a horse, but which was faster than walking, and saved fatigue on the nervous infantryman.

On walking, cavalrymen walked a lot in order to save their horses.  This differed greatly from the native practice.  Natives in transit didn't walk at all.

The Cheyenne, Sioux and Arapaho, in contrast to the Army, had all Range Horses and large numbers of them.  This avoided the problems noted above, but in a camp of this size, it meant that they had to move every few days as they'd wipe out the forage.  Ultimately, they couldn't keep a camp this size together at all.

Custer's command spent the night of June 24 in the Wolf Mountains. At 3:00 a.m. his scouts climbed a peak called "the Crow's Nest" and at first light, 5:00 a.m. they sighted it.  It was 15 miles distant.  The 7th Cavalry started its advance on the camp at 8:00, an hour after Custer was informed of the camp's presence.  It took the 7th Cavalry four hours to cover the ground.  Once the command departed at 8:00, it was committed to action, albeit with no plan in place, as the risk of the natives detecting the dust of the huge  number of  horses was too great not to advance to conclusion.

At noon Custer's command had a good view of a portion of the camp and he divided his command, detailing Maj. Reno to hit what would have been the left flank, from his prospective.

This brings up a couple of things that need to be addressed in any discussion of the battle.  One thing is that there was no reconnaissance of the position being attacked whatsoever.  This probably isn't surprising, however, even though reconnaissance was a function of cavalry.  Once committed at 8, as noted, the command was committed and there was no choice but to go forward.

But was committing itself a mistake. Terry suggested, but did not command, that Custer wait for Gibbons and Terry to advance from the north.  The location of Terry and Gibbon, however, was completely unknown, and it was clear to all that a large camp would move.  Native camps, moreover, were notoriously able to move without being detected.  Custer had some justification for attacking when he could.  By the same token, however, shadowing the camp, was a bit of an option, although the longer the cavalry was nearby the greater the risk that it would be attacked itself.  Custer's decision, therefore, was not unreasonable.

Added to that, Custer did not really have very much experience in Indian warfare.  Nobody in the post Civil War Army did.  There had been men with vast frontier fighting experience n the Army prior to the Civil War, but the war had consumed them in one form or another, and  they were not the field commanders of the post Civil War Army.  Custer had campaigned against natives before, but those campaigns had been largely ineffectual with no trace of the natives being found. The exception was Washita in 1868 which had been a near disaster and a moral travesty.  

Custer had, of course, a lot of Civil War experience. Every officer in his command did. That, however, was not particularly useful on the plains.

The second part of this is that once the location of the camp was determined, Custer had a choice of hitting it from one side, with a unified command, or trying to effectively surround it, and hit from both sides.  He opted for that latter option.  In theory, that was a good decision, but it depended on the right flank being found and hit with no reconnaissance.  

Once the decision was made, it took from noon until 3:00 for Reno's troops to charge the village.  He hit alone, with Custer's command detached and its location unknow to Reno.  It's known now that Custer personally advanced down to the river several times to try to determine where to hit the Indian village, only to find that he was not yet on its edge.  It took Custer an hour to find a location to attempt to charge the camp.

All of this means that as this was occurring the entire command was mounted on horses that were fatigued to start with. During the last phase of the operation horses would have been kept at a fast gait the entire time.  From something like 2:30 until 4:00 every mount in the command was at a canter or faster.

Reno's charge immediately stalled out and he was forced to have his troops dismount and fight a defensive action from 3:00 to 3:40, at which point the survivors retreated in the hills, to be later joined by Benteen who was bringing up the pack train.  This means that Custer actually committed his command after Reno had already retreated.  The native camp covered an expanse of three miles. not a great distance, but a difficult one for cavalrymen because of it hilly terrain, where as the Sioux and Cheyenne were on the flat river bottom.   The native combatants, mounted on fresh mounts, were able to cover the distance from Reno's failed retreat to Custer's new charge in no time.  Reno in contrast was effectively immobilized, in spite of later criticism that he should have attempted to ride to Custer's aid.  In reality, he could not have and that would have resulted in the elimination of his command as well.

Custer's command was destroyed over a period of an hour, much longer than popularly imagined, with a huge volley of fire being heard at one point.  The last of his troops were overrun at about 5:30.  Native combatants thereafter drifted back to where Reno was to take potshots at his dug in troops.  They kept it up all the next day until they decamped and departed the night of June 26.

Last edition:

Wednesday, June 17, 2026

Saturday, June 17, 1876. Battle of the Rosebud Battlefield, Montana.

Today In Wyoming's History: Battle of the Rosebud Battlefield, Montana.: The Battle of the Rosebud was an important June 1876 battle that came, on June 17, just days prior to the Battle of the Little Big Horn.  Fo...

Battle of the Rosebud Battlefield, Montana.

The Battle of the Rosebud was an important June 1876 battle that came, on June 17, just days prior to the Battle of the Little Big Horn.  Fought by the same Native American combatants, who crossed from their Little Big Horn encampment to counter 993 cavalrymen and mule mounted infantrymen who had marched north from Ft. Fetterman, Wyoming, at the same time troops under Gen. Terry, including Custer's command, were proceeding west from Ft. Abraham Lincoln.  Crook's command included, like Terry's, Crow scouts, and he additionally was augmented soon after leaving Ft. Fetterman by Shoshoni combatants.

The battlefield today is nearly untouched.








































Called the Battle Where the Sister Saved Her Brother, or the Battle Where the Girl Saved Her Brother, like Little Big Horn, it was a Sioux and Arapaho victory, although it did not turn into an outright disaster like Little Big Horn. Caught in a valley and attacked, rather than attacking into a valley like Custer, the Army took some ground and held its positions, and then withdrew.  Crook was effectively knocked out of action for the rest of the year and retreated into the Big Horn mountains in Wyoming.

Last edition:

Tuesday, June 9, 2026

Friday, June 9, 1876. Battle of Prairie Dog Creek.

The Battle of Prairie Dog Creek, also known as the Skirmish at Tongue River Heights, or the Battle of the Tongue River, occurred at the confluence of Prairie Dog Creek and the Tongue River primarily in Wyoming Territory, but also in part of Montana.


Crooks command was camped on the creek when it was attacked by a large party of Sioux, which engage them with volley fire.  Crook had his men mount an attack in response, which pushed the Sioux back three times before they disengaged.  Two Sioux warriors were killed in the battle.

The Sioux goal had been to steal the Army remuda.

Last edition:

Thursday, June 8, 1876. "It's Harder Not To: 1876 in Deadwood" First issue of the Deadwood Pioneer.

Friday, May 29, 2026