The Nationalist launched the Handan Campaign (邯郸战役) against the Communists in northern China, one of their largest campaigns in the immediate post World War Two period.
Egypt recognized the United Nations Charter.
Churchill participated in a debate in which he made a pithy comment on Socialism. It's often miscited as being delivered in a speech, but it was not.
DEMOBILISATION
HC Deb 22 October 1945 vol 414 cc1688-8101688
§3.23 p.m.
§Mr. Churchill (Woodford): We have asked for this Debate upon demobilisation, because demobilisation is the foundation upon which, at this moment, everything else stands, and also, because tardy, inadequate demobilisation is the fountain-head of all our domestic difficulties. Whatever view may be taken of Socialism or free enterprise, surely it is common ground between us all, that we should get all the great wheels and the little wheels of life and industry in this country turning as soon as possible. For this we need the men. Without the men, and also the women, now held in the Services, there can be no speedy revival. The woeful shortage of consumer goods will continue. The Government will be afraid to allow people to spend their savings, for fear of undue rise in prices. Scarcity will be used as justification for controls, and controls will become the fatal means of prolonging scarcity. Get all the great wheels turning, and all the little cog wheels too. Let them rotate and revolve, spin and hum, and we shall have taken a long step forward towards our deliverance. In order to get them turning, we must bring the men home, and set the men free.
I am disquieted at the slow rate of demobilisation. I would have been ashamed to be responsible for the earliest declarations of His Majesty's Government on this subject. Even now that these have been markedly improved, I have no hesitation in saying that they fall far below what is both possible and necessary. His Majesty's Ministers have had an enormous windfall in the sudden end of the Japanese war, and of the cessation of fighting and slaughter throughout the world. There are no more enemies to conquer; no more fronts to hold. [Hon. Members: "Oh."] I mean of course in a military sphere. All our foreign foes 1689have been beaten down into unconditional surrender. Now is the time to bring home the men who have conquered, and bring them back to their families and productive work. There is, we are assured, no lack of productive work. There is, at this time, no fear of large-scale unemployment. Every industry is clamouring for men. Everywhere are useful and fruitful tasks to be performed. I am sure that the restrictions and controls which would prevent men from getting work, and which would hobble and fetter the life energies of the nation, will be swept away once the men are back, and the whole great series of wheels will begin to turn. Do not let us be deterred by the fear of shortage of houses. Use billeting wherever necessary to the full; take the land for houses, if you need it—I say if you need it—as readily as you would have taken it for a gun site in 1940–41. Do whatever is needful and humanly possible to bring the men home and get things started again.
I would not go so far in urging the Government to these extreme efforts—I know their difficulties—if I were not prepared myself to run the risk of trying to make a positive contribution to our problems. There is some risk in a Member of the Opposition making a positive proposal, or set of proposals. I have no longer the power to "press the button" and obtain the exact information on any point. Still I have a general knowledge of our national life problem as a whole, particularly on its military side. For what it is worth, however, I am prepared, in good will and in good faith, to offer some definite suggestions to His Majesty's Government. We are told that the return of the troops and the members of the other Services is delayed or regulated by three conditions—first, our commitments—such is the term that is used—that is the military necessities; second, transportation; and third, the execution of the Bevin Coalition Government demobilisation plan.
I will deal with these three. First of all, commitments. This is a most dangerous ground for anyone not possessed of the latest information to venture upon. Nevertheless, I shall try my best, and, if the estimates which I make are shown to be erroneous, I shall be very ready to be convinced by the responsible statements of Ministers. I am going to submit 1690to the House what I think should be the strength of the United Kingdom Armed Forces, which we should aim to reach with all possible speed. A year later these strengths could be reconsidered in closer relation to our long-term plan. I take the Navy first. On existing plans, allowing for intake, on 31st December of this year, the strength of the Navy would be 665,000, of whom 55,000 are women, so that the Navy would even retain 448,000 at the end of June, 1946. I am astounded that such figures should be accepted by His Majesty's Government. I know no reason why Vote A of the Navy should exceed the figure at which it stood in the Estimates of 1939,namely, 133,000. We had a fine Navy at the outbreak of war. I was sent to the Admiralty, at a few hours' notice on 3rd September, 1939, and that is what I found, relatively, to the Forces of other countries against whom we were at that time matched, or likely to be matched. I have yet to hear any argument which justifies our planning to maintain, or maintaining, at the present time—unlessit be in connection with the Fleet Air Arm—a larger naval force in personnel than we had at the beginning of the late war.
I remember that at the height of the Nelson period, in the war against Napoleon, we reached a Vote A of 148,000, and that, oddly enough, was the figure that I was responsible for reaching in August, 1914. Let us take, as a working figure,150,000. If there is some entirely new case to be unfolded because of new commitments, which I have not heard of, the Government should lay that case before the House. On the whole, although I think we should not be too precipitate in judging these matters, it would seem that new conditions might, at any rate in respect of very large vessels, tell the other way. But, failing some entirely new situation, of which only the Government can be aware, definite orders should be given to discharge all men surplus to the 150,000, and to make sure that the enormously swollen shore establishments are reduced equally with those afloat. I hazard the guess that at this time, there are nearly as many men of the Navy ashore as afloat. I should have thought that no great length of time would be needed for this operation, provided orders were given now, and enforced with real authority. At the same 1691time, while this operation is going on, every opportunity should be given to men, entitled to release, to stay on if they volunteer. If there were so many volunteers that the number was exceeded, I think we should face that.
Here I will make a digression. It seems most urgent, and, indeed, vital, that the Government should put forward their proposals, in outline at any rate, for the permanent scale at which all three of our Armed Services are to be maintained, let us say, in the next 10 years. Men and women in all the three Forces ought to know, now, the conditions under which they can continue in the Services, or can transfer from "hostilities only" to longer or full-time engagements. I am inclined to agree with a remark which I saw attributed to the Minister of Labour and National Service the other day, to the effect that there is not the same universal general desire to leave the Services now, which was encountered after the first great war.
§The Minister of Labour (Mr. Isaacs): Would the right hon. Gentleman permit me to explain that that was a section of a statement which I made at Birmingham, and which was reported in the Birmingham newspaper, but the preceding sentence, which was of importance, was omitted from the Press statement?
§Mr. Churchill: I am sorry—I thought we were making a link of agreement. It seems to me that there is a. large number of people in the Services who wish to continue voluntarily, and we all think that is a very good thing. After all, though this war has been terrible in many ways, we have not had the awful slaughter of the last war, or the hideous grind of the trenches. There have been movement and drama, and I can quite see that there may be some who would prefer to continue in the profession of arms. I think that if they were offered suitable terms, they would give a further period, voluntarily, of service abroad. But at present I am assured that no plan has been made, and no commanding officer in any of the Services knows how to answer the inquiries which are made of him. So while affirming and enforcing the principle of national service—of which I trust we are to hear from His Majesty's Government—it should surely be our policy to encourage the largest number of men to stay 1692of their own free will. We ought to be very reluctant at this juncture to turn off any trained man who wishes to continue under arms. This digression applies to all three Services, but, returning to the Navy, apart from what I have said about volunteers, I submit that the figure should come down at once, as speedily and as quickly as possible, to 150,000 men on Vote A.
I come now to the Royal Air Force. I do not know what the Government's policy is about our Air Force. It may be that what I am going to suggest is more than they have in mind. I consider that the permanent Royal Air Force must be maintained on a very large scale, and in magnificent quality, with the very latest machines, and that they should become the prime factor in our island and Imperial defence. I may say I had thought that 150 to 200 combatant squadrons, with the necessary training establishments, and, of course, with the large auxiliary reserves which can be developed, should be our staple. This would involve about 4,000 machines under constant construction, the auxiliary forces being additional. If you have 100 men on the ground for every machine in the air you are making an allowance which, in my opinion, is grossly extravagant and capable of immense revision by competent administration. However, to be on the safe side, I would take that figure. It would seem to me that the personnel for the R.A.F. should be 400,000, as compared with 150,000 for the Royal Navy, and that it should now be brought down to that figure. The present plan for the Air Force contemplates 819,000 men and women being retained up to 31st December, and as many as 699,000—I might almost have called it 700,000—being held as late as 30th June, 1946.
I yield to none in my desire to see preserved this splendid weapon of the Royal Air Force, upon which our safety and our freedom depend, but, for this great purpose, it is all the more necessary to get the life of the nation working again, and not to squander our remaining treasure in keeping a large number of men in the Royal Air Force—who are not really wanted either for immediate needs, or for the permanent organisation—and to keep them lolling about at great cost to the public and vexation to themselves. I sub- 1693mit to the Ministers whom I see opposite, that they should fix the figure of the permanent Air Force organisation and then cut down to that with the utmost speed. This also implies decisions being taken about airfields which are now being held and guarded, on a full war-time scale, by such large numbers of men.
I have dealt with the Navy—or rather, I have touched on the Navy, because one could speak for very long periods on these points—and the Royal Air Force. Now I come to the most difficult subject of all, the Army, and if I were to burden the House with all the reasonings which led to my present computation, I should, Mr. Speaker, far outrun the limits of your patience and, no doubt, of my own voice. For the occupation of Germany and the Low Countries a ration strength of 400,000 men should be the maximum. I say ration strength because all calculations in divisions are misleading. There is no need for general organisation in divisional formations, or for such divisions as are maintained to possess the characteristics and the armaments of divisions entering a line of battle in the heat of the struggle against the former German Army in its prime. It is a different task that they have to do, and different organisations are required to meet it. Mobile brigades, military police, armoured car and light tank units, sedentary forces for particular garrison duties—such are the methods to which military thought should be guided by political authority.
The task of holding Germany down will not be a hard one; it will be much more difficult to hold her up. The weight of administration must be thrown upon the Germans. They must be made to bear the burden. We cannot have all our best officers, scientists and engineers organising them, when we, ourselves, have need of those men's services. But I will not expatiate on this point. I say 400,000 ration strength—one half teeth, the other half tail—properly organised, with perhaps half of them fighting men and men for rearward service, and also for garrison work, would be sufficient. It may well be, also, that apart from this force, training establishments from Great Britain should be set up in Germany, where the young troops would learn their profession on soil which their fathers and elder brothers have at once conquered and liberated I understand that the United 1694States are keeping about 350,000 troops in Germany, of which, again broadly speaking, one-half are fighting men and one-half administrative services.
In view of all the dangers that there are in North-Eastern Italy, in view of our obligations in Greece and all the difficulties developing in Palestine and the Middle East, I would hazard the figure of another 400,000 ration strength which would be required, at any rate, I think, until the end of 1946, and probably longer, in the Mediterranean theatre. In Palestine, above all, gendarmerie and brigade groups should supersede divisional formations with all their cumbrous apparatus. I would add to these figures, as a margin for War Office establishments in this island and India, as well as fortress garrisons outside the Mediterranean, another 200,000 men, making a total for the Army, in the period which lies immediately before us, of 1,000,000 men. I must emphasise that this 1,000,000 strength is a ration strength of United Kingdom soldiers, and does not take auxiliary or native soldiers into account. I may say that I came to this conclusion before I saw the figures of the late Government's plan which the Minister of Labour put forward, I think, on the 2nd of this month. I find that by 30th June, 1946, His Majesty's Government propose to reduce the Army to 1,156,000 men. There is certainly not much between us on that figure. I would not quarrel about it.
The question however remains, When is this total to be reached? Why should time be wasted in reaching that total? This is the vital point. Any unnecessary men kept by compulsion with the Colours hamper our revival here, and waste the money we shall need to maintain our Armed Forces in the years that are to come. Under the present plan, by 31st December there will still be 2,343,000 men and women in the Army, of whom 130,000 will be women. Considering that that will be nearly eight months after the German war ended, I say that the number is far too many. I am told that January and February are months when releases from the Army flag notably. In what way should we be harmed, if the Government total of 1,156,900 men aimed at for 30th June, 1946, were, by good and energetic administration, reached by the end of March? Should we not be very much 1695better off? I urge that this new target should be at once declared, namely, to reach the June figure three months earlier. If we add 1,000,000 United Kingdom ration strength for the Army to 400,000 for the Royal Air Force and 150,000 for the Royal Navy, we have a total ration strength of 1,550,000 men, which, I submit to the House, if organised with due economy and contrivance, should suffice for our needs in the immediate future, and should give time for the long-term policy to be shaped in closer detail.
Now if we take this figure as a working basis, let us subtract it from the total numbers which will be retained under arms at31st December by the latest scheme of the Government. I understand that if the whole of their present programme is carried out, they will have 3,842,000 men and women in the Forces at that date. There are, therefore, potentially more than 2,225,000 men who are redundant and surplus, in my view, and who should not be retained in the Services more than one moment longer than is necessary to bring them home, or set them free, if they are here already. These 2,225,000 men who are redundant are unemployed. We publish the unemployment figures each week and rejoice that they are small, but they are an inaccurate return while there is this great pocket, this 2,225,000, unemployed. To have 2,225,000 unemployed, and unemployed under the most wasteful and expensive conditions to the State, and in many cases irritating to the men themselves, is intolerable.
The majority of these men are outside the United Kingdom. Nothing is more costly than holding the dumbbell at arm's length. Every day counts. Even in June, 1946, eight months from now, and 13 months after the end of the war with Germany, the Government propose, with intake, to hold 2,408,000 persons in uniform in the three Services. I contend that the target to be aimed at should be 1,550,000 and that this smaller figure should be reached earlier. The maintenance of immense numbers of redundant forces overseas, and held here in this island, not only brings ruin to the Exchequer but also makes inroads upon our shipping for the feeding of the Forces overseas. These inroads are of a grievous character, and the most solid justification 1696is needed to defend them. I regard the speedy repatriation and release of these 2,225,000 men as a supreme task which lies before His Majesty's Government at the present time.
I must, however, make one very serious reservation. In my calculations and estimates I have definitely excluded the possibility of a major war in the next few years. If His Majesty's Government consider that this is wrong, then it would not be a case of demobilisation at all but of remobilisation, because what has taken place and is going on has already woefully impaired the immediate fighting efficiency of the enormous Forces we still retain. I believe, however, it may be common ground that this possibility of a major war may rightly be excluded, and that we have an interlude of grace in which mankind may be able to make better arrangements for this tortured world than we have hitherto achieved. Still I make that reservation.
I shall no doubt be told that there is no transport, and that all our transportation both by sea and air is fully occupied on the existing proposals. So far as sea transportation is concerned, I do not believe it. When I recall to mind the immense magnitude of the supply fleets which were provided and prepared for the Japanese struggle in 1945 and 1946, and the fact that we are relieved of at least three-quarters, if not four-fifths, of the burden of maintaining an aggressive war at the other end of the world, it is incredible that there should not be now enough tonnage available, and that we should not be able to have an incomparably higher scale of transportation than any envisaged in the days when the Bevin scheme was framed, when we contemplated a prolonged war with Japan.
We on this side are well acquainted with the position as it stood when the last Government resigned. While transportation is certainly tight, it cannot be considered the first limiting factor. The releases of troops from abroad have been more restricted than the transportation to move them. In proof of this I have been told—I am willing to learn if I have been wrongly told—that we are carrying, or about to carry, a considerable number of French troops about the world, to Dakar or Indo-China or elsewhere, which, according to earlier plans were not to be moved by us until after 30th June, 16971946, but that they are now being taken earlier because British military and Air Force releases have not come up to the forecasted schedule. I am quite willing to be told that this is wrong, but let us be told if it is wrong. I do not wish to blame the Government. I know their difficulties. I have no doubt that they are doing their best, but if these facts are true they are very painful and they ought to be grappled with.
There are various suggestions of a minor character, but cumulatively of some notable consequence, to make about speeding up transportation by more ingenuity in the employment of the merchant vessels now engaged on troop movement. For instance, would it not be possible to bring into service the laid-up escort carriers with skeleton crews? Each of these would carry some 1,500 troops. Why should not the Medloc movement, that is the Mediterranean line of communications movement, which is well below the former planned target, not be doubled? For this purpose, and in order to secure the immediate release of more men from India and the Middle East, it may be necessary to expand the staging carries in Egypt. Surely this should not be delayed another moment. Again, is it not possible to make greater use of the trans-Canada route to bring home our people from the Pacific that way round? If we could do this we should use to the full on their return voyage, at least, the British ships now engaged on repatriating Canadian and American personnel from Europe. Together these measures would even now secure a substantial increase in the movement of troops in the first three months of next year. If these measures had been taken earlier that increase could have been gained on these figures by the end of this year. Surely even now not a moment should be lost in bringing into play these potentialities. There is also the Navy, which could move, with its own resources, some 6,000 men monthly—their own men from the Pacific fleet to Vancouver.
§The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. A. V. Alexander): We are doing so.
§Mr. Churchill: That shows that we are not in dispute in the matter, but we have not heard about it. The right hon. Gentleman may indeed "do good by 1698stealth," but he must not be vexed when he "blushes to find it fame." Are these men now being transported across Canada by the same rolling stock which is being used to take in the opposite direction the Canadian troops who have arrived in Halifax from Europe? These Navy men from the Pacific could then embark for home in ships which carry home to Canada, Canadian troops. Has that been arranged? These 6,000 naval ratings per month could then be brought home earlier than under the plan, even under the present rules. This would entail the release of a much larger corresponding number of the same age and service groups who are kept waiting for their release, and an appreciable acceleration would be brought about. These are points which I give only as instances. No doubt there are many others which should be studied with attention by His Majesty's Government. If they are already approved, it would give us great pleasure to hear that fact and credit the administration with it in the later stages of the Debate. We should be glad also of further information of the mass movement by air from remote areas, which seems to be of the greatest value and importance-.
But, after all, the great bulk of the troops and air ground personnel are over here at home, or only across the Channel in Europe. Sea transport does not enter into their return to any great extent. Ships of all kinds—well we know it—can carry troops either way across the Channel. No ships at all are needed for those who are now in this country. In the Debate on the Address I asked for the numbers of men in the various depots. They have not been given. There is no reason why they should not be given. They ought to be given. We request that they should now be given. Until we have the official figures I cannot, of course, speak with up-to-date accuracy, but I do not expect the assumption on which I am basing my argument will be very far astray.
I believe there are at least 400,000 more men than are needed for any useful purpose in what used to be called the 21st Army Group in Germany and in the Low Countries. That is not including the British Army in Italy or Austria, with which I am not dealing at this moment. Is it not true that there are here at home over a million men, the great majority of whom are absolutely redundant? Is it 1699not true that there are something like, or over, a million men here at home? We expect to know. All these men, so much needed in civil life, are being kept out of the national economic and industrial recovery, not because of any military commitments, nor for any want of transportation, but simply because their turn comes later than that of a far smaller number of men who cannot for a considerable time be brought home from the East and the Far East. This raises grave problems of which I am well aware, but we must ask: Is it sensible, is it necessary, and can it on that basis be defended?
This brings me to the third and last part of this argument. It is a part with which I am deeply familiar, namely, the Bevin demobilisation plan. No one, I think, except its author, has more right to speak about it than I, for I was Secretary of State for War and Air during the whole demobilisation period after the last war, and well I know the perils and difficulties which beset that process. I have left on record in my book "The After-math" the complexities and shocking misfortunes in which we were involved in those days by the Addison scheme of demobilisation, which was felt by the fighting troops and those who had been out longest to be most unfair, and which was sprung upon them in a manner which gave it the least chance of favourable acceptance. I have, therefore, always been a strong supporter of the Bevin scheme. One must always try to carry the confidence and sense of loyalty and fair play of the troops. It must, however, be stated and remembered that this scheme was based on the assumption that the Japanese war would continue on a great scale for at least 18 months after a German surrender, and perhaps longer, and that large new armies would have to be sent to the Far East, going away from home at the end of this long struggle in Europe, while the process of turning over to peace conditions was in full swing through the country and through a very large part of the Armed Forces.
That problem we have, thank God, been saved. It is not the situation with which we are now confronted. We have a different scene, and a different problem. We must do justice to the case as it stands and to the facts as they are. I am sure it was right to frame this Bevin 1700scheme and to make it our foundation and the first floor of our demobilisation. Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that Army opinion as a whole, convinced of the fairness of the intentions of the late and present Governments towards them, will be prepared to accept further considerable modifications in that scheme. Tidiness is a virtue, symmetry is often a constituent of beauty, but it would be a mistake to insist pedantically upon a rigid application of the Bevin scheme in the changed circumstances of to-day.
Let us take an extreme example. If, for instance, 100 men have to be kept idle in England, because 10 men higher up on the list cannot yet be brought home from Hong Kong, or Rangoon, or Calcutta, and cannot yet be placed in a category which entitles them to be brought home from these places, everyone would admit that that would be pushing a good principle to absurdity I would rather address myself to the 10 men and, by substantial additions to their pay or bonus or leave on release, and by special care for their future employment or otherwise, make up to them any disappointments which they may feel, not because they are not returning as soon as possible but because others lower down on the list have got out before them.
I am sure—and I do not speak without thought or some knowledge—that if the whole position were explained to the Army, and if substantial compensation were forthcoming to those kept longer than their time, with a proper proportion of compassionate cases, the men would understand and would accept the position. After all, does a Briton say to himself, "I am unfortunate; I cannot get home but I can bear it, because I know that 10 or 20 other men are being made unfortunate too, on my account"? That seems to me a sour and morose form of comfort. Might not a man prefer substantial compensation for himself instead of misfortunes needlessly inflicted upon others which can do him no possible good? Supposing every man was given double pay for every day that he was kept beyond his proper priority, that would be a small cost to the State compared with the enormous waste of keeping hundreds and hundreds of thousands of men out of productive work.
§Mr. Evelyn Walkden (Doncaster): Is the right hon. Gentleman seriously preach- 1701ing the Dukes plan—the T.U.C. speech suggesting compensation be given to the men in Burma if they stay out there a little longer? It was a speech by Charles Dukes at the T.U.C. which has been the subject of much correspondence in the various journals in the Far East.
§Mr. Churchill: I thought I was preaching my own plan.
§Mr. Walkden: This is rather important. Is the right hon Gentleman aware that what he is now preaching has been condemned bell, book and candle by the men in Burma and that they have vigorously attacked it in correspondence to Members on both sides of this House?
§Mr. Churchill: However that may be, I am saying what I think is in the interest of the State.
§Mr. Walkden :The right hon. Gentleman should ask the men in Burma then.
§Mr. Churchill: With considerable responsibility and after much heart searching, I am making a positive contribution to this Debate. It can be knocked about from all quarters, but I hope to see at any rate a foundation for thought and discussion on a matter in which we cannot afford to rest in a half paralysed deadlock. Supposing every man were given double pay for every day he was kept beyond his proper priority, that would be a small burden on the State compared with the enormous waste such as is going on now. Certainly a great effort should be made to solve this problem. If it makes possible a far larger rate of releases, the general rejoicing will sweep away many invidious reflections.
We are told that very large numbers of men here at home must be kept under arms because the men abroad would think it unfair that they should have the advantage of gaining employment before them. But nothing we can do will prevent men at home, who have the opportunity of moving about this country when on leave and furlough, from having an advantage in finding employment over men who are still kept beyond the oceans. Why should this difficulty be based only upon the uniformed men at home? Over 1,500,000 munition workers have been released from their war-time jobs. Only 50,000 of these, I understand, are to be used for the intake. They are being absorbed, I trust, rapidly in peace-time industry. Are not 1702these munition workers having an advantage over men kept abroad and over the men kept in uniform at home? Are not they getting the first pick of the jobs in peace-time industry? Whatever we do, there must be heart burnings, but these heart burnings are more likely to be eased by paying substantial compensation to the sufferers than by inflicting suffering on larger numbers, so that large numbers can be brought home where they can find their own feet when they arrive.
I am well aware that in paragraph 5 of his recent paper the Minister of Labour and National Service has stated that once the release of a group has become due, the men in that group are let go at once and not kept with the Colours until the men abroad have been found transportation and have been brought to this country. That was a very reasonable concession, but it departs from the principle of absolutely equal treatment as between men abroad and men at home. Men in the same group may get out several months earlier merely because they are serving at home. We have been driven from the position of absolute abstract justice with reason and good sense, and surely, having departed from the principle with good reason and with good results, we should not exclude from our minds a further advance.
Now I come to the women. I have never admitted that the principles of the Bevin scheme of priority of release in accordance with age and length of service need necessarily be applied to the women in the three fighting Services. Whatever men in group A might feel about other men with less service being released before them, or the order of priority being broken to their relative disadvantage, they do not feel the same about women. The women do not compete with the men in the same way or to the same degree. Besides, the innate chivalry of British soldiers will not dwell long upon nice calculations of relative age and length of service as between men and women. If it can be proved that a woman is necessary for some indispensable task connected with our commitments or our demobilisation, let her be kept until the due time for her release arrives. More especially is this true if it can be shown that in any particular instance a woman is replacing a man higher up the scale who can be released as a result of her retention. 1703But I am not speaking of this class. I am speaking of the very large numbers of young women in the three Services who have been kept doing nothing, fooling around with every kind of futile, fanciful task, to their own annoyance and at wasteful expense to the State. Every woman who is not irreplaceable in her present Service job, except by a man of higher category, should be released on giving a month's notice. The other day it was decided to keep a considerable number of officers longer in Germany than their class A group qualifications warranted. The reason was that the strength of the battalions had become so great that very large numbers of men were exceeding the proportion of officers, and, as the men could not under the present arrangements be demobilised, there were not the proper number of officers.
Well, this was done, and they were delayed. I understand—perhaps I am wrongly informed—that it was thought necessary to hold their opposite numbers here at home, who are a much greater number, beyond their time. After all, the officers who are kept are kept because there is vital work for them to do while similar officers, whose release is retarded at home, are kept without useful work. There is a great difference between being kept to do something, and being kept to do nothing. As for the women, many of them want to stay, but surely those who have nothing to do, and are not wanted for any purpose under the sun, should be set free now.
I earnestly hope that the Government will give unprejudiced attention to the suggestions I have ventured to make. They are put forward in no spirit of controversy but in the general interest. If we do not get this country going again pretty soon, if we do not get the great wheels turning, we may lose forever our rightful place in the post-war economic world and we may involve our finances in dire and irretrievable confusion. It is no party matter, but one in which the House as a whole should make its opinion felt in a way that will override all hesitations and obstacles which are found in the path. In order to bring us all together, I will end this practical discourse in a philosophic vein. The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings. The inherent virtue of Socialism is the equal sharing of miseries. In the present case, where an overwhelming majority of Service men and women would gain the blessings, can we not unite on the broad democratic principle of "the greatest good of the greatest number"?
§4.18 p.m.
§The Minister of Labour (Mr. Isaacs): Perhaps the first thing I should say, in speaking for the first time——[Hon. Members: "Speak up."] If hon. Members be a little courteous and wait a minute perhaps they will hear me. If that is the spirit in which we start it is a pity. The first thing that should fall to me is to express our pleasure in seeing the right hon. Gentleman back again in his accustomed health. Whatever may be our political feelings, we do like to see our colleagues recovered from illness and back with us again. In wishing the right hon. Gentleman back again there might be a little drawback so far as I am concerned, for I must admit that I am meeting a doughty opponent.
In reference to the peroration of the right hon. Gentleman, in which he said he wanted to end a practical discourse in a philosophic vein, and to what he previously said about making a number of new suggestions, I hope to show that none of his suggestions is new to the Government and that they have all been considered. Even his peroration is a bit stale and outworn. The right hon. Gentleman opened by referring to "Let's get the wheels turning," but with great respect I would suggest that the Government have endeavoured to get the wheels turning and that what we have to consider now is whether the best way to keep them turning is by giving them a push behind or by putting something down in the front of them. With great respect I would like to say to the right hon. Gentleman that I think his speech was most irresponsible and mischievous. I was just wondering whether it was intended to get the men out of the Services or to get the men out of temper with the present Government. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman cannot have read as many letters from men in the Services as some of us have read or he would realise that some of the suggestions that he made are suggestions that would be most unacceptable to them. He mentioned encouraging the men to stay in the Services. This Government 1705desire to create a scheme whereby the country will have an Armed Service in its protection that will be based upon the desire of men to enter a career and not based upon men who cannot find jobs and are forced into the Army. That will be the line of policy which the Government will follow in endeavouring to get the Forces maintained on a permanent basis. [An Hon. Member: "When?"] Not to-morrow, at any rate.
The right hon. Gentleman also mentioned the question of the number of men to be retained in the various theatres of war at the end of the war. I am not a tactician or so skilled in tactics myself as to be able to criticise the figures that are given to the Government by their skilled advisers, but we still have the same confidence in those skilled advisers as had the right hon. Gentleman when they were advising him some time back. Therefore, we must take some heed of what they say. The right hon. Gentleman mentioned that the Forces in Germany are hanging about and doing nothing and that—
Hon. Members No.
§Mr. Churchill: I said that there were 400,000 who were redundant.
§Mr. Isaacs: I was coming to the point where I think the right hon. Gentleman made a reference that is worthy of more careful examination. It was that if we have a great number of men in Germany or on the Continent who are redundant and not fully occupied, then it might be necessary to keep them there for military commitments and other contingencies; and that it might be a good thing to look into the question of establishing training centres there, as well as at home, so that those men might have an opportunity of being equipped or re-equipped to come back to their industrial life. That matter is under consideration, but it will now be pushed on.
The right hon. Gentleman said something about transport, and I would like to deal with some of the points which he raised, putting the case as the Government see it. He asked why there was a shortage and said that he did not believe it. He made some reference to the movement of French troops which, so far as I am aware, is news to the Government. He mentioned aircraft carriers; aircraft carriers are being used for the transport of troops. He mentioned the Cana- 1706dian overland route and asked why we did not consider that. We have considered it and it has not only been considered, it is being used. Foremost priority is being given to prisoners of war so that those who have suffered so much might be brought home in advance of demobilised soldiers and those who are still living under the pledge of the Government that they should have leave. That source is being used and, if at all possible, it will be extended. Further, the Navy itself are helping considerably in bringing home demobilised soldiers and people on leave. The Navy has other plans, such as converting vessels to make them more useful for troop transport and thereby expediting the return of the men.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to the Bevin scheme and further modifications of it. Any modification that can be carried out in that scheme that will not destroy the fair basis upon which it is working will be introduced. We know only too well that the fellows abroad are very anxious that we shall not play about with the scheme and that they shall get their chance to return equally with others. I would like particularly to refer to one point mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman and that is that there are, so far as the Army abroad are concerned, arrangements that if a certain group is to be released within a certain time and by a certain day, the Army arranges with Commands overseas that those men due to be released on that date are selected, sorted out and dispatched home to Britain with the intention of their being home at the time that the other men in the group are released. So from that point of view an effort is made to prevent the retaining of men abroad or at home so that other men come out at the same time.
Another point in the right hon. Gentleman's speech to which I should like to refer is Service women. It sounds so easy to say, "Let all the women come out who want to come out." In the women's Service there are grades of jobs. There are nice, cushy clean ones; some are hard, and one or two are fairly dirty. We understand that some women are quite willing to remain in the Forces, but it is fair to say that those who want to remain are those who have the clean, cushy jobs. Those who do not want to remain are those who have the dirty jobs. The same kind of thing happens elsewhere, but someone has to do the dirty work in the 1707Army as well as in industry. If we agreed to release those who are doing the dirty work, as soon as any others got on to the dirty work they would want to come out, and the thing would go on until there would be nobody left. We are convinced that the scheme as it stands is the best possible. I think we are all agreed that there must be an orderly system of release, understood by the Forces and acceptable to them as fair. So far as we understand, by direct contact, by communications and correspondence, by visits of officials and Members of the House to the Forces, there is a recognition of some of the drawbacks of the scheme but that it is better to suffer those drawbacks than to abolish or to completely change the scheme. We have stated recently, in the statement issued, that it is necessary to maintain military forces adequate to meet our national commitments.
The Government have another aim, in addition to those specified by the right hon. Gentleman, in desiring to release as many as possible from the Forces. We are anxious to save the State money by moving men out of the Forces and we are particularly anxious to get the wheels of industry turning so that we can find work for our men, goods for our people and overseas trade; but the factor that the right hon. Gentleman did not mention is that we want to get the men out in fairness to themselves. We want them all to return to their homes and families and we want to get them out of the disciplined and ordered life, back to the life of freedom. I am quite satisfied with the way in which we propose to do it, which was a way accepted by the right hon. Gentleman, who himself said, "If there is anybody, other than the present Foreign Secretary, who is responsible for the present demobilisation scheme it is myself. "We give him the credit for his idea, and we are going to stick to it.
§Mr. Churchill: Irrespective of any modifications?
§Mr. Isaacs: No. There have already been one or two modifications which I hope to explain in a moment. If we can make them without upsetting the basis of the scheme, it will be done. That is the main thing.
The Chiefs of Staffs, in a very rapid survey, completed an examination of 1708their military requirements, and they brought the figure down to2,250,000 by the end of June next year. I would make it clear that it is not the intention of the Government to say that that is where demobilisation ceases. This survey goes on and as soon as we have anything definite, in the light of military circumstances and difficulties all over the world, about the number of persons to be kept, the number will be brought down to that new figure.
§Mr. Churchill: Can the right hon. Gentleman give us the distribution of the 2,250,000 men that the Chiefs of Staffs have recommended, among the various theatres? How many at home? How many in Europe, the Mediterranean theatre, in India and in the Far East? There is no reason why we should not have the figures.
§Mr. Isaacs: I am not in a position to give those figures, but the right hon. Gentleman's request has been noted and will be considered. There are still one or two little problems knocking about in the world which might make it difficult to give all those details. It is my duty as Minister of Labour to deal with the demobilised people as they become demobilised, and I wish mainly to address myself to that part of the story.
The actual rate of release depends mainly on transport, but the Government have said, "Never mind what the transport problem is; get out the maximum numbers of men and make the transport to suit the men, and not the men to suit the transport." Every naval ship coming home is filled to capacity with men due to return; fighting ships are being used to convey personnel, and aircraft carriers are bringing home prisoners of war. A number of ships are being converted for trooping purposes. In addition to the demands upon transport for implementing the release scheme, transport is required for the repatriation of ex-prisoners of war, the repatriation of men whose overseas tour has expired, and the repatriation of Dominion and Colonial Forces. We are a long way behind in giving men their leave, and the pledge in regard to that must be kept. We have to provide transport, too, for moves of occupational forces, drafting of replacements, moves of Allied forces for occupational duties in the Far East, and for the repatriation of 1709civilians and other civilian movements. All these cause a great demand on transport, and we are happy to be able to say that, through the co-operation of the United States of America, we now have the use of the "Queen Elizabeth," the "Aquitania" and other ships, which have been placed at our disposal to help us get demobilisation hurried forward.
§Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore (Ayr Burghs): What does "placed at our disposal" mean? Are not these British ships?
§Mr. Isaacs: Of course they are, but I thought hon. Gentlemen knew that there was a contract of some sort between ourselves and America by which they had the use of these ships.
§Mr. Stephen (Glasgow, Camlachie): We have never been told.
§Mr. Isaacs: Will hon. Members accept it from me that there was that contract, which was made some time ago when troops were being carried in the opposite direction? The American Government have now agreed to surrender those ships, in spite of the contract, to enable this movement of troops to go ahead.
The rate of relief is already being accelerated. The total number of men and women returned from the Forces between 18th June and 30th September was 431,309, of whom 361,279 were demobilised in Classes, A and B. There was an appreciable increase in Class B releases during September, when 9,651 men and women were released, making a total of 17,946 since Class B releases began. In the last two weeks of September, 54,000 were released under Class A, and 5,550 under Class B, which was over 10 per cent. I mention these figures because the releases under Class B are vitally important if we are to proceed with the primary work of reconstruction, houses and so on. The Class B arrangement was not very acceptable to the troops in the beginning, but the modifications which have been made have apparently made it more acceptable, and the releases are beginning to come in on the basis of the figures anticipated. We are faced with the problem that many of the men who accept release under Class B are in far distant countries, and it takes a little time to get them back.
§Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: (Combined English Universities) Is it true that men in Class B have been sent to India during the last three weeks?
§Mr. Isaacs: I could not answer that without notice, and in any case it is a question for the Service Ministers. I should be surprised if such a thing happened except by accident. The method of choosing Class B releases is as follows. On the industrial side we are bringing out the men in building and civil engineering and ancillary industries, underground coal mines, cotton, food, wool, draughtsmen, gas, pottery and electricity. Under essential services, we are bringing out school teachers, university students, candidates for Colonial Service, theological students, university teachers, and miscellaneous classes to the number of 2,250. The industrial groups for women in Class B are wool textiles, laundries, cotton, boots and shoes, clothing, cigarettes, flax and jute. The essential services are hospital cooks, telephone and telegraph operators, and 600 in the miscellaneous groups. Added to these two groups are 10,000 men and women specialists. This gives us a target for Class B releases of 148,000. That target can be revised and increased as we see the flow of people under Class A. It is fairly evident that the only way to get the full resumption of industry is to get out as many men under Class A as possible, and it is the Government's aim to do that having in mind our military commitments.
The provisional programme for the release of women is 321,000 by next June, and 162,000 by the end of this year. The Government will be glad to see more women released, but they are satisfied that the figures cannot at present be increased. In addition to the fact I mentioned about various grades and jobs, many women in the Forces are doing work comparable to that of men, and an increase in the numbers of women released would keep back a similar number of men if we are to keep to our main target. For that reason, they are treated as near as possible on an equality with men and brought out under the same kind of scheme.
§Mr. Churchill: What about the ones who have nothing to do?
§Mr. Isaacs: There might be some—
§Mr. Churchill: A great number.
Of note, the actual quote, while condemning socialism, doesn't support capitalism as much as generally believed.
.jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)
