Let the duels begin?

The other day, we posted, in jest, about the "less government, more freedom" line of some members of the GOP that now duels could be legal and how nifty that would be. 

And now, in a five to two decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court has held as follows about an apparently high and intoxicated fellow who seems to have been a general nuisance at a campground and who shook a vehicle an armed person, who had encountered him earlier, was sleeping in. That person's view was, apparently, that the high person was attempting to break in the car, although according to the opinion, there was no obvious physical evidence of that.  The person, who had been camping for several days in an Albany County campground in his car (and car camping isn't really that unusual) ended up shooting the other guy in the leg, with a .22.  Apparently the shot guy was high enough, it would seem that he didn't even really grasp that at first.

The Supreme Court held, in part:

[¶41] We find the record contains facts from which a jury could have concluded Mr. Pickering was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering Mr. Howitt’s habitation. After thoughtfully and thoroughly examining the record, the dissent reached the opposite conclusion. This illustrates the fact-intensive nature of this inquiry and highlights the need for this factual question to be resolved by the jury.

[¶42] In Widdison we stated: “[t]he determination whether [the victim’s] home was [the defendant’s] residence was a question that had to be answered before the jury could have been instructed on the castle doctrine.” 2018 WY 18, ¶ 23, 410 P.3d at 1213. This language should not be read as requiring the trial court to bifurcate the proceedings and have the jury determine the factual questions surrounding the castle doctrine before the court determines what self-defense instructions to give. The trial court has the discretion to determine the best method for allowing the jury to resolve factual questions surrounding the castle doctrine. A trial court may choose to bifurcate the proceedings or use instructions and a detailed special verdict form to allow the jury to resolve all the factual questions raised by the evidence.

CONCLUSION

[¶43] Mr. Howitt presented competent evidence to create factual issues about whether hisvehicle was adapted for overnight accommodation and fit within the definition of a habitation and whether Mr. Pickering was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering that habitation when he was shot. The district court should have allowed these factual questions to be resolved by the jury. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

There were two dissents, including that of the Chief Justice. The dissent, written by a Justice who was a very long serving district court judge before becoming a Wyoming Supreme Court Justice:

[¶47] The majority opinion does not find the statutory language ambiguous, and it is not.It is entirely plain and unambiguous. We should rely on the plain meaning of the wordsand phrases the legislature used. See Ailport v. Ailport, 2022 WY 43, ¶ 22, 507 P.3d 427,437 (Wyo. 2022) (“If the [statutory language] is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, theCourt simply applies the words according to their ordinary and obvious meaning.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).[¶48] The plain meaning of “in the process of” is “working on (doing something) thattakes a certain amount of time to do[.]” https://www.merriamwebster.com. The plain meaning of “forcefully enter” is “to go into” “in a forceful, powerful or emphatic manner.”https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/forcefully and https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/enter. Under these definitions, it was appropriate to give thestatutory castle doctrine instruction only if there was evidence the victim was going into,i.e., entering, Mr. Howitt’s vehicle. Subsection 6-2-602(b)(ii) reinforces the necessity of aphysical effort to enter before the castle doctrine applies by requiring that the defendant knew or had reason to believe “an unlawful and forcible entry . . . was occurring.”(Emphasis added).

[¶49] As the majority recognizes, the facts show the victim neither entered nor made an effort to enter Mr. Howitt’s vehicle. The majority also acknowledges in Paragraph 40 that Mr. Howitt’s subjective belief the victim would attempt to enter the vehicle was clearly insufficient to warrant instructing the jury on the castle doctrine. What the facts show is he never grabbed the door handle, attempted to break the windows, or otherwise tried to gain entry in any manner, much less in a forceful manner. Being in the vicinity of the car, knocking on the windows, bumping the car, and engaging in verbal threats all are insufficient to establish the victim was working on or attempting to enter Mr. Howitt’s vehicle. Even if the victim “lunged,” as Mr. Howitt claimed, that act does not constitute entry, or even an attempted entry. Furthermore, when the shooting occurred, the victim was not doing any of those things.

    * * * 

[¶54] The effect of the majority opinion is to greatly expand the castle doctrine statute in Wyoming. It permits juries to find defendants can use deadly force even though no one is in the process of entering a home, but only knocks on a window, makes a verbal threat, or stands outside. The majority’s approach ignores the statutory limitation of the castle doctrine presumption to circumstances when someone is in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering a home or habitation and permits juries to apply that presumption in speculative circumstances. That simply is not what our statute provides.

[¶55] Because there was no evidence showing the victim was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering Mr. Howitt’s vehicle when Mr. Howitt shot him, the trial court correctly refused to give the castle doctrine instruction. 

Interesting.

Note that this doesn't decide that the shooter was in the right, only that a jury instruction should have been given.  But it does seem to expand the castle doctrine.