Was the Domino Theory Right?

One of the interesting things about the podcast that followed the Burns and Novik Vietnam War documentary is that Burns is interviewed and openly questions whether his pre documentary belief that The Domino Theory was ridiculous was in error.

That surprised me a bit as the documentary doesn't address the theory much other than to note that it was a basis for our going into Vietnam.

I've written on the Domino Theory here before, more specifically in my 2013 post on Looking at the Vietnam War differently. Not a war, but as a campaign in the Cold War.  In that post I urged that the Vietnam War should be looked at as a campaign in the Cold War in order to be viewed historically accurately.  That post came, of course, nearly four years ago and I doubt that very many people search back for post that old here very often (I suppose some might surf into it and I know that occurs with some of our older posts), but in the interesting of not repeating too much what I already have said, I'll quote at length from that post (although, please note, I'm not quoting the whole post):

This brings us back to the "Domino Theory", which was that the if any nation in Southeast Asia fell they'd all fall, one after another.  The general theory is that they'd fall all the way to India, in all likelihood.

As noted, I'm not quoting from the entire 2013 post here.   So perhaps I should flesh that out.  I did so a bit in that post when I noted:

It’s easy to dismiss the Domino Theory now, although erroneously in my view, but at the time dominoes really were falling.  One giant one fell, China, and another one, South Korea, nearly tipped over almost immediately thereafter.  With that history, with Communist insurgencies breaking out all over South East Asia, and with a big huge Communist neighbor behind nearly all of them, geographically, starting in 1947 things looked pretty darned grim. 

Let's still flesh that out just a bit.

The idea was, and it was based on prior experience, that once one nation fell to the Communist that put pressure on its neighbors, particularly if the fallen nation was in a strategic area and particularly if there was already Communist activity in the region.

This idea, following Vietnam, was widely discredited.  But was it as absurd as many would now have us believe?  Many historical examples of the success of militant movements would suggest otherwise.  When the USSR was founded, for example, Communist revolutions did in fact spared to nearby states.  Hungary, for example, had one immediately after Russia and while it didn't succeed, it nearly did.  Germany's red revolution in the 1918-1919 time frame nearly did as well. 

Fascism provides a good example also.  It wasn't as if Germany was the only state that went to the far right in the 1930s.  It was preceded by Italy and joined by Spain and Romania.  Arguably it was somewhat joined by France.  When fascism was on the rise, it wasn't on the rise in one state.  Even the United Kingdom and Ireland had fascists movements in the 1930s.

And before we get too far on the topic of the Vietnam War, let's consider Asia as a whole.

Southeast Asia.  It's big. . . but more connected when you take a little higher view.

One of the things that missed in discussions on the Vietnam War, and it was missed in the Burns and Novik documentary, is that it was Australia that was demanding Western powers get into the Indochinese War after France fell there, not the United States at first.  Australia was begging the US to get in and threatened the Kennedy Administration with going it alone if the US wouldn't go.  In retrospect, maybe we should have allowed for that.  Australia had thinner resources but it also had more experience in fighting guerrilla was in the jungle than we did.

Australian soldiers of the Royal Australian Rifles in Vietnam.

They weren't the only nation concerned about what they were seeing, of course, but looking at the map, and recalling World War Two, you can see why the Australians were particularly concerned.

 Royal Australian Rifles in Vietnam. We didn't ask them to come. ..  they asked us.

Stepping back a second, and before considering the validity of the theory itself, you can at least see why there was legitimate concern about it.  China had emerged from a long civil war in 1948 with the Red Chinese the surprise victors.  Everyone would have presumed, to include Stalin, that the Nationalist Chinese would come out on top.  They didn't, and of course, its now clear that one of the many straws that broke that camels back (and there were many) was pretty effective efforts by Soviet agents to hinder and delay US resupply to the Nationalist Chinese.  That deprived them of effective resupply in some instances, but that doesn't explain what occurred in and of itself by a long shot.  Not that we're doing a history of the Chinese Civil War here.  Of interest, the Nationalist Chinese provided some air support to the South Vietnamese early during the Vietnam War and contributed some special troops, some of whom were killed in combat, to the South Vietnamese effort during the war.

 South Korean soldiers in Vietnam.  The ROK had a major military commitment to South Vietnam and late in the war appeared set to retain up to 50,000 troops in the country even after the United States was set to withdraw. American encouragement that they leave, during the "Vietnamization" program period, secured their departure.  "Soldiers of the ROK 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam. Photo by Phillip Kemp.  Photo taken by Phillip Kemp from cockpit after sling-loading water drums to outpost..jpg"  Posted pursuant to Wikepeidia license.  South Korea was second only to the United States in terms of the number of troops it sent to support the Republic of Vietnam.

Anyhow, China fell.  North Korean was left Communist following World War Two as part of an arraignment with the United States on post war occupation.  In 1950 that turned into a North Korean invasion of South Korea that was only halted at great costs to the United States and its allies, and only after the Truman Administration changed its mind about what was going on globally and regionally.  We'll pick up on that in a moment.

 Soviet troops marching into North Korea at the end of World War Two. They'd stay briefly, as would US troops in the South, and set up a state modeled on the USSR while they were there.  That nation would try to reunite the peninsula by armed force in 1950. 

And it wasn't just there.

The Philippines had presented the US with a domestic Communist guerrilla movement to contend with as the US was returning to them during World War Two.  Of the various anti Japanese guerrilla movements that sprung up during the war was the Hukbalahap, more commonly called the Huks.  Relationships with them were tense following the war as the Philippines moved towards independence and they broke out in full scale rebellion in 1949, the year after China fell.  The Philippine government managed to put them down with US military assistance and, significantly, through the co-opting of their movement by some rather brilliant men in the early CIA.  Even at that however, various Communist guerrilla movements continue on in the Philippines to the present day.

During the Vietnam War the Philippines would supply 10,000 non combat troops to aid South Korea.

Of course, as we've already noted, the British also contended with Communist guerrillas in Southeast Asia in the Malayan Emergency, which they successfully managed to counter in a combined policing and military operation that went on from. . .  yes, 1948, and lasted until 1960.

Malayan police patrol in 1950.

And then there was Burma.

Burma was a region which was, at first, largely happy to see the Japanese take over from the British during World War Two, but soon grew discontent with the Japanese. Some armed groups that supported the Japanese at first actually switched sides during the war.  This did not mean that they looked forward to the return of the British.  They country, now Myanmar, became independent in that fateful year of 1948 and did not join the English Commonwealth.  In 1962 a military coup brought the military into power and it chose to rule the country in a manner inspired by the Soviet Union to a significant degree.  The country even changed its name to the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma.

Between Burma and Cambodia/Laos is Thailand. Thailand did not participate in World War Two and was not a colony of any nation during that period or any other.  It's the only nation in Southeast Asia that has never been colonized (it even sent an envoy to the Pope as early as 1688.) A monarchy, it had acquired Japanese military aid prior to World War Two, it was in a difficult spot during the war and more or less participated on both sides of the war, while technically, due to a declaration of war, was at war with the United States and the United Kingdom, after having fought briefly against Japan.  It's treaty with Japan provided that Japan would assist Thailand to reacquire territories lost to colonial powers on all sides of it, include to the French in what became Laos and Cambodia.

Following World War Two Thailand faced an encamped Nationalist Chinese army in its far north (for decades) and a domestic Communist insurgency that broke out in the 1960s.  Thailand would provide air bases to the United States during the Vietnam War and would ultimately contribute combat troops just as the United States started to withdraw. Thailand's commitment to the war would amount to 12,000 men just as the United States was pulling out, with their troops including contributions of elite units.

 Artillerymen from New Zealand's army in Vietnam.  New Zealand was still more English than the English the time, but unlike the UK or any European power (excluding France) they also sent troops to Vietnam. . . no doubt looking at their position on the globe.

That takes us to the Vietnam War.  Communist forces were not just active in South Vietnam or even North and South Vietnam. They were active in Laos, where they succeed after the fall of South Vietnam, and in Cambodia, where they also did. They were also active throughout Southeast and Central Asia.  Indeed, the Communist Party is still a political force in India.  So, no wonder:

And not only in our view, but in the view of nearly every Western nation.  The UK had been in nonstop combat against some Communist force since before the end of World War Two up through 1954, and at least Australia had been involved in two wars against Communist forces by the end of 1954.  The French had been involved in two such wars, one in Indochina, and had actually sought our aid there, but the British vetoed it (we were reluctant) as they felt, probably rightly, that the French had a hard time distinguishing the difference between a war against Communist insurgents and a war against French colonialism, with the latter being doomed even if the two efforts were mixed.

Looking at it that way, with Communist insurgencies breaking out everywhere in Asia, with the potentiality for more breaking out where they hadn’t already, and with a lot of the insurgencies seeming to be successful, it’d be hard to imagine Western nations regarding any of the wars as mere local affairs without global implications.  A person might ask “why Vietnam” but the answer might just be that it was Vietnam’s turn.  The British and Australians had already fought one war against Communist in Southeast Asia and it reasonably looked like not putting the fire out where it broke out would make things worse. Indeed, it almost certainly would have.  The Australians were, for their part, urging the US to take action in Vietnam before we did.  And in terms of the big Communist powers, China and the USSR, Vietnam did have a good deep water port which was strategic enough that the US had attacked it from the air,during WWII, when the Japanese occupied it.

Maybe the theory was, therefore, correct.  At least it seemed rational to believe it was, as we noted:

The question almost would have been whether to draw the line in Vietnam or somewhere else,with all the other somewhere else’s being increasingly bad choices.  I don’t really see how the war could have been avoided.

Indeed, I was less clear on the challenges faced in my earlier post than I have been in this one (which I researched on this topic a bit more).  During the early 1960s, when the Kennedy Administration was faced with trying to decide how much, and how, to support South Vietnam, it faced a situation in which nearly every country in the region had been challenged by a Communist insurgency and some had been successful while others had only been recently defeated by hard effort.

I went on from there in my original post to ponder what that meant, and I'll leave the reader to review that in the context of my Cold War analysis that I offered there, but I'll note that it started off with this:

And maybe the war, if considered a campaign in the Cold War, the campaign worked, although it certainly wasn't an unqualified success.  It would have been, rather, a type of extraordinarily long, and unintentional, delaying action.

This went on, and looked at the war in the context of a Cold War campaign.  You can judge for yourself whether I was right or wrong, or partially right or wrong on that, but I'm going to divert from quoting that post here to go on to the main point here.  That is, was the Domino Theory correct?

Well, the evidence would suggest. . . it was correct.

The proponents of the theory argued that if Vietnam fell (or continued to fall, as North Vietnam had fallen to Communism) then Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma and India would all follows suit.

So how can you say that it was correct, critics (now) say, Thailand didn't fall the Communists?

That's right, Thailand didn't.  But you have noticed that Laos and Cambodia did, correct?

And they fell after South Vietnam, which is more than a little coincidental.  Both nations had been part of French Indochina and both had Communist movements in the 1940s, but neither fell to Communism until after Saigon fell in 1975.

Now, to be fair, Laos was falling in slow motion since the mid 1960s. . . or even the 1950s.  But something kept it from teetering completely over the edge.  That something was the war in South Vietnam.  North Vietnam was willing to dominate parts of the country and to force it into an uneasy neutrality but it apparently feared tipping it over the edge as that might have caused the United States to intervene full scale in Laos, rather than low scale as it was doing.

Pathet (Communist) Laotian troops, 1972.

That came to an end when the South collapsed in 1975. At that point, the North basically invaded Laos and forced it into Communism, where it remains. 

So, I suppose, a person could argue that it didn't fall, it was pushed.  The significant thing there, however, is that it wasn't pushed any earlier than that.

Cambodia wasn't pushed, it fought it out late in the Vietnam War and then fell to the Khmer Rouge as it received increased support, for awhile, from the North Vietnamese.  Cambodia had favored the Communist effort, slightly, during most of the Vietnam War but when its monarchy fell in a coup the Army chose to actively enter the Vietnam War, albeit on its own soil.  This turned into a fierce civil war and when the war went badly for the South Vietnamese in the end it went just as badly for Cambodia.  Like South Vietnam and Laos, it fell in 1975.

By that time, of course, Burma had already gone to its own odd brand of near Communism. Thailand was surrounded.

But nobody else fell. So surely that means that the Domino Theory was wrong, correct?

Well, that''s hard to tell, in the end.  What we do know is that nearly every Southeast nation fought a war against a communist insurgency.  Some were successfully fought, some were not.  A person might argue that the long war in Indochina gave other nations that had already fought a war against Communist insurgents the chance to consolidate politically so that their wars would not renew.  Arguably the war in Thailand failed as it came too late, after the Thai government had been given an extra decade to plan against it and to have cut its teeth on the war in Vietnam.

Of course, you can argue it the other way around.  After the North Vietnamese won against the South and then intervened with finality in Laos, they ended up invading Communist Cambodia and fighting a guerrilla war against the Khmer Rouge.  China invaded North Vietnam and was thrown back.  The rift between Chinese Communism and Soviet Communism proved to be pretty bitter and the respective allies of those nations would fight amongst themselves.  North Vietnam proved to be highly Soviet at first, but it was never a Soviet puppet and ultimately, would be forced to later abandon much of its hardcore economic Communist that it espoused.  Cambodia would reemerge from Vietnamese rule as a free state and a royal one at that, no longer Communist. So things didn't work out they way they were hoped for or feared for anyone.

None of which answers the question. Was the Domino Theory correct?  It's impossible to say, but even now, the evidence suggests it might have been.

President Trump's August 21, 2017 Speech on the War In Afghanistan.

"U.S. Army Sgt. Joshua Smith, 82nd Airborne Division’s 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, talks to group of Afghan children during a combined patrol clearing operation in Afghanistan's Ghazni province, April 28, 2012.  U.S. Army Photograph"

While the locals, including myself, were being stunned by the solar eclipse, President Trump was delivering a long speech on the war in Afghanistan. The full text of that speech follows.

Thank you very much. Thank you. Please be seated.

Vice President Pence, Secretary of State Tillerson, members of the Cabinet, General Dunford, Deputy Secretary Shanahan, and Colonel Duggan. Most especially, thank you to the men and women of Fort Myer and every member of the United States military at home and abroad.

We send our thoughts and prayers to the families of our brave sailors who were injured and lost after a tragic collision at sea, as well as to those conducting the search and recovery efforts.

I am here tonight to lay out our path forward in Afghanistan and South Asia. But before I provide the details of our new strategy, I want to say a few words to the service members here with us tonight, to those watching from their posts, and to all Americans listening at home.

Since the founding of our republic, our country has produced a special class of heroes whose selflessness, courage, and resolve is unmatched in human history.

American patriots from every generation have given their last breath on the battlefield for our nation and for our freedom. Through their lives -- and though their lives were cut short, in their deeds they achieved total immortality.

By following the heroic example of those who fought to preserve our republic, we can find the inspiration our country needs to unify, to heal, and to remain one nation under God.

The men and women of our military operate as one team, with one shared mission, and one shared sense of purpose.

They transcend every line of race, ethnicity, creed, and color to serve together -- and sacrifice together -- in absolutely perfect cohesion. That is because all service members are brothers and sisters. They're all part of the same family; it's called the American family. They take the same oath, fight for the same flag, and live according to the same law. They are bound together by common purpose, mutual trust, and selfless devotion to our nation and to each other.

The soldier understands what we, as a nation, too often forget that a wound inflicted upon a single member of our community is a wound inflicted upon us all. When one part of America hurts, we all hurt. And when one citizen suffers an injustice, we all suffer together.

Loyalty to our nation demands loyalty to one another. Love for America requires love for all of its people. When we open our hearts to patriotism, there is no room for prejudice, no place for bigotry, and no tolerance for hate.

The young men and women we send to fight our wars abroad deserve to return to a country that is not at war with itself at home. We cannot remain a force for peace in the world if we are not at peace with each other.

As we send our bravest to defeat our enemies overseas -- and we will always win -- let us find the courage to heal our divisions within. Let us make a simple promise to the men and women we ask to fight in our name that, when they return home from battle, they will find a country that has renewed the sacred bonds of love and loyalty that unite us together as one.

Thanks to the vigilance and skill of the American military and of our many allies throughout the world, horrors on the scale of September 11th -- and nobody can ever forget that -- have not been repeated on our shores.

But we must also acknowledge the reality I am here to talk about tonight: that nearly 16 years after September 11th attacks, after the extraordinary sacrifice of blood and treasure, the American people are weary of war without victory. Nowhere is this more evident than with the war in Afghanistan, the longest war in American history -- 17 years.

I share the American people’s frustration. I also share their frustration over a foreign policy that has spent too much time, energy, money, and most importantly lives, trying to rebuild countries in our own image, instead of pursuing our security interests above all other considerations.

That is why, shortly after my inauguration, I directed Secretary of Defense Mattis and my national security team to undertake a comprehensive review of all strategic options in Afghanistan and South Asia.

My original instinct was to pull out -- and, historically, I like following my instincts. But all my life I've heard that decisions are much different when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office; in other words, when you're President of the United States. So I studied Afghanistan in great detail and from every conceivable angle. After many meetings, over many months, we held our final meeting last Friday at Camp David, with my Cabinet and generals, to complete our strategy. I arrived at three fundamental conclusions about America’s core interests in Afghanistan.

First, our nation must seek an honorable and enduring outcome worthy of the tremendous sacrifices that have been made, especially the sacrifices of lives. The men and women who serve our nation in combat deserve a plan for victory. They deserve the tools they need, and the trust they have earned, to fight and to win.

Second, the consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable. 9/11, the worst terrorist attack in our history, was planned and directed from Afghanistan because that country was ruled by a government that gave comfort and shelter to terrorists. A hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum that terrorists, including ISIS and al Qaeda, would instantly fill, just as happened before September 11th.

And, as we know, in 2011, America hastily and mistakenly withdrew from Iraq. As a result, our hard-won gains slipped back into the hands of terrorist enemies. Our soldiers watched as cities they had fought for, and bled to liberate, and won, were occupied by a terrorist group called ISIS. The vacuum we created by leaving too soon gave safe haven for ISIS to spread, to grow, recruit, and l

aunch attacks. We cannot repeat in Afghanistan the mistake our leaders made in Iraq.
Third and finally, I concluded that the security threats we face in Afghanistan and the broader region are immense. Today, 20 U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations are active in Afghanistan and Pakistan -- the highest concentration in any region anywhere in the world.

For its part, Pakistan often gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence, and terror. The threat is worse because Pakistan and India are two nuclear-armed states whose tense relations threaten to spiral into conflict. And that could happen.

No one denies that we have inherited a challenging and troubling situation in Afghanistan and South Asia, but we do not have the luxury of going back in time and making different or better decisions. When I became President, I was given a bad and very complex hand, but I fully knew what I was getting into: big and intricate problems. But, one way or another, these problems will be solved -- I'm a problem solver -- and, in the end, we will win.

We must address the reality of the world as it exists right now -- the threats we face, and the confronting of all of the problems of today, and extremely predictable consequences of a hasty withdrawal.

We need look no further than last week’s vile, vicious attack in Barcelona to understand that terror groups will stop at nothing to commit the mass murder of innocent men, women and children. You saw it for yourself. Horrible.

As I outlined in my speech in Saudi Arabia three months ago, America and our partners are committed to stripping terrorists of their territory, cutting off their funding, and exposing the false allure of their evil ideology.

Terrorists who slaughter innocent people will find no glory in this life or the next. They are nothing but thugs, and criminals, and predators, and -- that's right -- losers. Working alongside our allies, we will break their will, dry up their recruitment, keep them from crossing our borders, and yes, we will defeat them, and we will defeat them handily.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, America’s interests are clear: We must stop the resurgence of safe havens that enable terrorists to threaten America, and we must prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists and being used against us, or anywhere in the world for that matter

But to prosecute this war, we will learn from history. As a result of our comprehensive review, American strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia will change dramatically in the following ways:

A core pillar of our new strategy is a shift from a time-based approach to one based on conditions. I’ve said it many times how counterproductive it is for the United States to announce in advance the dates we intend to begin, or end, military options. We will not talk about numbers of troops or our plans for further military activities.

Conditions on the ground -- not arbitrary timetables -- will guide our strategy from now on. America’s enemies must never know our plans or believe they can wait us out. I will not say when we are going to attack, but attack we will.

Another fundamental pillar of our new strategy is the integration of all instruments of American power -- diplomatic, economic, and military -- toward a successful outcome.

Someday, after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan, but nobody knows if or when that will ever happen. America will continue its support for the Afghan government and the Afghan military as they confront the Taliban in the field.

Ultimately, it is up to the people of Afghanistan to take ownership of their future, to govern their society, and to achieve an everlasting peace. We are a partner and a friend, but we will not dictate to the Afghan people how to live, or how to govern their own complex society. We are not nation-building again. We are killing terrorists.

The next pillar of our new strategy is to change the approach and how to deal with Pakistan. We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond. Pakistan has much to gain from partnering with our effort in Afghanistan. It has much to lose by continuing to harbor criminals and terrorists.

In the past, Pakistan has been a valued partner. Our militaries have worked together against common enemies. The Pakistani people have suffered greatly from terrorism and extremism. We recognize those contributions and those sacrifices.

But Pakistan has also sheltered the same organizations that try every single day to kill our people. We have been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars at the same time they are housing the very terrorists that we are fighting. But that will have to change, and that will change immediately. No partnership can survive a country’s harboring of militants and terrorists who target U.S. service members and officials. It is time for Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment to civilization, order, and to peace.

Another critical part of the South Asia strategy for America is to further develop its strategic partnership with India -- the world’s largest democracy and a key security and economic partner of the United States. We appreciate India’s important contributions to stability in Afghanistan, but India makes billions of dollars in trade with the United States, and we want them to help us more with Afghanistan, especially in the area of economic assistance and development. We are committed to pursuing our shared objectives for peace and security in South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

Finally, my administration will ensure that you, the brave defenders of the American people, will have the necessary tools and rules of engagement to make this strategy work, and work effectively and work quickly.

I have already lifted restrictions the previous administration placed on our warfighters that prevented the Secretary of Defense and our commanders in the field from fully and swiftly waging battle against the enemy. Micromanagement from Washington, D.C. does not win battles. They are won in the field drawing upon the judgment and expertise of wartime commanders and frontline soldiers acting in real time, with real authority, and with a clear mission to defeat the enemy.

That’s why we will also expand authority for American armed forces to target the terrorist and criminal networks that sow violence and chaos throughout Afghanistan. These killers need to know they have nowhere to hide; that no place is beyond the reach of American might and Americans arms. Retribution will be fast and powerful.

As we lift restrictions and expand authorities in the field, we are already seeing dramatic results in the campaign to defeat ISIS, including the liberation of Mosul in Iraq.

Since my inauguration, we have achieved record-breaking success in that regard. We will also maximize sanctions and other financial and law enforcement actions against these networks to eliminate their ability to export terror. When America commits its warriors to battle, we must ensure they have every weapon to apply swift, decisive, and overwhelming force.

Our troops will fight to win. We will fight to win. From now on, victory will have a clear definition: attacking our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing al-Qaeda, preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan, and stopping mass terror attacks against America before they emerge.

We will ask our NATO allies and global partners to support our new strategy with additional troop and funding increases in line with our own. We are confident they will. Since taking office, I have made clear that our allies and partners must contribute much more money to our collective defense, and they have done so.

In this struggle, the heaviest burden will continue to be borne by the good people of Afghanistan and their courageous armed forces. As the prime minister of Afghanistan has promised, we are going to participate in economic development to help defray the cost of this war to us.

Afghanistan is fighting to defend and secure their country against the same enemies who threaten us. The stronger the Afghan security forces become, the less we will have to do. Afghans will secure and build their own nation and define their own future. We want them to succeed.

But we will no longer use American military might to construct democracies in faraway lands, or try to rebuild other countries in our own image. Those days are now over. Instead, we will work with allies and partners to protect our shared interests. We are not asking others to change their way of life, but to pursue common goals that allow our children to live better and safer lives. This principled realism will guide our decisions moving forward.

Military power alone will not bring peace to Afghanistan or stop the terrorist threat arising in that country. But strategically applied force aims to create the conditions for a political process to achieve a lasting peace.

America will work with the Afghan government as long as we see determination and progress. However, our commitment is not unlimited, and our support is not a blank check. The government of Afghanistan must carry their share of the military, political, and economic burden. The American people expect to see real reforms, real progress, and real results. Our patience is not unlimited. We will keep our eyes wide open.

In abiding by the oath I took on January 20th, I will remain steadfast in protecting American lives and American interests. In this effort, we will make common cause with any nation that chooses to stand and fight alongside us against this global threat. Terrorists take heed: America will never let up until you are dealt a lasting defeat.

Under my administration, many billions of dollars more is being spent on our military. And this includes vast amounts being spent on our nuclear arsenal and missile defense.
In every generation, we have faced down evil, and we have always prevailed. We prevailed because we know who we are and what we are fighting for.

Not far from where we are gathered tonight, hundreds of thousands of America’s greatest patriots lay in eternal rest at Arlington National Cemetery. There is more courage, sacrifice, and love in those hallowed grounds than in any other spot on the face of the Earth.

Many of those who have fought and died in Afghanistan enlisted in the months after September 11th, 2001. They volunteered for a simple reason: They loved America, and they were determined to protect her.

Now we must secure the cause for which they gave their lives. We must unite to defend America from its enemies abroad. We must restore the bonds of loyalty among our citizens at home, and we must achieve an honorable and enduring outcome worthy of the enormous price that so many have paid.

Our actions, and in the months to come, all of them will honor the sacrifice of every fallen hero, every family who lost a loved one, and every wounded warrior who shed their blood in defense of our great nation. With our resolve, we will ensure that your service and that your families will bring about the defeat of our enemies and the arrival of peace.

We will push onward to victory with power in our hearts, courage in our souls, and everlasting pride in each and every one of you.

Thank you. May God bless our military. And may God bless the United States of America. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Okay, what about this speech and what it reveals.

It's being interpreted in the punditsphere in various ways. Surprisingly (and I was surprised) the New York Times actually said it might help conditions on the ground in Afghanistan.  Given that the Times has gotten to where whatever Trump says is wrong, that's a pretty interesting comment.

Secondly, about the only real strategic thing in the speech, in terms of military strategy, is that he's indicating that the rules of engagement will be liberalized.  We now know that the US will also commit an additional 4,000 or so troops to the country, but in real terms that's not a large addition of manpower (an American division includes about 15,000 troops).

"Members of Co. C, 1st Bn, 8th Inf, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div, descend the side of Hill 742, located five miles northwest of Dak To. November 14-17, 1967"  U.S. Army photograph.  The US commitment to the tenuous government of South Vietnam was far more vast than that to the government in Kabul.  At one time up to 500,000 US troops were in the Southeast Asian country, and additional forces were there in our support from numerous other nations.  The South Korean commitment alone number 50,000 troops.

It's very long been the case that troops in the theater have criticized the rules of engagement for Afghanistan.  I don't know how far back it goes, but it goes back a long ways.  Now, rules of engagement exist for a reason and we don't want the war in Afghanistan to become the war in Vietnam in the "burn the huts down" sense.  No matter what those sort of images portray, what that leads to is always bad and in this day and age, and thankfully at that, we don't want to go there and can't either.  We aren't, after all, the French operating in Morocco in 1908 in a news vacuum.  And we don't want to be either.

General Lyautey re-entering Marrakech.  He really did go by automobile, the first one in Morocco.  And it really was equipped with a machinegun  Lyautey's efforts were not marked by overreaction, but earlier French efforts had featured "scatter the tent" type actions.

Shoot, for that matter, even later French actions in the post World War Two environment in North Africa, or US ones for that matter, couldn't operate in any sort of heavy handed fashion long term.

French soldier of unspecified unit, but a paratrooper based on appearance, with suspected Algerian terrorists.  In Algeria the French faced a disunited, but hostile population and a determined guerilla opponent.  Ground efforts waxed and waned in their success with guerilla bands taking refuge in neighboring nations.  A counter guerilla effort that relied on similar terroristic tactics was successful but when its existence became known to the French population it was stopped as the French would not tolerate it.

But the rules have, according to the soldiers fighting the war, been far too restrictive.  This seems like a good tactical change, depending upon how its actually implemented.

It should be noted, however, that the present situation didn't come about solely due to the rules of engagement by any means.  Early tactical errors caused it also, and now they are difficult to repair.  Afghanistan was the central locus of the enemy that launched the September 11, 2001 attack upon the United States and therefore the US had to engage in some sort of military intervention in the nation.  The extent of that action can be debated, but a full scale invasion, which is what we did, was not irrational.

It was not sound, however, to so quickly refocus the nation's attention on Iraq, which had nothing to do with 9/11. Saddam Hussein was a nuisance, to be sure, but its now quite clear that the invasion of that country so hard on the heels of Afghanistan used a great deal of military resources that would have been better spent in Afghanistan.  The thesis in Afghanistan was that we could win the war on the cheap.  That thesis was proven wholly incorrect.  We did push out the existing quasi government but we did not destroy the opponent, which perhaps we could have done, and if we were going to enter the nation, should have done.  Doing it now will have a completely different psychological sense to the native population than doing it in 2001 would have.  We have to keep that unfortunately in mind.  We will not be the vengeful justified wounded in 2017 as we would have been in 2001.

 "Members of an Iraqi Concerned Citizens group discuss a checkpoint with coalition forces in Haswa, Iraq, Sept. 22, 2007. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Justin K. Thomas)".  U.S. troops in Iraq ten years ago.  There too our invasion didn't result in peace, but in a second war, that's now given way to a third.

Beyond that, it seems we're turning up the heat on Pakistan, which is a good thing as that country has been far too conciliatory to the forces we're fighting.  It seems we might be cozying up to India, which is a bad thing as we have no dog in the Pakistan v. India fight, and that will unfortunately suggest that we do, or even cause us to have one.

So what beyond that?

We can't really tell.

Other than that we're not getting out.

"U.S. Army National Guard Spc. Timothy Shout, a native of Austin, Texas, scans the nearby ridgeline along with other members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Kunar Security Force element, following an engagement with anti-Afghan forces. Shout is deployed from Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 143rd Infantry (Airborne) out of Austin, Texas. The unit took small-arms fire from a nearby mountain top during a routine patrol, and was able to suppress the enemy with the assistance of local Afghan National Security Forces."  U.S. Army photograph.

Trump had suggested to some degree that we might get out. And plenty of Americans would like for us to get out. For one thing, this war has been incredibly long, sixteen years.  But the comment in the speech about what happens if we get out is right.  It goes back to being a training ground for Islamic Caliphatist terrorist, and perhaps a worse one than it was before.

Now, it should be noted, that some would suggest that this could in fact be addressed even with us still withdrawing by using what I'll call the Israeli option.

 IIsraeli airborne officers of the Paratrooper Battalion 890 in 1955 with Moshe Dayan

It's often noted that Israel has maintained its independence since 1948 surrounded by more or less hostile neighbors (some a lot more hostile than others), and that they've won several wars against those neighbors.  What's rarely noted, however is that all of its victories have been partial.  Israel has never achieved a total victory over anyone neighbor and frankly it's leadership has been to smart, given its strategic situation, to try for one.  Israel can't occupy an entire Arab neighbor for any prolonged basis and even attempting to do so would be some sort of strategic nightmare.  This should give Israel's neighbors a sense of security, for good or ill, even if nothing else does. But what this has meant is that Israel has had to be prepared to act on a greater or lessor basis continually for seventy years.  Most of its wars, if we reconsider them in the long term sense, other than the 1948 war for independence, where giant raids.  In between those giant raids have been a lot of smaller raids, some big in raid terms, and some very small.  We don't hear about most of them, but we do about hte bigger ones.

So, if we got out, and this is what those proposing we get out have sometimes suggested, in Afghanistan what we have to do is be prepared to raid on a nearly continual basis.  And some of those raids would be really big, from time to time.  It's an option, but a distasteful one.  Particularly as we have sixteen years in now.  Who knows how long that would go on?

But for that matter, we don't know how long this will go on either.  It's amazing to think that starting this year or next we will have enlistees in the services who were born the year this all started, and then the following year people who were born after it started.

 

  US Troops fighting in Vietnam.

I recall that when the US withdrew from Vietnam in 1973 my mother was relieved as it meant that there was no chance I'd have to go to Vietnam.  Heck, I was ten.  That struck me as absurd then, but looking at it now, she had a keen sense of history and she was not an American by birth.  Growing up in an era in which the British Empire was a strong thing and still supported greatly by her native country, Canada, a war lasting twenty or more years in some far off pile of bush no doubt didn't seem that long to her.  How long, after all, had the British, with Australian, New Zealander, and Rhodesian help, fought in  southeast Asia after World War Two.  Longer than that, really.  How long will this go on, and how long will we be prepared to tolerate it going on?

I can't answer those things, but I suspect that this effort will bring some renewed success on the ground but ultimately any long term solution means un-doing what the Soviets did in 1979 when they entered the country and wrecked its culture.  Contrary to the way we imagine it now, Afghanistan wasn't always 100% wild Islamist combatants.  It's always partially been that, but it was once a country of large cities, farming, and country villas.  It's proof that civilization can in fact retreat, and retreat enormously.  Had the country continued to develop in the fashion it was in 1970, which is no certainty, it may have been a shining light of quasi democracy in the region today.  A lessor Turkey, perhaps (although Turkey now has its own problems).  Now its a mess.

Cleaning up that mess is going to be really hard.  How can it be done?  I frankly have no idea, and it seems nobody else has much of one either.  But do we have any other choice?

It might do us well to remember the lessons of history in regards to this.  While I don't like the term "post colonial wars" very much, that term is perhaps useful here.  Almost none of the Western efforts after the Second World War in the Third World have been militarily successful.  The French failed in Indochina and Algeria, although the nature of those wars is not really analogous here.   We failed in Indochina as well, although a good case can be made that we were successful, and had won the war on the ground, following a fifteen year effort, only to loose it shortly there after when we lost our political will and abandoned the South Vietnamese government.  The Rhodesian Bush War, which pitted a white English government against two black insurgent armies was also not successful, although its not very analogous either.  Wars in Angola, Chad, and the like are too dissimilar to provide useful examples.  The Soviet Union certainly failed in Afghanistan.  Only the Malayan Emergency stands out as a successful Western, in that case Commonwealth, example of Western nations clearly defeating an indigenous guerilla foe.

 Royal Australian Air Force Avro Lincoln dropping bombs on insurgents during the Malaysian Emergency.

In that example we find that the British lead effort took twelve years, a long time, but it was treated more as a police action, supported by the military, than the other way around. Does that teach us something?  Perhaps. The British were patient, but they also simply treated the foe as an illegal criminal organization, recasting a guerilla war as a civil emergency.  Perhaps there are lessons to be learned there.  The country is over half Islamic, although of the relaxed Southeast Asian variety, and a functioning democracy today.  It tolerates other religions.  It is a federation with more than one ethnicity.  The British effort was a success.

Of course, Malaysia is not Afghanistan.  Nor is the British effort, which was fairly coherent from the start and even back into the Second World War, is not the American one.  Perhaps it provides lessons, but perhaps those lessons come a little too late? Perhaps not?

Perhaps the best that can be done is to give the government in Kabul the high side of the fight and then get out, hoping for the best.  That's not a grand victory, but it might be the best we can hope for.  But it's going to take, bare minimum, a few years to do that.