The New York Times and the Bismarck Tribune reported the disaster at the Little Big Horn.
Showing posts with label cavalry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label cavalry. Show all posts
Monday, July 6, 2026
Sunday, July 5, 2026
Wednesday, July 5, 1876. Reno writes a report.
Reno wrote his official report of the recent disaster on the Little Big Horn.
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH UNITED STATES CAVALRY,
Camp on Yellowstone River, July 5, 1876
E. W. Smith,
A. D. C. and A. A. A. Gen.:
The command of the regiment having developed upon me as the senior surviving officer from the battle of the 25th and 26th of June, between the Seventh Cavalry and Sitting Bull's band of hostile Sioux, on the Little Big Horn River, I have the honor to submit the following report of its operations from the time of leaving teh main column unitl the command was united in the vicinity of the Indian village:
The regiment leflt the camp at the mouth of the Rosebud River, after passing in review before the department commander, under command of Bvt. Maj. Gen. G. A. Custer, lieutenant-colonel, on the afternoon of the 22nd day of June, and marched up the Rosebud 12 miles and encamped; 23rd, marched up the Rosebud, passing many old Indian camps, and following a very large pole-trail, but not fresh, making 33 miles; 24th, the march was continued up the Rosebud, the trail and signs freshening with every mile, until we had made 28 miles, and we then encamped and waited for information from the scouts. At 9:25 p.m. Custer called the officers together and informed us that beyond a doubt the village was in the valley of the Little Big Horn, and in order to reach it it was necessary to cross the divide between the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn, and it would be impossible to do so in the day-time without discovering our march to the Indians; that we would prepare to march at 11 p.m. This was done, the line of march turning from the Rosebud to the right up one of its branches which headed near the summit of the divide. About 2 a.m. on the 25th the scouts told him that he could not cross the divide before daylight. We then made coffee and rested for three hours, at the expiration of which time the march was resumed, the divide crossed, and about 8 a.m. the command was in the valley of one of the branches of the Little Big Horn. By this time Indians had been seen and it was certain that we could not suprise them, and it was determined to move at once to the attack. Previous to this, no division of the regiment had been made since the order had been issued on the Yellowstone annuling wing and battalion organizations, but Custer informed me that he would assign commands on the march.
I was ordered by Lieut. W. W. Cooke, adjutant, to assume command of Companies M, A, and G; Captain Benteen of Companies H, D, and K. Custer retained C, E, F, I, and L under his immediate command, and Company B, Captain McDougall, in rear of the pack- train.
I assumed command of the companies assigned to me, and, without any definite orders, moved forward with the rest of the column, and well to its left.
I saw Benteen moving farther to the left, and, as they passed, he told me he had orders to move well to the left, and sweep everything before him. I did not see him again until about 2.30 p.m. The command moved down to the creek toward the Little Big Horn Valley, Custer with five companies on the right bank, myself and three companies on the left bank, and Benteen farther to the left, and out of sight.
As we approached a deserted village, and in which was standing one tepee, about 11 a.m., Custer motioned me to cross to him, which I did, and moved nearer to his column until about 12.30 a.m. [p.m. ?] when Lieutenant Cook, adjutant, came to me and siad the village was only two miles above, and running away; to move forward at as rapid a gait as prudent, and to charge afterward, and that the whole outfit would support me. I think those were his exaxt words. I at once took a fast trot, and moved down about two miles, when I came to a ford of the river. I crossed immediately, and halted about ten minutes or less to gather the battalion, sending word to Custer that I had everything in front of me, and that they were strong. I deployed, and, with the Ree scouts on my left, charged down the valley, driving the Indians with great ease for about two and a half miles. I, however, soon saw that I was being drawn into some trap, as tehy would certainly fight harder, and especially as we were nearing their village, which was still standing; besides, I could not see Custer or any other support, and at the same time the very earth seemed to grow Indians, and they were running toward me in swarms, and from all directions. I saw I must defend myself and give up the attack mounted. This I did. Taking possession of a front of woods, and which furnished, near its edge, a shelter for the horses, dismounted and fought them on foot, making headway through the woods. I soon found myself in the near vicinity of the village, saw that I was fighting odds of at least five to one, and that my only hope was to get out of the woods, where I would soon have been surrounded, and gain some high ground. I accomplished this by mounting and charging the Indians between me and the bluffs on the opposite side of the river. In this charge, First Lieut. Donald McIntosh, Second Lieut. Benjamin H. Hodgson, Seventh Cavalry, and Acting Assistant Surgeon J. M. De Wolf, were killed.
I succeeded in reaching the top of the bluff, with a loss of three officers and twenty-nine enlisted men killed and seven wounded. Almost at the same time I reached the top, mounted men were seen to be coming toward us, and it proved to be Colonel Benteen's battalion, Companies H, D, and K. We joined forces, and in a short time the pack-train came up. As senior, my command was then A, B, D, G, H, K, and M, about three hundred and eighty men, and the following officers: Captains Benteen, Weir, French and McDougall, First Lieutenants Godfrey, Mathey, and Gibson, and Second Lieutenants Edgerly, Wallace, Varnum, and Hare, and Acting Assistant Surgeon Porter.
First Lieutenant De Rudio was in the dismounted fight in the woods, but, having some trouble with his horse, did not join the command in the charge out, and hiding himself in the woods, joined the command after night-fall on the 26th.
Still hearing nothing of Custer, and, with this re- enforcement, I moved down the river in the direction of the village, keeping on the bluffs.
We had heard firing in that direction and knew it could only be Custer. I moved to the summit of the highest bluff, but seeing and hearing nothing sent Captain Weir with his company to open communication with him. He soon sent word by Lieutenant Hare that he could go no farther, and that the Indians were getting around him. At this time he was keeping up a heavy fire from his skirmish line. I at once turned everything back to the first position I had taken on the bluffs, and which seemed to me the best. I dismounted the men and had the horses and mules of the pack-train driven together in a depression, put the men on the crests of the bluffs, and which seemed to me the best. I dismounted, the men and had the horses and mules of the pack- train driven together in a depression, put the men on the crests of the hills making the depression, and had hardly done so when I was furiously attacked. This was about 6 p.m. We held our ground, with a loss of eighteen enlisted men killed and forty-six wounded, until the attack ceased, about 9 p.m. As I knew by this their overwhelming numbers, and had given up any support from that portion of the regiment with Custer, I had the men dig rifle pits, barricade with dead horses and mules, and boxes of hard bread, the opening of the depression toward the Indians in which the animals were herded, and made every exertion to be ready for what I saw would be a terrific assault the next day. All this might night the men were busy, and the Indians holding a scalp- dance underneath us in the bottom and in our hearing. On the morning of the 26th I felt confident that I could hold my own, and was ready, as far as I could be, when at daylight, about 2.30 a.m., I heard the crack of two rifles. This was the signal for the beginning of a fire that I have never equaled. Every rifle was handled by an expert and skilled marksman, and with a range that exceeded our carbines, and it was simply impossible to show any part of the body before it was struck. We could see, as the day brightened, countless hordes of them pouring up the valley from the village and scampering over the high points toward the places designated for them by their chiefs, and which entirely surrounded our position. They had sufficient numbers to completely encircle us, and men were struck from opposite sides of the lines from where the shots were fired. I think we were fighting all the Sioux Nation, and also all the deparadoes, renegades, half-breeds, and squaw-men between the Missouri and the Arkansas and east of the Rocky Mountains, and they must have numbered at least twenty-five hundred warriors.
The fire did not slacken until about 9.30 a.m., and then we found they were making a last desperate effort and which was directed against the lines held by Companies H and M. In this charge they came close enough to use their bows and arrows, and one man lying dead within our lines was touched with the coup- stick of one of the foremost Indiands. When I say the stick was only ten or twelve feet long, some idea of the desperate and reckless fighting of these people may be understood.
This charge of theirs was gallantly repulsed by the men on that line, lead by Colonel Benteen. They also came close enough to send their arrows into the line held by Companies D and K, but were driven away by a like charge of the line, which I accompanied. We now had many wounded, and the question ofwater was vital, as from 6 p.m. the previous evening until now, 10 a.m., about sixteen hours, we had been without.
A skirmish line was formed under Colonel Benteen to protect the descent of volunteers down the hill in front of his position to reach teh water. We succeeded in getting some canteens, although many of the men were hit in doing so. The fury of the attack was now over, and to our astonishment the Indians were seen going in parties toward the village. But two solutions occured to us for this movement; that they were going for something to eat, more ammunition, (as they had been throwing arrows,) or that Custer was coming. We took advantage of this lull to fill all vessels with water, and soon had it by camp- kettles full. But they continued to withdraw, and all firing ceased save occasional shots from sharp-shooters sent to annoy us about the water. About 2 p.m. the grass in the bottom was set on fire and followed up by Indians who encouraged its burning, and it was evident to me it was done for a purpose, and which purpose I discovered later on to be the creation of a dense cloud of smoke behind which they were packing and preparing to move their village. It was between 6 and 7 p.m. that the village came out from behind the dense clouds of smoke and dust. We had a close and good view of them as they filed away in the direction of the Big Horn Mountains, moving in almost perfect military order. The length of the column was full equal to that of a large division of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac as I have seen it in its march.
We now thought of Custer, of whom nothing had been seen and nothing heard since the firing in his direction about 6 p.m. on the eve of the 25th, and we concluded that the Indians had gotten between him and us and driven him toward the boat at the mouth of the Little Big Horn River. The awful fate that did befall him never occurred to any of us as within the limits of possibility.
During the night I changed my position in order to secure an unlimited supply of water, and was prepared for their return, feeling sure they would do som as they were in such numbers; but early in the morning of the 27th, and while we were on the qui vire for Indians, I saw with my glass a dust some distance down the valley. There was no certainty for some time what they were, but finally I satisfied myself they were cavalry, and, if so, could only be Custer, as it was ahead of the time that I understood that General Terry could be expected. Before this time, however, I had written a communication to General Terry, and three volunteers were to try and reach him. (I had no confidence in the Indians with me, and could not get them to do anything.) If this dust were Indians it was possible they would not expect any one to leave. The men started, and were told to go as near as it was safe to determine whether the approaching column was white men, and to return at once in case they found it so, but if they were Indians to push on to General Terry. In a short time, we saw them returning a note from Terry to Custer saying Crow scouts had come to camp saying he had been whipped, but that it was not believed. I think it was about 10.30 a.m. when General Terry rode into my lines, and the fate of Custer and his brave men was soon determined by Captain Benteen proceeding to the battle-ground, and where was recognized the following officers, who were surrounded by the dead bodies of many of their men; Gen G. A. Custer, Col. W. W. Cook, adjutant; Capts. M. W. Keogh, G. W. Yates, and T. W. Custer; First Lieuts. A. E. Smith, James Calhoun; Second Lieuts. W. V. Reily, of the Seventh Cavalry and J. J. Crittenden, of the Twelfth Infantry, temporarily attached to this regiment. The bodies of Lieut. J. E. Porter and Second Lieuts. H. M. Harrington and J. G. Sturgis, Seventh Cavalry, and Asst. Surg. G. W. Lord, U. S. A., were not recognized; but there is every reasonable probability they were killed. It was more certain that the column of five companies with Custer had been killed.
The wounded in my lines were, during the afternoon and evening of the 27th, moved to the camp of General Terry, and at 5 a.m. of the 28th I proceeded with the regiment to th battle-ground of Custer, and buried 204 bodies, including the following-named citizens: Mr. Boston Custer, Mr. Reed (a young nephew of General Custer,) and Mr. Kellog, (a correspondent for the New York Herald.) The following-named citizens and Indians who were with my command were also killed: Charles Reynolds, guide and hunter; Isaiah Dorman, (colored,) interpreter; Bloody Knife, who fell from immediately by my side; Bobtail Bull, and Stab, of the Indian scouts.
After traveling over his trail, it was evident to me that Custer intended to support me by moving farther down the stream and attacking the village in flank; that he found the distance greater to ford than he anticipated; that he did charge, but his march had taken so long, although his trail shows that he had moved rapidly, that they were ready for him; that Companies C and I, and perhaps part of E, crossed to the village or attempted it; at the charge were met by a staggering fire, and that they fell back to find a position from which to defend themselves, but they were followed too closely by the Indians to permit time to form any kind of a line.
I think had the regiment gone in as a body, and from the woods from which I fought advanced upon the village, its destruction was certain. But he was fully confident they were running away, or he would not have turned from me. I think (after the great number of Indians that were in the village,) that the following reasons obtain for the misfortune; His rapid marching for two days and one night before the fight; attacking in the day-time at 12 m., and when they were on the qui vire, instead of early morning; and lastly, his unfortunate division of the regiment into three commands.
During my fight with Indians, I had the heartiest support from officers and men, but the conspicuous services of Bvt. Col. F. W. Benteen I desire to call attention to especially, for if ever a soldier deserved recognition by his Government for distinguished services he certainly does. I inclose herewith his report of the operations of his battalion from the time of leaving the regiment until we joined commands on the hill. I also inclose an accuate list of casaulties, as far as it can be made at the present time, separating them into two lists: A, those killed in General Custer's command; B, those killed and wounded in the command I had.
The number of Indians killed can only be approximated until we hear through the agencies. I saw the bodies of eighteen, and Captain Ball, Second Cavalry, who made a scout of thirteen miles over their trail, says that their graves were many along their line of march. It is simply impossible that numbers of them should not be hit in the several charges they made so close to my lines. They made their approaches through the deep gulches that led from the hill-top to the river, and, when the jealous care with which the Indian guards the bodies of killed and wounded is considered, it is not astonishing that their bodies were not found. It is probable that the stores left by them and destroyed the next two days was to make room for many of these on their travois. The harrowing sight of the dead bodies crowning the height on which Custer fell, and which will remain vividly in my memory until death, is too recent for me not to ask the good people of this country whether a policy that sets opposing parties in the field, armed, clothed, and equipped by one and the same Government should not be abolished.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
M. A. RENO,
Major Seventh Cavalry, Commanding Regiment.
The Helena Daily Herald ran an editorial on the disaster.
Wednesday, July 5, 1876
EDITORIAL
The news received last evening of the defeat of Custer and the massacre of his entire command, fell upon the festivities of the day with a gloom that could not be shaken off. There is only toe much reason to believe that the facts given in the extras of last evening are literally true. The parties from whom the facts were received are too well known to leave a reasonable doubt.
BOZEMAN and HELENA, however, were not alone in beating the Bismarck Tribune, for on 5 July 1876, the Commanding Officer, Ft. Rice, near Bismarck, had news of the battle, and at once wired it to the Adjutant at St. Paul. The following extract from letter of Colonel Hugh F. Reed, Ret'd., dated 14 April 1926, tells the story:
"We officers at Fort Rice and the Post Trader made up a purse, and had a pony race on the Fourth of July. * * * The day after the pony race three Sioux Indians arrived at the post. One of them had a bow and half a dozen arrows. I bought them. * * * The Indian from whom I bought the bow and arrows said that he had pulled the arrows from the dead bodies of soldiers that the Indians had killed with Custer. This was our first news of a fight. The Indians said that a big force of Indians had killed Custer and all his soldiers. I then took the three Indians to Lieut. Humbert the post commander, and they repeated their story of the fight. * * * As Adjutant I wrote a message which Humbert signed and sent it by a courier thirty miles to Bismarck, the nearest telegraph office, to the Adjutant General, Dept. of Dakota, St. Paul. This was the first news sent of the fight. There was an old stockade south of the post buildings, and Humbert put his company in one bastion and I put my company in the other bastion, where we stayed all night on watch for an attack. The next day Capt. Grant Marsh with his steamer The Far West arrived at Bismarck. He had on board some wounded soldiers from Reno's battalion.
But why the telegraph operator at Bozeman failed to transmit Terry's report the afternoon of 3 July has never been explained: nor has it ever been explained why the editor of the Bozeman Times did not round up the operator and scoop the news himself. Certainly the opportunity was wide open.
It has been stated that the wires were down and that no message could be sent from Bozeman on that day; but Captain Benham's official report gives the lie to that assertion.
Perhaps the Bozeman telegraph operator had already commenced to celebrate the Glorious Fourth when Benham rode in with Terry's report. In the "good old days" many celebrants of Independence Day absorbed their patriotism from a bottle. Perhaps-but it is idle to speculate. Quien sabe!
Last edition:
Tuesday, July 4, 1876. The Centennial.
Saturday, July 4, 2026
Sunday, July 4, 1926. The Sesquicentennial.
The Sesquicentennial Exposition, again in Philadelphia, was being held to celebrate the Sesquicentennial of American independence.
Casper was celebrating the Fourth.
Some displeasure was expressed about "modern girls".
Tourism was being boosted.
The Battle of the Little Big Horn was being recalled while Casper was arguing for North Platte appropriations.
The Headquarters Troop of the state's National Guard cavalry regiment was hosting a rodeo.
Twentyone Mexican prisoners at the Blue Ridge State Prison Farm, in Blue Ridge, Texas in Fort Bend County, near Houston, escaped. Thirtytwo fellow countrymen chose to remain. The break was accomplished by sawing through the building.
The Nazi Party staged its 2nd Party Congress in Weimar. The Grossdeutsche Jugendbewegung (Greater German Youth Movement) was renamed Hitler Jugend Bund der deutschen Arbeiterjugend (Hitler Youth League of German Worker Youth.
I'm quite confident that if Pete Hegseth proposed renaming the Boy Scouts the Greater Trump Loving Boy's Movement, the current GOP would demand it.
Torrential rains hit the country on the same day.
Last edition:
Friday, July 2, 1926. Air Corps established.
Sunday, June 28, 2026
Wednesday, June 28, 1876. Burial detail.
Marcus Reno's detail began burying the dead on Last Stand Hill in shallow graves.
The graves were very shallow, reflecting that cavalry in the field really didn't have equipment suitable for digging graves. During the battle itself digging in had proven to be difficult. The extent to which the soldiers were barely covered would be shocking under modern circumstances, but then burying men where they fell would be too. In the 19th Century, however, there was little other choice.
Last edition:
Tuesday, June 27, 1876. Terry and Gibbon arrive.
Saturday, June 27, 2026
Tuesday, June 27, 1876. Terry and Gibbon arrive.
Terry's column arrived at the Little Big Horn. He wrote his report to Gen. Sheridan on Last Stand Hill.
It is my painful duty to report that day before yesterday, the 25th instant, a great disaster overtook General Custer and the troops under his command. At 12 o'clock of the 22nd instant he started with his whole regiment and a strong detachment of scouts and guides from the mouth of the Rosebud; proceeding up that river about twenty miles he struck a very heavy Indian trail, which had previously been discovered, and pursuing it, found that it led, as it was supposed that it would lead, to the Little Big Horn River. Here he found a village of almost unlimited extent, and at once attacked it with that portion of his command which was immediately at hand. Major Reno, with three companies, A, G, and M, of the regiment, was sent into the valley of the stream at the point where the trail struck it. General Custer, with five companies, C, E, F, I, and L, attempted to enter about three miles lower down. Reno, forded the river, charged down its left bank, and fought on foot until finally completely overwhelmed by numbers he was compelled to mount and recross the river and seek a refuge on the high bluffs which overlook its right bank. Just as he recrossed, Captain Benteen, who, with three companies, D, H, and K, was some two (2) miles to the left of Reno when the action commenced, but who had been ordered by General Custer to return, came to the river, and rightly concluding that it was useless for his force to attempt to renew the fight in the valley, he joined Reno on the bluffs. Captain McDougall with his company (B) was at first some distance in the rear with a train of pack mules. He also came up to Reno. Soon this united force was nearly surrounded by Indians, many of whom armed with rifles, occupied positions which commanded the ground held by the cavalry, ground from which there was no escape. Rifle-pits were dug, and the fight was maintained, though with heavy loss, from about half past 2 o'clock of the 25th till 6 o'clock of the 26th, when the Indians withdrew from the valley, taking with them their village. Of the movements of General Custer and the five companies under his immediate command, scarcely anything is known from those who witnessed them; for no officer or soldier who accompanied him has yet been found alive. His trail from the point where Reno crossed the stream, passes along and in the rear of the crest of the bluffs on the right bank for nearly or quite three miles; then it comes down to the bank of the river, but at once diverges from it, as if he had unsuccessfully attempted to cross; then turns upon itself, almost completing a circle, and closes. It is marked by the remains of his officers and men and the bodies of his horses, some of them strewn along the path, others heaped where halts appeared to have been made. There is abundant evidence that a gallant resistance was offered by the troops, but they were beset on all sides by overpowering numbers. The officers known to be killed are General Custer; Captains Keogh, Yates, and Custer, and Lieutenants Cooke, Smith, McIntosh, Calhoun, Porter, Hodgson, Sturgis, and Reilly, of the cavalry. Lieutenant Crittenden, of the Twelfth Infantry, along with Acting Assistant Surgeon D. E. Wolf, Lieutenant Harrington of the Cavalry, and Assistant Surgeon Lord are missing. Captain Benteen and Lieutenant Varnum, of the cavalry are slightly wounded. Mr. B. Custer, a brother, and Mr. Reed, a nephew, of General Custer, were with him and were killed. No other officers than those whom I have named are among the killed, wounded, and missing.
It is impossible yet to obtain a reliable list of the enlisted men killed and wounded, but the number of killed, including officers, must reach two hundred and fifty. The number of wounded is fifty-one. The balance of report will be forwarded immediately.
Benteen walked the ground of Last Stand Hill. He later recounted:
I went over the battlefield carefully with a view to determine how the battle was fought. I arrived at the conclusion then, as I have now, that it was a rout, a panic, until the last man was killed ...
That there was no line formed on the battlefield. You can take a handful of corn and scatter it over the floor, and make just such lines, there were none. The only approach to a line was where 5 or 6 horses found at equal distances, like skirmishers. Ahead of those 5 or 6 horses there were 5 or 6 men at about the same distances, showing that the horses were killed and the riders jumped off and were all heading to get where General Custer was. That was the only approach to a line on the field. There were more than 20 killed there to the right. There were 4 or 5 at one place, all within a space of 20 to 30 yards. That was the condition all over the field and in the
I think, in all probability, that the men turned their horses loose without any orders to do so. Many orders might have been given, but few obeyed. I think that they were panic stricken; it was a rout, as I said before.
Last edition:
Monday, June 26, 1876 Day two of the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Reno fights to hold his positions and against thirst, Gibbon marches south, Crook camps on Goose Creek.
Thursday, June 25, 2026
Sunday, June 25, 1876. The Battle of the the Little Big Horn.
June 25
1876 The legendary Battle of the Little Big Horn occurs in southeastern Montana. On this date, in 1876, a large combined group of Cheyennes, Sioux, Arapaho and maybe even a few Metis, defeated an assault by the 7th Cavalry in southern Montana, resulting in the complete elimination of one prong of a split assault, and the retreat and desperate defense by two other elements of the command. The 7th's effort was part of a summer 1876 campaign on the northern plains, which had seen a the defeat of a combined unit of elements of the 2d & 3d Cavalry, 4th and 9th Infantry, and Crow and Shoshone scouts in southern Montana several days earlier. Both Plains Indians victories marked the high water mark, and the rapidly receding tide, of Indian power on the northern plains.
Little Big Horn is by far the most famous of American Indian battles, and almost defines them for the average person. It remains one of the most written about of all American historical events. It was a huge shock to the American psyche at the time, and resulted in the Army being expanded by 2,500 men for Plains service.
In terms of actual casualties, the 7th suffered about 52 percent casualties of the force that was deployed, in a battle that saw fighting at widely separated points, several miles distant, including 16 officers and 242 enlisted men killed. One officer and 51 enlisted men survived the battles with wounds. The battle is mostly remembered due to the fact that the every man in Custer's immediate command was killed, which makes up the bulk of the casualties. This may be a bit unfair, as it somewhat discounts the effective defense put up by Reno and Benteen's men in a separate location.
Of interest, 22% of the 7th Cavalry was detached prior to the expedition on other duties, a fairly common occurrence. 166 men and officers therefore were not present on the campaign, and missed the battle.
Some may wonder why I have included this even in a Wyoming daily history blog, as I included an item about Colorado's Sand Creek Massacre yesterday, but these are all regional events, which had an enormous impact on Wyoming at the time. For the Indians in particular, the territorial borders did not exist.
The battle remains the greatest single defeat, and the greatest single loss of life in a single battle, in the post 1865 Indian Wars. It is not, however, the U.S. Army's worst day during the long struggle with Native Americans. That day was the Battle of the Wabash in 1791 in which the Northwestern Confederacy of Native Americans decisively defeated the U.S. Army with the Army loosing 656 men to the Natives 21 in spite of the forces being evenly matched. It was by some measures the worst day in American military history.
This is also the most written about even in American military history of all time. Only the Battle of the Bulge and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor rival it, which shows what a major psychologic impact it had on American culture and historical memory. There are, of course, a number of reasons for that which remain worth considering for a number of reasons.
To start off with the battle was, of course, a major shock at the time that it occurred, although it was no unprecedented. Fetterman's detachment being wiped out on December 21, 1866 outside of Ft. Phil Carney provided an earlier example which its always temping to draw analogies too. That particular battle, which resulted in the loss of 81 soldiers and armed civilians at the hands of some of the same combatants, and at the hands of the same tribes, actually had a more dire immediate effect on the survivors in that the post was so remote it was in serious danger of being overrun, had the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho bothered to attempt it, which they did not. 81 men, of course, is considerably less than 242.
A big part of the shock was due to the early press reporting. In spite of the Fetterman Fight, the press and the public was not prepared for such a singular defeat at the hands of Plains Indians, even though Custer's detached command was considerably outnumbered at the time of the attack. Custer was thought of as a real Indian Fighter, which he in fact was not, and the result was nearly inconceivable, resulting in a lot of fanciful speculation. To add to this the surviving officers had a built in incentive not to be responsible for what occurred, and indeed in the 7th Cavalry's case, they really were not. That didn't keep, however, some from trying to blame them just as Custer was elevated to an absolute hero. As time went on it was fairly clear to the U.S. Army what had happened, even if it wasn't necessarily to civilian writers. Early histories, moreover, assumed a level of knowledge about certain things, particularly horses, that later historians lacked, resulting in both of them omitting them. All of this contributed to a sense of romantic mystery that endures to the present day.
Evan as that mystery has endured, however, Custer became a symbol for the entire American effort against the Native Americans, from 1620 through Wounded Knee, a fact that his peculiar character lent itself to. Hated by many of his men, and detested by many of his fellow 7th Cavalry officers, he made a ready and easy scapegoat that further allowed some historians to assign personal blame to him for what occurred on this day in 1876.
In truth, what occurred at Little Big Horn is really obvious if a person is actually familiar with the conditions of frontier campaigning, which unfortunately many of the post 1930 or so historians have not been.
Alfred Terry had detached Custer's command on June 22, 1876, because it was a cavalry command and he needed a force to cover vast distances quickly. Cavalry suited that purpose. But even as it did, it was saddled with certain distinct limitations, the most pronounced being the very thing that gave it mobility, the horse.
American cavalrymen, like European cavalrymen, and the cavalrymen of ever modern army (and yes this was a modern army) assigned one mount per man. Officers often had a second. This was not, it might be noted, the historical norm. Mongols, for example, had multiple mounts per man.
In fact, Native Americans had multiple mounts per man. And so did cowboys when working cattle, in spite of what the movies may have falsely told us. The cowboy norm was seven mounts per man. The Native American situation depended upon his personal wealth, often measured in horses, but to be an effective warrior he needed more than one. Indeed, the entire culture of horse raiding is explained by this.
The reason for this is that horses "break down". In a campaign, at first, this is not a factor. But by June 21, 1876, when Custer's command was detached, his troopers, and their horses, had been in the field for weeks. By that time the horses were undoubtedly fatigued.
Moreover, American cavalrymen were mounted on American Horses, big cavalry mounts that were strong and adept at covering ground, but also horses bread for more temperate conditions. In the East, there was always plenty of feed, but that was not true in the West. As a result, horses "broke down" quickly. Once a mount "broke down", a cavalryman was converted into a foot soldier for the rest of the campaign, attached to the baggage train.
The Army was well aware of this problem and studied it constantly One solution was to pick up local mounts, like those the Indians were using, and like those used by cowboy. "Range horses" were really ponies, but were tough and acclimated to their conditions. Like any horse, they would break down, but they'd endure much more than American Horses would. In some commands cavalry units going West swapped out American Horses for Range Horses, much like Marines deploying to combat during part of the Vietnam War swapped their M16s for M14s.
The Army had also long attempted to address this by severely limiting the weight load of a horse. Cavalrymen themselves were limited in height and weight. They were short, generally not being taller than 5'6", and the were light, generally not weighing more than 140 lbs. The McClellan saddle they used was very light weight. They carried very little. Even at that, however, they were faced with the problem of horse fatigue.
Indeed, while cavalry was critical, the problems it faced were so severe that at one point one Army commander lobbied for only having infantry. That was extreme, but it shows the difficulty that could exist. In contrast, Crook routinely mounted his infantry on the pack trains mules, mounting them on the mules, a double tough animal that wasn't as fast as a horse, but which was faster than walking, and saved fatigue on the nervous infantryman.
On walking, cavalrymen walked a lot in order to save their horses. This differed greatly from the native practice. Natives in transit didn't walk at all.
The Cheyenne, Sioux and Arapaho, in contrast to the Army, had all Range Horses and large numbers of them. This avoided the problems noted above, but in a camp of this size, it meant that they had to move every few days as they'd wipe out the forage. Ultimately, they couldn't keep a camp this size together at all.
Custer's command spent the night of June 24 in the Wolf Mountains. At 3:00 a.m. his scouts climbed a peak called "the Crow's Nest" and at first light, 5:00 a.m. they sighted it. It was 15 miles distant. The 7th Cavalry started its advance on the camp at 8:00, an hour after Custer was informed of the camp's presence. It took the 7th Cavalry four hours to cover the ground. Once the command departed at 8:00, it was committed to action, albeit with no plan in place, as the risk of the natives detecting the dust of the huge number of horses was too great not to advance to conclusion.
At noon Custer's command had a good view of a portion of the camp and he divided his command, detailing Maj. Reno to hit what would have been the left flank, from his prospective.
This brings up a couple of things that need to be addressed in any discussion of the battle. One thing is that there was no reconnaissance of the position being attacked whatsoever. This probably isn't surprising, however, even though reconnaissance was a function of cavalry. Once committed at 8, as noted, the command was committed and there was no choice but to go forward.
But was committing itself a mistake. Terry suggested, but did not command, that Custer wait for Gibbons and Terry to advance from the north. The location of Terry and Gibbon, however, was completely unknown, and it was clear to all that a large camp would move. Native camps, moreover, were notoriously able to move without being detected. Custer had some justification for attacking when he could. By the same token, however, shadowing the camp, was a bit of an option, although the longer the cavalry was nearby the greater the risk that it would be attacked itself. Custer's decision, therefore, was not unreasonable.
Added to that, Custer did not really have very much experience in Indian warfare. Nobody in the post Civil War Army did. There had been men with vast frontier fighting experience n the Army prior to the Civil War, but the war had consumed them in one form or another, and they were not the field commanders of the post Civil War Army. Custer had campaigned against natives before, but those campaigns had been largely ineffectual with no trace of the natives being found. The exception was Washita in 1868 which had been a near disaster and a moral travesty.
Custer had, of course, a lot of Civil War experience. Every officer in his command did. That, however, was not particularly useful on the plains.
The second part of this is that once the location of the camp was determined, Custer had a choice of hitting it from one side, with a unified command, or trying to effectively surround it, and hit from both sides. He opted for that latter option. In theory, that was a good decision, but it depended on the right flank being found and hit with no reconnaissance.
Once the decision was made, it took from noon until 3:00 for Reno's troops to charge the village. He hit alone, with Custer's command detached and its location unknow to Reno. It's known now that Custer personally advanced down to the river several times to try to determine where to hit the Indian village, only to find that he was not yet on its edge. It took Custer an hour to find a location to attempt to charge the camp.
All of this means that as this was occurring the entire command was mounted on horses that were fatigued to start with. During the last phase of the operation horses would have been kept at a fast gait the entire time. From something like 2:30 until 4:00 every mount in the command was at a canter or faster.
Reno's charge immediately stalled out and he was forced to have his troops dismount and fight a defensive action from 3:00 to 3:40, at which point the survivors retreated in the hills, to be later joined by Benteen who was bringing up the pack train. This means that Custer actually committed his command after Reno had already retreated. The native camp covered an expanse of three miles. not a great distance, but a difficult one for cavalrymen because of it hilly terrain, where as the Sioux and Cheyenne were on the flat river bottom. The native combatants, mounted on fresh mounts, were able to cover the distance from Reno's failed retreat to Custer's new charge in no time. Reno in contrast was effectively immobilized, in spite of later criticism that he should have attempted to ride to Custer's aid. In reality, he could not have and that would have resulted in the elimination of his command as well.
Custer's command was destroyed over a period of an hour, much longer than popularly imagined, with a huge volley of fire being heard at one point. The last of his troops were overrun at about 5:30. Native combatants thereafter drifted back to where Reno was to take potshots at his dug in troops. They kept it up all the next day until they decamped and departed the night of June 26.
Last edition:
Wednesday, June 24, 2026
Saturday, June 24, 1876. Custer marches into the Wolf Mountains, Terry starts down the Big Horn.
The 7th Cavalry halted at where Busby Montana presently is. Knowing that the Sioux were somewhere in the vicinity, scouts were sent ahead to the Crow's Nest in the Wolf Mountains. The command then married a further fifteen miles at night towards the location.
Keeping in mind that sundown occurs in this region on this day at about 9:00 p.m., this means the already exhausted command was making a difficult night march.
Not all that far off, the Sioux/Cheyenne camp was holding the Dying Dancing Ceremony in which teenagers vowed to lose their lives in battle to defend the camp.
Terry's command was ferried to the southside of the Yellowstone near the mouth of the Big Horn to proceed up the river's valley with the goal of reaching the mouth of the Little Big Horn by June 26. It was hoped that Custer's command would have maneuvered to the south of the camp by the 26, which was an approximate date, allowing the camp, which was known to exist somewhere in the area, to be trapped. As it was, Custer had maneuvered to the southwest of the camp by the late night of the 25th.
Last edition:
Friday, June 23, 1876. Camp on the Rosebud.
Tuesday, June 23, 2026
Friday, June 23, 1876. Camp on the Rosebud.
The 7th Cavalry's camp on this day in 1876: https://www.flickr.com/photos/mtalplacido/53876295032/in/photostream/
President Grant created a reservation in California, the largest in that state.
Executive Order—Creating the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation
June 23, 1876
EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 23, 1876.
It is hereby ordered that the south and west boundaries and that portion of the north boundary west of Trinity River surveyed, in 1875, by C. T. Bissel, and the courses and distances of the east boundary, and that portion of the north boundary east of Trinity River reported but not surveyed by him, viz: “Beginning at the southeast corner of the reservation at a post set in mound of rocks, marked ‘H. V. R., No. 3'; thence south 17½ degrees west, 905.15 chains, to southeast corner or reservation; thence south 72½ degrees west, 480 chains, to the mouth of Trinity River,” be, and hereby are, declared to be the exterior boundaries of Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation, and the land embraced therein, an area of 89,572.43 acres, be, and hereby is, withdrawn from public sale, and set apart for Indian purposes, as one of the Indian reservations authorized to be set apart, in California, by act of Congress approved April 8, 1864. (13 Stats., p. 39.)
U. S. GRANT
Last edition:
Thursday, June 22, 1876. 7th Cavalry leaves the Yellowstone.
Monday, June 22, 2026
Thursday, June 22, 1876. 7th Cavalry leaves the Yellowstone.
The 7th Cavalry, under George A. Custer, departed the Yellowstone River under orders to ride south the entire length of the Rosebud, then went until they encountered the Sioux. Gibbon and Terry marched the rest of the command to the South, with there being the thought they would accordingly trap the Sioux in this fashion.
Custer as given written orders, stating:
Headquarters of the Department of Dakota (In the Field)
Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana Territory June 22nd, 1876
Lieutenant-Colonel Custer,
7th Calvary
Colonel: The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians passing around your left flank.
The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible. The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's command.
The supply-steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks of the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander, who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the mean time you receive further orders.
Very respectfully, Your obedient servant,
E. W. Smith, Captain, 18th Infantry A. A. J. G.
Much has been made of this order, but it is clear that it gave Terry's wishes, while also giving Custer operational freedom.
Col. Gibbon was in command of the 7th Infantry of the Montana Column consisting of the F, G, H, and L of the 2nd Cavalry under James S. Brisbin from Fort Ellis.
Reno of the 7th Cavalry, as noted, had seen traces of a Sioux party on the Rosebud, which was likely the band that had earlier hit Crook, a battle which the Montana Column was unaware of. Crook was drawing off towards the Big Horn Mountains at the time.
Custer's command made ten miles that day.
Last edition:
Wednesday, June 21, 1876. Far West.
Sunday, June 21, 2026
Wednesday, June 21, 1876. Far West.
Brig Gen. Alfred Terry held a conference of war aboard the steamboat the Far West. They determined to use a pincer strategy and divide their forces in order to locate and subdue the Sioux and Cheyenne in the field, with one column under Lt. Col. George A. Custer and another under Terry.
Custer was to go up Rosebud Creek to track a village known to be somewhere in the area. It was not known that George Crook had just encountered the same native band, and had been turned back.
Last edition:
Sunday, June 18, 1876. Montenegrin-Ottoman War commences.
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