Map showing respective areas of French and Viet Minh control, and contested ground, in 1954. Purple is the zone controlled by the French. Looking at this, it's really hard to see why anyone would have wanted to follow the French into Vietnam. map of first Indochina war 1954.
- CC BY-SA 3.0
- File:First Indochina War map 1954 de.svg
- Created: 10 October 2014
Let's look at a question that seems to have a presumed answer, but which might be a harder question to actually answer.
Could we have avoided entering the war entirely?
The answer to this question often seems a simple presumed "yes". I know that was my mother's opinion, "we shouldn't have gone there". And she certainly isn't alone in that view. Quite a few people hold that as an opinion of fact, perhaps even the majority of Americans.
But avoiding wars is often more difficult than it seems and the path around the conflict only apparent, in some cases, after the war's over. Once you choose to walk down certain streets, it''s hard to run back down them. So we should look at this seriously. Maybe the Vietnam War was a disaster, but an unavoidable one.
Japanese troops entering Saigon in 1941. French Indochina acquiesced to Japanese presence as after the fall of France in 1940 it was isolated and had little choice. This lead to a French war with Thailand in 1940 in one of the more surreal moments of the war in which French naval forces defeated Thai forces but were forced to accept a resolution with Thailand over territory that basically amounted to a Thai victory. In March of 1945, in an example of flagrant self delusion, the Japanese sponsored a coup in Vietnam and established it as a pupped empire which was not long to exist.
We showed up in Vietnam for the first time during World War Two in the form of an OSS mission. That we surely could have avoided and its impact on the war overall was no doubt extremely negligible. That may have had an impact on the Vietnamese indigenous effort against the Japanese, but I'm not terribly familiar with that story and I frankly doubt that it did. What it seems to have done is to have raised Viet Minh hopes that the United States would recognize the Viet Minh as the legitimate government of Vietnam and help keep out the French. The hope was not irrational.
The OSS was the predecessor to the CIA, as is well know, but it was not the same hardcore anti Communist organization that the CIA was. Indeed, the freewheeling OSS had a fair number of Communist and Communist sympathizers in it, including, perhaps, at least one, Lt. Col. Duncan Chaplin Lee (a descendant of Moss Robert) who were very high placed in the organization.* Donovan, much like Frankly Roosevelt, was basically blind to the dangers that Communism posted and the OSS only half heartedly complied with instructions to make sure that its operatives were not Communists. This isn't to say that they were all Communist by any means, but in those early days during the Roosevelt Administration Communists were basically assumed to be sort of extremely left wing Democrats and weren't taken very seriously. Additionally, Roosevelt was highly anti Colonial in his views and the OSS reflected this view very strongly. British secret service agents complained to their superiors repeatedly that they felt that they were in a constant struggle with the OSS and the OSS in the field was pretty open that they indeed were at that.
So, in context, that the United States would send OSS agents into occupied French Indochina, and that the indigenous guerilla organization there, a nationalist anti French and anti Japanese movement with strong Communist elements would receive our support is hardly surprising. But did that make much of a difference to anything? Probably not.
British sailors accepting the surrender of Japanese arms in Vietnam. The British, not the French, were the first European power to return to Vietnam albeit on a temporary basis until the country could be stabilized and returned to the French. Ironically, they had to rearm Japanese troops in order to fulfill that mission.
The US left as the French came back in, really having nothing further to do. The US wouldn't return in any fashion until the French effort to restore their colony was badly failing.
In the interval between the Japanese surrender in 1945 and the increasing disaster of the French effort in the mid 1950s a lot had occurred, all of which we've already discussed. The Cold War was now on. So here we have the first thing to consider.
Should we have simply refused to aid the French in any fashion in Vietnam? That would have kept us away from the country, maybe.
Well, that would have been very hard to do. Colonial power that it was, and anti colonial power that the United States was and is, both countries were western democracies. Moreover, France was one of our World War Two allies but a highly unstable one. Prior to the war French democracy had teetered on the brink occasionally as the European right slid into fascism. France had surrendered under a massive German assault in 1940, as is well known (and contrary to what armchair generals may think, there was no realistic way that the French could have stopped the 1940 German invasion). France thereafter legally became a neutral and the Free French forces that fought with the British and the the British and the Americans up through Operation Torch. Vichy basically fell after Operation Torch which saw French forces defect, after some period of doubt, to the Allied cause, and the Germans thereafter marched into southern France. Vichy as a real sovereign, therefore, only existed until November 1942, having therefore existed only a little over two years, but Vichy officials continued to exercise civil authority, unwisely, thereafter, fleeing to Germany after the Allied landings in France in 1944.
The Cross Lorraine, the Christina symbol that DeGaulle chose for the French resistance movement. The hammer and sickle wold have been a more appropriate symbol for many French Maquis.
French maquis with a British Sten gun, an American lieutenant with a M1911 pistol, and French police and a disinterested American soldier in the background. Hopefully this was a staged photographs as otherwise the Frenchman is basically serving as cover for the lieutenant.
Following the war the French had many wartime ghosts to contend with as well as major political problems to immediately deal with. This necessitated a dedicated an effort, in their view, to restore their colonial empire and to defeat Communism wherever it was, just as at home Communist remained a major actor on the French political scene. That the reconstituted French military would be highly anti Communist and pro empire is not surprising.
Nor could the United States in anyway ignore France. The US had to do what it could to support France's return to the European scene as a functioning, free, European state. And that meant supporting France, at least to some degree, where she elsewhere was.
The United States was never very keen on that, but looking back its difficult to see what choice the US had. The US was partially rearming France (France was also partially rearming itself). The US needed a free France as a European ally. That in and of itself meant that the French military was receiving US aid and part of that aid was being used in Indochina. When the Korean War came France contributed to forces on the Korean peninsula and those forces were equipped and trained to fight in the logistically rich American way with American equipment. Those same units later went directly from Korean to Indochina. The US was supporting the war in Indochina whether it meant to or not.
French marines disembark from a formerly American landing craft in Vietnam.
That in turn lead to growing reluctant direct support to the French effort in the war. But not, in the end, to direct involvement in spite of that nearly coming to pass. In the end, the US backed down from intervening in the French fall in Indochina and instead it let the French fall. This decision was probably the wise one, and so the US did in fact avoid Vietnam, at first.
But it stopped doing that as the negotiations to end the French Indochinese War commenced. The US took a very direct role in that. And here's where our real involvement in Vietnam began.
The French Indochinese War was resolved after nearly a decade of fighting through a conference that was held in Geneva. The war in Indochina wasn't the only topic, and the conference was somewhat of a mess. The situation in Korea was also on the table.. The then current members of the United Nations Security Council were the participants, those being the USSR, the US, the UK, France and the People's Republic of China, plus those countries and parties that had a role in the two pending conflicts.
No resolution was reached on the topics that pertained to Korea. The resolution, in the case of Indochina, occurred, but was far from perfect.
Concerning Vietnam, which had only just acquired that name, the conference reached what was called the Geneva Accords. Prior to that the concept of a united Vietnam was in some ways oddly introduced by way of the combined effort of the Viet Minh, which was fighting for it, and Emperor Bảo Đại, who had managed to go from being the Emperor of the Nguyen Dynasty under French protection, in Annam (Emperor of Annam), to being the Japanese sponsored Emperor of Vietnam, to being the Head of State of Vietnam. In short, he was a survivor, and by that time was living mostly in France, which would prove to be wise. Bảo Đại appointed Ngô Đình Diệm, whom we have already discussed, as the Prime Minister of the country. He'd soon depose the Emperor and declare the nation a republic.
As a republic, under the Geneva Accords, he found himself President, with dubious democratic credentials of only that part of the country below the 17th Parallel. The accords split the country in two with the concept that an election would soon follow, but the entire process, including who would monitor an election that would obviously be subject to fraud, was subject to debate and the American proposal that the UN monitor the election ultimately failed. The resulting agreement was not agreed to at all by what would become South Vietnam and the United States and none of the parties on the ground adhered to its tenants. The North did not withdraw its forces and the South, which wasn't really part of the agreement anyway, did not hold an election.
By the time the agreement was reached the United States was heavily involved in efforts concerning Vietnam. It was just sort of increasingly sucked in. But that event made some sense. Being a strategic coastal region of the Asian continent, having been heavily involved in Korea, and being the major democratic power in the world, there was no realistic way that the United States could sit it out. In the end, it didn't sign the agreement, but by the time it was reached it was heavily involved in the diplomatic developments.
It seems impossible that anything else could have occurred.
That brings us to the period from 1955 to 1963 in which South Vietnam fought against increasing odds against North Vietnam. We've already discussed that. Having allied with Diem, who was anti Communist and anti French, the United States necessarily became South Vietnam's military supplier and military backer. Again, it's hard to imagine any other result occurring. So the period of increasing military involvement, from 1955 to 1963, seems more or less inevitable.
What was not inevitable, by any measure, was the 1963 coup that deposed Diem. That was extraordinary and the United States was complicit in it. There's little excuse for that, although a person can question whether or not that coup would have occurred anyhow, perhaps in 1964 or, if the country had managed to hang on that long, 1965. By that time, at any event, the Untied States was increasingly involved in the Republic of Vietnam's war against the Viet Cong and not always in a way that the RVN appreciated. But here too, it's difficult to imagine this occurring otherwise.
Indeed, today the United States is likewise involved in odd wars all over the world. Just this path month we've seen an example of American troops being involved in combat in Niger, a country that few Americans know anything about, and we're told that the US is waging a drone war against Al Shabob in Somalia. All told, the US is involved in greater or lesser efforts in Iraq, Niger, Somalia, Afghanistan and likely other places, often on a small scale. At the height of the Cold War, U.S. involvement in South Vietnam's struggles in the 1955 to 1963 time frame do not seem possible to have avoided. The coup, however, could have been avoided in 1963.
The 1963 coup did nothing to arrest the slide that the South was under and in 1964 and 1965 US involvement increased considerably. Here's where we have to really question if the US was getting in too far, but even in those years the steps were small enough that you can see how they occurred. In 1965 the US established an air base at Da Nang and soon thereafter was patrolling in the area to protect it. U.S. involvement increased steadily from there.
I've twice mentioned that the Australians could have come in deeper when they were asking for the US to prior to 1965. That's true, but it didn't happen, therefore we won't reconsider that scenario. The real breaking point is the 1965 commitment of air power to Vietnam. Did we have to do that?
Looking back it's easy to say no. But it was, after all, just air power. . . at first. Its hard, once again, to see how that limited increase in our involvement would inevitably mean 400,000 men on the ground soon thereafter, if viewed from the prospective of 1965. Looking back, it seems inevitable.
And hence the point.
The war was hard to avoid.
But it stopped doing that as the negotiations to end the French Indochinese War commenced. The US took a very direct role in that. And here's where our real involvement in Vietnam began.
The French Indochinese War was resolved after nearly a decade of fighting through a conference that was held in Geneva. The war in Indochina wasn't the only topic, and the conference was somewhat of a mess. The situation in Korea was also on the table.. The then current members of the United Nations Security Council were the participants, those being the USSR, the US, the UK, France and the People's Republic of China, plus those countries and parties that had a role in the two pending conflicts.
No resolution was reached on the topics that pertained to Korea. The resolution, in the case of Indochina, occurred, but was far from perfect.
Bảo Đại, Emperor of Annam, Emperor of Vietnam, Head of State of Vietnam and then exile in France.
Concerning Vietnam, which had only just acquired that name, the conference reached what was called the Geneva Accords. Prior to that the concept of a united Vietnam was in some ways oddly introduced by way of the combined effort of the Viet Minh, which was fighting for it, and Emperor Bảo Đại, who had managed to go from being the Emperor of the Nguyen Dynasty under French protection, in Annam (Emperor of Annam), to being the Japanese sponsored Emperor of Vietnam, to being the Head of State of Vietnam. In short, he was a survivor, and by that time was living mostly in France, which would prove to be wise. Bảo Đại appointed Ngô Đình Diệm, whom we have already discussed, as the Prime Minister of the country. He'd soon depose the Emperor and declare the nation a republic.
As a republic, under the Geneva Accords, he found himself President, with dubious democratic credentials of only that part of the country below the 17th Parallel. The accords split the country in two with the concept that an election would soon follow, but the entire process, including who would monitor an election that would obviously be subject to fraud, was subject to debate and the American proposal that the UN monitor the election ultimately failed. The resulting agreement was not agreed to at all by what would become South Vietnam and the United States and none of the parties on the ground adhered to its tenants. The North did not withdraw its forces and the South, which wasn't really part of the agreement anyway, did not hold an election.
By the time the agreement was reached the United States was heavily involved in efforts concerning Vietnam. It was just sort of increasingly sucked in. But that event made some sense. Being a strategic coastal region of the Asian continent, having been heavily involved in Korea, and being the major democratic power in the world, there was no realistic way that the United States could sit it out. In the end, it didn't sign the agreement, but by the time it was reached it was heavily involved in the diplomatic developments.
It seems impossible that anything else could have occurred.
That brings us to the period from 1955 to 1963 in which South Vietnam fought against increasing odds against North Vietnam. We've already discussed that. Having allied with Diem, who was anti Communist and anti French, the United States necessarily became South Vietnam's military supplier and military backer. Again, it's hard to imagine any other result occurring. So the period of increasing military involvement, from 1955 to 1963, seems more or less inevitable.
What was not inevitable, by any measure, was the 1963 coup that deposed Diem. That was extraordinary and the United States was complicit in it. There's little excuse for that, although a person can question whether or not that coup would have occurred anyhow, perhaps in 1964 or, if the country had managed to hang on that long, 1965. By that time, at any event, the Untied States was increasingly involved in the Republic of Vietnam's war against the Viet Cong and not always in a way that the RVN appreciated. But here too, it's difficult to imagine this occurring otherwise.
Indeed, today the United States is likewise involved in odd wars all over the world. Just this path month we've seen an example of American troops being involved in combat in Niger, a country that few Americans know anything about, and we're told that the US is waging a drone war against Al Shabob in Somalia. All told, the US is involved in greater or lesser efforts in Iraq, Niger, Somalia, Afghanistan and likely other places, often on a small scale. At the height of the Cold War, U.S. involvement in South Vietnam's struggles in the 1955 to 1963 time frame do not seem possible to have avoided. The coup, however, could have been avoided in 1963.
The 1963 coup did nothing to arrest the slide that the South was under and in 1964 and 1965 US involvement increased considerably. Here's where we have to really question if the US was getting in too far, but even in those years the steps were small enough that you can see how they occurred. In 1965 the US established an air base at Da Nang and soon thereafter was patrolling in the area to protect it. U.S. involvement increased steadily from there.
I've twice mentioned that the Australians could have come in deeper when they were asking for the US to prior to 1965. That's true, but it didn't happen, therefore we won't reconsider that scenario. The real breaking point is the 1965 commitment of air power to Vietnam. Did we have to do that?
Looking back it's easy to say no. But it was, after all, just air power. . . at first. Its hard, once again, to see how that limited increase in our involvement would inevitably mean 400,000 men on the ground soon thereafter, if viewed from the prospective of 1965. Looking back, it seems inevitable.
And hence the point.
The war was hard to avoid.
_________________________________________________________________________________
*Lt. Col. Lee was a confidential assistant ot Wild Bill Donovan, the head of the organization. His status as a supplier of information to the Soviets is not proven beyond a doubt, but he was named by Elizabeth Benchley as a supplier of information and is associated with a second Soviet spy, Mary Price, with whom he was having an affair. Benchley's accusation lead to hsi downfall in the American military but he went on to be a successful lawyer thereafter and moved to Canada with his wife, who was a Canadian, in his retirement in the 1970s.
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