Wednesday, April 19, 1944. Operation Ichi-Go.

 Operation Ichi-Go commenced in China.

Japanese plans for the offensive, which would be a largely successful Japanese effort.

Control of the ground at the end of the war.

The massive and highly successful offensive was designed, in no small measure, to help force a conclusion to the war in China, something perhaps best demonstrated by its alternative Japanese name, Tairiku Datsū Sakusen (大陸打通作戦), "Continent Cross-Through Operation"). It would gain a huge amount of ground, and demonstrate the importance of the war on the mainland to the Asian conflict.  It's specific goas were to link railways in Beijing and Hankou in northern China to the southern Chinese coast at Canton and spare shipping and avoid American submarines; to take the airfields in Sichuan and Guangxi to preclude U.S. bombing of Taiwan and the Japanese mainland; and to destroy elite Nationalist units to cause the Nationalist government to collapse.

It was ambitious and would be, late war though it was, the largest military campaign of the Japanese war against China.  Japan committed 80% of their forces in China, some 500,000 men, as well as 100,000 horses, 1,500 artillery pieces, and 800 tanks.

700,000 Nationalist Chinese troops were eliminated from combat in the operation, which would continue into October.

The Allies launched Operation Cockpit, an operation that featured all of the principal Allied forces in the East, the same being an air assault on Sabang Indonesia.

The RAF mined the Danube.

 

Sarah Sundin notes, on her blog:

Today in World War II History—April 19, 1944 In the US, shortening, salad & cooking oils are removed from rationing, but butter & margarine are still rationed. Read more: “Make It Do—Rationing of Butter, Fats & Oils in World War II.”

Congress extended the Lend Lease Act.  Apparently the 78th Congress was a little more active than the 119th.

The 1944 NFL Draft was held, and the first draft pick was Angelo Bertelli, who was drafted by the Boston Yanks.  It wouldn't matter, Bertelli was already slated to enter the Marine Corps.

Canadian Gérard Côté won the Boston Marathon.

Côté winning the 1940 Boston Marathon.

He was serving in the Canadian Army at the time, and took leave to run in the race, sponsored by a Montreal restaurateur.  While the Canadian Army, which initially used him as a physical education instructor, and then stationed him in a munitions plant, had been proud of his status as Canada's premier runner, it had taken heat for perceived preferential treatment that he received, and reacted negatively to his taking leave and running in the race. Côté was shipped to the UK and served the rest of the war in Europe, winning three English marathons during that time period.

Last prior edition:

Tuesday, April 18, 1944. 4,000 tons v. 53.

1940s, 1943, Battle of Kohima, boats and ships, Catholic, Crimea, Eastern Front, German Luftwaffe, London England, Operation U-Go, Royal Air Force, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, World War Two

Thursday, January 13, 1944. Chinese hold at Tarung.

A patrol from the Wiltshire Regt., British X Corps, tries to draw fire from a German MG nest. 13 January, 1944.  The soldier in front is carrying an Italian Model 38 submachine gun, the one in the rear a Thompson submachine gun.  This is the second photo I've seen of a British soldier carrying a captured Model 38.

Today in World War II History—January 13, 1944: Germans make large-scale arrests of Danish resistance members. Chinese gain control of Tarung River line, driving back the Japanese in the Hukawng Valley .

Sarah Sundin's blog.

The Red Army took Korets.  Part of pre-war Poland, it had been a small Jewish city.  It is now in Ukraine.

The director of the United States Typhus Commission warned that Naples and southern Italy were seriously threatened by the disease.

The U-231 was sunk by a Vickers Wellington off of the Azores.

Wednesday, November 14, 1923. In from the cold.

German Gen. Hans von Seeckt ordered that Berlin cafés, halls and cabarets must admit the city's poor and cold in order to warm themselves, least the Government seize them to be used for that purpose.

Von Seeckt's tomb.

Von Seeckt had been an important figure in the Imperial German Army before going on to be a major figure in the Reichswehr.  He was in the German parliament from 1930 to 32 as a member of a center right party, but turned towards the hard right thereafter.  He was assigned to the German military mission in China in 1933, where he restored the failing relationship with the Nationalist Chinese.  His advice lead to the 1934 Nationalist campaign that resulted in the Communist Long March.

Germany suspended payments on its reparations.

New Zealand's laws were extended to Antarctica as Governor General John Jellicoe applied its jurisdiction to the Ross Dependency.

Wednesday, May 26, 1943. Edsel Ford passes. Canada rations, Barclay stays,

Today in World War II History—May 26, 1943: Edsel Ford, President of Ford Motor Company, dies, age 49; his father, Henry Ford, resumes the presidency. Canada begins meat rationing.

From Sarah Sundin's blog.

Ford, a major philanthropist, died of stomach cancer.

Edsel Ford with his wife Elanor.

Edsel had taken the company into aviation, over the objections of his father, which was foresighted at the time.  This allowed the company to engage in aviation manufacture during World War Two.

Like his father, his reputation in not wholly unblemished.  There are some reasons to suspect that he sympathized with the Germans in World War Two early on.

Edwin Barclay, the President of Liberia, visited President Roosevelt and spent the night, at the Executive Mansion, the first black to do so.  On the same day, Roosevelt ordered striking workers at rubber plants in Akron, Ohio to return to work.

U.S. Troops at Massacre Bay, Attu, May 26, 1943.

The Japanese attached Chinese forces at Pianyan in Hubei Province, but were repelled. the Japanese force of 4,500 men sustained 3,000 casualties.

The Germans ordered that concentration camp inmates cease being given sequentially numbered identification numbers in order that the number of murder victims could be concealed.

My father celebrated his 14th birthday.

May 12, 1943. The Afrika Korps Surrenders.

 Axis forces in North Africa surrendered.

This was the first full theater collapse of an Axis army during World War Two.

Regarding this event, Sarah Sundin notes:

Today in World War II History—May 12, 1943: 80 Years Ago—May 12, 1943: German and Italian troops surrender in Tunisia, ending the campaign in North Africa; Allies take 225,000 prisoners.

The Axis surrender was affected by Colonel General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim and General Giovanni Messe, commanders, of the German Army and the Italian Army in North Africa.  Von Arnim refused to surrender the terms of the unconditional surrender, although his troops were surrounded and in fact were surrendered.

Messe.

Messe had experience in armored warfare, and had served on the Russian Front prior to being posted to North Africa.  This is all the more remarkable when you consider that Messe was an Italian Royalist and would go on to serve as Chief of Staff of the Italian Co-Belligerant Army after Italy switched sides in the war, making him a unique figure.  He was popular with the Italian people and went on to serve in the Italian Senate.

Messe wearing Iron Cross and inspecting Italian troops in Russia.

He may be the only figure to have fought with the Germans on two fronts, and then against them in his homeland, as well as perhaps being the only commander to have fought against the Soviets on Soviet territory to go on to fight in an army allied to them.

He died in 1968 at age 85.

The Trident conference between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt commenced in Washington, D.C.  It would run for sixteen days.

Sundin, in her blog, also notes that the Indian Army evacuated Maungdaw.

The massive Battle of West Hubei commenced in China between the Nationalist Chinese Army and the Imperial Japanese Army.  The Japanese offensive would fail, with each army loosing about 25,000 casualties.

The "Fido" acoustic homing torpedo came into action in the North Atlantic, being used by a Royal Air Force B-24 to damage the U-456.

Wednesday, May 5, 1943. First Nuclear Strike Chosen

 

Choosing the first atomic target – May 5, 1943

From the linked in site:

May 5, 1943 is one of the most important dates, and possibly the least known, in the history of the nuclear age. It was the date when the first atomic bomb targeting decision was made — a full two years before the end of World War II in Europe.

Also from that site:

Like many I have concluded that the bombings were unjustified, though that is an opinion far from universally held. But some of my reasons may surprise you. I explained them in a talk I gave in Santa Fe in 2012, entitled From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima.

I'll be frank, I also view the bombings as morally unjustified acts.  Indeed, of the worst sort.  There's simply no escaping that the scale of a nuclear weapon, when used on a city, is going to have the primary effect of killing civilians.  Indeed, no matter how dressed up, by the wars end, that was looked at unflinchingly and was largely the point.

Of course, by that war the Allies had acclimated themselves to firebombing in Japan with the intent to destroy civilian housing, and thereby deprive Japanese war workers of their dwellings.  Once again, the use of force was over matched to the goal.  Striking factories is one thing, burning people to death in their homes quite another.

Make no mistake about it, Germans, under the monstrous Nazi regime, had become monstrous themselves, and in a way that no individual German can really excuse. The Japanese, who retained a peasant culture to a very large degree going into the war, likewise did, with the average soldier routinely committing murders and the entire military being acclimated to atrocity.  The Allies undoubtedly had the moral side of the war, and there's no two ways about it.  Nonetheless, that doesn't excuse the crimes committed by the Allies themselves, which in the case of the Western Allies came principally from unprincipled bombing.  Over European skies, the British were much more guilty of this than the Americans, having turned to inaccurate night bombing early in the war out of necessity, but then having readily adopted the liberal bombing views of "Bomber" Harris thereafter.  In the Pacific, the United States, the major Western combatant, went to free bombing of civilian targets with firebombs by the end of the war, as noted.  In some ways, the atomic bomb could almost be viewed as an extension of the late war firebombing, but in a new, much more devastating, and horrifying, way.

Sarah Sundin noted a true World War Two technological landmark, the first flight of the P51B.

Today in World War II History—May 5, 1943: 80 Years Ago—May 5, 1943: First flight of production-model North American P-51B Mustang (with a Packard-built Merlin engine), at Inglewood, CA.

The combination of the British engine with the P51 airframe, in what had been an Anglo-American project to start with, would revolutionize and completely alter the performance of the fighter.  It would be the P51B that would really start long range bomber escorts all the way into Germany.

Sundin noticed several other events of this day on her blog, including that Admiral Sir Charles Little was naval as the Allied naval commander for the invasion of France from Britain, although he would not hold the post long.

She also noted that the Japanese launched an offensive south of the Yangtze toward Chongqing. The often forgotten front, to the West, in China, remained Japan's largest ground commitment and in many ways most important theater of operations in the war. 

Twenty-seven ships of all types were lost in the war on this day.

A new law went into effect in California requiring marriage licenses to identify race.  Interracial marriage was illegal in California, as it was in much of the United States.

Monday, September 14, 1942. Truman speaks.

Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri delivered a speech on developments in the War Program.

The Japanese effort at Edson's Ridge on Guadalcanal draws to a close in a Marine Corps victory.

US bombers stationed at Adak bomb the harbor at Kiska, damaging two Japanese submarines.

Stalingrad experienced fierce fighting and. . . frost.

The Japanese reached Ioribaiwa Ridge and attack, but the Australians hold out.

The Chinese take Wuyi.

Day two of Operation Agreement proves an Allied failure.

The Yankees took the 1942 American League Pennant, beating out the Cleveland Indians.

Saturday, August 22, 1942. Brazil declares war on Germany and Italy.

Brazil, having endured several days of German U-boat attacks, declared war on Germany and Italy.  The Germans has presumed, incorrectly, that Allied ships were taking refuge in South American territorial waters.

Brazil would contribute some ground forces to the war in Europe, but its major contribution would be in regard to providing its massive coastline in the war effort.

On this day, the German 16th Panzer Division crossed the Don, with the path to Stalingrad now open before it.

A renewed naval battle in the Savo Sound occurred between the U.S. Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy in the early morning hours, resulting in the ultimate loss of the USS Blue.

The Chinese captured Yuijiang.

In the Caribbean, an American B-18, a plane we hardly think of in the context of World War Two, sank the U-654.

B-18.

The USS Ingraham sank off of Nova Scotia after she was hit in fog by the oil tanker Chemung.

Thursday, August 20, 1942. Positioning moves.

The Japanese Army, believing that Henderson field is lightly defended, moves 770 troops forward within a few miles of the same, with Japanese and Marine patrols then running into each other.  The Marines deploy two battalions and 37mm anti tank rifles loaded with canister along the Tenaru River, with supporting 75mm and 105mm howitzers ranging on the east side of the river.

The 37mm was a very light anti tank rifle, but was used fairly extensively early in World War Two and was effective in the Pacific.  In addition to being trailed, as in the instance of the M3 guns in use here, it also equipped U.S. light tanks.

Meanwhile, 19 Grumman Wildcats and 12 Douglas Dauntless dive bombers land on the field.

In China, where most Japanese troops are in fact deployed, the Chinese Nationalist recapture Guangfeng and Shangaro.

The Twelfth Air Force of the U.S. Army Air Force was created at Bolling Field, District of Columbia.

Internees began arriving at the Heart Mountain Internment Camp.

Soviet officers listening to news of the Leningrad Front on this day in 1942.

Saturday, March 21, 1942. The "last" British cavalry charge.

On this day in 1942 the last British "cavalry" charge. . . maybe . . .  occurred at Toungoo Burma.

This is sort of a well known historical footnote, which means that it's often not really very well understood.  The unit conducting the charge was a Sikh element of the Burma Frontier Force and was part of the Indian Army, although it's sometimes asserted that this unit was in the nature of paramilitary police.  The Frontier Force still exists today as part of the Pakistani Army.  That categorization, however, is probably improper, and the various unis of the Frontier Force did see extensive combat during the war.

The officer in command of the charge, Cpt. Arthur Sandeman, was an officer of the Central Indian Horse.  The battle at Taungoo itself was actually principally between the Chinese Nationalist Army, which had been given the task of defending Burma, and the Japanese.  Indeed, the charge occurred when the unit, which was actually a column of mounted infantry, not cavalry, mistook a Japanese unit for a Chinese one while on patrol.  The patrol accordingly went to close with what they thought were their Chinese allies when it turned into a charge by necessity.  Sandeman and most of his men were killed in the ensuing charge.

The Frontier Force was not the only cavalry unit involved in the battle, which would prove to be a Chinese defeat, as the Chinese had committed a motorized cavalry unit to the action.

It could well be argued, of course, that this charge was not a British one, although it was British led.

Malta, which had been besieged from the air for months, suffered its heaviest air raid today.

Entrapped German troops at Demyansk attempt a breakout.

Monday, February 2, 1942. Things Chinese

Franklin Roosevelt asked Congress to loan $500,000,000 to Nationalist China.

US poster for China relief.  This is obviously an idealized poster, but its interesting in that the family is shown in typical Chinese dress for the time, with the Nationalist soldier pretty accurately shown with a export pattern contract M98 Mauser and attired in German inspired clothing, including the feldmutze adopted by the Nationalist Chinese Army.

This doesn't seem surprising now, but in retrospect, Nationalist China's road to being an ally of the United States was a circuitous one.  The Nationalist had been a Soviet client since 1921 and remained one even after the Communist were removed from the Kuomintang, the event that brought about the Chinese Civil War.  Indeed, while the Soviets also supported the Chinese Communist Party, it operated to force the CCP to make accommodations to the Kuomintang even while the two were fighting against each other.  Moscow's hand was so heavy that it can be argued that Stalin essentially prevented a Communist takeover of China before 1949 through its actions.  A pre-war effort by the Japanese to secure a treaty with the USSR that went beyond being a mere non-aggression pact had included, as part of its conditions, that the Soviets quit supplying the Nationalist, which the Soviets refused.

Soviet volunteer aviators with the Nationalist Chinese.  Soviet aircrews fought with the Nationalist until the German invasion of the USSR, making their volunteer effort earlier than the American one.

Indeed, the Soviets not only supplied aid and material to the Chinese Nationalist, they supplied a group of volunteer aviators.  The US AVG came about only after the Soviet effort concluded.  The Soviets, therefore, aided the Nationalist in real terms longer, and in some ways, more concretely, than the US did, right up until the late 1930s when the US became very interested in Japanese aggression in China.

Soviet I-16 fighter in Nationalist Chinese use.  This aircraft was a popular fighter of the 1930s and saw service early in World War Two, by which time it was obsolete.

At the same time, Nationalist China received significant support from Nazi Germany as well.

Poster symbolizing German and Nationalist Chinese military cooperation, and also demonstrating the very close appearance of their respective uniforms.  The German pattern helmets used by the Chinese were of the late M35 pattern, making them a more modern pattern, for example, than that usually shown worn by the Finns, who retained the old M16s until later patterns were supplied to them during World War Two.

German aid to the Chinese Nationalist military dated back to Weimar Germany, and China had been one of the outlet nations which allowed the Weimar government to basically bypass restrictions on the size of the German officer corps. This continued on into the 1930s with it going so far as to see one of Chiang Kai Shek's children, an adopted son, receive German military training, while another saw an education in the USSR, showing the nature of the relationship between the two countries and the Nationalist.

Chiang Wei-kuo.

The Germans pulled towards the Japanese in the late 1930s, although that relationship was not anywhere near as seamless or trusting as sometimes supposed, and was more than a little cynical on the German side (it was much less cynical on the Japanese side).  As this occurred the Germans began to slowly abandon the Chinese, although not before the Chinese Nationalist Army was essentially equipped in a fashion that distantly mirrored the German Army's to a significant extent.  The Nationalist Chinese fought the Second World War principally armed with German infantry weapons, and they even acquired a handful of tanks from the Germans before Japanese protests caused the supply of such things to cease.

Chinese soldier guarding American P-40s.  He's armed with a contract German M98 Mauser and  his uniform, sans footgear, is basically German in pattern.

The United States, in contrast, had never actually been a major military supplier to anyone prior to World War Two and only stepped into that role with China very late, indeed basically at the same time it started to supply the British in the Second World War. 

It should be noted that in spite of all of this aid, from all of these various sources, and in spite of the fact that the Nationalist Chinese fought much better than they have been credited as doing, massive corruption existed within the Nationalist Chinese ranks which enormously depleted their effectiveness.  Vast amounts of aid were wasted or subject to corrupt diversion and the plight of the Chinese enlisted man a bad one, which accounted for a massive desertion rate.

The US can be regarded as having been naive throughout this period in regard to China in every fashion.  The Nationalist Chinese fought much harder than they're credited with against the Japanese, as noted, but the Nationalist were not in a position to expel them and their own internal corruption hindered their effectiveness.  Chiang clashed with his American advisor's views, although he was always extremely polite to them even though he knew that some, such as Gen. Stilwell, held him in contempt.  The long history of his political movement demonstrates that it was one of complicated political beliefs which in fact included some sympathy to the very hard left, but the government was not a democratic one during Chiang's control of it, something he attributed to wartime and civil war conditions.

Wartime pro British Nationalist card.

During the war the US military mission to China would become significant, but wartime conditions also meant that the OSS mission was more than a little sympathetic to the Chinese Communists and, in fact, included members who were Communist themselves.  The rapid collapse of the Chinese Nationalist, who had held out throughout the 1930s, raised questions that have still never really been fully answered about how that came about, but it is clear that the Truman administration simply had no real sympathy for the Nationalist and had grown tired of them.  Here too, the US failed to appreciate China and where things were heading, once the Nationalist had lost the favor of their final patron, the United States.  Chiang, for his part, partially attributed his 1949 defeat to the corruption that has always existed in his movement, and he diligently worked to eliminate it once he was exiled to Taiwan.

Oddly, Chiang Kai Shek has undergone a bit of a rehabilitation in Communist China in recent years, with some scholarly articles reassessing his leadership favorably.  It's hard to know what to make of this.

On this same day, and on the same topic, more or less, Joseph Stilwell was designated Chief of Staff to Supreme Commander, China Theatre, which meant he was Chief of Staff to Chiang.

Stilwell didn't get along with Chiang and was outraged by Chinese corruption and military inefficiency, both of which were very real as noted.  He became more vociferous about his views as the war went on, and was ultimately partially recalled because of this.  He referred to Chiang as peanut, and his views might be best illustrated, in part, by this poem he authored.

I have waited long for vengeance,
At last I've had my chance.
I've looked the Peanut in the eye
And kicked him in the pants.

The old harpoon was ready
With aim and timing true,
I sank it to the handle,
And stung him through and through.

The little bastard shivered,
And lost the power of speech.
His face turned green and quivered
As he struggled not to screech.

For all my weary battles,
For all my hours of woe,
At last I've had my innings
And laid the Peanut low.

I know I've still to suffer,
And run a weary race,
But oh! the blessed pleasure!
I've wrecked the Peanut's face.

Also on this day, as Sarah Sundin's blog reports:

February 2, 1942: : US 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion arrives in Melbourne to build airfields near Darwin, Australia. Allied ships begin withdrawal from Singapore to East Indies.

At this time, there was a real fear that the Japanese would land on Australia.

On the Eastern Front, the Germans were forced to supply the troops surrounded at Kholm by air.

Life Magazine featured a P-47 on its cover, a stunning thing to realize in that in 1942 the common American fighter was the over matched P-40.  The P-47 would go on to be one of the great convoy escort aircraft of the war and obtain a reputation as a terrific ground support aircraft.  The plane had made its first flight in 1941 and had not yet gone into service, but the fact that it was at this stage meant that the US had already leaped an entire aircraft generation ahead of any other combatant in the war.

A final Republic of China/People's Republic of China Showdown? Can the People's Republic of China pull it off? Part III

Well, they'd certainly have to fight to do it.

So, what would renewed fighting between the old contestants of the Chinese Civil War look like?

That would depend, of course, on whether the US entered the contest or not.

The principal tactical problem faced by the PRC in taking Taiwan by force would be the 100 miles that lie between mainland China and Taiwan.  Crossing that distance with an assault force would be a major military undertaking that could not be concealed.

Indeed, in order to do it the PRC would need to amass troops in the coastal areas in location that they could embark upon assault or troop craft.  The build up would likewise be quite noticeable and its well within the range of Taiwanese missiles.  Indeed, with recent acquisitions, Taiwan can strike targets dep inside of the PRC.

And crossing the straights under those circumstances would not be easy.  Taiwan would be alert to a Chinese buildup and be ready to strike any invasion fleet.  It's well-equipped with armaments, including anti shipping missiles, that would make such a crossing difficult at best, and potentially impossible.  It could well be a bloody and embarrassing Chinese failure.

Because of that, it could only really occur if China struck in a surprise fashion in something resembling the Japanese attacks on Port Arthur, Manchuria, in 1905 or Pearl Harbor in 1941.  That could be done.

Now, for those not familiar with the Port Arthur, it was a sudden attack on that location on the opening night of the Russo Japanese War. The Russians simply weren't prepared for it.  That attack basically set the stage for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 36 years later.  The gist of it was to declare war and then attack.

The PRC would not declare war, as doing that 1) makes no sense if you regard territory as belonging to a rebel providence and; 2) it seems to have become passé.  But what they would have to do is engage in a massive pre invasion build up.  Following that, however, what they could do is blanket Taiwan with a sudden missile strike to eliminate as much of its military capacity to strike back as possible.  And it has massive assets with which to do that.

The thought there would be to devastate the Taiwanese capacity to interdict or destroy an invasion fleet and give it the six to ten hours it would need to be able to put an invasion force on the ground, in Taiwan.

Of course, after having done that, it'd have to fight the Taiwanese Army, on its own ground. The modern Nationalist Chinese Army is really good, and it would at least outnumber the Chinese invaders.  It wouldn't be an easy task.  And it would likewise require a massive Red Chinese air operation to suppress and interfere with a Nationalist effort to drive the Red Chinese off the beaches.

Could they pull it off?

Well. . .maybe.

They have the missile capacity to attempt it, there's no doubt about that.  And the sizse of their navy is massive.  They presently have a 450 ship navy, about 100 more ships than the United States now has.  And in terms of regional capacity, they'd dwarf anyone else.

Of course, the anyone else is the United States, and the PRC would have to take that into account.  In any instance of a big build up, the US Navy would be likely to appear in the region as at threat. . . or a bluff.  But would the Red Chinese abstain from hitting the U.S. Navy?

It might, if it felt that the U.S. Navy could be brushed aside or that it wouldn't act, but that would be a real gamble.  If significant US assets were in the region, the picture for China becomes complicated.  You could hit Taiwan, for example, but still end up leaving significant forces that could hit China back or stop its invasion fleet in the straits.  I.e., it might not do much good to devastate Taiwanese capacity if, when the ships enter the strait, they're met with U.S. submarines and aircraft from aircraft carriers.  Maybe you'd gamble that the risk would be worth it, but maybe you'd end up losing 10% to 20% of an invasion fleet, put troops on the ground to face the Nationalist Army but end up tangling with the U.S. Navy above Taiwan, and have things tilt just enough that the Nationalist push them back and you end up being unable to pull trapped troops off the beach.  Indeed, it'd be risky in that scenario to leave ships in the straits.

That could be addressed by hitting the U.S. Navy in the same Pearl Harbor style attack.

That would bring the US into the war from the onset, but maybe its worth the risk, if you are the PRC.  The U.S. Navy is unlikely to strike China first, and with missiles, the PRC might be able to take out so much American naval power that there would be no way for the surface Navy to be effective to counter an invasion.  The US in such an instance might end up being much like it was in 1941 and early 1942, a big naval power with sufficient losses and problems such that it couldn't really react.  And the Red Chinese, militarily, wouldn't need much time to carry out their plans.

It still might now work, however. The US has a huge navy, albeit not as large as China's, but its stationed all over the globe. In the build up to a war, much of it would be pulled into the Pacific, but not all of it.  The result would be that not all of it could be destroyed in one big strike, even though a lot of it would be initially useless in such a war.

And countering US submarines would be difficult at best, and probably couldn't really be done.  

Still, enough American naval power could be destroyed or distracted such that it could be an American military disaster and allow the Red Chinese to pull this off.

Or, it could be an expensive American military event but one which didn't knock the U.S. Navy out of action, which would provoke a massive American military response.  And the Chinese would have to plan for that.  That response might, moreover, come anywhere in China, and along its very long coast.

Indeed, for that reason, a careful Chinese planner might hit American ground and air assets in South Korea, an event that would probably provoke the North Koreans into invading the South.  If that didn't work, the Chinese might then have to deal with an American ground presence that was advancing north, towards the Chinese border, and an unsinkable air base in the form of South Korea.

All of which might cause the Red Chinese to threaten to go nuclear if the US counterstrike was too large, which might not deter the US from a large counterstrike at all, as the Chinese are at least as vulnerable to an American nuclear strike as we are to theirs.

So it would appear to be excessively risky.

I think they'll try it.

That would come only after a set of threats, such as is now going on, followed by an ultimatum, which hasn't happened yet.  

Within the next decade, my guess is that it will.

My further guess is that the Chinese will actually try to pull this off without striking the US. They launch a huge prolonged missile strike on Taiwan that will in fact be fairly effective, but not as effective as they hope.  The Taiwanese will hit back in kind, with that being more effective than the Chinese are prepared for.  The US will join in nearly immediately.

Following that, they'll put their ships into the strait and push toward the island. They'll incur losses right away and already be somewhat in disarray.  The U.S. Navy will interdict, probably most effectively with submarines, but also with aircraft.  At that point, the Chinese will launch a second missile strike at the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Navy will take serious losses.  The U.S. will deploy some ground forces at this point to Taiwan, but they'll be small by necessity.  The Chinese will abstain from hitting U.S. forces in South Korea or Japan.

My further guess is that the invasion will fail, but it will be a close run thing.

A final Republic of China/People's Republic of China Showdown? Weighing the costs and benefits from a Red Chinese prospective. Part II

A final Republic of China/People's Republic of China Showdown? Part I.

Tuesday September 30, 1941. Operation Typhoon commences.

On this day in 1941, the Germans launched Operation Typhoon, an offensive aimed at the capture of Moscow (some sources put the date as October 2, with others this date, including the official Russian histories).

German armor advancing towards Moscow, October 1941.

Also on this day, the SS finished its murders at Babi Yar and buried the victims in mass graves.

The Germans sank the Russian cruiser Aurora, which was well past its prime and whose guns had been removed to be used in the defense of Leningrad.  The Aurora is claimed to have fired the first shot of the October Revolution.  She was later raised and is a museum ship today.

Churchill delivered a speech on the state of the war.

In June last I deprecated the making of too frequent expositions of Government policy and reviews of the war situation by Ministers of the Crown. Anything that is said which is novel or pregnant will, of course, be studied attentively by the enemy and may be a help to him in measuring our affairs. The House will have noticed how very silent the Nazi leaders have fallen. For seven months Hitler has said nothing about his war plans. What he blurted out in January and February certainly proved helpful to us.

"In the spring," he said, "our submarine warfare will begin in earnest, and our opponents will find that the Germans have not been sleeping. The Luftwaffe and the entire German defence forces will, in this way or that, bring about the ultimate decision."

And again:

"In March and April naval warfare will start such as the enemy never expected." We were, therefore, led to expect a crescendo of attacks upon our lifeline of supplies. Certainly the Germans have used an ever larger force of U-boats and long-range aircraft against our shipping. However, our counter measures, which were undertaken in good time on the largest scale, have proved very successful. For reasons which I have explained very fully to the House, we have since June abandoned the practice of publishing statements at regular monthly intervals of our shipping losses, and I propose to continue this salutary practice. But, apart from anything that may happen during this afternoon, the last day of the month, I may make the following statement to the House. The losses from enemy action of British, Allied and neutral merchant ships during the quarter July, August and September have been only one-third of those losses during the quarter April, May and June. During the same period our slaughter of enemy shipping, German and Italian, has been increasing by leaps and bounds. In fact, it is about one and a half times what it was in the previous three months. So we have at one end a reduction in average monthly losses of about a third and a simultaneous increase in the losses inflicted upon the enemy of half as much again.

These important results enable us to take a more expansive view of our important programme. Very few important ships carrying munitions have been lost on the way. Our reserves of food stand higher than they did at the outbreak of war, and far higher than they did a year or 18 months ago. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Food, who has a pretty tough job, now finds himself able to make some quite appreciable improvements in the basic rations of the whole country, and in particular to improve the quantities and varieties of the meals available for the heavy worker during the coming winter. There will be better Christmas dinners this year than last, and at the same time more justification behind those dinners. It seems likely now that we shall bring in several million tons more than the import total which I mentioned in private to the House earlier in the year, which total was itself sufficient to keep us going. We are now within measurable distance of the immense flow of American new building, to which, together with our own construction, we look to carry us through and on progressively till the end of the war.

I deprecate premature rejoicings over these considerable facts, and I indulge in no sanguine predictions about the future. We must expect that the enemy U-boat warfare, now conducted by larger numbers of U-boats than ever before, supported by scores of Fokke wolves, will be intensified. The U-boats will be beaten, and kept beaten, only by a corresponding intensification of our own measures and also, to put it very plainly, by that assistance which we are receiving in increasing degree from other quarters. We must not, I repeat, relax for an instant; nevertheless, the facts that I have stated must be regarded as not entirely unsatisfactory, and certainly they are most stultifying to Hitler, who so obligingly warned us of his hopes and plans. This is, I think, an apt illustration of the dangers which should prevent those who are engaged in the high conduct of the war from having to make too many speeches about what they think is going to happen or would like to happen or what they intend to try to do. All the more is this habit important when we have to deal not only with our own affairs but with those of other great Allied or associated nations.

Here I may perhaps be pardoned for making an observation of a somewhat encouraging character. We are no longer alone. Little more than a year ago we seemed quite alone, but, as time has passed, our own steadfast conduct, and the crimes of the enemy, have brought two other very great States and nations into most intimate and friendly contact and concert with us. Whether we look to the East or whether we look to the West, we are no longer alone. Whether we look at the devoted battle lines of the Russian Armies or to the majestic momentum of United States resolve and action, we may derive comfort and good cheer in our struggle which, nevertheless, even if alone, we should carry on inflexibly, unwearyingly, and with steadily increasing resources. The fact, however, that at every stage we have to consider the interests of our Russian Ally and also the outlook, wishes and actions of the United States, makes it all the more necessary, imperative even, that I and my colleagues should be particularly careful about any pronouncements, explanations or forecasts in which we might otherwise be tempted to indulge. I feel sure that the House of Commons, which is the solid foundation of the British war effort and which is resolved to prosecute the war as sternly and implacably as did our forerunners in bygone days, will expect and require from the Ministers who are its servants a particular measure of caution and restraint in all their utterances about the war.

We have climbed from the pit of peril on to a fairly broad plateau. We can see before us the difficult and dangerous onward path which we must tread. But we can also feel the parallel movement or convergence of the two mighty nations I have mentioned, Russia and the United States. We feel around us the upsurge of all the enslaved countries of Europe. We see how they defy Hitler's firing parties. Far away in the East we see the faithful, patient, inexhaustible spirit of the Chinese race, who too are battling for home and freedom. We are marching in company with the vast majority of mankind, all trending, bearing, forging, steadily forward towards a final goal, which though distant, can already be plainly seen.

When we reflect upon the magnitude of modern events compared with the men who have to try to control or cope with them, and upon the rightful consequences of those events on hundreds of millions, the importance of not making avoidable mistakes grows impressively upon the mind.

For those reasons I could not attempt to discuss at the present time questions of future strategy. They are discussed every day in the newspapers, in an exceedingly vivid and often well-informed manner, but I do not think that His Majesty's Government ought to take any part just now in such Debates. Take, for instance, the question of whether we should invade the Continent of Europe in order to lift some of the weight off Russia, whether we ought to take advantage of the lull now that Hitler is busy in Russia to strike him in the West. I shall be guilty of no indiscretion if I admit that these are questions which have several times occurred to those responsible for the conduct of the war. But what could I say about them that would be useful? If I were to throw out dark hints of some great design, no one would have any advantage but the enemy. If, on the other hand, I were to assemble the many cogent reasons which could be ranged on the other side, I should be giving altogether gratuitous reassurance to Hitler.

Such confidences are not reciprocated by the enemy. They have told us nothing since Hitler's speech in February. We are in complete ignorance at this moment about what he is going to do. We do not know how far he will attempt to penetrate the vast lands of Soviet Russia in the face of the valiant Russian defence, or how long his people will endure their own calamitous losses, or, again, whether he will decide to stand on the defensive and exploit the territory of immense value which he has conquered. Should he choose this last, we do not know whether he will turn a portion of his vast armies Southwards, towards the Valley of the Nile, or whether he will attempt to make his way through Spain into North-West Africa, or whether, using the great Continental railways of Europe and the immense chains of airfields which are in excellent order, he will shift his weight to the West and assemble an extensive army with all the special craft that he has constructed for an attempted invasion of the British Isles. It would certainly be in his power, while standing on the defensive in the East, to undertake all three of these hazardous enterprises, on a great scale, together, at one time.

The enemy's only shortage is in the air. This is a very serious shortage, but, for the rest, he still retains the initiative. We have not the force to take it from him. He has the divisions, he has the weapons, and on the mainland of Europe he has ample means of transport. If he does not tell us his plans, I do not see why we should tell him ours. But I can assure the House that we study and ponder over these dangers and possibilities and on how best to dispose our resources to meet them every working day, and all days are working days, from dawn to far past midnight. We also have the advantage of following very closely all the arguments which are used about it in the public Press and of considering every helpful suggestion which reaches us from any quarter. More than that I really cannot say, and I feel sure that the House would reprove me if I were by any imprudence or desire to be interesting to say anything which afterwards was seen to be harmful.

There is, however, one matter upon which I may speak a little more freely, namely, the material assistance in the way of munitions and supplies which we and the United States are giving to Russia. The British and United States Missions are now in conference with the chiefs of the Soviet at Moscow. The interval which has passed since President Roosevelt and I sent our message from the Atlantic to Premier Stalin has been used in ceaseless activity on both sides of the ocean. The whole ground has been surveyed in the light of the new events, and many important supplies have already been despatched. Our representatives and their American colleagues have gone to Moscow with clear and full knowledge of what they are able to give to Russia month by month from now onward. The Soviet Government have a right to know what monthly quotas of weapons and supplies we can send and they can count upon. It is only when they know what we can guarantee to send, subject, of course, to the hazards of war, that they themselves can use their vast resources and reserves to the best possible advantage. It is only thus that they can best fill the gap between the very heavy losses sustained and the diminution of munitions-making power which they have suffered on the one hand and the arrival of really effective quantities of British and American supplies on the other. I may say at once, however, that in order to enable Russia to remain indefinitely in the field as a first-class war-making power, sacrifices of the most serious kind and the most extreme efforts will have to be made by the British people and enormous new installations or conversions from existing plants will have to be set up in the United States, with all the labour, expense and disturbance of normal life which these entail.

We have just had a symbolic Tank Week for Russia, and it has, I feel--in fact, I know--given an added sense of the immediate importance of their work to the toiling men and women in our factories. The output of Tank Week is only a very small part of the supplies which Britain and the United States must send to Russia, and must send month after month upon a growing scale and for an indefinite period. It is not only tanks, the tanks for which we have waited so long, that we have to send, but precious aircraft and aluminum, rubber, copper, oil and many other materials vital to modern war, large quantities of which have already gone. All these we must send and keep sending to Russia. It is not only the making and the giving of these commodities, but their transportation and reception which have to be organised. It may be that transportation rather than our willingness or ability to give will prove in the end the limiting factor. All this is now being discussed and planned with full authority and full knowledge by our representatives and the American representatives in conclave in Moscow with Premier Stalin and his principal commanders. It would certainly not be right for me in public Session, or even in Secret Session, at the present time to make any detailed or definite statements upon these subjects. The veriest simpleton can see how great is our interest, to put it no higher, in sustaining Russia by every possible means.

There are, however, other interests which have to be remembered at the same time. In some respects the problems we now have to face are similar to those which rent our hearts last year, when we had, for instance, to refuse to send away from this country for the help of France the last remaining squadrons of fighter aircraft upon which our whole future resistance depended; or again, they remind one of the occasion when, rightly judging Hitler's unpreparedness for invasion in the summer of 1940, we took the plunge of sending so many of our tanks and trained troops all round the Cape to the Valley of the Nile in order to destroy the Italian Armies in Libya and Abyssinia. If it is now thought that we solved those problems correctly we should hope that there might be grounds for confidence that in these new problems His Majesty's Government and their professional advisers will not err either in the direction of reckless improvidence or through want of courage. Anyone who, without full knowledge, should attempt to force the hands of those responsible would act without proper warrant and also--I say it with great respect--would not achieve any useful purpose, because in the discharge of the duties which the House has confided to us we are determined to make our own decisions and to be judged accordingly.

Here I must say a few words about the British Army. There is a current of opinion, which finds frequent expression, that the brass hats and Colonel Blimps and, of course, the much abused War Office, are insisting on building up a portentous, distended and bloated mass of soldiers in this island at the expense of the manufacture of those scientific weapons and appliances which are the main strength of victory in modern war. The truth is far different. We have never had, and never shall have, an Army comparable in numbers to the armies of the Continent. At the outbreak of war our Army was insignificant as a factor in the conflict. With very great care and toil and time, we have now created a medium sized, but very good Army. The cadres have been formed, the battalions, batteries, divisions and corps have taken shape and life. Men have worked together in the military units for two years. Very severe training was carried out all through last winter. It will continue all through this winter. The Army is hardened, nimble and alert. The commanders and staff have had opportunities and are having opportunities of handling large scale movements and manoeuvres.

Our Army may be small compared with the German or Russian armies. It has not had the repeated successful experiences of the German army, which are a formidable source of strength. Nevertheless, a finely tempered weapon has been forged. It is upon this weapon, supported by nearly 2,000,000 of armed and uniformed Home Guard, that we rely to destroy or hurl into the sea an invader who succeeded in making a number of successive or simultaneous lodgments on our shores. When I learned about the absolutely frightful, indescribable atrocities which the German police troops are committing upon the Russian population in the rear of the advance of their armoured vehicles, the responsibility of His Majesty's Government to maintain here at home an ample high-class force to beat down and annihilate any invading lodgment from the sea or descent from the air comes home to me in a significantly ugly and impressive form. I could not reconcile such responsibilities with breaking up or allowingly to melt away the seasoned, disciplined fighting units which we have now at last laboriously and so tardily created.

As our Army must necessarily be small compared with European standards, it is all the more necessary that it should be highly mechanised and armoured. For this purpose a steady flow of skilled tradesmen and technicians will be required in order to use the weapons which the factories are now producing in rapidly increasing numbers. There is no question of increasing the numbers of the Army, but it is indispensable that the normal wastage--considerable even when troops are not in contact with the enemy--should be made good, that the ranks should be kept filled and that the battalions, the batteries, and the tank regiments should be at their proper strength. Above all, we cannot have the existing formations pulled to pieces and gutted by taking out of every platoon and section trained men who are an essential part of these living entities, on which one of these fine or foggy mornings the whole existence of the British nation may depend.

I hope, indeed, that some of our ardent critics out of doors--I have nothing to complain of here--will reflect a little on their own records in the past, and by searching their hearts and memories will realise the fate which awaits nations and individuals who take an easy and popular course or who are guided in defence matters by the shifting winds of well-meaning public opinion. Nothing is more dangerous in war-time than to live in the temperamental atmosphere of a Gallup Poll, always feeling one's pulse and taking one's temperature. I see that a speaker at the week-end said that this was a time when leaders should keep their ears to the ground. All I can say is that the British nation will find it very hard to look up to leaders who are detected in that somewhat ungainly posture. If today I am very kindly treated by the mass of the people of this country, it is certainly not because I have followed public opinion in recent years. There is only one duty, only one safe course, and that is to try to be right and not to fear to do or say what you believe to be right. That is the only way to deserve and to win the confidence of our great people in these days of trouble.

Our hearts go out to our British Army, not only to those who in the Mediterranean and in the East may soon have to bear the brunt of German fury and organisation, but also to the splendid, but not too large, band of men here at home whose task is monotonous and unspectacular, whose duty is a long and faithful vigil, but who must be ready at any hour of any day to leap at the throat of the invader. It may well be the occasion will never come. If that should be the final story, then we may be sure that the existence of the kind of army we have created would be one of the reasons why once again in a war which has ravaged the world our land will be undevastated and our homes inviolate.

Of course we strive to profit from well informed criticism, whether friendly or spiteful, but there is one charge sometimes put forward which is, I think, a little unfair. I mean the insinuation that we are a weak, timid, lethargic Government, usually asleep, and in our waking hours always held back by excessive scruples and inhibitions, and unable to act with the vehemence and severity which these violent times require. People ask, for instance, "Why don't you bomb Rome? What is holding you back? Didn't you say you would bomb Rome if Cairo were bombed?" What is the answer? One answer is that Cairo has not yet been bombed. Only military posts on the outskirts have been bombed. But, of course, we have as much right to bomb Rome as the Italians had to bomb London last year, when they thought we were going to collapse, and we should not hesitate to bomb Rome to the best of our ability and as heavily as possible if the course of the war should render such action convenient and helpful.

Then there is the case of Persia. I see complaints that we have acted feebly and hesitatingly in Persia. This surprises me very much. I do not know of any job that has been done better than that. With hardly any loss of life, with surprising rapidity and in close concert with our Russian Ally, we have rooted out the malignant elements in Teheran; we have chased a dictator into exile, and installed a constitutional Sovereign pledge to a whole catalogue of long-delayed sorely-needed reforms and reparations; and we hope soon to present to the House a new and loyal alliance made by Great Britain and Russia with the ancient Persian State and people, which will ratify the somewhat abrupt steps we were forced to take, and will associate the Persian people with us not only in their liberation but in the future movement of the war. It must, indeed, be a captious critic who can find a pretext to make a quarrel out of that. The Persian episode, so far as it has gone, would seem to be one of the most successful and well conducted affairs in which the Foreign Office has ever been concerned. It ill deserves the treatment it has received from our natural and professional crabs.

In conclusion, let me once again repeat to the House that I cannot give them any flattering hopes, still less any guarantee, that the future will be bright or easy. On the contrary, even the coming winter affords no assurance, as the Russian Ambassador has candidly and shrewdly pointed out, that the German pressure upon Russia will be relaxed; nor, I may add, does the winter give any assurance that the danger of invasion will be entirely lifted from this island. Winter fog has dangers of its own, and, unlike last year, the enemy has now had ample time for technical preparation. We must certainly expect that in the spring, whatever happens in the meanwhile, very heavy fighting, heavier than any we have yet experienced in this war, will develop in the East, and also that the menace to this island of invasion will present itself in a very grave and sharp form. Only the most strenuous exertions, a perfect unity of purpose, added to our traditional unrelenting tenacity, will enable us to act our part worthily in the prodigious world drama in which we are now plunged. Let us make sure these virtues are forthcoming.

The British withdrew their early model B-17s from combat service on this day due to problems they were experiencing with it. The B-17s used by the US during the war were principally later models.

Today in World War II History—September 30, 1941

As noted in the item above, the Japanese suffered a defeat in China at the Second Battle of Changsha.

Pic magazine, featuring a cheesecake photo of a young female tennis player, also had a cover story on "What Lindbergh's hometown thinks of him."