Saturday, April 18, 1942. The Doolittle Raid.

On this day in 1942, the U.S. Army Air Corps, with the assistance of the U.S. Navy, raided Japanese targets with B-25 bombers launched from the USS Hornet.

The dramatic raid overshadowed the news of a series of raids against Japanese targets elsewhere that had taken place earlier that prior week.

Launching occurred somewhat earlier than desired due to an encounter with a Japanese picket boat, which did radio a warning of the task force, but  whose warning was ineffectual.  All sixteen aircraft were successfully launched, hitting targets in Japan around noon, and then flying on to China, with one exception, where the crews had to bail out or crash land.  The exception was a B-25 that landed in the Soviet Union.

69 of the 80 crewmen evaded Japanese capture.  Three were killed in action in China.  Two drowned following the landing attempts.  Eight were taken prisoner by the Japanese, which tried all eight for war crimes and which executed three of them, an act of supreme hypocricy on the part of the Japanese.  The crew held by the Soviets was internned but allowed to escape into Iran some months later.

It was the longest mission every flown by B-25s.

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)	0F10/Ld
S E C R E T	April 28, 1942	Care of Postmaster, San Francisco, California.
From:	Commanding Officer.
To:	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Via:	Commander Carriers, Pacific Fleet.
Subject:	Report of Action, April 18, 1942, with notable events prior and subsequent thereto.
Reference:	(a) U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920, Article 712.

1. In compliance with reference (a), the following report of action is submitted:

   1. On 1 April, 1942, while Hornet was moored at the U.S. Naval Air Station, Alameda pier, sixteen Army B-25 bombers were hoisted to the flight deck and there parked. Under the command of Lieut. Colonel James H. Doolittle, U.S. Army, the B-25 Detachment consisted of seventy officers and one hundred thirty enlisted men. Lieutenant H.L. Miller, U.S. Navy, attached to the detachment as carrier take-off instructor also reported aboard for temporary duty, intending to return to Alameda after a demonstration take-off for the benefit of doubting Army pilots. The idea was abandoned when all planes were spotted for take-off and it was found that sixteen bombers could be comfortably accommodated, leaving a take-off run of 467 feet for the first plane. The advantage of having an extra plane for attack outweighed the desirability of demonstrating a proper take-off.

   2. At 1000, April 2, 1942, Task Force Eighteen, consisting of Hornet, Nashville, Vincennes, Cimarron and Desdiv 22, stood out of San Francisco in a fog which reduced visibility to about 1000 yards. Once clear of the swept channel a northwesterly course was set. Air coverage was provided by Commander Western Sea Frontier until late afternoon. Navy blimp L-6 delivered two boxes of navigator's domes for the B-25s. Vessels of the Task Force were notified of the mission by semaphore message late in the afternoon, and the crew of this vessel were informed by loudspeaker. Cheers from every section of the ship greeted the announcement and morale reached a new high, there to remain until after the attack was launched and the ship well clear of combat areas.

   3. On 6 April a strange type of numeral code was heard on 3095 kcs, strong signal (type of code: 69457 R 73296 R 47261 R). Japanese broadcast stations were continually monitored in order to establish program continuity. Any departure from their usual arrangement while Hornet was in the combat zone could have been construed as a warning of danger.

   4. Weather conditions were generally bad throughout the voyage. Heavy seas and high winds, coupled with rain and squalls, reduced the danger of being sighted but prevented cruiser aircraft from conducting flight operations. At times speed of the force was reduced to prevent structural damage to the Cimarron. Destroyers fueled on 8 April.

   5. On April 9 instructions were received to delay rendezvous with Task Force 16 until 13 April. Reversed course and slowed to comply. Attempted to fuel Hornet from Cimarron but had to defer the operation because of heavy seas. Cimarron lost two men overboard in the attempt; one was recovered by life ring and heaving line, the other by Meredith. A man previously lost overboard from Vincennes was also recovered by Meredith in a prompt and efficient manner. On 10 April Cimarron fueled both cruisers. On 11 April set course 255° true for rendezvous with Task Force 16. On 12 April fueled Hornet and topped off cruisers and destroyers. Cimarron efficiently fueled two destroyers simultaneously under adverse weather conditions. At 1630 LCT 12 April, radar transmissions were detected from 230°, distant 130 miles. Contact was made with Task Force 16 at daylight 13 April. From 2 April until junction with Task Force 16 no contacts of any kind were made.

   6. Various minor difficulties were experienced with the B-25s from departure until launching. Generator failures, spark plug changes, leaky gas tanks, brake trouble, and engine trouble culminated in the removal of one engine to the Hornet shops where it was repaired, then reinstalled. Planes could not be spotted for take-off until after final fueling because their wings overhung the ship's side. The high winds encountered caused vibrations in all control surfaces. Constant surveillance and rigid inspections were required to make certain the planes were properly secured to the flight deck.

   7. B-25s were spotted for take-off on 16 April. The last plane hung far out over the stern ramp in a precarious position. The lead plane had 467 feet of clear deck for take-off.

   8. On 18 April at 0800 orders were received to launch aircraft. Army crews, who had expected to take-off late in the afternoon, had to be rounded up and last minute instructions noted. Engines were warmed up, Hornet turned into the wind and at 0825 the first plane, Lieut. Colonel Doolittle, USA, pilot, left the deck.

   9. With only one exception, take -offs were dangerous and improperly executed. Apparently, full back stabilizer was used by the first few pilots. As each plane neared the bow, with more than required speed, the pilot would pull up and climb in a dangerous near-stall, struggle wildly to nose down, then fight the controls for several miles trying to gain real flying speed and more than a hundred feet altitude. Lieutenant Miller, USN, held up a blackboard of final instructions for the pilots, but few obeyed. That the take-off could be made easily when properly executed was shown when a B-25 made a straight run down the deck, lifted gently in an easy climb and gained altitude with no trouble.

   10. Plane handling on the flight deck was expeditious and well done. One plane handler lost an arm by backing to a B-25 propeller. A high wind of over forty knots and heavy swells caused Hornet t pitch violently, occasionally taking green seas over the bow and wetting the flight deck. The over-all time for launching sixteen bombers was 59 minutes. Average interval, 3.9 minutes.

   11. From April 13 to April 16, little of note occurred; weather continued to be heavy and squally, with generally poor visibility, which of course contributed to the success of the mission. Enterprise maintained air patrol. Steaming on westerly courses.

   12. On April 17 all heavy ships were topped off and oilers and destroyers were detached. After fueling, cruisers and carriers continued their westerly advance at various high speeds (20-25 knots). 20000 position April 17: Lat:38°-33'N; Long. 157°-54'E. At 0310 April 18 made radar contact on unknown object, distance 3100 yards abeam. At 0313 course was changed by TBS to 350° T. At 0411 the ship was called to General Quarters and course was again changed to west. At 0507 course was changed into wind for launching of Enterprise planes. At 0522 changed course to 270° T. At 0633 changed course to 220° T. At 0738 sighted enemy patrol craft of about 150 tons bearing 220°, distance 20,000 yards. At 0748 changed course to 270° T. At 0755 Nashville opened fire on patrol vessel which was also bombed and strafed by Enterprise planes. The vessel was still afloat when out of sight astern; Nashville remained behind to destroy it. 0800 Position, April 18: Lat. 35°-26' N.; Long. 153°-27; E. At 0800 received orders from Comtaskfor 16 to launch bombers. At 0803 changed course into wind and prepared to launch; steaming at 22 knots, course 310° T. Crews manning planes and numerous lashings being removed from planes consumed several minutes. At 0825 launched first B-25 (Lieut. Colonel Doollttle pilot). Second plane launched 7 minutes later. Launchings have been previously discussed. Last bomber launched at 0920, after which Hornet reversed course to 090° T. and joined disposition. At 1100 word was received that enemy aircraft contact had been made by Japanese at 0830 (-10 time) in our approximate position at that time. At 1107 Nashville rejoined. Hornet aircraft being made ready for launching. At 1115 launched 8 VF. At 1410 small enemy craft sighted 15,000 yards on port beam. Nashville proceeded and destroyed this vessel. At 1425 an Enterprise VSB crashed dead ahead of this ship while flight operations were being conducted. Nashville recovered plane personnel. At 1445 Japanese language and English language broadcast announced the raid on Japan. No enemy aircraft sighted at any time. General Quarters stations were manned through the day.

   13. The remainder of return trip was uneventful except for the loss of one VSB -- both occupants were seen to sink - one with the plane and one unconscious alongside the plane. Entered Pearl Harbor morning April 25.

2. The Commanding Officer desires to state that the morale of the crew was exceptionally fine. All officers and men performed their duties in a completely satisfactory manner. No individual was outstanding or deserving of special commendation, and there is no reason for censure. Morale was somewhat lowered after danger of enemy air attack had diminished; a majority of the officers and men were quite surprised that no further action against enemy bases was contemplated, and were obviously disappointed. It is believed that attacks should be made as frequently as possible on raiding missions to keep morale and "action exhiliration" in a high state.

3. Submarines used in conjunction with such an attack would be highly valuable. They could cover the retreat of the attacking force and could possibly eliminate the patrol vessels in the track of the attacking force, permitting the latter to reach a more favorable launching point without being discovered.

On the same day, B-26s of the U.S. 5th Air Force strike Simpson Habor at Rabaul. They were flying out of Townsville, Ausstralia.

The raid will be noted on every World War Two history site, including Sarah Sundin's, which notes the following:

Today in World War II History—April 18, 1942: Doolittle Raid: 16 B-25s launched from carrier USS Hornet bomb Tokyo, led by Lt. Col. James Doolittle; little damage inflicted.

She also notes the restoration of the Stars and Stripes, which had first published during World War One, and the creation of the War Manpower Commission.

45 - Executive Order 9139 Establishing the War Manpower Commission. April 18, 1942

1. There is established within the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President a War Manpower Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission. The Commission shall consist of the Federal Security Administrator as Chairman, and a representative of each of the following departments and agencies: the Department of War, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the War Production Board, the Labor Production Division of the War Production Board, the Selective Service System, and the United States Civil Service Commission. 2. The Chairman, after consultation with the members of the Commission, shall: (a) Formulate plans and programs and establish basic national policies to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war; and issue such policy and operating directives as may be necessary thereto. (b) Estimate the requirements of manpower for industry; review all other estimates of needs for military, agricultural, and civilian manpower; and direct the several departments and agencies of the Government as to the proper allocation of available manpower. (c) Determine basic policies for, and take such other steps as are necessary to coordinate, the collection and compilation of labor market data by Federal departments and agencies. (d) Establish policies and prescribe regulations governing all Federal programs relating to the recruitment, vocational training, and placement of workers to meet the needs of industry and agriculture. (e) Prescribe basic policies governing the filling of the Federal Government's requirements for manpower, excluding those of the military and naval forces, and issue such operating directives as may be necessary thereto. (f) Formulate legislative programs designed to facilitate the most effective mobilization and utilization of the manpower of the country; and, with the approval of the President, recommend such legislation as may be necessary for this purpose. 3. The following agencies shall conform to such policies, directives, regulations, and standards as the Chairman may prescribe in the execution of the powers vested in him by this Order, and shall be subject to such other coordination by the Chairman as may be necessary to enable the Chairman to discharge the responsibilities placed upon him: (a) The Selective Service System with respect to the use and classification of manpower needed for critical industrial, agricultural, and governmental employment. (b) The Federal Security Agency with respect to employment service and defense training functions. (c) The Work Projects Administration with respect to placement and training functions. (d) The United States Civil Service Commission with respect to functions relating to the filling of positions in the Government Service. (e) The Railroad Retirement Board with respect to employment service activities. (f) The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor. (g) The Labor Production Division of the War Production Board. (h) The Civilian Conservation Corps. (i) The Department of Agriculture with respect to farm labor statistics, farm labor camp programs, and other labor market activities. (j) The Office of Defense Transportation with respect to labor supply and requirement activities. Similarly, all other Federal departments and agencies which perform functions relating to the recruitment or utilization of manpower shall, in discharging such functions, conform to such policies, directives, regulations, and standards as the Chairman may prescribe in the execution of the powers vested in him by this Order; and shall be subject to such other coordination by the Chairman as may be necessary to enable the Chairman to discharge the responsibilities placed upon him. 4. The following agencies and functions are transferred to the War Manpower Commission. (a) The labor supply functions of the Labor Division of the War Production Board. (b) The National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel of the United States Civil Service Commission and its functions. (c) The Office of Procurement and Assignment in the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services in the Office for Emergency Management and its functions. 5. The following agencies and functions are transferred to the Office of the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, and shall be administered under the direction and supervision of such officer or employee as the Federal Security Administrator shall designate: (a) The Apprenticeship Section of the Division of Labor Standards of the Department of Labor and its functions. (b) The training functions of the Labor Division of the War Production Board. 6. The National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel transferred to the War Manpower Commission and the Apprenticeship Section transferred to the Federal Security Agency shall be preserved as organizational entities within the War Manpower Commission and the Federal Security Agency respectively. 7. The functions of the head of any department or agency relating to the administration of any agency or function transferred from his department or agency by this Order are transferred to, and shall be exercised by, the head of the department or agency to which such transferred agency or function is transferred by this Order. 8. All records and property (including office equipment) of the several agencies and all records and property used primarily in the administration of any functions transferred or consolidated by this Order, and all personnel used in the administration of such agencies and functions (including officers whose chief duties relate to such administration) are transferred to the respective agencies concerned, for use in the administration of the agencies and functions transferred or consolidated by this Order; provided, that any personnel transferred to any agency by this Order, found by the head of such agency to be in excess of the personnel necessary for the administration of the functions transferred to his agency, shall be retransfered under existing procedure to other positions in the Government service or separated from the service. So much of the unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available for the use of any agency in the exercise of any function transferred or consolidated by this Order or for the use of the head of any agency in the exercise of any function so transferred or consolidated, as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget with the approval of the President shall determine, shall be transferred to the agency concerned, for use in connection with the exercise of functions so transferred or consolidated. In determining the amount to be transferred, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget may include an amount to provide for the liquidation of obligations incurred against such appropriations, allocations, or other funds prior to the transfer or consolidation. 9. Within the limits of such funds as may be made available for that purpose, the Chairman may appoint such personnel and make provision for such supplies, facilities, and services as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Order. The Chairman may appoint an executive officer of the Commission and may exercise and perform the powers, authorities, and duties set forth in this Order through such officials or agencies and in such manner as he may determine.

The war in the East ground to a halt due to spring mud.