Showing posts with label Chinese Navy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chinese Navy. Show all posts

Thursday, November 11, 2021

A final Republic of China/People's Republic of China Showdown? Can the People's Republic of China pull it off? Part III

Well, they'd certainly have to fight to do it.

So, what would renewed fighting between the old contestants of the Chinese Civil War look like?

That would depend, of course, on whether the US entered the contest or not.


The principal tactical problem faced by the PRC in taking Taiwan by force would be the 100 miles that lie between mainland China and Taiwan.  Crossing that distance with an assault force would be a major military undertaking that could not be concealed.

Indeed, in order to do it the PRC would need to amass troops in the coastal areas in location that they could embark upon assault or troop craft.  The build up would likewise be quite noticeable and its well within the range of Taiwanese missiles.  Indeed, with recent acquisitions, Taiwan can strike targets dep inside of the PRC.

And crossing the straights under those circumstances would not be easy.  Taiwan would be alert to a Chinese buildup and be ready to strike any invasion fleet.  It's well-equipped with armaments, including anti shipping missiles, that would make such a crossing difficult at best, and potentially impossible.  It could well be a bloody and embarrassing Chinese failure.

Because of that, it could only really occur if China struck in a surprise fashion in something resembling the Japanese attacks on Port Arthur, Manchuria, in 1905 or Pearl Harbor in 1941.  That could be done.

Now, for those not familiar with the Port Arthur, it was a sudden attack on that location on the opening night of the Russo Japanese War. The Russians simply weren't prepared for it.  That attack basically set the stage for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 36 years later.  The gist of it was to declare war and then attack.

The PRC would not declare war, as doing that 1) makes no sense if you regard territory as belonging to a rebel providence and; 2) it seems to have become passé.  But what they would have to do is engage in a massive pre invasion build up.  Following that, however, what they could do is blanket Taiwan with a sudden missile strike to eliminate as much of its military capacity to strike back as possible.  And it has massive assets with which to do that.

The thought there would be to devastate the Taiwanese capacity to interdict or destroy an invasion fleet and give it the six to ten hours it would need to be able to put an invasion force on the ground, in Taiwan.

Of course, after having done that, it'd have to fight the Taiwanese Army, on its own ground. The modern Nationalist Chinese Army is really good, and it would at least outnumber the Chinese invaders.  It wouldn't be an easy task.  And it would likewise require a massive Red Chinese air operation to suppress and interfere with a Nationalist effort to drive the Red Chinese off the beaches.

Could they pull it off?

Well. . .maybe.

They have the missile capacity to attempt it, there's no doubt about that.  And the sizse of their navy is massive.  They presently have a 450 ship navy, about 100 more ships than the United States now has.  And in terms of regional capacity, they'd dwarf anyone else.

Of course, the anyone else is the United States, and the PRC would have to take that into account.  In any instance of a big build up, the US Navy would be likely to appear in the region as at threat. . . or a bluff.  But would the Red Chinese abstain from hitting the U.S. Navy?

It might, if it felt that the U.S. Navy could be brushed aside or that it wouldn't act, but that would be a real gamble.  If significant US assets were in the region, the picture for China becomes complicated.  You could hit Taiwan, for example, but still end up leaving significant forces that could hit China back or stop its invasion fleet in the straits.  I.e., it might not do much good to devastate Taiwanese capacity if, when the ships enter the strait, they're met with U.S. submarines and aircraft from aircraft carriers.  Maybe you'd gamble that the risk would be worth it, but maybe you'd end up losing 10% to 20% of an invasion fleet, put troops on the ground to face the Nationalist Army but end up tangling with the U.S. Navy above Taiwan, and have things tilt just enough that the Nationalist push them back and you end up being unable to pull trapped troops off the beach.  Indeed, it'd be risky in that scenario to leave ships in the straits.

That could be addressed by hitting the U.S. Navy in the same Pearl Harbor style attack.

That would bring the US into the war from the onset, but maybe its worth the risk, if you are the PRC.  The U.S. Navy is unlikely to strike China first, and with missiles, the PRC might be able to take out so much American naval power that there would be no way for the surface Navy to be effective to counter an invasion.  The US in such an instance might end up being much like it was in 1941 and early 1942, a big naval power with sufficient losses and problems such that it couldn't really react.  And the Red Chinese, militarily, wouldn't need much time to carry out their plans.

It still might now work, however. The US has a huge navy, albeit not as large as China's, but its stationed all over the globe. In the build up to a war, much of it would be pulled into the Pacific, but not all of it.  The result would be that not all of it could be destroyed in one big strike, even though a lot of it would be initially useless in such a war.

And countering US submarines would be difficult at best, and probably couldn't really be done.  

Still, enough American naval power could be destroyed or distracted such that it could be an American military disaster and allow the Red Chinese to pull this off.

Or, it could be an expensive American military event but one which didn't knock the U.S. Navy out of action, which would provoke a massive American military response.  And the Chinese would have to plan for that.  That response might, moreover, come anywhere in China, and along its very long coast.

Indeed, for that reason, a careful Chinese planner might hit American ground and air assets in South Korea, an event that would probably provoke the North Koreans into invading the South.  If that didn't work, the Chinese might then have to deal with an American ground presence that was advancing north, towards the Chinese border, and an unsinkable air base in the form of South Korea.

All of which might cause the Red Chinese to threaten to go nuclear if the US counterstrike was too large, which might not deter the US from a large counterstrike at all, as the Chinese are at least as vulnerable to an American nuclear strike as we are to theirs.

So it would appear to be excessively risky.

I think they'll try it.

That would come only after a set of threats, such as is now going on, followed by an ultimatum, which hasn't happened yet.  

Within the next decade, my guess is that it will.

My further guess is that the Chinese will actually try to pull this off without striking the US. They launch a huge prolonged missile strike on Taiwan that will in fact be fairly effective, but not as effective as they hope.  The Taiwanese will hit back in kind, with that being more effective than the Chinese are prepared for.  The US will join in nearly immediately.

Following that, they'll put their ships into the strait and push toward the island. They'll incur losses right away and already be somewhat in disarray.  The U.S. Navy will interdict, probably most effectively with submarines, but also with aircraft.  At that point, the Chinese will launch a second missile strike at the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Navy will take serious losses.  The U.S. will deploy some ground forces at this point to Taiwan, but they'll be small by necessity.  The Chinese will abstain from hitting U.S. forces in South Korea or Japan.

My further guess is that the invasion will fail, but it will be a close run thing.

A final Republic of China/People's Republic of China Showdown? Weighing the costs and benefits from a Red Chinese prospective. Part II