Showing posts with label The Cold War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The Cold War. Show all posts

Monday, June 22, 2020

Military Installation Names. What they were, and are, and how they got there. Part 1. Named for Confederate Generals

Camp Cody, New Mexico. This camp was named after a figure associated with Wyoming, but not from Wyoming, Buffalo Bill Cody.  It operated from 1917 to 1919.

This is a post that I’m posting here following a discussion I read elsewhere on the seemingly probable, and now apparently Presidentially derailed, decision of the U.S. Army to rename a collection of forts that were named after Confederate generals in the 1917 to 1942 period (or give or take a few years on either side of that).  That lead me to pondering the names of posts in Wyoming, and how they were named, which is what this blog entry was originally going to be about.  It grew so large, however, that I've now busted into at least three parts.

First an item on those posts from the blog Tasks and Purpose.  I was trying to remember what they all were, and couldn't (or didn't realize the association) and that website cleared that up, and added a little more detail. As they noted:
“The bases are named for the following Confederate officers: Gen. Robert E. Lee, Gen. Braxton Bragg, Gen. Pierre Gustave Toutant-Beauregard, Gen. John Bell Hood, Lt. Gen. John Brown Gordon, Lt. Gen. A.P Hill, Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, Maj. General George E. Pickett, Brig. Gen. Henry Benning, and Col. Edmund W. Rucker.
Among those commanders: Gordon is believed to have become the leader of the Ku Klux Klan in Georgia; Pickett ordered the execution of 22 prisoners who had switched from the Confederate to Union army; Bragg was fired after being defeated at Chattanooga and was also roundly despised by his peers and subordinates; and Hood’s military career came to an ignominious end after his army was smashed at the Battle of Nashville.”
For those who might not be familiar with it, and by way of a brief introduction to the topic, U.S. Army military posts are frequently, but not always, named after prior significant or heroic Army figures.  The Air Force also does this as well.  Neither service, as noted, uniformly does this and there are exceptions to this practice.  Indeed, the exceptions aren't uncommon.

Anyhow, one thing that this tread, which is growing to the overlong stage, will explore a bit is the history of naming conventions.  And what we'll tend to find looking at that is that who things are named after changes quite a bit over time.  During the Revolutionary War, for example, forts were fairly frequently named after presently serving commanders, in the American case, not always wisely.  Ft. Washington, for example, was outside of the City of New York and didn't stand up at all to the British assault on it.

Anyhow, period from 1917 to 1942 provides a really odd example of naming practices in that its the only instance in American history when posts were named after people who had been treasonous.


Camp Wheeler, Georgia, named after Confederate general Joseph Wheeler.  Camp Wheeler was used from 1917 to 1919, and again from 1940 to 1945, after which the land was returned to its original owners.

In recent days there's been a service wide movement to address Confederate symbols in the military, the first of which was an order by the Commandant of the Marine Corps banning the Confederate battle flag from appearing in any form on Marine Corps installations. The Navy followed suit  but the Army, which has the only official vestiges of the Confederacy, demurred on the topic of renaming those military bases which had been named for Confederate Army figures, something that was done in the 1917 to 1942 time frame.  President Trump has apparently put the kibosh on this, noting:
It has been suggested that we should rename as many as 10 of our Legendary Military Bases, such as Fort Bragg in North Carolina, Fort Hood in Texas, Fort Benning in Georgia, etc. These Monumental and very Powerful Bases have become part of a Great American Heritage, and a history of Winning, Victory, and Freedom. The United States of America trained and deployed our HEROES on these Hallowed Grounds, and won two World Wars. Therefore, my Administration will not even consider the renaming of these Magnificent and Fabled Military Installations...


Camp Custer,  Michigan.  1918.  This camp was obviously named after Michigan native Col. George A. Custer.  I've put it up here to illustrate that problems with who forts are named after may be a bit more problematic than the news at first seems. Camp Custer went into military service in 1917 and is still used today by the Michigan National Guard.

Meanwhile, the Army itself has indicated that it has intended to start the process of looking at new names for the posts and the current defense appropriations bill would require it.

So what are those posts?

The Confederate Named Posts.

The actual installations are:

Camp Beauregard (Louisiana National Guard)

Camp Beauregard, 1941.

Camp Beauregard was established in 1917 as part of the World War One build up.  In 1919 it was returned to the state, following the war.  It became a Federal installation again in 1940 which used it as a major training base during World War Two.  Following the war, the Federal Government returned it to the state, which used it for a couple of years and then deactivated it.  It returned to Louisiana National Guard use in 1973.

The post is named after P.G.T. Beauregard who was a career Army officer who fought in the Mexican War but who resigned to join the Confederate forces at the start of the Civil War.  A native Louisiana, he held mixed views that make him stand somewhat apart from most Confederate figures, something that tended to be more common with Louisianans as it reflected their Catholic background.  His family had owned slaves itself and he was a post war opponent of Reconstruction in the South, even as, at the same time, he went on record on more than one occasion urging white Southerners to accept full equality for blacks and he urged black land ownership, something we also have a post on.

The choice of the name of this post reflects that Beauregard was a Louisianan.  Renaming this post might be something that even those urging renaming might reconsider, as Beauregard was not only a rebel against his country, which he was, but he was one that rethought white Southern positions on the equality of blacks, which he urged be accepted after the war when it would not have been a popular thing to do.  He moved on rapidly after the war to look very far forward towards a new Louisiana, and was even the subject of a memorial poem by black Creole Victor Rillieux upon his death.

Ft. Benning, Georgia




Ft. Benning is a massive U.S. Army installation in Georgia which is home to the Army's Infantry and Armor schools.  It was established as Camp Benning in October, 1918, making it a post established at the tail end of the First World War, and was converted to permanent status in 1920.  It's been a major U.S. Army installation ever since.

Benning was named for Confederate general Henry L. Benning.  Benning was a lawyer from Columbus, Georgia, and therefore different from some of the other Southern figures that have posts named after him in that he had no service in the U.S. Army at all.  He was an ardent and radical proponent of slavery and proposed a Southern system designed to permanently institutionalize it out of the fear that the arch of history would start to eliminate it in the northern most Southern states.  As a Justice in the Georgia Supreme Court he was of the view that the court was free to ignore decisions made by the United States Supreme Court.  He joined the Confederate service during the war, survived it, and returned to the practice of law following it, at which time he was essentially financially ruined by the war.  He died in 1875 of a stroke.

Henry Benning provides a really good example of why some would like to rename these posts.  It's baffling why a post was named after him in the first place and it seems to be simply because he was a Southern Civil War figure from Georgia.  There's very little to admire about Benning personally in that he was such a dedicated proponent of slavery and succession that his views were radically in that direction even for Southerners.

Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.  


U.S. Airborne troops training at Ft. Bragg very early in World War Two.  The howitzer is the 75mm pack howitzer that had been developed for pack artillery between the wars and which was used by airborne troops, as well as others, during it.  The soldiers in this photograph are completely lacking the unique uniforms associated with the airborne and are still wearing M1917 helmets, although they are equipped with the new M1 Carbine.

Ft. Bragg is currently the most populous military installation in the world with 50,000 residents.  It started its existence in 1918 as an artillery training center and was converted to a permanent installation in 1922.  During World War Two it became associated with the airborne and it remains associated with them and special warfare units today.

Ft. Bragg was named after Braxton Bragg, who had served as a U.S. Army officer in the Second Seminole War and the Mexican War before leaving the Army in 1856 to purchase a sugar plantation in Louisiana.  He was, accordingly, a slave holder and the Southern born Bragg had never been known to oppose slavery.  His long service in the Army resulted in a military sense of discipline over his slaves which in turn resulted in the quick profitability of the plantation.  Pretty clearly, therefore, he had a vested interest in slavery.

Bragg's reputation as a commander hasn't held up well post war, a war which he survived.  He relied upon frontal assaults which, contrary to the widespread movie fed belief, were already past their military prime after the early stages of the war..  He lost his plantation due to the war and died in 1876 of a stroke, at age 59, in Texas.




Bragg's poor reputation as a Civil War commander has caused some to wonder, on this topic, why any post was ever named after him.  Oddly enough, it was the second time a fort was named for Braxton Bragg, however, as a military post in northern California was named that upon being established in 1857. In that instance the field commander at the location named the post after his former Mexican War commander, Braxton Bragg, who at that time had no association with the Confederacy as the naming predated it.  In 2015, prior to current events, there was a petition to rename the town given Bragg's later association with the armed effort to keep men enslaved in the South.

Bragg points out the problem with renaming posts.  The post has become so closely associated with the Airborne that mentioning it is more likely to bring to mind the Airborne of World War Two, or the Special Forces of the Cold War, than it is to bring to mind Braxton Bragg.

Ft. Gordon, Georgia.


The 82nd Division  honoring the widow of John Brown Gordon at the first Camp Gordon.

The first Camp Gordon was one of the many World War One training camps established as part of the effort to train troops for the Great War.  It was the training camp for the 82nd Division, one of the divisions made up of conscripts during the war, with that division being given the name the "All American" division, as its men were drawn from across the country.  Having said that, half of those men were from Georgia and of course additional men were from Southern states, such as the units most famous Great War soldier, Alvin York of Tennessee.  The Camp was disbanded in 1921 and the real estate sold.

Black soldiers at the original Camp Gordon in 1917.  These troops are being read to by one of tehir members due to the illiteracy of the listening soldiers. What would serving at a camp named for Gordon have been like for these troops?

When the Second World War created a demand for training camps once again, a second Camp Gordon was established in Georgia in a different location.  It seems to have been named Camp Gordon as the first Georgia Camp Gordon was named that.  The second Camp Gordon achieved permanent fort status in 1956.  The Army's important cyber school is located there today.

The first one, and hence the second one, were named after Confederate General John Brown Gordon.  Gordon was a Georgia lawyer and planter, although he was not a large slave owner.  In the 1860 census he reported owning a single slave, a 14 year old girl, while his father owned a further four.  He rose high in Confederate ranks during the war and was highly regarded by Robert E. Lee. Following the war he had an extremely successful career in politics serving in the United States Senate and as the Governor of Georgia.

He is also believed to have been the titular head of the Klu Klux Klan in Georgia, a charge he denied, although he admitted to be part of a secret "peace police" organization.  The KKK records and organization was so secretive at the time that it's proven impossible to prove the charge.

Gordon provides an example of the sort of person the Army shouldn't have honored with a camp name, and beyond that, the bizarre nature of post Civil War American politics in that he actually served as the Presiden to the United States Senate at one time, the first post Civil War Southerner to do so.  If he'd clearly had a change of heart regarding the rebellion and slavery that would be one thing, but clearly, that doesn't seem to have been the case.  Given that, and given that this fort doesn't have a strong connection with post World War One history the way that some other Army posts do, renaming this post doesn't involve the considerations that renaming the others might.

Ft. Hood


Latrine basin at Camp Hood, Texas, in 1943.

Fort Hood stands out in this list as it was established in 1942, during World War Two, and therefore comes a good generation after the Lost Cause naming of most of the other installations in this list.  Having said that, by 1942 the Lost Cause version of the South was highly established and even widely accepted in some circles, having just been celebrated in the film Gone With The Wind.  It's one of the largest military installations in the world.

The post was named for Confederate general John Bell Hood, a West Point graduate who entered the U.S. Army in the late 1850s.  A Kentuckian who has served with the U.S. Army in Texas, he resigned from the Army after the start of the Civil War and ended up joining the Confederate forces in Texas as he was upset that his native Kentucky had not declared for the Confederacy.  He was an outright racist.  A young man during the war, he married after the war and worked as an insurance company representative.  He fathered eleven children with his wife and died of the yellow fever in 1879 at age 48.  The same epidemic that killed him, and one of his daughters, destroyed his companies finances and his family was supported by a Texas veterans organization for the following twenty years.

Hood was the youngest individual to be given command of an army during the Civil War which is likely why he came to mind when Camp Hood was named, combined with his association with Texas.  He wasn't a Texan and lived after the war in New Orleans.  It's curious that as late as 1942, with many examples of heroism having been provided by the recently fought World War One, that the Army was still naming posts after Civil War generals, let alone Confederate civil war generals.

Ft. A.P. Hill



Fort A. P. Hill is a training range in Kentucky.  This is a post that I frankly haven't heard of.  Like Benning, this post was established in the 1940s, with this one being established in 1941, just prior to the war.  It was named after Virginia native and Confederate general Ambrose Powell Hill.  Hill was a West Point graduate who had a cavalry command that did not see action during the Mexican War, after which he transferred to the Coastal Artillery.  He resigned his commission just prior to the Civil War and joined the Confederate forces when the war commenced.

Hill was very well liked by the men under his command and most fellow officers.  His career was hampered by constant ill health due to the effects of gonorrhea contracted while he was at West Point.  He was not a great commander and is sometimes cited as an example of the Peter Principle at work in a military command.  Unlike some of the other Confederate figures here he's not personally associated with ardent racism and seems to have gone with the South simply because he was a Virginian.  Having said that, he was vocal about not wanting to live in a defeated South and got his wish when he was shot dead by a Union officer when he was attempting to quixotically demand the Union troops surrender. This came just seven days prior to the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse and therefore at a time at which the South had obviously lost the war.

Hill likely would not be a candidate for the naming of a post today even if he were a Union officer.

Ft. Lee, Virginia.  


The United State's Navy's Camp Lee, Virginia, in 1911.  This Camp Lee predates the Army's.

This post was established in 1917 as Camp Lee in 1917 and rapidly expanded in size.  Oddly enough the name had already been used by the Navy, which is surprising.  It was disestablished in 1920 and then reestablished in 1940.  It became Ft. Lee in 1950 when it became a training location for the Quartermaster Corps.

The fort is named for Robert E. Lee.  Robert E. Lee is probably the most beloved of the Confederate generals but his reputation ignores that he was a slave owner who had a long career in the U.S. Army prior to the war and who was offered command of the Army by Lincoln but resigned rather than fight in a war against Virginians, only to join the rebellion and fight against the nation he'd sworn a loyalty oath to in the first place.  He was a good an effective general but his conscience was obvious pretty elastic towards some very serious matters.

If a person is inclined to want to change the names of these posts this is one that, interestingly enough, might be capable of being salvaged as there have been a number of well known U.S. officers by that name.  Charles Lee was a Continental Major General during the Revolution.  "Light Horse" Henry Lee also served during the Revolution and again during the Whiskey Rebellion, putting the father of Robert E. Lee, as he was, in the ironic position of commanding the suppression of an earlier rebellion.  William C. Lee was a Major General during World War Two and was the commander of the 101st Airborne. John H.C. Lee was a Lieutenant General who was in charge of logistics in the ETO during World War Two.  Indeed, John H.C. Lee, while a controversial figure, probably makes more sense than Robert E. Lee in terms of a naming influence for an ordinance post, and William C. Lee, the "father of the airborne", would be a good choice for an updated naming.

Ft. Pickett (Virginia National Guard)

Ft. Pickett is obviously named after Confederate General George Pickett of Pickett's Charge fame.

Ft. Pickett was established as Camp Pickett in 1941 as part of the build up during World War Two.  It had been a Civilian Conservation Corps camp prior to that, although not with Pickett's name. The post has an odd  history in that following World War Two it was basically disestablished and then reestablished to support Operation Portex, a large war game, that was staged in 1950, just prior to the Korean War. After that the camp remained being used and was transferred as a military establishment to the National Guard, although it received heavy use from other reserve and active components.  In 1960 the post was converted for Guard and Reserve training cycles and then it achieved permanent fort status in 1974.

The use of Gen. Pickett's name for this post seems to follow on the naming customs that were adopted during World War One as the government chose Pickett's name because this was a Southern post.  In doing this, it named the post after another example of a Southern born regular Army officer who had resigned his commission to join the Confederate forces.  In his case, this involved considerable effort as he was stationed at the time on San Juan Island off the coast of Washington State, where he had been involved in the armed standoff of the Pig War a year prior.  After a lengthy sea voyage, he joined the Confederate army.

Pickett's service is subject to some mixed reviews as to how good of an officer he was.  Obviously fondly recalled by Southerners because of his doomed charge at Gettysburg, he is not uniformly regarded as a great commander.  He did have a measure of wit, however, as he was noted to have commented after the war, when asked about why the doomed charge had failed, "I've always thought the Yankees had something to do with it".  On another occasion, that being a post war gathering of former officers of the Army of Northern Virginia, he'd turned to a companion and blamed Lee for the horrific loss, which is something that Lee deserved, noting that "That's the man who lost my division".

While Pickett is recalled principally for that charge today, he himself feared he'd be recalled by the United States for ordering the execution of 22 Union soldiers at New Bern, North Carolina in 1864. Those soldiers had in some instances served previously in Confederate home guard units, i.e., state militia.  For that matter, prior to this, Pickett had been issuing aggressive orders about the on the spot execution of guerillas that were captured by Confederate forces, something that was apparently starting to occur.

The irony of this is to thick not to notice. Pickett had been a serving Federal officer when the Civil War broke out and, like the North Carolina militiamen he hung, had chosen for the other side.  The only real difference is that the North Carolinians had opted for the Union when faced with Confederate conscription whereas he's opted to rebel.  If he wasn't deserving of hanging, they were not either.

Faced with probable prosecution, Pickett fled to Canada but soon benefited from the intercession of an old Army friend, U.S. Grant.  He returned to the U.S. and was pardoned by act of Congress in 1874, a year prior to his death in 1875 at age 50.

Pickett provides a good example of somebody whom the Army should not have honored by naming a fort after him and also of the attitudes of the majority of whites following teh war.  Connections allowed him to escape conviction and receive forgiveness in spite of his actions, where as black citizens, as they now were, were not to receive, ultimately, the sort of systemic assistance that they required to establish their place in the country.

Ft. Polk, Louisiana

Ft. Polk was established as Camp Polk in 1941, making it part of the World War Two collection of posts in this article.  It was a major training post during the war, but following the war it was closed and reopened repeatedly, sometimes serving as a reserve training facility.


It achieved permanent fort status in 1955, which hasn't saved it from continually being on the edge of closure.

Ft. Polk was named after Confederate general, the Right Reverend Leonidas Polk.  Polk was a planter and the Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana prior to the Civil War.  He resigned his ecclesiastical position to take up the sword during the Civil War.  Prior to the Civil War he was a major slaveholder.  He was killed by Union artillery in June, 1864.

Polk is another example of the mystery of the naming conventions in this period.  He was a poor commander and unlike Lee or Pickett he had no pre war association with the U.S. Army.  He was a major slaveholder and his associations in life, including his role as Episcopal Bishop while still retaining his fellow human beings in bondage, and then resigning his clerical role for a military one, make him a poor example of any kind.

Ft. Rucker, Alabama

Ft. Rucker was opened during World War Two in 1942 as Camp Rucker.  It was closed at the end of the war but reopened during the Korean War and made a fort in 1955.

The post was named after Col. Edmund Rucker, an Alabama Confederate officer who became an industrial leader in Alabama after the war.  Rucker was thought fairly high of by his immediate commander as after he was wounded, losing an arm, and captured, that commander, Nathan Bedford Forrest, arranged a prisoner exchange for him. After his recovery, he returned to a Confederate command.

Rucker is somewhat unusual in this collection as he was not a career soldier, although as noted some of the others on this list were not either, and he wasn't technically a general, although he was breveted to that rank, much like George Custer, during the war.  He seems to have come to mind as he was a very successful post Civil War businessman in Alabama.

Pondering those Confederate names

So what of these bases?

I've heard of all of these bases save for one which I somehow wasn't aware of and I wasn't going to comment on it directly, but I will be frank that from a northern and western perspective, naming Army installations after men who were traitors to their country just seems flat out bizarre.  Naming a post after somebody who was associated with the KKK is flat out inexcusable.  And the whole thing is a bit hard to figure.  Until I saw the list, I didn't realize that there were ten, which is a lot.  I didn't know about Beauregard and Pickett having posts named after them at all and I'd not realized that Ft. Gordon, Ft. Polk and Ft. Rucker were named after Confederate generals, although I should have.

We noted just the other day that this film, which is a brilliant film and also a piece of Lost Cause apologetics, was made in 1939 but we failed to note that it was released on January 17, 1940.  This film, as brilliant as it is, definitely has racist elements and unashamedly glorifies the Southern cause in the war, showing how late the Lost Cause Era really lasted.

I also would not have guessed that five or six, depending upon how you reckon it, of these posts were given the names of Confederate figures during World War Two.  Perhaps because I was aware of the use of Confederate figures for camps in the South during World War One, and perhaps because I associate the Lost Cause Era with the 1910s, I would have guessed that they were mostly named during World War One.  I was wrong on that.

Indeed, as the purpose of this blog is to learn, what we've learned from that is that the Lost Cause era went on for a lot longer than I would have guessed. But perhaps I should have known better.  We covered Spiro Agnew going to Battle Mountain's dedication in 1970 just the other day, and while doing this I was informed that the Confederate unknown soldiers tomb was established in 1980.

I did know that all of these came about during the 1916 to 1942 time frame, and that they fit into the same period in which monuments to Southern generals were going up all over the South, even if I erroneously contracted the time period they went up overall (I probably should have run the era from about 1900 to 1980, rather than concentrate on the 1910s).  That period was the heyday of the "Lost Cause" movement that glorified the Southern cause, omitting that it was about slavery, and for which the bookends could perhaps be seen as the movies Birth Of A Nation (nasty racist trash) and Gone With The Wind (well filmed technicolor whitewashing).

It frankly baffles me a bit that the Army remained so concerned about drawing in Southern troops, if that's what it was really concerned about, that it started this practice in World War One, particularly as so many Southerners (black and white) had enlisted to fight in the Spanish American War, which is further baffling in light of the fact that the government resorted to the draft during the Great War, so the concern seems unwarranted, but then I guess I wasn't around doing the worrying at the time so perhaps I'm missing something.

If I am, I'm really missing it in regard to World War Two, by which time it was abundantly clear that the Army was having no trouble at all recruiting Southern men to the service and during which, moreover, the Amy eventually went completely over to conscription and quit taking volunteers as it was more efficient.  Given that, the names assigned during the Second World War really have to be regarded as part of the Army culture at the time.

Indeed, we might note on that culture that the Army's officer corps always had a strong Southern make up. That was the case prior to the Civil War and caused problems in the ranks during the Mexican War when large numbers of German and Irish immigrants, whom Southern officers generally despised, joined for the duration of the war.  Things became so bad that it inspired the only really large defection of US troops to an enemy as Irish soldiers in some numbers left the U.S. Army and joined the Mexican Army.  And that helps explain why so many officers were simply allowed to leave the service at the start of the Civil War and go freely into treason.  The brotherly nature of the officer corps allowed for it, and there were a lot of Southerners in that corps.* In spite of post war fears, Southerners continued to join the Army in numbers greater than Northerners after the Civil War and this was still the case at least as late as the Vietnam War, if not later.

I get why blacks. . .and white Northerners, may remain offended by those names and might want them changed.  Having said that, I also get President Trump's point that by now more Americans may associate those post  names with the Second World War than they do with the Civil War, so it may be a bit late to change some of  them now.  Having said that, the association of some of these individuals with hardcore racism or, in Pickett's case, with a war crime are so strong that at least in some cases something should be done.  Indeed, in the list of names a person might wish to now preserve on post titles, the ones where the post name now overshadows the original person the name honored is small, and when you look at those examples, at least one of them is extremely problematic.

So, now that the Army is looking at it, perhaps all the names should go.

When I first thought of this post I guessed, apparently inaccurately, that some southern states may have National Guard posts named after Confederate figures as well.  Anyhow, that then caused me to ponder how the US has named its military installations, in general, in the past, which lead me to thinking about military installations locally, and who they were named after.  We all know the well-known posts, but rarely the lesser known Guard and smaller military installations. Given that, as it might be interesting, I’ll list them for my state, Wyoming.  I’ll break them down into a couple of different categories.

Part of the reason that I thought this might be interesting, and I hope others follow, is that it helps illustrate what posts were named at various times and why.  So we'll get to Wyoming next.

_________________________________________________________________________________

*Of interest, very few artillerymen, which required some mathematical knowledge, were Southerners prior to the war and, of those who were, most stayed in the Union Army.  The Confederate artillery was, accordingly, always bad.

Wednesday, June 17, 2020

And then there's the Communist Hermit Kingdom, was Lex Anteinternet: 第二帝国 (The Second Reich). China Channels Kaiser Wi...

Korean peninsula at night.

We just posted this:
Lex Anteinternet: 第二帝国 (The Second Reich). China Channels Kaiser Wi...: From the German reunification in 1870 up into World War One Germany, a continental power seeking to enter the colonial game just as the g...
But we should also note that as China pushed closer and closer to outright armed imperial aggression, it's tiny childish neighbor, the Communist monarchy of  North Korea, is outright acting with violence of a demonstrative sort.  It's blown up the structure where it met with its adult sibling to the south and its moving troops to the border.  And it now appears that Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un's not too pleasant sister, is in fact taking more of a role in the Marxist monarchy.

All of this is likely because North Korea isn't getting the attention it feels it deserves and, more significantly, that it likely needs as things are likely not going well there.  But its risky.

And it puts the West, and more particularly the United States, in an increasingly precarious position.

The US hasn't fought a deep war, that is a major toe to toe war, with a serious opponent since 1973.  Sure, we've fought various conflicts since then, any one of which is serious if you are in it, but they are all very minor in their scale, if not their length, compared to the last major war we fought, the Vietnam War.  The Vietnam War required an American military presence of 500,000 men on the ground in Indochina.  The Korean War, which was in reality fought only shortly prior to that, took 500,000 U.S. troops as well.  Both wars resulted in 50,000 US killed in action, with the Korean War taking a little under four years to achieve that total (in fairness, while the Vietnam War went from 1958 to 1975, in U.S. terms, most U.S. casualties were sustained from 1965 to 1970).

Since 1945 the US has relied on technology to counter its opponents and has been so successful at it that its made internal modifications to the nature of its military that really weaken its combat abilities in a toe to toe engagement.  We've been comfortable with that, and even ignored that we were doing that, as we have been convinced that no war like the Korean War will ever come again.  If we're wrong on that, we're really going to pay the price.

Thursday, June 11, 2020

June 11, 1970. Leaving Libya

F100 Super Saber taking off from Wheelus Air Force Base, Libya.

On this day in 1970 the American military presence in Libya came to an end when the U.S. Air Force turned Wheelus Air Force Base over to the North African country.

Few people today would even be aware that the USAF had a base in Libya, but it first started having a presence at Wheelus during World War Two when it took over the former Italian air field in 1943 after it was captured by the British.  It occupied the air field steadily until this date in 1970. During much of that time the US had friendly relations with the country's monarch, King Idris I.

King Idris I of Libya, who reigned from 1951 until 1969. The former king would live out his life in exile in Egypt.

Idris was overthrown in a military coup led by Muammar Gaddafi, who subsequently ruled the "republic" from that point until is his violent death at the hands of a revolutionary crowd in 2011.  During Idris' reign the nation went from being one of the poorest in the world to being one of the richest, due to the discovery of oil, and at the same time the purpose of the USAF presence in the country declined to the point of irrelevance.  Gaddafi wanted the US out and the US, for its part, was glad to leave.

Wheelus was soon used by the Soviet Air Forces as a base and as a Libyan air force base.  It was hit  in 1986 by the U.S. during it raid on Libya during the Reagan administration.

USAF FB-111 landing after air strike in Libya in 1986.

The air strip is an airport today.

On the same day William Bentvena was shot by Tommy DeSimone, an event, mostly recalled from the movie Goodfellas.  Bentvena was a "made man" of the Gambino crime family and DeSimone would disappear in 1979.

Sunday, December 1, 2019

December 1, 1969. The United States resumes a lottery system for conscription.

This is, frankly, a bit confusing.

The United States had resumed conscription following World War Two in March 1948.  It had only actually expired in January 1947, showing how a need for manpower in the wake of World War Two caused it to actually continue to exist in spite of a large reduction in force following the end of the war.

After coming back into effect in March 1948 it stayed in existence until 1973, but was then done away with following the end of the Vietnam War. By that time conscription was massively unpopular.  It can't be said to have ever really been "popular", per se, but it didn't meet with real resistance until the Vietnam War.

The resumption of a lottery system for the draft, in which each registrant was assigned a number and the number then drawn at random, was designed to attempt to reduce the unpopularity of conscription at that point in the Vietnam War.  Numerous changes were made to the system during the war including ending a marriage exemption and ultimately curtaining an exemption for graduate students. With the adoption of the lottery system also came a change in age focus so that rather than top of those in the age range being drafted it then focused on those who were 19 years old. The reason for this was that if a person's number wasn't chosen in the lottery as a 19 year old, they were not going to be drafted and could accordingly plan around that.

Because of the way that the draft worked prior to 1969, and even after that date, many men joined the service when faced with the near certainty of being conscripted. As a result, oddly, far more men volunteered for service than who were actually conscripted.  Additionally, the number of men who were volunteers for the service who served in Vietnam outnumbered those who were drafted, with a surprisingly large number of troops who served in the war itself volunteering for service in Vietnam.

Monday, November 11, 2019

An odd thought on Veterans Day

I'm now the only veteran in the office.

When I first worked here, we had two World War Two veterans and one Vietnam War veteran.

Now, I'm it. 

They've all passed on.


Since I've worked here, we've had two women who had been in the Marines. They're still very much with the living, but no longer work here.  One of them was married to a serving Marine, and she of course travels with him.

But something that was common for men at one time now no longer is.  And so, there's not another veteran here.

Friday, October 11, 2019

An actual reason, if not a necessarily a moral one, or even a good one, to stand aside in northern Syria. . . Realpolitik

But there's a catch to it.

Kissinger.  He probably wouldn't have stopped the Turks either. . . but he wouldn't have gone into Syria in the first place and he wouldn't have offered the Kurds false hopes.  Shoot, he'd have made it look like we were doing the right thing, even if we weren't.

Turkey has been our ally since 1945. Technically, but fairly hypocritically, Turkey became an American ally when it declared war on Germany in February 1945.

Turkey never fired a shot in World War Two (making Donald Trump's line about the Kurds not being with us in Normandy all the more odd).  And Turkey was courted for most of the war by the Germans.  Turkey didn't enter World War Two as it guessed German chances correctly, which didn't mean that it was our pal.  Rather, Germany had been close to Turkey since the Imperial German and Imperial Ottoman days. The fall of the Kaiser and the Emperor hadn't disrupted that.

And Turkey both had designs on Turkish Central Asia and feared the Soviet Union, which it had good reason to do.  There's little reason to doubt that if the Germans had entered Moscow in 1941 and pushed the Soviets over the Volga at Stalingrad in 1942 the Turks would have entered the war and crossed the Soviet frontier, taking Soviet Central Asia.  But Ataturk and his men had a better historical memory than Hitler and his cronies, and the Turks weren't convinced that the Soviets would fall.

They also weren't convinced that they wouldn't cross the Turkish frontier in 1944 or 45, so they threw in with the Allies at the bitter end to help avoid that.

After the war the Turks sided with the west as it feared the Soviets, and rightly so.  Turkey fought with the United Nations in Korea.  It was a steadfast NATO and American ally against the Soviet Union.  It allowed the US to position nuclear missiles on its territory in the late 50s and early 60s.  It allowed U2 flights to take off from its airfields and cross its frontier into the USSR.

And it might be a useful ally against the Russians today.

All of that is highly cynical.  Turkey has gone from being a country basically ruled by its military, which possessed a veto power over its civilian government, to a shaky democracy with an Islamist prime minister.  As its done that, it's been less and less friendly to American positions in the world, but the relationship remains.

Presuming that Turkey doesn't fall into being an Islamic republic, and take the same path as Pakistan or, worse yet, Iran (and it probably won't), the alliance between the two nations could remain useful.

But that means that the United States has to accommodate itself to Turkish suppression of the Kurds. Or at least it might.

Playing both side of an alliance; being an ally of a sovereign nation and opposing its armed foreign positions can be done, but it's really tricky.  Dwight Eisenhower followed by John F. Kennedy did that in regard to the French in Algeria, whom we did not support even though they were a NATO ally.  Eisenhower also managed that in regard to Israel, France and the UK during the Suez crisis, telling those nations close to us not only that they were on their own but that they had no business intervening in Egypt.  And the US sort of managed that with the UK in Ireland, although never in any official sort of way.

Maybe we could pull that off in regard to the Kurds, who deserve their own state, and a state that would make Turkey a smaller one. But that would be really tough.  That worked in regard to Ireland only because the British were headed in that direction anyhow, and they judged an ongoing relationship with the United States something not to be disrupted.

Which is part of the reason that you need to think out your interventions before you get in.

When we went into Syria, there was no way that we weren't going to end up supporting the Kurds there. After all, we had done that very thing with the Kurds in Iraq.

And that was always going to make Turkey highly uncomfortable.

So at that point, you really have to ask, do you value Kurdish liberty over Turkish support against the Russians, if you need it?

If you don't ask that question, you're going to end up blowing something. Either the Turks become enraged with the US, or the Kurds do.

Make no mistake about it.  We have betrayed the Kurds. And we didn't even do it in the Machiavellian Kissinger way of selling somebody out while pretending we aren't.  We've done something wrong.

And that error started when we didn't think out Syria well in the first place.

And perhaps now, all the damage that can be done, has been.  We've betrayed the Kurds and the Turks have already started to become a shaky ally. So nothing has been achieved.

Thursday, October 10, 2019

The Secondary Waves of the Great War.

World War Two, for obvious reasons, looms large in our imagination as the biggest event of the 20th Century.  The biggest, and the most significant.

But are we wrong?  

It seems lately that the echos of World War One are resounding pretty loudly.

World War One smashed the old order and demolished the borders of centuries.  The interbellum tried to reconstruct them, but did so in a metastasized and imperfect form, giving rise to new malignant orders that sought to fill the voids left by the death of the old imperial ones.  World War Two pitted three forces against each other, fascism, communism, and democracy, with democracy and communism ultimately siding with each other against fascism. After the war, the results of the Second World War gave rise to a contest between the two victors, communism and democracy, against each other until the vitality of free societies and free markets drove the rigidness of communism to and beyond the breaking point.

And now that communism is dead and gone, buried alongside its evil cousin fascism, the old unsolved questions of the Great War are back.  The rights of small nations, including those with out countries, against the possessions of older larger ones.  The demise of great empires giving rise to smaller ones.  Nationalism of all stripes against everything else.

It's 1919 all over again.

Turkey didn't sign the Treaty of Sevres.

Indeed, rather than do that, it fought it out.

It can't be blamed.  The Greeks had a quasi legitimate claim to Smyrna, but only quasi. A lot of ethnic Greeks lived there, which is no surprise as Anatolia had been Greek. The Ottoman's were invaders to the region, finally taking it in the 1450s.  But it had a large Ottoman population that they were bloodily brutal towards and they engaged in conquest, with the help of their Western allies, in Anatolia proper, seeking in a way to reverse what was lost centuries prior.

The Italian claim, moreover, to islands off of Turkey was absurd.

But the Armenian claims to their lands weren't.

The region sought of Armenia marked for a plebiscite is Kurdistan.  The Syria that ran to the sea and down to Palestine was an Ottoman province carved away from the Empire.  So was the Mesopotamia, i.e., Iraq, that appears on the map.

In 1990, the United States intervened in the Middle East to force Iraq, the British post World War One creation, out of Kuwait, a desert province that the British had protected during their stay in the Middle East, launching operations, with the assistance of others, from that region of Arabia named for the Sauds, that Arabian family that spent the Great War and the immediate interbellum consolidating power at the ultimate expense of the Hashemites, that Arabian noble family who had made war on the Turks.  The British dolled out kingdoms to that family as consolation prizes, with the Hashemites taking Iraq and the Transjordan.  The French got to administer Syria, a region that it claimed an historical affinity to, with the British taking administration of Palestine and Egypt, both of the latter having been Ottoman provinces although Egypt was long administered by the British in an arrangement that nobody can possibly grasp.

And so now, the old fights, and the interbellum struggles, reappear.  The peoples not accorded nations would like to have them. The old empires would like to keep their domains.  Borders drawn by European nations, with the help of Woodrow Wilson, are treated as real, when perhaps they were never correct.

Wednesday, October 9, 2019

Why an understanding of history is important.

They (the Kurds) didn't help us in the Second World War; they didn't help us with Normandy.
Donald Trump on the Kurds.

Of course they didn't. 

In 1944-45 the Kurds were where they are now, which means that they were unwilling citizens of Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey.  Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey also didn't help us in the Second World War.

Indeed, the Turks were courted by the Germans throughout much of the war but wisely stayed out, having learned their lesson by siding with the Germans during World War One.  Turkey was a neutral power, lead by the aggressively secular military man Ataturk,. 

Syria was a French possession going into World War Two, a League of Nations mandate from World War One.  It became independent in 1946 basically as the British forced a weakened France to depart.  Iraq became independent in 1932 but following a pro fascist coup at the start of World War Two, the British defeated it in a short war in 1941.  Iran was a neutral during the war, but a neutral that leaned heavily towards the Allies and which allowed transportation of supplies from the Western allies to the Soviet Union across its territory.

So what does one make of all of this?

Well not much. 

World War Two was the single most significant event of the modern era, but it's now 75 some years ago.  All of the nations that were our allies, or perhaps more accurately that we became allied to, are still our allies. But the two major nations we fought in World War Two, Germany and Japan, are also our allies.  One of the nations that was a major ally of ours during World War Two, the Soviet Union, would be our major opponent for decades thereafter.  Russia, its predecessor and successor, can hardly be called our friend.

And bizarrely, perhaps World War One now has more to do with what's gong on in that region than World War Two, at least in some ways.  World War Two, followed by the Cold War, put the issues that the Great War's peace shoved into prominence back on the back burner.  The major wars were too big and the ideologies too deep for the rights of small peoples to take the place that seemed so prominent in 1918.

Now those issues are back.

Yes, the Kurds didn't fight at Normandy.  How could they?  But the Western Allies didn't save the Armenians from the Ottomans.  How could they?  The Allies didn't save the Turks from the Greeks nor did they save the Greeks from the Turks.  They probably could have done something about that.

In 1918 the European powers that carved up the Ottoman Empire, as well they should have, imagined a much smaller Turkey.  That Turkey would have suffered injustices. Greek claims to the interior of Turkey were unjust.  Italian claims to some of Turkey were absurd.  But the imagined Kurdish and Armenian states that some saw were not. And Armenia did manage to emerge. Kurdistan did not. We didn't do anything about that.

Maybe we couldn't have. But we could have kept this from breaking out.

Saturday, August 3, 2019

Reconsidering the Vietnam War. . . again.

Vietnam Era manual for the M16A1 rifle.  We still had these when I was in the National Guard in the very early 1980s, but by the late 1980s, they were gone in favor of a conventional print manual.  The M16 has been an enduring Vietnam War innovation which is unfortunate, as its junk.

Most of the post on this blog take place in the pre 1930 time frame, and not surprisingly, therefore, the war that's mentioned the most on the pages here is World War OneThe Great War has over 1,000 posts regarding it, and there's more added all the time, even though we're now past the war's centennial.  Next to WWI, World War Two shows up the most, 277 times, unless you consider the Punitive Expedition, which is the conflict that this blog was formed to concentrate on, sort of.  In spite of that intent, the Punitive Expedition* has only 341 posts compared to over 1,000 for World War One, which is more than the 277 dedicated to the Second World War.

This will be, in contrast, only the 79th post featuring the Vietnam War.

But we have posted on the war before, and we've even done a retrospective of sorts on the war, a topic we're returning to here.  Indeed, we've done more than one.  Following Ken Burn's documentary on the war, we did a series of them, including these:


Vietnam: Could we have avoided it?


Did the Vietnam War wreck the country?


Vietnam: Could we have won the war?


Was the Domino Theory Right?


Looking at the Vietnam War differently. Not a war, but as a campaign in the Cold War.


And that's not all.  

Indeed, I'm finding that I'm now at the point on this blog where I'm repeating myself quite a bit. When you get to that point, it's time to do something, such as maybe quit posting except on stuff you know to be new to the blog.*

Anyhow, as I just noted the other day, I recently read Hasting's Vietnam, An Epic Tragedy 1945-1975.  The last time I really took a multi post re look at the Vietnam War was after Burn's documentary, which Hastings cites in his book.  That might argue against doing this again, but Hasting's book was so complete that it does or should cause a history minded person to ponder prior conclusions.

Hasting's views are pretty clear.  What he basically believes is:

  • There was no reason for the U.S. to go into Vietnam; and
  • Going into Vietnam was a mistake for the U.S.; because
  • The war was unwinnable.
So what of those conclusions?

Let's take a second look

Or a third one.

Why did the United States go into Vietnam in the first place?


This is oddly the least answered and most unclear topic of them all, which is really odd given the vast amount of consideration and retrospect that's been given to the war. Why did we go there?

It's really hard to say.

That takes us back to this entry:

Vietnam: Could we have avoided it?


In which I earlier stated:

Could we have avoided entering the war entirely?

The answer to this question often seems a simple presumed "yes".   I know that was my mother's opinion, "we shouldn't have gone there".  And she certainly isn't alone in that view.  Quite a few people hold that as an opinion of fact, perhaps even the majority of Americans.

But avoiding wars is often more difficult than it seems and the path around the conflict  only apparent, in some cases, after the war's over.  Once you choose to walk down certain streets, it''s hard to run back down them. So we should look at this seriously.  Maybe the Vietnam War was a disaster, but an unavoidable one.

My reasoning was really lengthy, but after going into the history of France in the immediate post war era, and France's defeat in Indochina, and the Geneva accords, I came to this conclusion.

By the time the agreement was reached the United States was heavily involved in efforts concerning Vietnam.  It was just sort of increasingly sucked in.  But that event made some sense.  Being a strategic coastal region of the Asian continent, having been heavily involved in Korea, and being the major democratic power in the world, there was no realistic way that the United States could sit it out.  In the end, it didn't sign the agreement, but by the time it was reached it was heavily involved in the diplomatic developments.

It seems impossible that anything else could have occurred.

I was wrong.

In thinking about it, I really think the reason we ended up getting into Vietnam was due to the Korean War.  And that's why going into Vietnam was a mistake.  The Korean War made sense, the Vietnam War, from a U.S. prospective, didn't.

It's been sort of forgotten in a way that we didn't go into Korean to save Korea, we went into Korea to save Japan.  Our analysis there was off the mark, but that was our thinking.  A look at the map, and a little history, explains it.


There they are.  Korea and Japan. . .and China and Russia.

In 1945 terms what this amounted to, after August, was a Japan occupied by the United States, a northern Korea occupied by the Soviet Union, a southern Korea occupied by the United States, and China, recently liberated from the Japanese and under the Nationalist government of Chaing Kai Shek.



That didn't last long.




No, not long at all.

In 1945 when the war ended, the Nationalist were in control of most of China and the Chinese Communist weren't much, really.  Indeed, their support from the Soviet Union was actually quite marginal.

What occurred can be and is debated, but by 1949 the Chinese Communists had reversed their fortunes and driven the Nationalist off the Chinese mainland.  By 49 the Soviets were fully supporting the Chinese Communists. A country that we imagined (rather naively) towards a western democratic future was, all of a sudden, a Communist behemoth.

The political repercussions were immediate.  The United States had shown no interest in getting into the Chinese Civil War, and indeed who would want to get into a Chinese Civil War?  It's now known that Communist fifth columnist in the U.S. were active in disrupting arms shipments to the Nationalist and were highly effective in doing so, but it's difficult to imagine the war turning out differently.  In order to save the Nationalist an epic intervention would have had to occur, and that wasn't going to happen. And for good reason.

That changed things geopolitically in ways that weren't even appreciated at the time.  Indeed, the United States even after that took the position that the Korean peninsula, which was experiencing a brutal civil war in the south, wasn't in is area of concern. The Reds took note of that.

The conventional invasion of South Korea by North Korea took place in 1950, as we've earlier noted, and suddenly American policy makers looked at the map and made the conclusion that Korea was a knife pointed at the heart of Japan.

And that's why we intervened. We couldn't risk Japan being invaded next.

That wasn't going to happen, but that's what we feared might happen.  In our view, the invasion of the south by the north was a Soviet invasion by proxy, with Japan being the next step.

Everything about that view was wrong.  The North's actions were licensed by the USSR, which equipped the North Koreans, but they didn't require the North to invade the South. They simply thought that the US, having declared disinterest on Korea, wouldn't do anything about it.  As the war went on, in fact, the Soviet interest in it declined while the Red Chinese interest naturally very much increased. The Red Chinese were fearful of sharing a border with American troops, which made sense.  Indeed, the Red Chinese had no choice but to intervene in the Korean War.

Which doesn't make our having done so wrong.  Thinking Cold War geopolitical we were right, if our assumptions were wrong.

France went back into Indochina for a different reason.  It was their colony.

We stumbled into Vietnam.

Vietnam is in a strategic location, sort of.  Cam Ranh Bay is a major port that provides military access for a vast swath of the Pacific in Indochina, something that was obvious to everyone prior to the Second World War and which made it a target of the Japanese and then the Allies during the Second World War.

Japanese tanker burning in Cam Ranh Bay after U.S. Navy air raid in 1945.

But it's also the far western end of Indochina.  Viewed one way, such as the Japanese did in 1941, its the doorway to Southeast Asia.  Viewed another, it's the last part of Southeast Asia before you are in the sea. Both views are correct.

The only reason for the U.S. to get into Indochina was to keep a global Communist movement from spreading.  But the Indochinese Communists weren't really global but local supported by the global.  Given our assumptions at the time we can be excused for not realizing that, but that was the reality of it.  At any rate, our only reason to get into Indochina was to keep Communism from spreading to someplace else we really cared about.

But where?

Well, our real concerns were India and Southeast Asia from Thailand on.  India was really beyond our ability to really do something about.  Thailand was probably an exception.  Added to that, Australia was massively concerned about Indonesia and urged the US to get into Indochina right from the onset, something the Australians later forgot.  They even threatened to unilaterally intervene during the Kennedy Administration if we did not.

But it was all so murky.

Earlier I said:

That brings us to the period from 1955 to 1963 in which South Vietnam fought against increasing odds against North Vietnam. We've already discussed that.  Having allied with Diem, who was anti Communist and anti French, the United States necessarily became South Vietnam's military supplier and military backer.  Again, it's hard to imagine any other result occurring.  So the period of increasing military involvement, from 1955 to 1963, seems more or less inevitable.

Hmmm. . . maybe not so much.

We didn't get involved in every civil war in which the Communist were active at any point in the Cold War, and we limited our actions to arms and sometimes covert action in others.  We didn't intervene to help the French or the Dutch anywhere in their collapsing empire and we didn't help the British anywhere it intervened in a third world struggle. . and the British intervened a lot.  We didn't try to keep the Greeks from falling to Communism, the British achieved that, and we didn't ask for a role in Malaysia.  We didn't fight in any fashion on the Chinese mainland, thankfully.

It sort of seems that having saved South Korea from the north, and having stepped into a larger Cold War role in the process, we assumed that we could save South Vietnam as well.  

We just didn't give it very much thought and even now, there's no real good explanation for what we were thinking.  One thing just lead to another.

Should we have gone in?

It's interesting that this debate still exists, in a very muted form, over fifty years after we actually did and over forty years after we lost the war.  In 1975 we weren't asking this question.  Now we somewhat do.

If the Vietnam War provides any lesson on intervention, and it provides more than one, a clear lesson of the war is that you shouldn't intervene in a war without a clear goal that serves a necessary purpose.

We probably did think that we had some sort of clear goal, to be fair, in the 1958 to 1965 time frame in which we went from assisting the Republic of Vietnam to intervening in its civil war.  The initial goal was to put down a Communist insurgency that was supported by the North and preserve a non Communist regime in the South. That was a laudable goal.

It was also simply not realistic in context. That is, as the North was absolutely dedicated to reuniting the country under its leadership, and as it was supporting the Southern insurgency, there was no realistic way to deal with the South without dealing with the North.

Dealing with the North, realistically, meant occupying it.  It's infrastructure was too primitive to be damaged to the pint where it couldn't' support the South.  It was really a conduit, for the most part, for Soviet and then Chinese arms to the South.  And it was a brutal Communist dictatorship that didn't care at all about he suffering of anyone, so it couldn't be intimidated in any fashion to quitting.  It's only fear, realistically, was that it would provoke an American invasion launched form the South.

The North never seems to have really feared this, reading the Americans completely correctly in that fashion.  The Soviets very much feared it, as did the Chinese.  But hence the problem.  While nobody can say for sure, the logical assumption would have to be that the Chinese would have sent ground troops into the North if the Americans had invaded it.

They did send huge numbers of anti aircraft gunners in, although they withdrew them prior to the U.S. withdrawing.

Now, this will be partially addressed immediately below, but there is an error in my assumption here.  Keep in mind we're speaking of 1958 to 1965, when these calculations should have been made. So what I'm saying is, when the U.S. committed the Marines to land in 1965, it should have been obvious that what that meant was getting into a guerrilla war with a force that was local but which had a supply chain running back to the Soviet Union.

Winning a war like that would have  meant fighting it until the guerrillas were so depleted that they were demoralized to the point of quitting, and keeping them from being replaced by regular troops from the North, and cutting of their supplies completely.  

And that would have really required a conclusion that the way to do that would have been to occupy North Vietnam, which we were not going to do.

So, here's my next question:

Vietnam: Could we have won the war?


Hastings says no.

I've read his book, and others, and frankly, I disagree, we could have.  Well, kind of sort of, maybe.

Let's start off where we started before.  I introduced the topic as follows:

Vietnam: Could we have won the war?

 

This is a topic that comes up about any time a discussion on the Vietnam War comes up (along with "how did we get in that?").  Could we have won the war?

This assumes that you agree, of course, that we didn't win the war. That we didn't seems self evident to me, but there's a small group of revisionist amateurs who insist that, no, we (the United States) won it.  The Republic of Vietnam may have lost it, they'll say, but that was after we left and that was not our fault and therefore not our defeat.

Well, by any rational measure, we lost the war.

And frankly the fall was fairly spectacular.  April 1975 saw not only the final fall of the Republic of Vietnam but also the fall of Cambodia.  Laos fell in December of that year.  A pretty spectacular final fall.

But did it have to be?  Could we have won?

At least some historians, some revisionist and some not so much, have answered that question "yes". Are they right, and what would winning in Vietnam have taken, and was that really politically possible?

Before we go further, let's further qualify our answer by noting that we're going to toss out the "if only our hands weren't tied' line of reasoning.  This became popular at some time in the 1980s, after the cycle of contempt towards soldiers swung to a late admiration for them.  While soldiers never deserved the contempt for the war that was levied upon them, the late concept that we fought with restrictive rules of engagement and hindered strategies weighted towards the enemy is just flat out wrong.  In every war since Vietnam we've fought under much more restrictive rules (arguably too restrictive in the case of Afghanistan) and to suggest that the Vietnam War was fought with kid gloves just doesn't match the facts.

B-52 on a bomb run during the Vietnam War.

It doesn't, anyhow, if you don't mean that we should have taken the war more directly to the areas outside of North Vietnam than we did, i.e., Cambodia and Laos, or if don't mean that we should have invaded North Vietnam.  Some do mean that, and we'll address those below.

Anyhow, with those qualifications, we'll look more directly at the topic.

One thing that seems abundantly clear now, given that we have access to their audiotapes, which were played in the recent Burns and Novik documentary, nearly every American President who served during the entire length of the Vietnam War, from Eisenhower to Nixon, felt there was no realistic chance of winning it. That's shocking given the things they actually did in prosecuting the war, or even just in getting into it (which we'll look at later) but it seems to be the case. Given that, we have to seriously question those who seriously maintain we could have won the war.  The men in power, at the time, did not think that was the case almost uniformly.  So, we some say we could have won it, they have to answer those retained doubts, even if those in the White House acted contrary to their own beliefs.

Which is not to say that there have not been those who have come about and challenged those assumptions.  There are at least four serious books that have maintained the war was winnable, or even that it had all but been won, when things developed, which did not need to, which gave us the results we got.  Historians Mark Moyer, Geoffry Shaw, and Mark Woodruff, amongst others, have all maintained that in relatively recent books.  Indeed, while Moyer's book was intended to be volume one of a two volume set (the second has yet to appear and its getting to be a long time), Woodruff's book, relying very heavily on statistics, nearly serves that purpose, with both books together covering the entire war.  Added to that at least books my William C. Westmoreland and William E. Colby, both of whom had active roles in the war, the first as the principal commander for much of the American involvement in the war and the second as the CIA station chief, have maintained, but in very differently fashions, that the war was winnable.

So was it?

From there, I looked at the early war.  As I've done that before, I'll do it again here.

1954-1963 (and maybe beyond?):  Winning or losing with Ngo Dinh Diem

Moyer and Shaw take the war up to the point of Diem's assassination as a separate and distinct part of the war, and I think they're right to do so.  The war after that point was distinctly different than before it. And many of the people who lived through it, including the Vietnamese, tend to view it that way as well, so we'll do the same.

 Ngo Dinh Diem

The basic gist of this argument is that South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem was a misunderstood Vietnamese nationalist who had things in hand, but for interference from his ally the United States, and that if let alone, he would have completed the victory over the Viet Cong over a period of years.  That's a summation of the argument, but it doesn't really complete it.  And surprisingly, at this point, quite a few who regard Diem poorly and who also feel that the war was a lost cause from the onset agree with many, maybe most, of the salient points that the revisionist now raise.  Not all, to be sure, but many, maybe most, of the significant ones.

So what do people now generally agree about, in regards to Diem, and where do they disagree?

An imperfect Vietnamese Nationalist. . . but the least offensive one we could find. 

Over time, people have come to an odd consensus on Diem, whether they like him or not.  It's come to be recognized that he was likely the best man to lead his country, which doesn't mean that he's universally admired now or that people agree we should have supported South Vietnam. Basically, for all his defects, real or perceived, he was the best there was.

Personally, he was hard driven and a true Vietnamese nationalist.  He hadn't been a tool of the French and nobody claimed that he was.  Indeed, even the North Vietnamese Communists, who of course did not like him, knew him, as he'd been pro independence.  He remained fiercely independent of mind after South Vietnam became and independent state, but it cannot be pretended that he made any real effort to hold the vote that was supposed to occur over reunification.

He also took a fiercely independent view of the war with the Viet Cong in the South, frequently in huge disagreement with his American advisers and the United States in general once the US became involved.  One of the real subjects of his disagreement was on the topic of American arms and military advice.  He wanted US military assistance, but the level of advanced mechanized equipment he was receiving concerned him.  And he did not always agree with the suggested strategy offered by his American advisers by any means.  Over time, particularly given the results after American withdrawal from the war in 1972, his concerns over American equipment and what it meant have come to be seen as correct.  Moyer is convinced he was correct in the early 1960s and that this was already playing a role in things going wrong in the war.

So both Diem's admirers and his detractors (and he has many detractors) have come to view as being about the only leader in South Vietnam who could lead the country at the time, that assassinating him was a huge mistake that threw the country into unending turmoil until its 1975 collapse and that his concerns that the South was receiving too much in the way of mechanized American equipment and advice on how to use it was correct.  Beyond that, however, there is little in agreement.

Some claim that Diem was a despot, ruling in a Western suit with an iron hand, and a minority hand at that as he was a Catholic in a Buddhist land. Others point out that Buddhism was fading in Vietnam and Diem actually acted to revive the Buddhist monasteries.  Self immolation of monks in protest of his rule is pointed out to be proof of his unpopularity, but it has since been conceded by some in that community that Communist infiltration was influencing their actions and that the first such act may have had more to do with a personal pledge than protest.  The truth of it is now difficult to sort out and it was then as well. What can be taken for granted, however, is that he wasn't a democrat in the Western sense and that he governed as a type of strongman.

None of which answers the question we posted from the start, although it does hint at the fact that his assassination made it more difficult to win the war, contrary to what the faction in the United States government who quietly hoped for his overthrow would have supposed.

 The American Way of War. . .or a Vietnamese War with American Arms?

 Early version of the ubiquitous M113 Armored Personnel Carrier in use by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.  In some ways, the US turned a huge percentage of its own Army and the ARVN into cavalry, or at least mounted infantry, rather than infantry, in the traditional context.

As early as the French Indochinese War the French had run into problems when units equipped with American equipment and trained to expect support from the thickly supplied American logistical system was not available.  It should not be surprising, therefore, when the Army of the Republic of Vietnam ran into the same problem. 

In 1963 when Diem was overthrown the situation in the countryside was not good.  Looking at it today there seems to be no real hope in the retrospective offering that things would have somehow improved. But at least Moyer has claimed things were not as grim as they might appear.  Nonetheless Moyer concedes that part of the appearance of a problem, at any rate, is that the ARVN in the early 1960s had been supplied with American armored personnel carriers to fight a jungle war that their much more poorly supplied opponents fought on foot.

Now, at first blush it would seem that the advantage should have gone to the ARVN, and indeed the American military mission to Vietnam understood it that way.  With better equipment and with equipment of all types the ARVN should have done well, right?


Well yes and no.  The war they were fighting was a bush war to start with and some American equipment was of doubtful utility except to a larger Army trained to use it.  The ARVN wasn't that army, and the mere existence of such expensive equipment in an army that was not used to it raised issues on how to use it, and whether nor not to use it at all out of fear it would be lost in battle.  It granted mobility, but the mobility in a way operated to deter the remote stationing approach that the British had used in Malaysia before the advent of such equipment.

 M41 light tank in use by the ARVN. The M41 was a truly light tank at the time of its adoption, but its armament was sufficiently heavy that it would have been a conventional medium tank in the World War Two context.  For the fighting in Vietnam, it wasn't a bad choice. The US would come to equip the ARVN with the M48 "Patton", a tank that the US used very heavily in the war itself.

Moyer argues that in fact the ARVN was doing better, in its own way, with American equipment and its tactics than American adviser credited with. And quite a few people now seem to concede that American equipment may not have been the best thing that the ARVN needed in some cases.  Moyer argues that the American press was grossly negligent in reporting what was going on and that one well known military adviser at the time was personally creepy and wrong in his advice.  All of that may or may not be correct.

What does seem to be plain, however, is no matter how you view it, the war on the ground wasn't going well and therefore just letting it progress as it was, it seems plain enough, was going to result in an ARVN defeat sooner or later.  So just doing nothing or to keep doing what we were doing wasn't going to bring a victory about. Defeat truly seems to have been on the horizon.


 A South Vietnamese Syngman Rhee?

Which doesn't mean that the assassination of Diem did any good, in any sense, at all.  Everyone now agrees that this was a huge mistake.

That the US was complicit in his death is quite clear.  No, we didn't argue for him dead but only an idiot would encourage a Southeast Asian coup and not expect the deposed leader to end up in a bloody pool.  Murder is murder, and the murder of Diem, worst of all, put a bunch of corrupt figures in uniform in charge of a revolving chair presidency in the South. That alone was going to make the war harder to win.

But what if we'd operated to keep Diem in power and intervened like we ultimately did?

Well, we'll address the expanded infiltration below.  It would have, no doubt, have been a better thing to do than what we did do. But we likely never would have been able to ignore Diem to the same extent we did Syngman Rhee during the Korean War.  Rhee was a strong figure, to be sure, but the US presence in South Korea came to so completely dominate the war that we could, and basically did, ignore South Korean input after a certain point.

Diem was too strong of personality. But that likely would have been a good thing, quite frankly.  US hubris was part of the ultimate reason for the defeat.

 What about those Aussies?


As can be seen from above, I don't think the ARVN was going to win without foreign intervention and I don't think any victory was on the horizon in the 1960-63 time frame. The South was loosing.  But what if the US hadn't chosen to be in charge of all actions everywhere?

One of the little secrets of the Cold War that occurred through successive administrations but is rarely talked about is that the US determined that, most of the time, it was better off running the show everywhere. We'd accept weak military partners if we got to call the shots, which is how the original financial and military imbalance came about in NATO. That only became really open in recent years when debates about whether to carry on with this or not broke out. Around about the time the civil war broke out in Libya we openly debated if we were better off carrying the freight and accepting the costs if we got to have the top hand on the stick for determining what occurred. We never really finished that debate.

In the early 1960s there was no debate. We just accepted that we were the Western superpower and it was up to us. We'd like help, but be sure, but if help was not in the offering we could do it alone.

Well, that probably was never the smartest policy.

It is a policy that Australia bought into as it was used to being a junior state.  Australia, as a result of World War Two, and accepted that the sun was setting on the British Empire and purposely decided to cast its lot with the United States, with Australia being the junior and the United States being the senior.  The Vietnam War soured Australia on that role and it doesn't view things that way anymore, but maybe the United States would have been much better off viewing things that way then.

Australia had a very vested interest, given its position on the map, in who won the Vietnam War.  The US could easily have urged Australia to act when Australia was threatening to go it alone.  And there's the one unexplored option that is never talked about. What if, when Australia said "if you don't go in, we will" the US had said in reply, "that's a great idea. . . we think you should do it"?

The Australians were, by that time, veterans of two jungle wars and had their own way of fighting them.  Less richly equipped than the US, they were more accustomed to fighting and staying in the bush itself and had seen how such a war could be won. They would have been unlikely to accidentally escalate the war as the US ultimately ended up doing. And they may have been willing to endure the long haul that winning a war in Vietnam would have taken, and it would have taken one.

This hypothetical has a lot of unknowns and frankly it ignores some things.  One thing that the Malayan Emergency had not featured was a border with a hostile nation, as the Republic of Vietnam had with North Vietnam.  North Vietnam was willing to match any opposing effort for as long, it seems as it might take. The Australians would still have faced that.

But they would also have faced the war differently.  There never would have been 500,000 foreign troops in Indochina. There wouldn't have been a massive bombing campaign against hte North. The war would have been more of a light infantry war in the bush, and the NVA wold likely not have been committed in the numbers which they were.  Indeed, at that point  the threat that the Australians might have to call upon the US and other Western powers might have deterred the Northern effort from getting  that large.

Or maybe it would have been an Australian failure, rather than a US one.  Even at that, however, perhaps an Australian failure would have been less of a major Western Cold War failure than the loss of the Vietnam War was for awhile.

After looking it over again, I'll answer this part pretty directly.  Diem was doomed to go down in defeat.

Revisionist historians notwithstanding, his regime was corrupt and his Army, inherited from the French but staffed with cronies, was inept.  There were some good units, but only some. By and large it was officered with cronies of one kind or another who were more interested in lining their pockets than saving the country.

Indeed, for much of the Vietnam War its' hard not to see the ARVN officer corps as sort of like being drunk men at a major natural disaster.  The earthquake is collapsing the building but they're in the bar whooping it up.  

Diem, who was personally highly honest, was never going to be able to reform a colonial military mess left by the French, who were good at leaving colonial military messes (one thing they very mcuh differed in comparison with the English).  His army was never going to defeat a dedicated Communist foe that was brutal, bloody, but singular minded and not nearly as corrupt.  

There was no saving that Republic of Vietnam.

So lets' look at later.

1963-1975:  Could we have won, did we, and could we have prevented the fall?

 US Army advisers and Vietnamese Special Forces wearing the ARVN pattern "tiger stripe" camouflage uniform.  In this photograph the ARVN troops are still carrying M1 or M2 carbines while the US troops are equipped with the M16A1 rifle.
Most Americans who look at whether we could have won the Vietnam War look at the war after 1965, when we really came in, in strength.  A few a historians, like Woodruff, in fact claim that we had won the war by the late 1960s and then gave the victory away.

The conventional narrative, and the one that Burns and Novik take, is that we came in during 1965 in a series of escalating and poorly grasped steps and were matched by escalating supplies and men coming in from North Vietnam (with equipment from the Soviet Union and Red China).  By 1967 we knew that we were bogged down and couldn't figure out how to get out.  Under Nixon, a cynical deal was struck in which the US "Vietnamized" the war and negotiated a peace, knowing full well that the South had no long term chance at all.  In 1975 the North invaded and the game was up.

There's a lot to support this view, even though some historians do not accept it.  Perhaps the best evidence for it is that the Nixon White House tapes expressly had this view at the time, making it hard to contest.  Kissinger and Nixon on tape admitted that they didn't think the South was going to make it more than a couple of years.

So how can anyone contest that view?

Well, some do, and of course one of the things about the Vietnam War is that it seems a lot of people were wrong about what was going on at any one time, and we generally were completely clueless about what was going on in the North.

We now know, and somewhat knew at the time, that the Communist forces were in fact having an increasingly difficult time contesting the American and ARVN after 1965 and by 1967 were in pretty desperate straights.  It was getting difficult to recruit in the South for the Viet Cong and the northern attrition rate was ghastly.  Only a fanatic level of dedication on the part of the North allowed the war to go on at all.  By 1967 things were so bad that northern leadership had decided to gamble,in an act of massive self delusion, on throwing in all their chips on one big offense. That offensive became the Tet offensive, which was a massive bloody North Vietnamese defeat.

That it was a defeat is well accepted by every historian.  That it was a shock to the American public is not contested.

What is less well known is that as bad as Tet was for the North, they'd attempt offensives like that, albeit in a smaller scale, at least twice more before the United States had completely withdrawn. That suggests that the common view that many historians have had that the north was finished after Tet was wrong.  We have to keep in mind that with the North the United States was dealing with an army of a Communist dictatorship.  Such nations have never had any regards whatsoever for the lives of their own troops and have always been willing to suffer attrition rates that no democratic nation could stand.

And that's the problem with the "we could have won view".

Those who argue that we could have won after the 1968 Tet Offensive usually cite to morale figures and attrition rates for the proposition that the North had to give up. But in fact the North did not give up.  Some, like Woodruff, have argued that the ARVN had improved sufficiently so that it really could go it alone and that Nixon's Vietnamization program was not a cynical cover for getting out of the war, but rather a realistic turning over of the war to the native army on the ground.  Others have argued that the war could then have been won with one big push.  Let's take a look at the various views that existed and those that exist now.

One Big Push

 ARVN Rangers during the Tet Offensive.  Some ARVN units fought well throughout the Vietnam War including special units such as this.  By Tet, the ARVN on the whole was fighting well.

Little considered now and not at all public at the time, some in the government argued after Tet that Communist losses were so high that there was an opportunity to end the war the same way that the North did in 1975.  Go big and invade.


William Westmoreland argued for that in his autobiography and, at the very least, he did approach Johnson for more troops following Tet.  After the Tet Offensive he went to President Johnson and asked for a couple hundred thousand more men.  I can't recall if he then expressed the view that the time was ripe for the US and the ARVN to go into North Vietnam but he was completely frank in his biography that this was his view.  Johnson rejected him flatly. And well he should have. Everything was wrong with Westmoreland's ideas at this point.

The concept that winning the war required another couple of hundred thousand men, even if they just stayed in South Vietnam, would have meant that we were obviously loosing it.  You can't have nearly 3/4s of a million men in a country just to contain it and pretend things are going well. And the idea of actually invading North Vietnam was berserk.

Invading North Vietnam only would have worked in an Avalon Hill rule book sort of way.  Avalon Hill games, for the un-initiated, were a set of strategy games that were closely based on actual military table war gaming.  Avalon Hill still exists, but the type of games we're speaking of it no longer makes, although some other companies do.  They're highly detailed and very closely model the actual military version that military men use to game strategy.  A feature of those games are limiting and expanding scenarios.

For example, I don't know if the original Korean War was ever a subject of an Avalon Hill type game (a later hypothetical Korean War, set in the 1980s, was) but if it were, it would be typical to put in a rules scenario for the Chinese not intervening when they did.  It would be an exception to the rules.  Or you might build in a rule that has the Russians intervening.  Various games of this type that gamed hypothetical second Korean Wars or a hypothetical war with the Soviet Union had all sorts of scenarios of this type.

So, in order to imagine an invasion of North Vietnam working, you have to build in a scenario in which the Chinese do not intervene. The trouble is, in a real war, they certainly would have.  If they intervened in 1950 to save a Soviet client state on their border, why on earth would they not have done the same thing in 1968?

So that idea was nuts.

The idea of simply adding 200,000 men wasn't any better either, as it wasn't politically or militarily realistic.  This too is something that could have only existed as an Avalon Hill option. That Westmoreland asked shows how disconnected from reality he was.

Invading North Vietnam would have surely brought the Chinese in to defend North Vietnam in force, and likely with far more men than we had committed to such an invasion.  There's absolutely no reason to believe that was not the case. They'd done that in the Korean War and they would have done it in the Vietnam War which was, after all, not that many years later.

Just adding 200,000 men to South Vietnam and perhaps raiding into Laos and Cambodia  probably wouldn't have done it either.  The United States already had 400,000 men in South Vietnam.  Ramping it up to 600,000 might have added a lot more combat troops to the field but at that number the US would have had a very significant portion of its existing military in Southeast Asia; beyond that which it already did. That would have required mobilization of nearly one third of the National Guard or a huge increase in the number of draftees if the nation wasn't to strip its defenses in other areas.  And it wasn't politically realistic.  

Assuming that Johnson would have been willing to add 200,000 men to the South alone, and keep them there for a few years, perhaps that would have worked, but perhaps not.  The same thing could have probably been achieved in a less taxing and risky fashion, however, by simply keeping on keeping on.

Keeping On Keeping On
U.S. paratrooper in Vietnam, equipped with M14, during 1967's Operation Junction City.

One thing that maybe the US could have done would have been to do, well, nothing.

I don't quite mean that the way it probably sounds.  Rather, what I mean is, if we were winning the war in some fashion by 1968, maybe we should have just kept doing what we were doing.  Not increasing the number of troops, and not decreasing them either.

That might have actually worked, if we could endure it.  The question is how long it would have taken.  A decade?  Longer?  It's really hard to tell. But at least we're at an option that isn't completely unrealistic.

But it darned near is.

The trouble with it is that the US commitment to the Vietnam War was a long one at that point as it was, and the casualty rate was sufficiently high that the public was growing very weary of it.  It doesn't seem to have been politically possible to carry it on forever.  To take, that is, a couple of hundred casualties fairly regularly, to keep POWs in the north indefinitely, and keep up the expense of a major tropical war indefinitely.  In a war of attrition, we may have indeed been winning, but we were suffering a societal and economic attrition as the NVA and the VC were suffering a human one.

It's easy to forget that now that we've been in Afghanistan for so long. But the difference is that the country just isn't bleeding at Vietnam War rates, and it isn't using a conscript Army to fight in Afghanistan while its holding a DMZ in Korea and a tense peace exists in Europe.  All that, except for the DMZ in Korea, has changed.  We had huge commitments in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, and keeping a large army in combat for a decade would have been extremely taxing in every sense.

But perhaps we could have done it for a few more years.  Had Johnson decided to run for reelection, maybe we would have.  And maybe that would have worked.  The cost would have been very high in very fashion, but its a possibility that can at least be contemplated. But it also wasn't a sure thing.

Not stabbing the ARVN in the back.

Maybe Victimization. . . with American air power, could have worked.

It did for awhile.

Vietnamization may or may not have been a cynical ploy by Nixon, but the fact was that by the late 1960s the ARVN was fighting quite well, to a degree.

Taht is, some South Vietnamese units were showing themselves to be quite capable fighting in the style the Americans had taugth them, as long as it was in South Vietnam.  Outside of South Vietnam, as in the large scale attempted 1972 raid into Laos, they were second best to the NVA.  Inside of Vietnam, however, they were sometimes at least equal to it. They were improving. But they required American air power and logistical support.  After all, they were equipped like US troops and trained in the American way of war in fighting on the ground. U.S. airpower speaks for itself.

With American air power, they were able to stop the 1972 conventional invasion of Vietnam by the NVA.  That was costly, but it was also impressive.  There's no reason to believe that this would have been the case later on.

Specifically, there's no reason to believe that the ARVN wasn't perfectly capable of stopping the 1975 Northern invasion of the South with the aid of American air power. That air power simply didn't come as Congress wouldn't permit it and President Ford didn't want to get involved once again. So we backed out of Nixon's promise to provide US air power and we let the South fall.

Had we provided air power in 1975 the NVA invasion would have been an enormous and cost NVA defeat.  The North would not have given up, but it would have been hugely bloodied in a way that would have been hard for it to recover quickly from.  That alone would have given the South at least until 1980.

Had that occurred, it's possible to imagine a slowly improving, militarily and politically, South.  If the South could have held the VC back until the mid 1980s, it would never have fallen.  We'd still have two Vietnam's today, but the northern part of the country would not be the equivalent of North Korea, as North Vietnam was never ruled in such a woodenheaded fashion.  The North would have had to lighten up, as it ultimately didn't after the fall of the Soviet Union, and chances are it'd be hostile, but not as aggressive, toward the South as it was from 1954 through 1975.

So, maybe it was winnable.  Not in a pretty, the war just stops, fashion.  And not without the US over a long period of time.  We probably could have done that, however.  But politically, after the long war, the revelations about the truth of what had gone on in the corridors of power, the societal destruction of the 1960s, and then Watergate, we didn't have the will to.

Sic Transit
 



Which leaves us with this.  We, that is the United States, really did loose the war. We blundered along for a really long time, and in the end, we just chose to loose it, selling the Vietnamese allied to us down the river in the end.

Okay, now at the present time I have the advantage of having read Hastings work.

Hastings does something that almost no American historian has.  He really studied the concluding battles of the war from 72 through 75.  And what that very much reveals is that in 1972 the Viet Cong were bled white. That had started with 1968 Tet Offensive and then it increased in the 1972 conventional invasion of the South.  By 1975, in the final Communist effort, they were ruined as a force in every sense.  

What is also plain is that by 1975 the NVA was down to soldiers in their early teens in many instances. They'd been wrecked by the war as well and only had discipline left.  

And the ARVN, which is portrayed as completely collapsing in 1975, actually did not.  The South Vietnamese president, a military man, gave it orders that were inept.  Some units collapsed. Others fought hard righ tot he bitter end.

A commitment of American air power in 1975 would have stopped the 1975 NVA offensive.  Moreover, at that point, it likely would have wrecked the NVA for a decade.

And there's the key.  

Had that occurred, by 1985 things would have been considerably different in the Republic of Vietnam, or at least they could have been.  Local support for the VC had dropped off substantially by 1975, even if ti had not really been boosted for the southern government.  If the South had a decade of peace in full occupation of its country, and if the U.S. had used that interval to support a transition to a more representative form of government, which would have been highly likely, by 1985 the Southern government would have been much more popular, much better equipped to handle anything the North threw at it, and would have been fairly well off economically.

Indeed, by 1985 the Soviets were in trouble in Afghanistan and economically and the Chinese were on the outs with Hanoi.  Neither nation would have been very likely to be very enthusiastic about a renewed Communist effort and it'd have been unlikely that the North would have been been in any condition to pull it off.  If 1985, more or less, came and went without a conventional invasion by 1990, when the Soviet Union collapsed, ti would have been out of the question.  By 2000 we can imagine a Republic of Vietnam that would mirror a Republic of Korea. . .western, wealthy and not too interested in its northern neighbor save for something to be wary of.  Today the question would be whether or not Hanoi was going to fall any time soon, although it's proven to be much more adaptable to change, however reluctantly, than North Korea.

Of course, that counterfactual assumes something.   And that is the assumption that the US could have committed air power in 1975.

Which takes us to this:

Did the Vietnam War wreck the country?


This came up from the Burns documentary.

In that thread I explore that hypothesis, and I'm not going to deal with it at length again here.  The war didn't ruin the country.  There were a lot of things going on that changed the country, but the war was merely one of them.

What Hastings does a good job of, however, is showing that the war did ruin the military and the American public was fatigued with the war in the extreme.

Both of those things are really significant and have been underplayed in recent years.  Hastings, once again, as an Englishman can take on topics that Americans don't want to. And again, here he has.  

Hasting demonstrates that fighting in Vietnam had, by 1970s, pretty much destroyed the larger American military.  It was a mess.  In that sense, the same thing that happened to the VC happened to us. The fighting demoralized the Army and Marine Corps and wrecked it.  It infected the Navy and the Air Force as well, but not to the same extent.  And that was a real Communist victory.

Hastings states that the war wrecked the American military for a period of fifteen years, which would pace the recover between the late 80s and early 90s.  I disagree with him on that, but I was in National Guard From 1981 until 1987 and things were realy different in the very early 80s.

In my view, the Army didn't recover until the Reagan Administration, but during that era, an infusion of money and new arms translated into really effective training and things rapidly changed.  By the mid 1980s it was a new Army.  But that process had really started when the draft was ceased on January 23, 1973.  

Ending the draft in 1973 meant that conscripted soldiers were out of the Army by 1975. By and large, the Army wanted them gone as they'd become a problem.  The ones taht it didn't worry about elected to stay in and were not a problem.  The military remained badly damaged in lots of ways throughout the 1970s but by the end of that decade it was well on its way to recovery.  Perhaps ironically, a corps of Vietnam veterans who weren't disenchanted remained in both the NCO and officer ranks and were accordingly really wise about combat.

Basically, if you want to look at it this way, we would have had a hard time taking on anyone anywhere from 73 through 77. After that, not so much. By 1985 we would likely ahve taken on anyone anywhere.

But, as you might note, that means than in 1975. . . . . 

Yes, in 75, we couldn't have gone back into Vietnam as an effective ground force. We were done.  We could have tried, but it would have been ugly.

We could have committed the Air Force and the Navy, however.

Evne the Air Force as having problems with discipline by 1972.  It overcame them and it 1975 it would have done fine.  The Navy experienced a mutiny in the late stages of the war on an aircraft carrier, and that speaks for itself. But it too could have committed air assets in 1975.

If the public supported it, maybe.

It's clear that he public didn't support it. The American public was also done by 1975 and by that time, partially due to fatigue, and partially due to American press influence, it wasn't ready for the military to lift a finger to help the Republic of Vietnam.

Neither was Congress, which was reflecting the public's views.  Indeed, Congress had been parsimonious with the RoV since the later stages of he war and it was starting to starve a client Army trained to fight in the American way of war.  That didn't cause, as some have claimed, the ARVN to collapse, but it did have in impact on its fighting.  But beyond that, Congress acted to prohibit the US from intervening.

But was that legal?

We don't know, because nobody tested it. That would have required President Ford to have ignored Congress and ordered the USAF and the USN into the air, which he was not willing to do.  And perhaps he can't be blamed for that.  Determining to flat out ignore a Congressional mandate is something any President ought to question, let alone on matters of war and peace.

And frankly, I'm of the view that by and large Presidents aren't free to go to war without Congressional authorization, although here we get into a legal oddity.  Committing troops to aid in putting down an insurrection is technically not going to war.  Of course, committing troops to stop a foreign invasion of a foreign power is going to war.  So, in my view, Ford would have required Congressional authorization at some point, and that would have been equivalent to a declaration of war with a limited war aim.

So, we turn to Clausewitz.

War is the continuation of diplomacy by other means.  But that continuation requires the will to engage in diplomacy and the will to engage in war.

And by 1975, that was gone.

So, as it turns out, we could have militarily have won the war.

But it would have required a Presidential act that was arguably illegal.

Ford was as weak President, and that just wasn't going to happen, and there's no telling what the Supreme Court would have done, had that been presented to them at the time, and it would have been.

Of course, time and history move on. And the impacts of things go on and on.  Fighting in Vietnam may have had the collateral effect of saving Indonesia and Thailand from their own communist revolutions, as we've addressed before.  If that's the case, and we can argue that it was, the war was a hugely expensive delaying action a la the 1941 defense of the Philippines.  And ultimately, while the North won the war, it's slowly loosing the peace.  While the South Vietnamese never came to love or even like their government during the 1950s, 60s and 70s, as Hastings book makes plain, many now look back on it and view it as a massively corrupt but much freer and better government than the brutal one that came in with the NVA.  Now, they look outward at what they lost with regret.  But they also look in with what they learned, and Ho Chi Minh City residents refer to it as Saigon once again, and tiny Vietnamese women are buying luxury underwear at Hanoi's Victoria's Secret.

And that last fact says a lot.

_________________________________________________________________________________

*Some people refer to the entire 1910s episode on the Mexican border as the "Border War" and in fact the U.S. Army issued a campaign ribbon recognizing it as such.  In retrospect I wish I'd included that term as a topic, but it's a bit late to do so now.

**Which would reduce its content, but that's fine.  At this point, this seems like a necessary change here as we've covered the big events of the 1910s on a day by day basis and its time to go back to odds and ends.