Thursday, July 16, 1942. The Vel d'Hiv Roundup

Things for European Jews, French Jews in particular, and the French in general took a turn for the much worse when French police in occupied Paris began rounding up Jews in the city under Nazi orders.  While the city was occupied and northern France was under Germany's rule as a practical matter, the fact of that the police were complicit in it is a stain on France's honor and further demonstrates how none of the fascistic regimes of the period were free from guilt.

Those arrested in the sweep, some 13,152 souls, would end up being sent to Auschwitz.  Only 811 survived.

On the same day, Parisian authorities announced that close relatives of "troublemakers" would be shot if they were male, or forced into labor if they were female.

Hitler moved his battlefield headquarters to Vinnytsia, Ukraine.

Hitler would have a variety of headquarters in the East, which perhaps shows the degree to which he had begun to focus on that theater of the war.  Such a focus was, of course, understandable in that the vast majority of German resources were now dedicated to fighting the Soviet Union. In this instance, the location, code-named Werewolf, was used by the Wehrmacht as its headquarters, but was little used by Hitler.  The Germans destroyed it upon their retreat from the region, and the underground portions remain sealed.  Only a swimming pool really remains intact.

The British XXX Corps took another key ridge west of El Alamein.  In the same battle, Australians repelled an attack on Point 24 resulting in 50% German casualties.

The United States severed relations with Finland.

In Italian Harlem, the following took place:

Rare Photos of the “Festa di Madonna di Monte Carmela” of East Harlem-July 16, 1942.

Thursday June 4, 1942. US prevails at Midway, the turning point of the war in the Pacific.

The Battle of Midway was being fought in earnest.

Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryu shortly before it sank.

The Japanese launched aircraft to attack Midway Atoll at 04:30, the same time that the Yorktown launched ten aircraft to search for the Japanese fleet. AT 0534 a PBY from Midway itself sighted Japanese ships.  At 0710 aircraft launched from Midway, including six TBF's and four B-26s bombers attacked the Japanese.  Over the course of the entire day, various strikes and countries would occur, mostly from carriers.

The Japanese carriers Akagi, Kaga and Soryu were all lost to the Japanese due to planes from the Enterprise and Yorktown.  The Yorktown had to be abandoned after it was hit by planes launched from the Hiryu, which itself was hit by U.S. carrier planes subsequently.  It would be scuttled the following day.

While the Japanese seemingly didn't appreciate it, the battle was the turning point in the war in the Pacific. The Japanese had been decisively defeated and would never regain the initiative nor be able to make good their losses.  The turning of the tide essentially came down to a single day.

A second day of raids occurred at Dutch Harbor.

A meeting between Hitler and Finnish general Mannerheim, effectively the Finnish head of state, results in the only known recording of Hitler speaking in a conversational manner.

Hitler at meeting that was recorded.

Blog Mirror: KARELIAN BEAR DOGS: HUNTER TURNED PROTECTOR

 

KARELIAN BEAR DOGS: HUNTER TURNED PROTECTOR

Thursday, March 26, 1942. The Battle of Suursaari

The Finns commenced an offensive in the Battle of Suursaari to retake two islands in the Gulf of Finland, Gogland and Bolshoy Tyuteers, which they'd earlier been forced to cede to the Soviet Union. They were successful in the effort in an offensive conducted over the frozen gulf.

They were clearly Finnish islands.  Bolshoy Tyuteers had been a center of fishing for centuries and had become a tourism destination prior to the war.  It reverted to Russian possession after World War Two but is abandoned, heavily mined and littered with abandoned German equipment and heavy weapons.  

Gogland remains a tourist destination, but is also a Russian possession today.  Given that Finland's entry into the war had specifically been aimed at recapturing the territories it had lost in the Winter War, the attacks on the island garrisons were probably not a surprise.

The Germans murdered over 1,000 Jews in Latvia in the second part of a ghetto clearing action.

Friday, March 20, 1942. Industrial scale murder

It was on this day in 1942 that Auschwitz first commenced the industrial scale murder of its inmates, principally, although completely exclusively, consisting of Jews from all over Europe.

Everything about this is mind-boggling, and repeated efforts to explain how this occurred continue to be inadequate.  I had originally intended to post a lengthy post on this, but the day got away from me and I didn't have the chance.  

While the intended post would have been much lengthier, I will note that up into the initial decade and a half of the 20th Century, nobody would have imagined a horror on this scale, which is not to say that antisemitism did not exist in Europe.  Indeed, it very much did, although not equally in every country by any means.  Perhaps ironically, Germany compared favorably in this regard compared to, for example, France, where antisemitism had been much more open.  Indeed, German Jews were highly assimilated and acculturated in many instances in Germany prior to the First World War.

Nonetheless, antisemitism remained and had deep roots.  Even before the loss of the Great War, warning signs existed of an underlying virulent strain of antisemitism developing.  This took root in odd places, including in the popular eugenics movement that existed in the early 20th Century, which melded with the PanGermanism movement which should to unite "Germans" in a single nation. These combined in no small part as frankly defining what a German was, was not easy, and in fact the Nazis were never able to come up with a cogent definition in spite of dedicating significant efforts to do so.  To some degree, indeed, the definition of "German" didn't really come about until the Germans had lost the war.  At any rate, defining the "other", i.e., who was excluded, combined with odd wacky genetic theories of the time, and mixed in antisemitism with it.  The stress of the economic collapse of Germany during the Great Depression, cultural misconceptions about Jews in certain industries, the presence of Jewish refugees escaping the collapse of the Russian Empire and the Russian Civil war, and the confusion and propogandization of Communism with the Jews all added fuel to the fire and combined with age-old fears and prejudices.

Nonetheless, in spite of this and the rise of the Nazis, none of this could have occurred if a lot of Germans didn't choose to simply go alone or sit on their hands. 

Added to this, the complicity of Eastern European, and indeed Western European, populations can't be ignored.  In spite of the intense suffering that they suffered at the hands of the Germans, Poles and residents of the Baltic States were complicit in the murder of the Jews.  Romanians were as well.  Ultimately, authorities in occupied France assisted in the deportation of Jewish residents of France, not all of whom who had French citizenship but many of whom did.

In remarkable contrast, however, Scandinavian countries were hostile to German efforts, with Denmark being notably so in spite of being occupied, but with Norway also being.  Norwegians were particularly uncooperative with their occupiers in everything.  Finland, with some slight exception, likewise did not cooperate, and even Italy, in spite of having passed antisemitic laws under the fascists, did not cooperate with efforts to murder Italian Jews until September 1943.

As noted, the murder of so many people on an industrial scale, by a modern nation, is hard to grasp and remains inexplicable.  It couldn't have happened but for the fact that so many people turned a blind eye and chose to think of themselves, first.

Across the globe, on this day in 1942 Douglas MacArthur stated:

The President of the United States ordered me to break through the Japanese lines and proceed from Corregidor to Australia for the purpose, as I understand it, of organizing the American offensive against Japan, a primary object of which is the relief of the Philippines. I came through and I shall return,

Wednesday, January 7, 1942. The biggest budget up to then.

 

President Roosevelt sent is budget message to Congress.  It stated:

To the Congress: 

I am submitting herewith the Budget of the United States for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1943. It is the budget of a Nation at war in a world at war. 

In practical terms the Budget meets the challenge of the Axis powers. We must provide the funds to man and equip our fighting forces. We must provide the funds for the organization of our resources. We must provide the funds to continue our role as the Arsenal of Democracy. 

Powerful enemies must be outfought and outproduced. Victory depends on the courage, skill, and devotion of the men in the American, British, Russian, Chinese, and Dutch forces, and of the others who join hands with us in the fight for freedom. But victory also depends upon efforts behind the lines—in the mines, in the shops, on the farms. 

We cannot outfight our enemies unless, at the same time, we outproduce our enemies. It is not enough to turn out just a few more planes, a few more tanks, a few more guns, a few more ships, than can be turned out by our enemies. We must outproduce them overwhelmingly, so that there can be no question of our ability to provide a crushing superiority of equipment in any theater of the world war. 

And we shall succeed. A system of free enterprise is more effective than an "order" of concentration camps. The struggle for liberty first made us a Nation. The vitality, strength, and adaptability of a social order built on freedom and individual responsibility will again triumph. 

THE WAR PROGRAM 

Our present war program was preceded by a defense effort which began as we emerged from the long depression. During the past eighteen months we laid the foundation for a huge armament program. At the same time industry provided ample consumers' goods for a rapidly growing number of workers. Hundreds of thousands of new homes were constructed; the production of consumers' durable goods broke all records. The industrial plant and equipment of the country were overhauled and expanded. 

Adjustment to a war program can now be made with greater speed and less hardship. The country is better stocked with durable goods. Our factories are better equipped to carry the new production load. The larger national income facilitates financing the war effort. 

There are still unused resources for agricultural and industrial production. These must be drawn into the national effort. Shortages, however, have developed in skilled labor, raw materials, machines, and shipping. Under the expanding war program, more and more productive capacity must be shifted from peacetime to wartime work. 

Last year fiscal policy was used to shift the economy into high gear. Today it is an instrument for transforming our peace economy into a war economy. This transformation must be completed with minimum friction and maximum speed. The fiscal measures which I outline in this message are essential elements in the Nation's war program. 

WAR APPROPRIATIONS. 

This is a war budget. The details of a war program are, of course, in constant flux. Its magnitude and composition depend on events at the battlefronts of the world, on naval engagements at sea, and on new developments in mechanized warfare. Moreover, war plans are military secrets. 

Under these circumstances I cannot hereafter present details of future war appropriations. However, total appropriations and expenditures will be published so that the public may know the fiscal situation and the progress of the Nation's effort. 

The defense program, including appropriations, contract authorizations, recommendations, and commitments of Government corporations, was 29 billion dollars on January 3, 1941. During the last twelve months 46 billion dollars have been added to the program. Of this total of 75 billion dollars there remains 24 billion dollars for future obligation. 

In this Budget I make an initial request for a war appropriation of 13.6 billion dollars for the fiscal year 1943. Large supplemental requests will be made as we move toward the maximum use of productive capacity. Nothing short of a maximum will suffice. I cannot predict ultimate costs because I cannot predict the changing fortunes of war. I can only say that we are determined to pay whatever price we must to preserve our way of life. 

WAR EXPENDITURES. 

Total war expenditures are now running at a rate of 2 billion dollars a month and may surpass 5 billion dollars a month during the fiscal year 1943. As against probable budgetary war expenditures of 24 billion dollars for the current fiscal year, our present objective calls for war expenditures of nearly 53 billion dollars for the fiscal year 1943. And in addition, net outlays of Government corporations for war purposes are estimated at about 2 and 3 billion dollars for the current and the next fiscal year, respectively. 

These huge expenditures for ships, planes, and other war equipment will require prompt conversion of a large portion of our industrial establishment to war production. These estimates reflect our determination to devote at least one-half of our national production to the war effort. 

The agencies responsible for the administration of this vast program must make certain that every dollar is speedily converted into a maximum of war effort. We are determined to hold waste to a minimum. 

THE CIVIL FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT 

In a true sense, there are no longer non-defense expenditures. It is a part of our war effort to maintain civilian services which are essential to the basic needs of human life. In the same way it is necessary in wartime to conserve our natural resources and keep in repair our national plant. We cannot afford waste or destruction, for we must continue to think of the good of future generations of Americans. For example, we must maintain fire protection in our forests; and we must maintain control over destructive floods. In the preparation of the present Budget, expenditures not directly related to the war have been reduced to a minimum or reoriented to the war program. 

We all know that the war will bring hardships and require adjustment. Assisting those who suffer in the process of transformation and taxing those who benefit from the war are integral parts of our national program. 

It is estimated that expenditures for the major Federal assistance programs- farm aid, work relief, youth aid—can be reduced by 600 million dollars from the previous to the current fiscal year, and again by 860 million dollars from the current to the next fiscal year. These programs will require 1.4 billion dollars during the fiscal year 1943, about one-half of the expenditures for these purposes during the fiscal year 1941. 

Improved economic conditions during the current year have made possible the execution of economic and social programs with smaller funds than were originally estimated. By using methods of administrative budget control, 415 million dollars of appropriations for civil purposes have been placed in reserves. 

Excluding debt charges and grants under the Social Security law, total expenditures for other than direct war purposes have been reduced by slightly more than 1 billion dollars in the next fiscal year. 

Agricultural aid. I propose to include contract authorizations in the Budget to assure the farmer a parity return on his 1942 crop, largely payable in the fiscal year 1944. I do not suggest a definite appropriation at this time because developments of farm income and farm prices are too uncertain. Agricultural incomes and prices have increased and we hope to limit the price rise of the products actually bought by the farmer. But if price developments should turn against the farmer, an appropriation will be needed to carry out the parity objective of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 

The remaining expenditures for the agricultural program are being brought into accord with the war effort. Food is an essential war material. I propose to continue the soil conservation and use program on a moderately reduced scale. Acreage control by cooperative efforts of farmer and Government was inaugurated in a period of overproduction in almost all lines of farming. Then its major objective was the curtailment of production to halt a catastrophic decline in farm prices. At present, although there is still excess production in some types of farming, serious shortages prevail in other types. The present program is designed to facilitate a balanced increase in production and to aid in controlling prices. 

Work projects. The average number of W.P.A. workers was two million in the fiscal year 1940, the year before the defense program started; the average has been cut to one million this year. With increasing employment a further considerable reduction will be possible. I believe it will be necessary to make some provision for work relief during the next year. I estimate tentatively that 465 million dollars will be needed for W.P.A., but I shall submit a specific request later in the year. Workers of certain types and in certain regions of the country probably will not all be absorbed by war industries. It is better to provide useful work for the unemployed on public projects than to lose their productive power through idleness. Wherever feasible they will be employed on war projects. 

Material shortages are creating the problem of "priority unemployment." I hope the workers affected will be reemployed by expanding war industries before their unemployment compensation ceases. Some of the workers affected will not, however, be eligible for such compensation and may be in need of assistance. 

Rather than rely on relief a determined effort should be made to speed up reemployment in defense plants. I have, therefore, instructed the. Office of Production Management to join the procurement agencies in an effort to place contracts with those industries forced to cut their peacetime production. The ingenuity of American management has already adapted some industries to war production. Standardization and substitution are doing their part in maintaining production. Ever-increasing use of subcontracts, pooling of industrial resources, and wider distribution of contracts are of paramount importance for making the fullest use of our resources. The newly nationalized Employment Service will greatly help unemployed workers in obtaining employment. 

Aids to youth. Under war conditions there is need and opportunity for youth to serve in many ways. It is therefore possible to make a considerable reduction in the programs of the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Administration. The youth, too, will be aided by the United States Employment Service in finding employment opportunities.

Although I am estimating 100 million dollars for these two agencies, excluding 50 million dollars for defense training, it is probable that the total amount will not be needed. I am postponing until next spring presentation to the Congress of specific recommendations as to youth aid. 

Public works program. The public works program is being fully adjusted to the war effort. The general program of 578 million dollars includes those projects necessary for increasing production of hydroelectric power, for flood control, and for river and harbor work related to military needs. Federal aid for highways will be expended only for construction essential for strategic purposes. Other highway projects will be deferred until the postwar period. For all other Federal construction I am restricting expenditures to those active projects which cannot be discontinued without endangering the structural work now in progress.

Civil departments and agencies. The work of the civil departments and agencies is undergoing thorough reorientation. Established agencies will be used to the greatest possible extent for defense services. Many agencies have already made such readjustment. All civil activities of the Government are being focused on the war program. 

Federal grants and debt service. A few categories of civil expenditures show an increase. Under existing legislation Federal grants to match the appropriations for public assistance made by the individual States will increase by 73 million dollars. I favor an amendment to the Social Security Act which would modify matching grants to accord with the needs of the various States. Such legislation would probably not affect expenditures substantially during the next fiscal year. 

Because of heavy Federal borrowing, interest charges are expected to increase by 139 million dollars in the current fiscal year, and by another 500 million dollars in the fiscal year 1943. Debt service is, of course, affected by war spending. 

COORDINATION OF FISCAL POLICIES. 

The fiscal policy of the Federal Government, especially with respect to public works, is being reinforced by that of State and local governments. Executive committees of the Council of State Governments and the Governors' Conference have issued excellent suggestions for harmonizing various aspects of State and local fiscal policy with national objectives. These governments are readjusting many of their services so as to expedite the war program. Many are making flexible plans for the postwar readjustment and some are accumulating financial reserves for that purpose. The larger the scale of our war effort, the more important it becomes to provide a reservoir of postwar work by business and by Federal, State, and local governments. 

FINANCING THE WAR 

Determination, skill, and materiel are three great necessities for victory. Methods of financing may impair or strengthen these essentials. Sound fiscal policies are those which will help win the war. A fair distribution of the war burden is necessary for national unity. A balanced financial program will stimulate the productivity of the Nation and assure maximum output of war equipment. 

With total war expenditures, including net outlays of Government corporations, estimated at 26 billion dollars for the current fiscal year and almost 56 billion dollars for the fiscal year 1943, war finance is a task of tremendous magnitude requiring a concerted program of action. 

RECEIPTS UNDER PRESENT LEGISLATION. 

Total receipts from existing tax legislation will triple under the defense and war programs. They are expected to increase from 6 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1940 to 18 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1943. This increase is due partly to the expansion of economic activities and partly to tax legislation enacted during the last two years. As we approach full use of our resources, further increases in revenue next year must come predominantly from new tax measures rather than from a greater tempo of economic activity. Taxes on incomes, estates, and corporate profits are showing the greatest increase. Yields from employment taxes are increasing half as fast; and the yields from excise taxes are increasing more slowly; customs are falling off. On the whole, our tax system has become more progressive since the defense effort started. 

DEFICITS UNDER PRESENT LAWS. 

The estimate of deficits must be tentative and subject to later revision. The probable net outlay of the Budget and Government corporations, excluding revenues from any new taxes, will be 20.9 billion dollars for the current fiscal year, and 45.4 billion dollars for the fiscal year 1943. Borrowing from trust funds will reduce the amounts which must be raised by taxation and borrowing from the public by about 2 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1942 and 2.8 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1943. 

· In estimating expenditures and receipts, only a moderate rise in prices has been assumed. Since expenditures are affected by rising prices more rapidly than are revenues, a greater price increase would further increase the deficit. 

THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL TAXES. 

In view of the tremendous deficits, I reemphasize my request of last year that war expenditures be financed as far as possible by taxation. When so many Americans are contributing all their energies and even their lives to the Nation's great task, I am confident that all Americans will be proud to contribute their utmost in taxes. Until this job is done, until this war is won, we will not talk of burdens. 

I believe that 7 billion dollars in additional taxes should be collected during the fiscal year 1943. Under new legislation proposed later in this Message, social security trust funds will increase by 2 billion dollars. Thus new means of financing would provide a total of 9 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1943. 

Specific proposals to accomplish this end will be transmitted in the near future. In this Message I shall limit my recommendations on war finance to the broad outline of a program.

Tax programs too often follow the line of least resistance. The present task definitely requires enactment of a well-balanced program which takes account of revenue requirements, equity, and economic necessities. 

There are those who suggest that the policy of progressive taxation should be abandoned for the duration of the war because these taxes do not curtail consumers' demand. The emergency does require measures of a restrictive nature which impose sacrifices on all of us. But such sacrifices are themselves the most compelling argument for making progressive taxes more effective. The anti-inflationary aspect of taxation should supplement, not supplant, its revenue and equity aspects. 

PROGRESSIVE TAXES. 

Progressive taxes are the backbone of the Federal tax system. In recent years much progress has been made in perfecting income, estate, gift, and profit taxation but numerous loopholes still exist. Because some taxpayers use them to avoid taxes, other taxpayers must pay more. The higher the tax rates the more urgent it becomes to close the loopholes. Exemptions in estate and gift taxation should be lowered. The privileged treatment given certain types of business in corporate income taxation should be reexamined. 

It seems right and just that no further tax-exempt bonds should be issued. We no longer issue United States tax-exempt bonds and it is my personal belief that the income from State, municipal, and authority bonds is taxable under the income-tax amendment to the Constitution. As a matter of equity I recommend legislation to tax all future issues of this character. 

Excessive profits undermine unity and should be recaptured. The fact that a corporation had large profits before the defense program started is no reason to exempt them now. Unreasonable profits are not necessary to obtain maximum production and economical management. Under war conditions the country cannot tolerate undue profits. 

Our tax laws contain various technical inequities and discriminations. With taxes at wartime levels, it is more urgent than ever to eliminate these defects in our tax system. 

ANTI-INFLATIONARY TAXES. 

I stated last year in the Budget Message that extraordinary tax measures may be needed to "aid in avoiding inflationary price rises which may occur when full capacity is approached." The time for such measures has come. A well-balanced tax program must include measures which combat inflation. Such measures should absorb some of the additional purchasing power of consumers and some of the additional funds which accrue to business from increased consumer spending. 

A number of tax measures have been suggested for that purpose, such as income taxes collected at the source, pay-roll taxes, and excise taxes. I urge the Congress to give all these proposals careful consideration. Any tax is better than an uncontrolled price rise. 

Taxes of an anti-inflationary character at excessive rates spell hardship in individual cases and may have undesirable economic repercussions. These can be mitigated by timely adoption of a variety of measures, each involving a moderate rate of taxation. 

Any such tax should be considered an emergency measure. It may help combat inflation; its repeal in a postwar period may help restore an increased flow of consumers' purchasing power. 

Excise taxes. All through the years of the depression I opposed general excise and sales taxes and I am as convinced as ever that they have no permanent place in the Federal tax system. In the face of the present financial and economic situation, however, we may later be compelled to reconsider the temporary necessity of such measures. 

Selective excise taxes are frequently useful for curtailing the demand for consumers' goods, especially luxuries and semiluxuries. They should be utilized when manufacture of the products competes with the war effort. 

Payroll-taxes and the social security program. I oppose the use of pay-roll taxes as a measure of war finance unless the worker is given his full money's worth in increased social security. From the inception of the social security program in 1935 it has been planned to increase the number of persons covered and to provide protection against hazards not initially included. By expanding the program now, we advance the organic development of our social security system and at the same time contribute to the anti-inflationary program. 

I recommend an increase in the coverage of old-age and survivors' insurance, addition of permanent and temporary disability payments and hospitalization payments beyond the present benefit programs, and liberalization and expansion of unemployment compensation in a uniform national system. I suggest that collection of additional contributions be started as soon as possible, to be followed one year later by the operation of the new benefit plans.

Additional employer and employee contributions will cover increased disbursements over a long period of time. Increased contributions would result in reserves of several billion dollars for postwar contingencies. The present accumulation of these contributions would absorb excess purchasing power. Investment of the additional reserves in bonds of the United States Government would assist in financing the war. 

The existing administrative machinery for collecting pay-roll taxes can function immediately. For this reason Congressional consideration might be given to immediate enactment of this proposal, while other necessary measures are being perfected. 

I estimate that the social security trust funds would be increased through the proposed legislation by 2 billion dollars during the fiscal year 1943. 

FLEXIBILITY IN THE TAX SYSTEM. 

Our fiscal situation makes imperative the greatest possible flexibility in our tax system. The Congress should consider the desirability of tax legislation which makes possible quick adjustment in the timing of tax rates and collections during an emergency period. 

BORROWING AND THE MENACE OF INFLATION. 

The war program requires not only substantially increased taxes but also greatly increased borrowing. After adjusting for additional tax collections and additional accumulation in social security trust funds, borrowing from the public in the current and the next fiscal year would be nearly 19 billion dollars and 34 billion dollars, respectively. 

Much smaller deficits during the fiscal year 1941 were associated with a considerable increase in prices. Part of this increase was a recovery from depression lows. A moderate price rise, accompanied by an adjustment of wage rates, probably facilitated the increase in production and the defense effort. Another part of the price rise, however, was undesirable and must be attributed to the delays in enacting adequate measures of price control. 

With expenditures and deficits multiplied, the threat of inflation will apparently be much greater. There is, however, a significant difference between conditions as they were in the fiscal year 1941 and those prevailing under a full war program. Last year, defense expenditures so stimulated private capital outlays that intensified use of private funds and private credit added to the inflationary pressure created by public spending. 

Under a full war program, however, most of the increase in expenditures will replace private capital outlays rather than add to them. Allocations and priorities, necessitated by shortages of material, are now in operation; they curtail private outlays for consumers' durable goods, private and public construction, expansion and even replacements in non-defense plants and equipment. These drastic curtailments of non-defense expenditures add, therefore, to the private funds available for non-inflationary financing of the Government deficit.

This factor will contribute substantially to financing the tremendous war effort without disruptive price rises and without necessitating a departure from our low-interest-rate policy. The remaining inflationary pressure will be large but manageable. It will be within our power to control it if we adopt a comprehensive program of additional anti-inflationary measures.

A COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-INFLATIONARY PROGRAM. 

The great variety of measures is necessary in order to shift labor, materials, and facilities from the production of civilian articles to the production of weapons and other war supplies. Taxes can aid in speeding these shifts by cutting non-essential civilian spending. Our resources are such that even with the projected huge war expenditures we can maintain a standard of living more than adequate to support the health and productivity of our people. But we must forgo many conveniences and luxuries. 

The system of allocations—rationing on the business level should be extended and made fully effective, especially with relation to inventory control. 

I do not at present propose general consumer ration cards. There are not as yet scarcities in the necessities of life which make such a step imperative. Consumers' rationing has been introduced, however, in specific commodities for which scarcities have developed. We shall profit by this experience if a more general system of rationing ever becomes necessary. 

I appeal for the voluntary cooperation of the consumer in our national effort. Restraint in consumption, especially of scarce products, may make necessary fewer compulsory measures. Hoarding should be encouraged in only one field, that of defense savings bonds. Economies in consumption and the purchase of defense savings bonds will facilitate financing war costs and the shift from a peace to a war economy. 

An integrated program, including direct price controls, a flexible tax policy, allocations, rationing, and credit controls, together with producers' and consumers' cooperation will enable us to finance the war effort without danger of inflation. This is a difficult task. But it must be done and it can be done. 

THE INCREASE IN THE FEDERAL DEBT 

On the basis of tentative Budget estimates, including new taxes, the Federal debt will increase from 43 billion dollars in June, 1940, when the defense program began, to 110 billion dollars three years later. This increase in Federal indebtedness covers also the future capital demands of Government corporations. About 2 billion dollars of this increase will result from the redemption of notes of Government corporations guaranteed by the Federal Government. 

These debt levels require an increase in the annual interest from i billion dollars in 1940 to above 2.5 billion dollars at the end of fiscal year 1943. Such an increase in interest requirements will prevent us for some time after the war from lowering taxes to the extent otherwise possible. The import of this fact will depend greatly on economic conditions in the postwar period. 

Paying 2.5 billion dollars out of an extremely low national income would impose an excessive burden on taxpayers while the same payment out of a 100-billion-dollar national income, after reduction of armament expenditures, may still permit substantial tax reductions in the postwar period. 

If we contract a heavy debt at relatively high prices and must pay service charges in a period of deflated prices, we shall be forced to impose excessive taxes. Our capacity to carry a large debt in a postwar period without undue hardship depends mainly on our ability to maintain a high level of employment and income. 

I am confident that by prompt action we shall control the price development now and that we shall prevent the recurrence of a deep depression in the postwar period. There need be no fiscal barriers to our war effort and to victory.

Japanese armor routed the 11th Indian Division at the Slim River in Malaya.  The division is destroyed, although some units take to the jungle and become guerrillas, one Gurkha remaining in the bush as late as 1949. 

The U.S. Navy issues a warning that German battleships may be off the East Coast.

The Battle of Moscow is regarded of ending on this day, and the Soviets were engaged in a theater wide offensive. They were doing well against the Germans, but in the far north, not so well against the Finns, where the lines were actually relatively static.

Friday, December 5, 1941. A Turning Point.

It's worth noting that this day was a Friday.  For Americans, this would be the last day in which the United States was not a full belligerent in the largest war in modern history.

As a Friday, most people would have been looking forward to a weekend off, when people really did have the weekends off.  Wartime shortages were already a thing, but young adults would have been out on the town, and even older ones such as myself may have gone to the movies or the like in an era when home entertainment of the electronic type was limited to the radio.  Thousands of men, at the end of the day, would have hit bars before going home.

It's also traditionally a day when some soldiers and sailors received weekend leave, but I don't know the situation on December 5, 1941. I suspect, but don't know, that it had largely been cancelled in overseas locations, although that's certainly not the way movies depict it.  On this day the US felt that a Japanese strike was imminent, but they were still not expecting it on Hawaii.  Indeed, as recent posts and today's' make plain, the Navy was just reinforcing some outlying Northern Pacific island now.

Secretary of War Stinson criticized the leakers of Rainbow 5 to be unpatriotic and dismissed the matter as one of simple contingent preparedness.

Secretary of the Navy Knox met with Franklin Roosevelt and expressed the opinion that the Japanese Navy, which was out to sea, was going south. Roosevelt asked it could be going north, which Knox allowed for, but discounted.

As detailed Today In Wyoming's History: December 5, 1941, things were in motion all over the globe.

1941  The USS Lexington, an aircraft carrier, and the cruisers USS Indianapolis, Astoria, Chicago and Portland, together with five destroyers depart the U.S. Naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 

Their mission was to deliver Marine Corps aircraft to Wake Island, where the commander was fearing a Japanese attack.

The USS Arizona arrived at Pearl Harbor, as noted here:

Today in World War II History—December 5, 1941

1941  Japanese diplomats provided the following explanation to the U.S. Secretary of State in response to a question about Japanese ship movements in the eastern Pacific.

Reference is made to your inquiry about the intention of the Japa­nese Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indo‑china. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as follows

As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo‑china bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo‑china. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed the southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. It should be added that no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France.

 [WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. The Ambassador handed to the Secretary a paper which he said was the Japanese Government's reply to the President's inquiry in regard to Japanese troops in French Indochina. The paper reads as follows:

STATEMENT HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON DECEMBER 5, 1941

Reference is made to your inquiry about the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indo-china. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as follows

As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-china bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo-china. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed the southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. It should be added that no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France.

The Secretary read the paper and asked whether the Japanese considered that the Chinese were liable to attack them in Indochina. He said, so Japan has assumed the defensive against China. He said that he had heard that the Chinese are contending that their massing troops in Yunnan was in answer to Japan's massing troops in Indochina. Mr. Kurusu said that that is all that they have received from their Government in regard to this matter. The Ambassador said that as the Chinese were eager to defend the Burma Road he felt that the possibility of a Chinese attack in Indochina as a means of pre?venting Japan's attacking the Burma Road from Indochina could not be excluded.

The Secretary said that he had understood that Japan had been putting forces into northern Indochina for the purpose of attacking China from there. He said that he had never heard before that Japan's troop movements into northern Indochina were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack. The Secretary added that it was the first time that he knew that Japan was on the defensive, in Indochina.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese are alarmed over increasing naval and military preparations of the ABCD powers in the southwest Pacific area, and that an airplane of one of those countries had recently, flown over Formosa. He said that our military men are very alert and enterprising and are known to believe in the principle that offense is the best defense. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador's observations applied to defensive measures we are taking against Hitler. The Ambassador replied that he did not say that, but that it was because of Japan's apprehensions in regard to the situation that they had made their November 20 proposal.

The Secretary asked whether, if the Chinese are about to Japan in Indochina, this would not constitute an additional reason for Japan to withdraw her armed forces from Indochina. The Secretary said that he would be glad to get anything further which it might occur to the Japanese Government to say to us on this matter.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government was very anxious to reach an agreement with this Government and Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Government felt that we ought to be willing to agree to discontinue aid to China as soon as conversations betweem China and Japan were initiated. The Secretary pointed out that when the Japanese bring that matter up it brings up the matter of the aid Japan is giving to Hitler. He said that he did not see how Japan could demand that we cease giving aid to China while Japan was going on aiding Hitler. Mr. Kurusu asked in what way was Japan aiding Hitler. The Secretary replied that, as he had already made clear to the Japanese Ambassador, Japan was aiding Hitler by keeping large forces of this country and other countries immobilized in the Pacific area. (At this point the Ambassador uttered sotto voce an expression in Japanese which in the present context means "this isn't getting us anywhere".) The Secretary reminded the Ambassador of what the Secretary had said to the Ambassador on this point on November 22 as well as on our unwillingness to supply oil to Japan for the Japanese Navy which would enable Japan to operate against us in the southern Pacific and also on our attitude toward continuing aid to China. The Ambassador said that he recalled that the Secretary had said that he would almost incur the danger of being lynched if he permitted oil to go to Japan for her navy. The Ambassador said that he believed that if the Secretary would explain that giving of oil to Japan had been prompted by the desirability of reaching a peaceful agreement such explanation would be accepted. The Secretary replied that senators and others are not even now desisting from criticizing the Secretary for the course that he had hitherto taken.

The Secretary then recapitulated the three points on which he had orally commented to the Japanese. Ambassador on November 22, with reference to the Japanese proposal of November 20, namely one, our difficulty with reference to the Japanese request that we discontinue aid to China, two, our feeling that the presence of large bodies of Japanese troops anywhere in Indochina caused among neighboring countries apprehensions for their security, and, three, public attitude in this country toward supplying Japan with oil for military and naval needs. He asked the Ambassador whether he had not set forth clearly his position on these points to the Ambassador on November 22. The Ambassador agreed.

The Ambassador said that this Government blames Japan for its move into Indochina but that if Indochina was controlled by other powers it would be a menace to Japan. The Secretary replied that as the Ambassador was aware we could solve matters without delay if only the Japanese Government would renounce courses of force and aggression. The Secretary added that we were not looking for trouble but that at the same time we were not running away from menaces.

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that if we could only come to an agreement on temporary measures we could then proceed with our exploration of fundamental solutions. He said that such a fundamental agreement would necessarily take time and that what was needed now was a temporary expedient. The Secretary replied that the Japanese were keeping the situation confused by a malignant campaign conducted through the officially controlled and inspired press which created an atmosphere not conducive to peace. The Secretary said that we knew the Japanese Government could control the press and that therefore we did not understand what the motives are of the higher officials of the Japanese Government in promoting such a campaign. Mr. Kurusu said that on the American side we were not free from injurious newspaper propaganda. He said that for example there was the case of a newspaper report of the Secretary's interview with the press which created an unfortunate impression in Japan. The Secretary replied that he had been seeing for months and months that Japanese officials and the Japanese press had been proclaiming slogans of a bellicose character and that while all this was going on he had kept silent. He pointed out that now he was being jumped on by the Japanese if he said a single word in regard to his Government's principles. Mr. Kurusu then referred to a press report casting aspersions on Kurusu to the effect that he had been sent here to check on the Ambassador, et cetera, et cetera. The Secretary replied that he had heard only good reports in regard to Mr. Kurusu and the Ambassador. At this point the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu took their leave after making the usual apologies for taking so much of the Secretary's time when he was busy:

The United Kingdom was expanding the war, at leat on paper. 

1941  UK declares war on Finland, Hungary and Romania.

Soviet territory lost to the Axis by December 1941, from Why We Fight.

1941  Soviets launched a massive counterattack against the Germans in the Siege of Moscow.  

This attack brought Operation Typhoon to an unsuccessful end for the Germans. Indeed, while not really perceptible, with German setbacks in North Africa and the Soviet Union, and Japan about to bring the United States fully into the war, it could be argued that the war was at a turning point.

Closer to Home:

This was a Friday in 1941, so at that time both of my parents would have been experiencing a "meatless" day, meaning that they were restricted to protein other than from animals or birds. This, of course, as their families were, and ours is, Catholic.

For my father, living in the interior of the country, it's likely that meant something like macaroni and cheese, a Catholic meatless staple.  For my mother, however, living in Quebec, that likely meant some sort of ocean fish, perhaps.

My mother, being a few years older than my father, may have gone to the movies with her sisters, brothers and cousins, all of whom lived on the same block, but I don't know for certain.

Monday November 17, 1941. Finland halts operations

On this day in 1941 Finland halted offensive operations, abandoning further progress on the joint German-Finnish Operation Silver Fox, which had sought to capture Murmansk.

German forces outside of Murmansk.

Of all of Germany's allies in Europe, Finland was the most competent and was fighting for distinctly different war aims than Germany.  It's operations up to this date had been largely successful, and they had achieved  most of what they'd sought by entering the war on the German side in the first instance, that being territory lost during the Winter War.  This did not end the as to Finland, of course, as the Soviets didn't agree to be regarded as defeated, but the Finns were, by this time, skeptical of German abilities and saw no point in continuing offensive operations that would have mostly served German purposes.

The halting of Operations Silver Fox and Arctic Fox did mean that the Finnish/German forces failed to close Murmansk to the Allies.  This would prove to be a strategic failure in that the Western Allies used the port to supply the Soviets.  The Germans somehow failed to appreciate this, and the Finns after this point in the war wanted to avoid antagonizing the West any more than they already had, and further did not wish to fight for German, rather than Finnish, goals.  This would result in the Arctic Front stabilizing until 1944, when the Soviets were in a position to regain lost ground.

As it was, of course, having entered the war on the German side meant that Finland would be faced with attacks from the Red Army at the end of the war, by which time the Red Army was not at all the same army that the Finns had faced in the Winter War.  Finland was fortunate to escape a disaster as a result.

The cessation of hostilities was further significant in that it showed that Finnish war aims were limited to recovering truly lost territories to Finland, rather than an exercise in acquiring all the lands occupied by Balto Finnic peoples, which would have included all of Karelia, and even more territory occupied by the USSR if the Saami (Lapps) were included.  Finland's wise decision to halt rather than go for the inclusion of those territories would pay off when Axis fortunes reversed.

If Finnish forces had fought well in their campaign, the better materially equipped German forces had proven lacking.  Overall, German forces performed below expectation, particularly Waffen SS forces.  When the cold weather set in they were not adequately equipped, whereas the Finnish forces were.  Ultimately, the Germans started withdrawing its forces from this front, and had commenced doing so prior to the cessation of the offensive.

Without Finnish cooperation, there was nothing the Germans could do in order to ever resume an offensive on Murmansk, and they were not going to receive that.  Having said that, the German failure to appreciate the need to take the city was a monumental failure to grasp the logistical importance of the city. For a country engaged in a massive U-boat campaign in the Atlantic and North Sea, that oversight is difficult to grasp but perhaps goes to the German lingering belief that the campaign against the Soviet Union was going to be brief, and basically decided by taking Moscow.

On this day German World War One aviation hero and Luftwaffe general Ernst Udet killed himself.

Udet's World War One aviation tally was second only to Manfred Von Richtoeffen's.  He was a non-committed member of the Nazi Party, having joined based on a promise from Herman Goering to purchase two American dive bombers in 1933.  Moved to a administrative production position within the Luftwaffe, Udet became an alcoholic due to being both bored with the position and not really being able to do it. As the war began to loom, this became worse, as Udet did not believe that Germany could win the war. Goering supplied him with alcohol and drugs at parties to keep him in control, and he suffered a pre-war nervous breakdown.  A pre Operation Barbarossa report warning that the Soviet air force was good and technologically advanced that he issued was withheld from Hitler by Goering.  His situation was complicated by a sense that he had been abandoned both by Hitler and a mistress. To complicate matters further, he'd had an affair with Martha Dodd, the daughter of the US Ambassador to Germany who was a secret Communist and who was spying for the USSR.

Hitler would later blame Germany's looming defeat in later years on Udet, a rather fanciful explanation for the defeat.

British commandos completed their raid on Rommel's former headquarters.  Only two men escaped being killed or captured and Rommel was not there.

Cordell Hull met with the Japanese Ambassadors.  He summarized his meeting as follows:

I accompanied Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Saburo Kurusu to the White House in order that the latter might be received by the President.

Following several minutes of an exchange of courtesies and formalities, the President brought up the more serious side by referring to the misunderstandings and matters of difference between our countries and made clear the desire of this country, and he accepted the statement of the Japanese Ambassador that it was the desire of Japan equally, to avoid war between our two countries and to bring about a settlement on a fair and peaceful basis so far as the Pacific area was concerned.

Ambassador Kurusu proceeded with one line of remarks that he kept up during the conversation and that was that we must find ways to work out an agreement to avoid trouble between our two countries. He said that all the way across the Pacific it was like a powder keg, and again he repeated that some way must be found to adjust the situation.

Ambassador Kurusu made some specious attempt to explain away the Tripartite Pact. I replied in language similar to that which I used in discussing this matter with Ambassador Nomura on November fifteenth, which need not be repeated here. I made it clear that any kind of a peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, with Japan still clinging to her Tripartite pact with Germany, would cause the President and myself to be denounced in immeasurable term and the peace arrangement would not for a moment be taken seriously while all the countries interested in the Pacific would redouble their efforts to arm against Japanese aggression. I emphasized the point about the Tripartite Pact and self-defense by saying that when Hitler starts on a march of invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand airplanes with an official announcement that he is out for unlimited invasion objectives, this country from that time was in danger and that danger has grown each week until this minute. The result was that this country with no other motive except self?defense has recognized that danger, and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too late; and that the Government of Japan says that it does not know whether this country is thus acting in self-defense or not. This country feels so profoundly the danger that it has committed itself to ten, twenty-five or fifty billions of dollars in self-defense; but when Japan is asked about whether this is self?defense, she indicates that she has no opinion on the subject-I said that I cannot get this view over to the American people; that they believe Japan must know that we are acting in self-defense and, therefore, they do not understand her present attitude. I said that he was speaking of their political difficulties and that I was thus illustrating some of our difficulties in connection with this country's relations with Japan.

The President remarked that some time ago he proclaimed a zone around this hemisphere, 300 miles out in the sea in some places and 1,100 miles in others.

The President added that this was self-defense.

I then said that Ambassador Nomura and I have been proceeding on the view that the people of the United States and Japan alike are a proud and great people and there is no occasion for either to attempt to bluff the other and we would not consider that bluffing enters into our conversations, which are of genuine friendliness.

The President brought out a number of illustrations of our situation and the Japanese situation as it relates to Germany and our self-defense which serve to emphasize our position and to expose the sophistry of the Japanese position.

Ambassador Kurusu said that Germany had not up to this time requested Japan to fight; that she was serving a desirable purpose without doing so; this must have meant that she was keeping the American and British Navies, aircraft, et cetera, diverted.

The further question of whether the United States is on the defensive in the present Pacific situation came up by soma general discussion in reference to that situation by Ambassador Kurusu, and the President and I made it clear that we were not the aggressors in the Pacific but that Japan was the aggressor.

At another point I said that the belief in this country is that the Japanese formula of a new order in greater East Asia is but another name for a program to dominate entirely, politically, economically, socially and otherwise by military force all of the Pacific area; that this would include the high seas, the islands and the continents and would place every other country at the mercy of very arbitrary military rule just as the Hitler program does in Europe and the Japanese in China. The Ambassador made no particular comment.

There was some effort by Ambassador Kurusu to defend their plan of not bringing the troops out of China. Placing the Japanese on the defensive, the President said that the question ought to be worked out in a fair way considering all of the circumstances and relative merits of the matters involved; and that at a suitable stage, while we know that Japan does not wish us to mediate in any way, this Government might, so to speak, introduce Japan and China to each other and tell them to proceed with the remaining or detailed adjustments, the Pacific questions having already been determined.

Ambassador Kurusu strongly stated that it would be most difficult to bring all the troops out of China at once.

Ambassador Kurusu said that we, of course, desired to bring up both sides of matters existing between our two countries and he said that we would recall. that when the Japanese went into Shantung during the World War, this Government insisted that she get out. I replied that my own country opposed a policy of this seizure of new territory by any country to the .fullest extent of its' ability to do so; that it declined to take a dollar of compensation or a foot of territory for itself; that it insisted that the world must turn over a new leaf in this respect or nations would be fighting always for territory and under modern methods of war would soon destroy and utterly impoverish each other; that in any event his country fared well in this respect.

The question of our recent proposal on commercial policy was brought up by us and Ambassador Kurusu said he had not examined it and that he had forgotten much of the technical side of commercial policy since he was in the Foreign Office. The President made very pertinent and timely reference to the destructive nature of armaments and the still more destructive effects of a permanent policy of armaments which always means war, devastation and destruction. He emphasized the point that there is from the long-term point of view no difference of interest between our two countries and no occasion, therefore, for serious differences.

All in all, there was nothing new brought out by the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu. Ambassador Kurusu constantly made the plea that there was no reason why there should be serious differences between the two countries and that ways must be found to solve the present situation. He referred to Prime Minister Tojo as being very desirous of bringing about a peaceful adjustment notwithstanding he is an Army man. The President expressed his interest and satisfaction to hear this. The President frequently parried the remarks of Ambassador Nomura and also of Ambassador Kurusu, especially in regard to the three main points of difference between our two countries. There was no effort to solve these questions at the conference. The meeting broke up with the understanding that I would meet the Japanese representatives tomorrow morning.

Some feral threads in the fabric.

I'm not going to take this too far, and you definitely could, but a couple of odds and ends I've run across recently.

One is this Agrarian blog I recently located:

Foothill Agrarian

There are only handful of really worthwhile agrarian blogs around.  That's at least better than the situation with the distributist situation, where there's nothing worthwhile whatsoever.  Of the handful that are out there, the two best ones are linked in here.  A third one that is also worthwhile (which is a successor to two prior blogs, just as this blog also is), is also linked in, but it's not quite as good.  I'll do a thread on them some other time, or on all of these together. A fourth one would get a link for its actual agrarian posts, but it descends into "Southern Agrarianism" of the Lost Cause variety, and we're not going there.  Nope, no way.

Anyhow, I thought that this entry by an agrarian California sheep rancher, who is an adult entrant into hunting, really interesting.  He's also a self professed agrarian.

Persistence

We've posted a lot about hunting here, from the prospective of the nearly feral agrarian who has been a hunter his entire life.  It's interesting to see some similar views come about from the thoughtful agrarian adult who came to it late.

I haven't made it all the way through the back entries on Foothill Agrarian. Not by a long shot, but I was also struck by this entry:

Coming to Terms with Being Part-Time

This is a little like reading my own thoughts.  Indeed, this guy is just about the same age as me (I'm a little older), and he's a rancher, not a "homesteader", which anymore conveys something else, and frankly something less serious, or perhaps less realistic.  I'll be looking forward to perusing his prior entries.

I'm glad I found his blog.

Here's the other thing that caught my eye.

Helsinki says no meat will be served, single-use cutlery used at its events

This quite frankly is a deceptive headline, but that's how it generally reads, even in English language editions of Finnish newspapers.  What it really means is that the City of Helsinki will be changing what it serves at official state and municipal functions, and venues it owns, and it actually still will be serving meat.

What it will serve is local fish and also local game.  We don't see wild game as a restaurant item much in the US, and indeed its subject to very strict statutory provisions everywhere.  Why peole make the distinction between fish and "meat" baffles me, but they have here.

This is being done, maybe, by Helsinki (its drawing a lot of criticism) to reduce, it claims, its carbon footprint.  There's a certain "m'eh" quality to this as frankly the concept that bovines are farting the plant into a climate crisis is not really well thought out.  Humans are omnivores and meat is part of our diet, including meat that is raised by farmers and ranchers.

Having said that, I've long been an advocate for getting your own meat directly, and therefore I'm somewhat applauding Helsinki here, probably surprisingly to those who might know me. They're emphasizing local fish, which is something that people of that city probably mostly subsisted on until the mid 20th Century. And hunting wild game has always been a big part of Finnish culture, and still is.

Now, I'm not advocating for what Helsinki did, and I suspect that the Woke city counsel of the city, or whatever its administering body is, won't have this in place long.  I'm a stockman and I'm hugely skeptical of the cow fart accusations on the climate.  Depending upon how cattle are fed, this is not the problem its made out to be, and so to the extent its a problem, and there's always been ungulates around all over, it can be addressed.  But I find it really surprising that in 2021 I'll occasionally find even ranchers and farmers who don't hunt.

People should get their meat locally if they can, and included in that, is getting it directly from the field.  Its healthy, and honest, and connects you with reality in a way that going to the stocked shelves at Sam's Club doesn't.

Saturday October 22, 1921. League adjustments.

Country Gentleman went to press with an elderly fiddler.

While Judge did with a mischievous kid.  I'm not liking this one.

Negotiations were going on in the UK over the status of Ireland.
 

Arthur Griffith, insert, and Irish Republican sympathizers, in London for Irish-British peace conference

The German cabinest resigned in protest over the League of Nation's decision to award part of Silesia to Poland.  The League also declared the Aland Islands neutral.  They'd recently been awarded to Finland.

La Ancien Régime

It's not like this column has the readership of one by George F. Will or something where I need to worry, really, about its presentation, but I'll note that this is one of a couple of posts I've brought in and out of the Zeitgeist thread and have ended up posting it as a single thread, because of its nature, I guess.

I have a recent thread on our Monday At The Bar series about a bill that would raise judicial retirement ages.  I'm against that.  I'm pretty convinced, by this point in time, that such thoughts are a byproduct of two or three things operating in American society, one being the weird American belief that everyone is going to grow old with their body's and minds fully intact.  Americans want to believe that everyone is 20 years old, right up to the moment they die at age 120.

The other is the Baby Boom generation's refusal to let go. The same generation that didn't want to trust anyone over 30, when they weren't 30, now doesn't want to trust anyone under 60.

Which brings me to this.

During the last election, there was a Republican undercurrent that Joe Biden was either senile or approaching senility, a highly ironic position given that there were many who suspected that nearly as old Donald Trump wasn't right mentally himself.  Indeed, both men have been highly studied, although on the back burner, by their opposing camps and both of those camps have the ability to argue that the opposing figure just isn't who he used to be.

Whether or not that's correct we are at a point where the evidence is now really in.  The nation really has to turn the leadership of. . . everything over to younger people.  

Joe Biden's Presidency so far has been a complete mess.  Starting off with real hope in some quarters, things are now off the rails in all sorts of ways.  Trump and Biden combined, and it was both of them, operated to make the withdrawal from Afghanistan a complete route, wasting decades of American effort in a retreat that will forever be remembered for how badly it was done.  Trump's meandering in the early part of the Coronavirus Pandemic, which was somewhat understandable at first but which turned into a bizarre "look at me not wearing a mask" series of photo ops has left Biden with a gigantic public health mess which he now needs to address, but the messaging has been very bad on it.  Biden needs to win the inevitable court challenges on his new OSHA mask policy, and get it enforced, or he will look hopelessly weak and that will fuel the left/right divide that's wrecking the country.

Trump took a lot of criticism for his very aggressive border policy but Biden's reaction, started when he was still a candidate, was a muddled open the border policy, no matter what he might claim about that now, which is swamping the border and leading to a giant humanitarian crisis.  If Biden didn't want to be as rigid and aggressive as Trump, he didn't have to be, but his counter policy was going to create a disaster, and it did.

Legislatively, the Administration has taken a strong economy, which was damaged by the pandemic, and inserted inflation into it but will not yield in a way that will address that, leaving trying to get some order into things in the hands of a single Senator  Much of this is in order to attempt to bring in a set of policy goals which are his right to back, as he's the President, but it's all happened too slow to really effectuate them.

So the point?

Well, this.  This administration is really close to dissolving into complete ineffectiveness.   Biden may turn out to be a gift to Republicans the way that Jimmy Carter was.  But only if the GOP gets over their own  old man.

Which brings us to the second point.  We're now on year five of administration by really old men, one a populist who had no prior government experience and who was scary from time to time, and one a neo left-winger who is ineffectual.

Theodore Roosevelt was 42 years old when he became President.  Franklin Roosevelt was 51.  Ronald Reagan, who seemed ancient at the time, was 69.  Most Presidents have been in their 50s when they took office.

There's a reason for that.

It's only in the last decade, as baby boomers reached their 70s, that a cult of antiquity took over the nation's politics at the highest level.  Since then, it's extended into everything, and the legislature is about to ask the people of Wyoming to amend the constitution to extend it to the bench.

The opposite should be occurring.

Funny thing is, Americans are now acclimated to this.  I mentioned this to a colleague the other day, and specifically referenced Sanna Marin, the 35-year-old Prime Minister of Finland. The colleague was shocked, demeaned Finland as an irrelevant country, and then went on to say that a President needed "some experience".

Experience relevant to the times, yes.

To another time. . . well not so much.

And to be mentally agile and capable as well.