Royal Saudi Air Force F3 Tornado.
As it becomes increasingly more likely that Iran had a role in this past week's drone strikes on Saudi Arabian oil production facilities which resulted in a 5% reduction in the world's oil supply (albeit at a time in which that doesn't matter much) the question has increasingly become, what will the U.S. do about that?
Note that it doesn't seem to be the case that people are debating whether or not the US should do nothing at all.
There are, of course, a lot of reasons for that. A primary ones is that a strike by a rogue nation that has a long history of crossing the line in participating in wars and quasi wars outside of its own borders is hard to ignore. Iran does more than aid its allies, including irregular allies, in the region, it directly participates in the struggles in those countries and invariably through a lens that's filtered through a very Shiia view, even if Iran's people aren't necessarily on board with such actions. Perhaps a larger reason, however, is that a strike in this fashion on 5% of a critical resource used around the globe is impossible to ignore.
Having said that, however, there seems to be a simple assumption that the US should and will do something about this.
We're less dependent upon Saudi oil than most European nations are and than Asian nations are. As American oil production increases, we're now a net energy (not oil) exporter. The 5% reduction in the global supply wouldn't really hurt us if the supply was tight, which it isn't.
And Saudi Arabia is a nation which shares no values with the US whatsoever. Iran is an Islamic republic, which is a term that has debatable meaning but which means, in its case, that Shiia clerics have a sort of an extra governmental role in the country and that it's not a real democracy. But Saudi Arabia is a Sunni monarchy. It's not democratic either.
Of course, Iran has had an expansive view of itself in which it has had sort of a missionary zeal, now much reduced among its population, to spread a certain sort of Islam wherever it can, and by whatever means, including violent ones, that it has. Saudi Arabia never had that, with its founding family's alliance with a certain conservative brand of Sunnism at least somewhat for convenience. It's goals were local, and it ceased being expansive in the 1920s. That does make it distinctly different.
Be that as it may, it has a military and that military has an air force. And that air force is a good one.
The Saudi army is a tiny one and real questions exist about its ability to do anything much in the case of a real war. It never has had to fight one on its own, and it's likely not accidental that its army is small. A standing army is a threat to a monarch. Iran's standing army did nothing to aid the Shah when he fell, basically taking the Hindenburg/Ludendorf option when that time came. Egypt's standing army deposed its monarch and still basically runs the country over 60 years later.
But Iran's army isn't all that great either and at this point, frankly, there are likely real questions about its loyalty. And Iran and Saudi Arabia do not share a border. Iran can make trouble for Saudi Arabia with terrorist forces, which Saudi Arabia no doubt knows and which is likely part of the reason that the desert monarchy is taking a role in the Yemeni civil war. So while Iran can make things worse for Saudi Arabia, it's not holding back all that much now.
And Iran doesn't really have much of an air force. It's had a hard time getting modern aircraft since the Islamic Revolution and therefore while it has military aircraft, it's really frozen in time with them and has a hard time maintaining the aircraft it has.
The long and the short of that is that Saudi Arabia can undoubtedly hit Iran from the air and there's not all that much Iran can do about it.
But due to the Pax Americana, it won't, and we likely will do something.
Saudi Arabia is not, contrary to what pundits will claim, our "ally", at least in a formal sense. There are unspoken arrangements, to be sure, however. And since 1945, or perhaps really since 1941, we've decided that there are certain things that our allies shouldn't do, or our clients shouldn't do, or that we'd rather other countries not do, so we do them ourselves. We're not the world's policeman, to be sure, but perhaps more the world's ranger, or sheriff, or something. Maybe just the local bodyguard in other ways.
Anyhow, as part of that, it's interesting to see that everyone is so acclimated to the concept that the question isn't, "will Saudi Arabia strike back?", but will we?
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September 19, 2019
A couple of interesting developments in this story today.
The first links back to something I mentioned above, more or less. The New York Times has an editorial headlined We Are Not The Saudi's Mercenaries. In other words, it's up to the Saudis to do something about this situation, not the U.S.
Other headlines keep noting that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that the attacks were an "act of war". He did, but the way he said it gives rise to how the press can be accused of inaccurate reporting, at least in headlines. Pompeo actually said it was an act of war upon Saudi Arabia, and specifically noted that the Iranian backed strikes was upon that country. That strongly suggests that the US was noting the strikes as an act of war, which if Iran launched them directly, it definitely is. But his further remarks suggested an effort to push Saudi Arabia to act or at least that the US regarded the strikes as an act of war upon a friendly nation.
That may very well be a predictor on how this will play out. Something will happen, but it may not be obvious to us what it is. Saudi Arabia has been strongly opposed to Iran for decades, but it has never shown an inclination get into a war with Iran, or any major Middle Eastern power, and it's unlikely to do so now. By noting that it was an act of war upon Iran, the US may be indicating that it will support what Saudi Arabia does, but that shouldn't be taken as a signal that the US will necessarily be the country that takes action. Indeed, President Trump, while he has talked tough on Iran, has been pretty openly reluctant to take military action against it where prior Presidents of both parties might have been.
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September 20, 2019
Iran's foreign minister declared yesterday that if the United States or Saudi Arabia strike its territory there will be "all out war".
If any more proof was needed that Iran's self isolation has reduced some of its government to being dangerously deluded in a "we only listen to ourselves" sort of way, this would be it. You can't really launch an air strike, by any means, including by proxy, and not be aware that this is itself an act of war.
It seems increasingly likely that Saudi Arabia will be taking the lead in a response and that there will be one. Iran's action seem to bizarrely be done in the belief that by attacking Saudi Arabia people will be convinced to deal with it as its a dangerously armed nation having a temper tantrum. It's sort of like a drunk trying to get admission to the bar by smashing a window.
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September 24, 2019
Germany, the United Kingdom and France yesterday proclaimed their certainty that Iran is behind the recent drone strikes on Saudi oil production. Iran dismissed the charge claiming that if it had been, the destruction would have been much more complete.
At this point there seems little doubt that Iran's behind the action in one fashion or another. The question therefore has become what shall be done, and who shall do it.
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