Wednesday, August 19, 2022. The Raid On Dieppe.

No. 4 Commando landing at Dieppe.

One of the most famous, and controversial, Allied operations of the Second World War occurred on this day when a largely Canadian force was committed to a British operation that's been termed a "raid", but which was on such a huge scale, that that term is debatable.  Operation Jubilee, or the Raid on Dieppe.  It was the bloodiest day of the war for the Canadian Army.

By Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-291-1205-14 / Koll / CC-BY-SA 3.0, CC BY-SA 3.0 de, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5476892

The Canadian Second Infantry Division, together with British Commando units featuring a small group of American Rangers, and French commandos, supported with Canadian armor, landed at 04:50 on this morning at the French resort town, with Allied forces landing on six beaches.   By the end of the day, 68% of the Canadian force was lost, either being killed, wounded or captured.

By Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-362-2211-12 / Jörgensen / CC-BY-SA 3.0, CC BY-SA 3.0 de, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5411278

The raid was somewhat ill-conceived in that it was on such a large-scale, and designed to test very large scale raids and to also send a signal to the Soviets that the Allies did actually intend to invade France at some point.  It made use of Canadian troops, as the Canadian 2nd Infantry Division had been assigned to protective duties in the United Kingdom and was available. The raid had been scheduled to occur somewhat earlier, and some equipment issued to the Canadians had been recovered, with the same type of equipment then hastily reissued, but with new examples that had to be rapidly reworked for functioning by Canadian troops.

Lord Louis Mountbatten, whom history has not treated well, played a planning role in the operation.  Bernard Law Montgomery got the blame later for some of the operations failures, but he had already been assigned to the 8th Army and cannot really be blamed.

The Germans were already wary of the possibility of British raids, and became aware that the British were interested in Dieppe by French double agents.  At the time, British intelligence was having trouble of this type.

By Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-291-1229-12 / Meyer; Wiltberger / CC-BY-SA 3.0, CC BY-SA 3.0 de, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5476900

Some of the raid went well.  No. 4 Commando, for example, to which the American Rangers were attached, landed and conducted their operations very well and withdrew as planned prior to 0800.  The Canadian landings, however, were generally a disaster, and ultimately they experienced heavy losses.  Trouble was experienced landing the supporting tanks, and the Luftwaffe turned out in force, with a major air battle between the Luftwaffe and the RAF/RCAF being the result.  The withdrawal commenced at 0940 and was complete by 1400, but was conducted under heavy fire.  The Germans captured the operation plan for the battle, which, when analyzed, was regarded by the Germans as basically inept.

The battle is regarded as a major disaster, but dissenting voices, which I basically am here, have taken the position that it was an expensive day in school for the Allies.  The British in particular gleaned major lessons about conducting landings that they would employ in Operation Overlord two years later, including the significance of landing tanks.  As a result, the British were particularly well-equipped with special tanks for the landings at Normandy.   The Allies also realized a need for temporary harbors, which would become a major focus for Overlord.

The Germans learned lessons as well, but were overall pleased with how well their forces had done in the defense, and not without reason.  One of the major factors in the German success, however, had been the presence of the Luftwaffe, which, in spite of being obvious, would be ignored by the Germans by 1944 as raids over Germany by strategic bombers took up their air assets.  

As minor side notes, the 50 American Rangers were assigned to Lord Lovat's No. 4 Commando, one of the most eccentric units of the war. This was to give them combat experience, but it was a fortunate assignment, as this part of the raid went well.  Additionally, Sarah Sundin notes that RAF Mustang I's were in the battle and gained their first areal victory on this day.

German treatment of Canadian prisoners would leading to lasting animosity between some Canadian soldiers in regard to the German army, leading some units to be very reluctant to take German prisoners in later actions.

The Japanese landed another 900 men on Guadalcanal.

The Red Army launched the Sinyavino Offensive in an effort to relieve Leningrad.

Last prior edition:

Tuesday, August 18, 1942. The Japanese Tokyo Express.

1940s, 1942, Guadalcanal, Imperial Japanese Navy, Posters, South Pacific, World War Two

Monday, August 17, 1942. The Makin Raid.

Today in World War II History—August 17, 1942: “Carlson’s Raiders”: 221 Marines conduct two-day raid on Makin Island in Gilberts to destroy a radio station; the first US amphibious landing from submarines.

From Sarah Sundin's blog.

Mankin Island through the periscope of the USS Nautilus, the submarine used in the raid.

The raid had goals beyond that, including taking prisoners, gathering intelligence and diverting the Japanese from reinforcing Guadalcanal.  In these goals, the mission was a failure.  Indeed, it was mixed overall for while half of the Japanese garrison was destroyed, twenty-one Marines were killed and a number left behind due to the confusion of the raid, nine of whom were executed by the Japanese.

The Japanese bombed Port Morseby.

The 8th Air Forces's first raid over Europe took place.

17 August 1942

The Second Moscow Conference came to an end.

Friday, August 14, 1942. Eisenhower named to command Torch.

While there are different dates for this that seem to be given, and this is just one of them, it seems that on this date Dwight Eisenhower, career U.S. Army officer who had been a Colonel prior to the built up for World War Two, and who had never been in combat, was chosen to lead Operation Torch, the planned fall 1942 amphibious landings by Anglo-American troops in North Africa.

Maj. Gen. Eisenhower, at that time, in 1942.

That this was being planned shows the degree to which, in planning, the tide of the war was turning, in spite of the evidence on the ground.

On the ground, British commandos conducted a nighttime raid on anti-aircraft and radar sites at Pointe de Saire, France.  The raiders crossed the channel in a British motor torpedo boat and did not sustain any losses.

The Ohio, mentioned yesterday, and the day before, doesn't sink, is reboarded and taken back under tow.  Further attacks break the towline, but they're repaired, and the towing keeps on, lashed to warships near her.

British freighter MV Brisbane Star, part of Pedestal as well, makes it to Malta at 4:15 P.M. in spite of being heavily damaged.

The Australians retreat from Deniki in New Guinea.   The Japanese land 3,000 additional troops.

From Sarah Sundin's blog:

Today in World War II History—August 14, 1942: Two P-38 Lightnings of the US 1st Fighter Group shoot down a German Fw 200 Condor bomber off Iceland—the first US claim against the Luftwaffe

Sunday, June 28, 1942. Fall Blau.

The Germans commenced Fall Blau (Case Blue), their 1942 summer offensive in southern the Soviet Union. The objective was to take the Baku oilfields.  It would run into November.

Burning Soviet KV-1 heavy tank.  By Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-216-0412-07 / Klintzsch / CC-BY-SA 3.0, CC BY-SA 3.0 de, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5410409

The offensive took considerable ground and can be regarded as a military success.  Indeed, so much so that it made the Germans overconfident in their abilities.  One of their offensive failures in the battle was to fail to cross the Volga and surround Stalingrad, choosing instead simply to enter it.

The offensive repeated the German tendency to commence offensives on Sundays.

The Australians raided Salamaua in New Guinea without loss of life.  The well planned raid was the first Australian commando raid of the war.

For civilian populations in the US and Canada, such as my then young parents, one can only imagine how this must have looked. The Japanese had recently struck two coastal installations in the Pacific with submarine bombardments, the British were on the retreat in North Africa, and the Germans were once again advancing in the Soviet Union.

Friday, June 19, 1942 . James Dougherty and Norma Jean Baker marry. The Second Washington Conference commenced. The Germans execute Eliáš,

The then Norma Jean Dougherty, as she looked when she appeared in Yank, as an employee of the Radio Plane Company

James Dougherty, then serving in the U.S. Navy, married Norma Jean Baker in Los Angeles, California.  He was 21, she was 16.  Their marriage prevented her from having to return to an orphanage following the relocation of her foster parents.

The sixteen-year-old had, as her living situation would indicate, a rough start in life.  Her parentage was uncertain, although her birth certificate had indicated that it was one Edward Mortenson, her mother's second husband.  In any event, Mortenson abandoned her mother when he learned of the pregnancy.  She was given up to a family by the last name of Boelender when only twelve days old to be raised until her mother, who had fallen into depression, had recovered enough to resume her role when she was somewhat older.  During this period of time, she acquired the last name of Baker.   Her mother's depression returned and became worse, and the child was raised in a series of foster homes.

While Dougherty was serving overseas, Baker dropped out of high school and went to work, something typical for service spouses, although the very young age of her marriage was unusual. She was noticed by photographer David Conover while taking photographs for Yank, which we discussed just the other day.

Dougherty did follow Conover's advice, and was quickly offered a modeling job by the Blue Star Agency. A provision of it required that she be unmarried, so she filed for divorce.  Her husband was still in the Navy, serving overseas.

And Conover's advice turned out to be good advice, in terms of her aspirations. As a model, her beauty was rapidly noticed, and she was in fact noticed by Hollywood and introduced into acting.  In the meantime, she'd changed her name to Marilyn Monroe.

Dougherty dismissed his wife's ambitions upon receiving divorce papers, but there wasn't much he could do about it.  He was, effectively, one of thousands of servicemen whose marriages had gone wrong during the war.  Effectively, he'd married a high schooler of obvious beauty and then departed from her, understandably, for years.

Probably the only one of the Conover photographs in which Monroe is actually recognizable in regard to her later appearance.

It was a story that repeated itself, but quietly, all over the United States.

Dougherty went on to become a significant figure in the Los Angeles Police Department.  He never spoke ill of his first wife, and after her death was of the opinion that she was too gentle of a person to survive in Hollywood.

The Second Washington Conference, a conference between the British headed up by Winston Churchill and the Americans headed by Franklin Roosevelt, convened.  Military matters were the topic.

The 1st Ranger Battalion came into existence.

World War Two Ranger shoulder patch.  By Zayats - Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=11400404

The brainchild of cavalryman Lucian Truscott, the Rangers were modeled on the example of British commando forces and supposed to fulfill a similar role.  Named after the examples of Rangers, light backwoods infantry of the French and Indian, and Revolutionary Wars, the several battalions of Rangers were formed during World War Two.  Most of them were comprised of volunteers, but at least one that was formed in the Pacific was an amalgamation of existing units that had served other purposes, including a disbanded pack artillery unit.

After the war they were disbanded but then reformed during the Korean War. The Army has retained Ranger units since. The British example is similar, in this regard, to the SAS and the SBS.

German Maj. Joachim Reichel went down behind Soviet lines in a crash landing, putting documents pertaining to an upcoming German offensive in Soviet hands. The Germans didn't change them, and the Soviets didn't believe what they captured was genuine.

The Germans executed Alois Eliáš, a former Czech general who was the prim minister of the German puppet state of  the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, for underground activities.  He was in fact working against German interests and had participated in the attempted poisoning of some collaborationist reporters, resulting in the death of one of them.

Sunday, June 7, 1942. The Yorktown goes down, the Chicago Tribune blabs, Attu occupied.

In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success. 

Isoroku Yamamoto to Japanese cabinet minister Shigeharu Matsumoto and Prime Minister Fumimaro before World War Two.

This day is regarded as the official end of the Battle of Midway.

Yorktown after she had rolled over on her port side

.

Lots of interesting items are mentioned by Sarah Sundin, on her blog, including the following.

Today in World War II History—June 7, 1942: In the Battle of Midway, carrier USS Yorktown sinks due to damage from the previous day, but the US is victorious in the major turning point of the Pacific War.

The Yorktown had sustained battle damage during the battle, and had been hit by a torpedo fired by a Japanese submarine the prior day.

The Yorktown started to list rapidly to port on the morning of June 7. She had already been abandoned due to battle damage by that time.  She rolled over to her port side, revealing the torpedo hole from a Japanese submarine.  The ship sank at 07:01 at which time the ships in the vicinity were all flying half-mast for her, and the crewmen mustered and at attention, heads uncovered.

The Chicago Tribune reported that the US had knowledge of the Japanese plans to strike Midway before it occurred, revealing sufficient information that had the Japanese studied the article, they would have realized that their codes had been broken.  Secretary of War Frank Knox demanded that the authors be prosecuted, but when it was soon noticed that the Japanese failed to change their codes, the matter was quietly dropped so as to avoid pointing the story out.

As Sundin also reports, Maj. Gen. Clarence Tinker, who was the commander of the U.S. Seventh Air Force, died when an LB-30 he was flying went down off of Midway. Tinker was leading a squadron of bombers in action in pursuit of the retreating Japanese forces.

The number of aircraft deployed from Midway during the battle is impressive, but U.S. Army Air Corps bombers, which included B-17s, LB-30s (B-24s) and B-26s were singularly unsuccessful in the action, largely disproving the prewar theory that multi engine bombers would be successful as a ground based threat to surface fleets.

Tinker had been born in Indian Territory and was of Osage extraction.  He was the first U.S. general officer to be killed in World War Two.  His Army service dated back to 1912.  Like several other generals in the Second World War, during World War One he'd served stateside.  He transferred to the flying service in 1922 and had reached the rank of Brigadier General in 1940.

The Japanese sweep in the Aleutians continued, with the Japanese landing on and taking Attu.  There were no military personnel on the island.  Three Aleuts were killed when the Japanse landed. It's 42 surviving Aleut residents were interned by the Japanese on Hokkaido, where 16 of them would die during the war.  Charles Jones, a resident of the island and a radio operator was murdered by the Japanese for his refusal to fix his radio for their use.  His wife Etta, a teacher on the island, survived the war and was interned with Australian nurses who had been taken on Rabaul.

The former residents of the island were resettled on other Aleutians islands after the war. 

The Japanese had intended the invasion of the island as a type of raid, intending to leave it by winter, but they ended up garrisoning it instead.

Attu village, 1937.  Note the Russian Orthodox Church.

The Germans ordered Jews in occupied France to wear yellow Stars of David.

British Commandos raided German airfields on Crete.

Saturday, March 28, 1942. The St. Nazaire Raid

On this day in 1942 the British conducted the large and risky raid on the Normandie Dry Dock at the port of St. Nazaire.  The raid involved ramming the HMS Campbeltown, an obsolete destroyer packed with explosives, into the dry dock.  It worked, and it took the dry dock out of operation for the rest of the war.

Areal photograph of Normandie Dry Dock with Campbletown inside dry dock.  The dry dock had been for the modern French passenger liner Normandie which had been lost in an accidental fire only recently while being converted to a troop transport in the United States.

The raid was sizable and involved air, sea and land elements of the British forces, resulting in British dead and 215 becoming prisoners of war.  Surprisingly, the Germans lost 360 dead, if civilian casualties at the dock are also included, in part because explosives on the Campbletown were time delayed and did not go off until noon.  At that time a party of 40 German officers and civilians were on board the Campbletown examining it.

The USS Buchanan in 1936.

The HMS Campbletown had originally been the USS Buchanan.  Decommissioned before World War Two, she was transferred to the British as part of the Destroyers For Bases program. She'd been built in 1918.

The British sank the SS Galilea in the Ionian Sea in a submarine strike.  The ship was an Italian hospital ship, but it was being used as a troops transport carrying Alpini to Italy so that they could be reassigned to the Eastern Front.  The ship also carried other Italian troops and some Greek POWs.  981 people went down with the ship.

The British struck Lubeck Germany with landmines, incendiary canisters and high explosives.  The raid resulted in damage to 62% of the cities buildings and destroyed its cathedral.

Friday, February 27, 1942. The Battle of the Java Sea, Gas Chambers at Auschwitz, The Raid on Brunvel.

February 27, 1942: Battle of Java Sea begins—Allied ships fail to prevent Japanese landing at Java, take heavy losses. Nazis order construction of gas chambers at Auschwitz. Seattle school board accepts forced resignation of Japanese-American teachers.

Sarah Sundin's blog notes a series of significant events for this day.

The big one, in the context of the fighting, was the beginning of the Battle of Java Sea, which would be an Allied defeat.  In human misery and global crime context, the beginning of the construction of the gas chambers at Auschwitz can't help but be noted.  And then there's the forced resignation of Japanese American teachers in Seattle.

A grim day all the way around.

Radar station at Brunvel, with surprisingly modern looking dish.

The British conducted Operation Biting, an airborne raid on a radar station in France.  The raid on Brunvel secured the radar array which the troops took with them when they withdrew by sea, giving the British a first-hand example of new type of German radar.  It was a completely successful raid.

Saturday, December 27, 1941. Vågsøy, Norway raided by Commandos. Australia turns towards the US.

Following up on yesterdays' diversionary raid on the Lofoten islands, British and Norwegian commandos raided the Vågsøy, Norway in Operation Archery.  The raid was the first combined arms raid conducted by the British.

British commandos in action on Operation Archery.

Fish oil was the material objective, but a broader goal was to cause the Germans to shift more manpower to Norway, where they'd accordingly reduce pressure on the Eastern Front. To that extent it was a success, as the Germans in fact moved 30,000 men into the Scandinavian country due to Hitler's fear that the British were preparing to invade Norway.  Ultimately the Germans would come to station 15 Divisions in Norway, where the 300,000 men were in fact fairly useless.

Operation Anklet, the diversionary raid, ended as the Germans were reacting with aircraft which that mission now lacked.

The first SOE operatives are dropped by the British into Denmark, but as the item below details, one was killed when his parachute didn't open:

Today in World War II History—December 27, 1941

Australian Prime Minister released this statement for publication.

That reddish veil which o'er the face

Of night-hag East is drawn ...

Flames new disaster for the race?

Or can it be the dawn? 

So wrote Bernard O'Dowd. I see 1942 as a year in which we shall know the answer. I would, however, that we provide the answer. We can and we will. Therefore I see 1942 as a year of immense change in Australian life. 

The Australian government's policy has been grounded on two facts. One is that the war with Japan is not a phase of the struggle with the Axis powers, but is a new war. The second is that Australia must go on a war footing. Those two facts involve two lines of action - one in the direction of external policy as to our dealings with Britain, the United States, Russia, the Netherlands East Indies and China in the higher direction of the war in the Pacific. 

The second is the reshaping, in fact the revolutionising, of the Australian way of life until a war footing is attained quickly, efficiently and withoutquestion. ... 

Now with equal realism, we take the view that, while the determination of military policy is the Soviet's business, we should be able to look forward with reason to aid from Russia against Japan. We look for a solid and impregnable barrier of the Democracies against the three Axis Powers, and we refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict. By that it is not meant that any one of the other theatres of war is of less importance than the Pacific, but that Australia asks for a concerted plan evoking the greatest strength at the Democracies' disposal, determined upon hurling Japan back. The Australian Government, therefore, regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies' fighting plan. Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom. 

We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat of invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength, but we know too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. ...  

Summed up, Australian external policy will be shaped toward obtaining Russian aid, and working out, with the United States, as the major factor, a plan of Pacific strategy, along with British, Chinese and Dutch forces. Australian internal policy has undergone striking changes in the past few weeks. These, and those that will inevitably come before 1942 is far advanced, have been prompted by several reasons. In the first place, the Commonwealth Government found it exceedingly difficult to bring Australian people to a realisation of what, after two years of war, our position had become. Even the entry of Japan, bringing a direct threat in our own waters, was met with a subconscious view that the Americans would deal with the short-sighted, underfed and fanatical Japanese. 

The announcement that no further appeals would be made to the Australian people, and the decisions that followed, were motivated by psychological factors. They had an arresting effect. They awakened the somewhat lackadaisical Australian mind the attitude that was imperative if we were to save ourselves, to enter an all-in effort in the only possible manner.

That experiment in psychology was eminently successful, and we commence 1942 with a better realisation, by a greater number of Australians, of what the war means than in the whole preceding two years.

The decisions were prompted by other reasons, all related to the necessity of getting onto a war footing, and the results so far achieved have been most heartening, especially in respect of production and conservation of stocks. I make it clear that the experiment undertaken was never intended as one to awaken Australian patriotism or sense of duty. Those qualities have been ever-present; but the response to leadership and direction had never been requested of the people, and desirable talents and untapped resources had lain dormant. Our task for 1942 is stern ... The position Australia faces internally far exceeds in potential and sweeping dangers anything that confronted us in 1914-1918.

The year 1942 will impose supreme tests. These range from resistance to invasion to deprivation of more and more amenities ...

Australians must realise that to place the nation on a war footing every citizen must place himself, his private and business affairs, his entire mode of living, on a war footing. The civilian way of life cannot be any less rigorous, can contribute no less than that which the fighting men have to follow. I demand that Australians everywhere realise that Australia is now inside the firing lines.

Australian governmental policy will be directed strictly on those lines. We have to regard our country and its 7,000,000 people as though we were a nation and a people with the enemy hammering at our frontier. Australians must be perpetually on guard; on guard against the possibility, at any hour without warning, of raid or invasion; on guard against spending money, or doing anything that cannot be justified; on guard against hampering by disputation or idle, irresponsible chatter, the decisions of the Government taken for the welfare of all.

All Australia is the stake in this war. All Australia must stand together to hold that stake. We face a powerful, ably led and unbelievably courageous foe. We must watch the enemy accordingly. We shall watch him accordingly.

The speech acknowledged that Australia was looking to the United States for support, rather than the United Kingdom, a major shift in its traditional allegiance to its mother country.

On the same day, the Japanese bombed the open city of Manila.  On the same day, US and Filipino forces withdrew to defensive line "D", the third of five pre-war designed lines of defense.

The US, as also detailed in the link above, commenced the rationing of rubber.  You can read more about that here:

“Make It Do—Tire Rationing in World War II”).

Tuesday November 18, 1941. German setbacks.

Yesterday the Finn's stopped advancing on Murmansk and the Germans stopped along with them, bringing to an effective end the German advance in the Arctic with the result that Murmansk would remain open to the Allies for the rest of the war.

On this day, the British launched Operation Crusader, a new offensive in the desert designed to relief the siege of Tobruk.

British tank in this operation passing a burning German one.  The British tank is, coincidentally, a "Crusader".

The attack demonstrated that the British were far from finished in the desert.

The British did conclude Operation Flipper on this day as well, which was not a success.

Mexico broke off diplomatic relations with  Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, giving a sign of the direction it would head in should the United States go to war. The sign had not been obvious, and it was still unclear. Mexico's PRI ruling party engaged in single state rule of the country, and accordingly it had a diversity of radical views within it, including strongly Communistic elements, but also some fascistic elements.  As a result, American defense planning included guarding the southern US border from Mexican incursions in case of it leaning towards the Axis.

Talks continued between the United States and the Japanese diplomatic mission in Washington, with the Japanese mission meeting with the Secretary of State, who issued this report:

After some preliminary remarks the Secretary took up the question of Japan's relations with the Axis. He pointed out that the public would place their own interpretation upon the implications of a situation wherein on the one hand Japan had an agreement with us and on the other was in an alliance with the Axis powers. He said that our people do not trust Hitler and furthermore we feel that it would be inevitable that Hitler would eventually, if he was successful, get around to the Far East and double-cross Japan. The Secretary cited the instance when Germany, after having concluded an 'anti-Comintern pact with Japan had surprised Japan later on by entering into a non-aggression pact with Russia and finally went back on the non-aggression pact by attacking Russia. The Secretary said that he presumed Japan did not know in advance what Germany's intentions were any more than we did. The Secretary expressed great doubt that any agreement into which we entered with Japan while Japan at the same time had an alliance with Hitler would carry the confidence of our people and he emphasized that we would have to have a clear-cut agreement making self-evident our peaceful purpose, for otherwise there would be a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their armaments. He pointed out that we are coming out of the Philippines in 1946 and that we are now bringing our marines out of China and in this way we are trying to make a contribution to the establishment of a peaceful world based on law and order. He said that this is what we want to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to offer in the may of bargaining except our friendship. Our commercial program was one, he said, calling for a maximum production and distribution of goods. The Secretary pointed out also that we are even now engaged in efforts to induce the British Empire to reduce its Empire preferences. w He said that what we desire is to put our people back to work in a way that can never be accomplished through permitting armies to overrun countries. The Secretary observed that many Japanese spokesmen had spoken of Japan's desire to have a controlling influence in Eastern Asia, but the only kind of controlling influence which was worth anything was one that could not be achieved or maintained by the sword.

He dwelt briefly upon what we have accomplished in South America through our peaceful policies and through renouncing the employment. of gunboats and armed forces. The Secretary made it clear that we recognized that under present emergency conditions we cannot carry out to perfection our commercial policy which must be modified to meet war conditions, but we can at least establish the. principles. The Secretary said, going back to the situation with regard to Japan's relations with the Axis, that a difficult situation was created thereby as far as our public was concerned-as, for example, when telegrams of congratulations were sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders when he commits some atrocity.

The Japanese Ambassador observed that the United States and Russia were not pursuing parallel courses and yet we are aligned with Russia at the present time. He also said he appreciated very well the relations we had developed with South America but that, although Japan would like to imitate us, Japan was not in a position to be so magnanimous-as, for example, in the mater of extending substantial lend lease aid to other countries. . . . The Secretary then added that he frankly did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan; that we can go so far but rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us to stand and take the consequences. The Ambassador then said that Japan is now hard?pressed and that the Secretary was well aware of how desirous Japan was to reach some agreement with the United States.

Mr. Kurusu said that he had served five years as Director of the Commercial Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office and that he was familiar with the developments in Japan's commercial policy. He said that the situation with respect to the Empire preferences was one of the factors which had influenced Japan to go into the Axis camp. He said that the United States was an economically powerful country and that the United States was, therefore, in a much better position than was Japan to enter into commercial bargaining. Furthermore, Japan was much more dependent than was the United States upon foreign trade. He felt that what the two Governments should now do would be to achieve something to tide over the present abnormal situation.. He referred, for example, to the exchange control situation which had been developed in Japanese-occupied China and expressed the view that that situation could not be done away with in a short time. He said that perhaps after the war was over it might be possible to adopt a more liberal policy but that he was unable to promise anything on the part of his Government. The Secretary asked whether Japan could not now agree in principle on commercial policy. Mr. Kurusu made no direct reply but went on to say that in the early years of American intercourse in the Far East our main interest was in commerce and not religious and cultural activities; that we had pursued a course of idealism, but with American occupation of the Philippines the situation changed somewhat and the United States tied itself in with the European concert of nations.

Turning to the question of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Kurusu said that he could not say that Japan would abrogate the Tripartite Pact but that Japan might do something which would "outshine" the Tripartite Pact.

The Secretary pointed out that unless peacefully minded nations now start their program of reconstruction it will be impossible to get such a program started later on because the selfish elements would get control of the situation and prevent the materialization of a liberal policy. Therefore, he said it was necessary to get the fundamental principles established, so that we might begin to enable the peaceful forces, which were now demoralized, to assert a leadership. Unless we pursue such a course, the Secretary noted, we shall not be able to obtain the confidence of peacefully minded people when the time for putting into effect a reconstruction program arrives. Mr. Kurusu asked whether the Secretary had a concrete formula for dealing with Japan's relations with the Axis alliance. The Secretary made it clear that this was a matter for Japan to work out. He said that if we could get a peaceful program firmly established, Hitler ought to be asked not to embarrass us too much. He asked whether Japan could not work it out in some way which would be convincing to the American people. He said that if it goes the wrong way every peaceful nation will redouble its defensive efforts. The Secretary emphasized again that the public would be confused in regard to a survival of a relationship between Japan and the Axis while Japan had an agreement with the United States.

The Ambassador asked whether it was not important now to make some understanding to save the situation. The Secretary said he agreed but that he felt that the Tripartite Pact was inconsistent with the establishment of an understanding.

Mr. Kurusu asked what could the Secretary suggest. The Secretary said that if we mix the Tripartite Pact with an agreement with the United States it will not be possible to get many people to follow us. The Secretary said that the question arises whether Japanese statesmen desire to follow entirely peaceful courses with China or whether they desire to face two ways. The Secretary went on to say that if the Japanese should back away from adopting a clear?cut position with regard to commercial policy, with regard to a course in China consistent with peaceful principles and with regard to Japanese relations to the European war this would leave us in an indefensible position in regard to the proposed agreement. We would have to say that the Japanese Government is unable to get its politicians into line.

The Ambassador repeated that the situation in Japan was very pressing and that it was important to arrest a further deterioration of the relations between the two countries. He suggested that if this situation could now be checked an atmosphere would develop when it would be possible to move in the direction of the courses which this Government advocated. He pointed out that big ships cannot turn around too quickly, that they have to be eased around slowly and gradually.

The Secretary replied that if we should sit down and write an agreement permeated with the doctrine of force it would be, found that each country would be entirely distrustful and would be piling up armaments, as countries cannot promote peace so long as they are tied in in any way with Hitler.

Mr. Kurusu pointed out that a comprehensive solution cannot be worked out immediately, that he could make no promises. He said that our freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and a feeling that Japan had to fight while it still could. If we could come to some settlement now, he said, it would promote an atmosphere which would be conducive to discussing fundamentals. The Secretary asked if he did not think that something could be worked out on the Tripartite Pact. The Ambassador said that he desired to emphasize that Japan would not be a cat's-paw for Germany, that Japan's purpose in entering into the Tripartite alliance was to use it for Japan's own purposes, that Japan entered the Tripartite Pact because Japan felt isolated. The Secretary observed that it would be difficult to get public opinion in this country to understand the situation as Mr. Kurusu had described it.

He then asked what the Ambassador had in mind in regard to the Chinese situation and whether the Japanese stood for no annexations, no indemnities, respect. for China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the principle of equality. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative.

The Secretary then said that while he had made this point already clear to the Ambassador he wished to make it clear also to Mr. Kurusu, that whereas the Japanese Government desired to consider our talks negotiations rather than exploratory conversations, the Secretary felt that without having first reached a real basis for negotiations, he was not in a position to go to the British or the Chinese or the other governments involved, as these governments had a rightful interest in these problems. Mr. Kurusu tried to get the Secretary to specify in just which problems each of the respective governments were interested but the Secretary said that he had not yet, for manifest reasons, discussed these problems with these other governments and anything that he might say would be just an assumption on his part. Mr. Kurusu then said that under such circumstances United States-Japanese relations would be at the mercy of Great Britain and China. The Secretary replied that he believed and must repeat that we must have something substantial in the way of a basis for an agreement to take to these governments for otherwise there would be no point in talking to them. Mr. Kurusu said that the situation was so pressing that it might get beyond our control. The Secretary agreed that, that was true but he pointed out that the fact that Japan's leaders keep announcing programs based upon force adds to our difficulties. He said he would like to leave the Hitler situation to the Japanese Government for consideration.

Turning to the China situation the Secretary asked how many soldiers the Japanese wanted to retain in China. The Ambassador replied that possibly 90 per cent would be withdrawn. The Secretary asked how long the Japanese intended to keep that remaining 10 per cent in China. The Ambassador did not reply directly to this but he invited attention to the fact that under the existing Boxer Protocol Japan was permitted to retain troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area. The Secretary pointed out that the question of the Japanese troops in China was one in which there were many elements of trouble. American interests even had suffered severely from the actions of the Japanese forces and we had a long list of such in stances. The Secretary made mention of the great patience this Government had exercised in the presence of this situation. He said the situation was one in which the extremists seemed to be looking for trouble and he said that it was up to the Japanese Government to make an extra effort to take the situation by the collar. He said also that the United States and Japan had trusted each other in the past, that the present situation was one of Japan's own making and it was up to the Japanese Government to find some way of getting itself out of the difficulty in which it had placed itself. The Secretary went on to say that the situation was now exceptionally advantageous for Japan to put her factories to work in producing goods which are needed by peaceful countries if only the Japanese people could get war and invasion out of mind.

The Ambassador said that our conversations had been protracted and if the American Government could only give the Japanese some hope with regard to the situation it might be helpful. He added that our country was great and strong. The Secretary replied that our Government has not made any threats and he has exercised his influence throughout to deprecate bellicose utterances in this country. He added that the Japanese armed forces in China do not appear to realize whose territory they are in and. that the people in this country say that Hitler proposes to take charge of one-half of the world and Japan proposes to take charge of the other half and if they should succeed what would there be left for the United States? Mr. Kurusu suggested, that Japan would have to move gradually in China, that one step right lead to another and that what was important now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course. The Secretary asked what was in Mr. Kurusu's mind. In reply to a suggestion that it was felt in Japanese circles that we have been responsible for delay the Secretary pointed out that we could more rightly accuse the Japanese of delays, that he had met with the Japanese Ambassador promptly every time the latter had asked for a meeting and had discussed matters fully with him. The Secretary added that when Japan's movement into Indo-china in July took place this had caused an interruption of our conversations and it was then that the Secretary could no longer defend the continued shipments of petroleum products to Japan, especially as for the past year he had been under severe criticism in this country for not having cut off those shipments. Mr. Kurusu asked whether we wanted the status quo ante to be restored or what we expected Japan to do. The Secretary replied that if the Japanese could not do anything now on those three points?getting troops out of China, commercial policy and the Tripartite agreement-he could only leave to Japan what Japan could do. The Secretary said that it is our desire to see Japan help furnish a world leadership for a peaceful program and that he felt that Japan's long-swing interests were the same as our interests. The Ambassador said that he realized that our Government was suspicious of the Japanese Government but he wished to assure us that Japan wanted to settle the China affair notwithstanding the fact that Japan desired to keep a few troops in China for the time being. The Secretary then asked again what the Japanese had in mind. Mr. Kurusu said that it was Japan's intention to withdraw Japanese troops from French Indochina as soon as a just Pacific settlement should be reached and he pointed out that the Japanese Government took the Burma Road situation very seriously. The Secretary asked, if there should be a relaxation of freezing, to what extent would that enable Japan to adopt peaceful policies. He explained that what he had in mind was to enable the peaceful leaders in Japan to get control of the situation in Japan and to assert their influence. The Ambassador said that our position was unyielding and that it was Japan's unyielding attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek which had stiffened Chinese resistance against Japan. He asked whether there was any hope of a solution-some small beginning toward the realization of our high ideals. The Secretary replied that if we do not work out an agreement that the public trusts the arming of nations will go on; that the Japanese Government has a responsibility in the matter as it has created the conditions we are trying to deal with. The Ambassador then suggested the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the date in July when, following the Japanese move into southern French Indochina, our freezing measures were put into effect. The Secretary said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo on the strength of a step by Japan such as the Ambassador had mentioned we do not know whether the troops which have been withdrawn from French Indochina will be diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. The Ambassador said that what he had in mind was simply some move toward arresting the dangerous trend in our relations. The Secretary said that it would be difficult for him to get this Government to go a long way in removing the embargo unless this Government believed that Japan was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest. The Ambassador said that the Japanese were tired of fighting China and that Japan would go as far as it could along a first step. The Secretary said that he would consult with the British and the Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the suggestion offered by the Japanese Ambassador. In reply to a question by the Secretary the Ambassador replied that the Japanese Government. was still studying the questions of commercial policy involved in our proposal of November 15. He said he assumed that what we had in mind was a program for dealing with the situation after the war. The Secretary replied in the affirmative, so far as the full operation of a sound program is concerned, but added that it should now be agreed upon as to principles.

When asked by the Secretary as to when the Ambassador would like to confer with us again the Ambassador said that he would get in touch with his Government and would communicate to the Secretary through Mr. Ballantine.

Monday November 17, 1941. Finland halts operations

On this day in 1941 Finland halted offensive operations, abandoning further progress on the joint German-Finnish Operation Silver Fox, which had sought to capture Murmansk.

German forces outside of Murmansk.

Of all of Germany's allies in Europe, Finland was the most competent and was fighting for distinctly different war aims than Germany.  It's operations up to this date had been largely successful, and they had achieved  most of what they'd sought by entering the war on the German side in the first instance, that being territory lost during the Winter War.  This did not end the as to Finland, of course, as the Soviets didn't agree to be regarded as defeated, but the Finns were, by this time, skeptical of German abilities and saw no point in continuing offensive operations that would have mostly served German purposes.

The halting of Operations Silver Fox and Arctic Fox did mean that the Finnish/German forces failed to close Murmansk to the Allies.  This would prove to be a strategic failure in that the Western Allies used the port to supply the Soviets.  The Germans somehow failed to appreciate this, and the Finns after this point in the war wanted to avoid antagonizing the West any more than they already had, and further did not wish to fight for German, rather than Finnish, goals.  This would result in the Arctic Front stabilizing until 1944, when the Soviets were in a position to regain lost ground.

As it was, of course, having entered the war on the German side meant that Finland would be faced with attacks from the Red Army at the end of the war, by which time the Red Army was not at all the same army that the Finns had faced in the Winter War.  Finland was fortunate to escape a disaster as a result.

The cessation of hostilities was further significant in that it showed that Finnish war aims were limited to recovering truly lost territories to Finland, rather than an exercise in acquiring all the lands occupied by Balto Finnic peoples, which would have included all of Karelia, and even more territory occupied by the USSR if the Saami (Lapps) were included.  Finland's wise decision to halt rather than go for the inclusion of those territories would pay off when Axis fortunes reversed.

If Finnish forces had fought well in their campaign, the better materially equipped German forces had proven lacking.  Overall, German forces performed below expectation, particularly Waffen SS forces.  When the cold weather set in they were not adequately equipped, whereas the Finnish forces were.  Ultimately, the Germans started withdrawing its forces from this front, and had commenced doing so prior to the cessation of the offensive.

Without Finnish cooperation, there was nothing the Germans could do in order to ever resume an offensive on Murmansk, and they were not going to receive that.  Having said that, the German failure to appreciate the need to take the city was a monumental failure to grasp the logistical importance of the city. For a country engaged in a massive U-boat campaign in the Atlantic and North Sea, that oversight is difficult to grasp but perhaps goes to the German lingering belief that the campaign against the Soviet Union was going to be brief, and basically decided by taking Moscow.

On this day German World War One aviation hero and Luftwaffe general Ernst Udet killed himself.

Udet's World War One aviation tally was second only to Manfred Von Richtoeffen's.  He was a non-committed member of the Nazi Party, having joined based on a promise from Herman Goering to purchase two American dive bombers in 1933.  Moved to a administrative production position within the Luftwaffe, Udet became an alcoholic due to being both bored with the position and not really being able to do it. As the war began to loom, this became worse, as Udet did not believe that Germany could win the war. Goering supplied him with alcohol and drugs at parties to keep him in control, and he suffered a pre-war nervous breakdown.  A pre Operation Barbarossa report warning that the Soviet air force was good and technologically advanced that he issued was withheld from Hitler by Goering.  His situation was complicated by a sense that he had been abandoned both by Hitler and a mistress. To complicate matters further, he'd had an affair with Martha Dodd, the daughter of the US Ambassador to Germany who was a secret Communist and who was spying for the USSR.

Hitler would later blame Germany's looming defeat in later years on Udet, a rather fanciful explanation for the defeat.

British commandos completed their raid on Rommel's former headquarters.  Only two men escaped being killed or captured and Rommel was not there.

Cordell Hull met with the Japanese Ambassadors.  He summarized his meeting as follows:

I accompanied Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Saburo Kurusu to the White House in order that the latter might be received by the President.

Following several minutes of an exchange of courtesies and formalities, the President brought up the more serious side by referring to the misunderstandings and matters of difference between our countries and made clear the desire of this country, and he accepted the statement of the Japanese Ambassador that it was the desire of Japan equally, to avoid war between our two countries and to bring about a settlement on a fair and peaceful basis so far as the Pacific area was concerned.

Ambassador Kurusu proceeded with one line of remarks that he kept up during the conversation and that was that we must find ways to work out an agreement to avoid trouble between our two countries. He said that all the way across the Pacific it was like a powder keg, and again he repeated that some way must be found to adjust the situation.

Ambassador Kurusu made some specious attempt to explain away the Tripartite Pact. I replied in language similar to that which I used in discussing this matter with Ambassador Nomura on November fifteenth, which need not be repeated here. I made it clear that any kind of a peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, with Japan still clinging to her Tripartite pact with Germany, would cause the President and myself to be denounced in immeasurable term and the peace arrangement would not for a moment be taken seriously while all the countries interested in the Pacific would redouble their efforts to arm against Japanese aggression. I emphasized the point about the Tripartite Pact and self-defense by saying that when Hitler starts on a march of invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand airplanes with an official announcement that he is out for unlimited invasion objectives, this country from that time was in danger and that danger has grown each week until this minute. The result was that this country with no other motive except self?defense has recognized that danger, and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too late; and that the Government of Japan says that it does not know whether this country is thus acting in self-defense or not. This country feels so profoundly the danger that it has committed itself to ten, twenty-five or fifty billions of dollars in self-defense; but when Japan is asked about whether this is self?defense, she indicates that she has no opinion on the subject-I said that I cannot get this view over to the American people; that they believe Japan must know that we are acting in self-defense and, therefore, they do not understand her present attitude. I said that he was speaking of their political difficulties and that I was thus illustrating some of our difficulties in connection with this country's relations with Japan.

The President remarked that some time ago he proclaimed a zone around this hemisphere, 300 miles out in the sea in some places and 1,100 miles in others.

The President added that this was self-defense.

I then said that Ambassador Nomura and I have been proceeding on the view that the people of the United States and Japan alike are a proud and great people and there is no occasion for either to attempt to bluff the other and we would not consider that bluffing enters into our conversations, which are of genuine friendliness.

The President brought out a number of illustrations of our situation and the Japanese situation as it relates to Germany and our self-defense which serve to emphasize our position and to expose the sophistry of the Japanese position.

Ambassador Kurusu said that Germany had not up to this time requested Japan to fight; that she was serving a desirable purpose without doing so; this must have meant that she was keeping the American and British Navies, aircraft, et cetera, diverted.

The further question of whether the United States is on the defensive in the present Pacific situation came up by soma general discussion in reference to that situation by Ambassador Kurusu, and the President and I made it clear that we were not the aggressors in the Pacific but that Japan was the aggressor.

At another point I said that the belief in this country is that the Japanese formula of a new order in greater East Asia is but another name for a program to dominate entirely, politically, economically, socially and otherwise by military force all of the Pacific area; that this would include the high seas, the islands and the continents and would place every other country at the mercy of very arbitrary military rule just as the Hitler program does in Europe and the Japanese in China. The Ambassador made no particular comment.

There was some effort by Ambassador Kurusu to defend their plan of not bringing the troops out of China. Placing the Japanese on the defensive, the President said that the question ought to be worked out in a fair way considering all of the circumstances and relative merits of the matters involved; and that at a suitable stage, while we know that Japan does not wish us to mediate in any way, this Government might, so to speak, introduce Japan and China to each other and tell them to proceed with the remaining or detailed adjustments, the Pacific questions having already been determined.

Ambassador Kurusu strongly stated that it would be most difficult to bring all the troops out of China at once.

Ambassador Kurusu said that we, of course, desired to bring up both sides of matters existing between our two countries and he said that we would recall. that when the Japanese went into Shantung during the World War, this Government insisted that she get out. I replied that my own country opposed a policy of this seizure of new territory by any country to the .fullest extent of its' ability to do so; that it declined to take a dollar of compensation or a foot of territory for itself; that it insisted that the world must turn over a new leaf in this respect or nations would be fighting always for territory and under modern methods of war would soon destroy and utterly impoverish each other; that in any event his country fared well in this respect.

The question of our recent proposal on commercial policy was brought up by us and Ambassador Kurusu said he had not examined it and that he had forgotten much of the technical side of commercial policy since he was in the Foreign Office. The President made very pertinent and timely reference to the destructive nature of armaments and the still more destructive effects of a permanent policy of armaments which always means war, devastation and destruction. He emphasized the point that there is from the long-term point of view no difference of interest between our two countries and no occasion, therefore, for serious differences.

All in all, there was nothing new brought out by the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu. Ambassador Kurusu constantly made the plea that there was no reason why there should be serious differences between the two countries and that ways must be found to solve the present situation. He referred to Prime Minister Tojo as being very desirous of bringing about a peaceful adjustment notwithstanding he is an Army man. The President expressed his interest and satisfaction to hear this. The President frequently parried the remarks of Ambassador Nomura and also of Ambassador Kurusu, especially in regard to the three main points of difference between our two countries. There was no effort to solve these questions at the conference. The meeting broke up with the understanding that I would meet the Japanese representatives tomorrow morning.

Monday, November 10, 1941. American Guide Week.

It was the start of American Guide Week, which had the purpose noted.  It seems odd that the Administration was boosting tourism right before World War Two, but it was.

On the same day, the British launched a commando raid on Rommel's headquarters, the same being Operation Flipper.  The mission by No. 11 Commando was designed to be a raid on the headquarters of Erwin Rommel on November 18.

The raid, timed with the commencement of a British offensive, was a flop.  Rommel had moved his headquarters weeks earlier and, by the time of the raid itself, was vacationing in Italy with his wife in celebration of his 50th birthday.  Two of the commandos were killed and 28 wounded in what was a fairly pointless endeavor.  The raid resulted in one posthumous Victoria Cross which has been criticized as, contrary to the norm, the report was not written by a witness and is contradicted by actual witnesses.

The German's launched an effort to take Sevastopol.  Elements of the Japanese naval force destined to raid Pearl Harbor started leaving Kure, their base in Japan.

Winston Church commented on this day that "should the United States become involved in war with Japan, the British declaration will follow within the hour."   The full speech read:

Alike in times of peace and war the annual civic festival we have observed to-day has been, by long custom, the occasion for a speech at Guildhall by the Prime Minister upon foreign affairs. This year our ancient Guildhall lies in ruins. Our foreign affairs are shrunken, and almost the whole of Europe is prostrate under the Nazi tyranny. The war which Hitler began by invading Poland, and which now engulfs the European Continent, has broken into the north-east of Africa, and may well engulf the greater part of Asia-nay, it may soon spread to the remaining portions of the globe. Nevertheless, in the same spirit as you, my Lord Mayor, have celebrated your assumption of office with the time-honoured pageant of Lord Mayor's Day, so I, who have the honour to be your guest, will endeavour to play, though very briefly-for in war-time speeches should be short-the traditional part assigned to those who hold my office.

The condition of Europe is terrible in the last degree. Hitler's firing parties are busy every day in a dozen countries-Norwegians, Belgians, Frenchmen, Dutch, Poles, Czechs, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Greeks, and above all, in scale, Russians are being butchered by thousands and by tens of thousands after they have surrendered, while individual and mass executions in all the countries I have mentioned have become part of the regular German routine.

The world has been intensely stirred by the massacre of the French hostages. The whole of France, with the exception of that small clique whose public careers depend upon a German victory, has been united in horror and indignation against this slaughter of perfectly innocent people. Admiral Darlan's tribute to German generosity falls unseasonably at this moment on French ears, and his plans for loving collaboration with the conquerors and murderers of Frenchmen are quite appreciably embarrassed.

Even the arch-criminal himself, the Nazi ogre Hitler, has been frightened by the volume and passion of world indignation which his spectacular atrocity has excited. It is he, and not the French people, who has been intimidated. He has not dared to go forward with his further programme of killing hostages.

This, as you will have little doubt, is not due to mercy, to compassion, to compunction, but to fear and to a dawning consciousness of personal insecurity rising in a wicked heart. I would say generally that we must regard all these victims of the Nazi executioners in so many lands, who are labelled Communists and Jews-we must regard them just as if they were brave soldiers who died for their country on the field of battle. Aye, in a way their sacrifice may be more fruitful than that of the soldier who falls with his arms in his hands. A river of blood has flowed and is flowing between the German race and the peoples of nearly all Europe. It is not the hot blood of war, where good blows are given and returned. It is the cold blood of the execution yard and the scaffold, which leaves a stain indelible for generations and for centuries.

Here, then, are the foundations upon which the "new order" of Europe is to be inaugurated. Here, then, is the house-warming festival of the Herrenvolk. Here, then, is the system of terrorism by which the Nazi criminals and their quisling accomplices seek to rule a dozen ancient, famous cities of Europe, and if possible all the free nations of the world. In no more effective manner could they have frustrated the accomplishment of their own designs. The future and its mysteries are inscrutable, but one thing is plain-never, to those bloodstained, accursed hands, will the future of Europe be confided.

Since Lord Mayor's Day last year very great changes have taken place in our situation. We were then the sole champion of freedom in arms. Then we were ill-armed and far out-numbered even in the air. Now a large part of the United States Navy, as Colonel Knox has told us, is constantly in action against the common foe. Now the valiant resistance of the Russian nation has inflicted most frightful injuries upon German military power, and at the present moment, the German invading armies, after all their losses, lie on the barren steppes exposed to the approaching severities of the Russian winter. Now we have an Air Force which is at least equal in size and numbers, not to speak of quality, to the German air power.

Rather more than a year ago I announced to Parliament that we were sending a Battle Fleet back into the Mediterranean for the destruction of the German and Italian convoys. The Admiralty brings us to-day news of the destruction of another Italian destroyer. The passage of our supplies in many directions through the sea, the broken morale of the Italian Navy-all these show that we are still masters there.

To-day I am able to go further. Owing to the effective help we are getting from the United States in the Atlantic, owing to the sinking of the Bismarck, owing to the completion of our splendid new battleships and aircraft carriers of the largest size, as well as the cowing of the Italian Navy already mentioned, I am able to announce to you that we now feel ourselves strong enough to provide a powerful naval force of heavy ships, with its necessary ancillary vessels, for service if needed in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

We stretch out the long arm of brotherhood and motherhood to the Australian and New Zealand people, and to the Indian people, whose army has already been fighting with so much distinction in the Mediterranean theatre. This movement of our naval forces, in conjunction with the United States main Fleet, may give practical proof to all who have eyes to see that the forces of freedom and democracy have not by any means reached the limit of their power.

I must admit that, having voted for the Japanese Alliance nearly 40 years ago-in 1902-and having always done my very best to promote good relations with the island Empire of Japan, and always having been a sentimental well-wisher of Japan and an admirer of her many gifts and qualities, I would view with keen sorrow the opening of a conflict between Japan and the English-speaking world.

The United States' time-honoured interests in the Far East are well known. They are doing their utmost to find a way of preserving peace in the Pacific. We do not know whether their efforts will be successful, but if they fail, I take this occasion to say-and it is my duty to say-that should the United States become involved in war with Japan the British declaration will follow within the hour.

Viewing the vast, sombre scene as dispassionately as possible, it would seem a very hazardous adventure for the Japanese people to plunge, quite needlessly, into a world struggle in which they may well find themselves opposed in the Pacific by States whose populations comprise nearly three-quarters of the human race.

If steel is a nation's foundation of modern war it would be rather dangerous for a Power like Japan, whose steel production is only about 7,000,000 tons a year, to provoke quite gratuitously a struggle with the United States, whose steel production is now about 90,000,000 tons a year. And I take no account of the powerful contribution which the British Empire can make in many ways. I hope devoutly that the peace of the Pacific will be preserved in accordance with the known wishes of the wisest statesmen of Japan, but every preparation to defend British interests in the Far East and to defend the common cause now at stake has been, and is being, made.

Meanwhile, how can we watch without emotion the wonderful defence of their native soil, and of their freedom and independence, which has been maintained single-handed for five long years by the Chinese people under the leadership of that great Asiatic hero and commander, General Chiang Kai-shek. It would be a disaster of the first magnitude to world civilization if the noble resistance to invasion and exploitation which has been made by the whole Chinese race were not to result in the liberation of their hearths and homes. That, I feel, is a sentiment which is deep in our hearts.

To return for a moment to the contrast between our position now and a year ago. I do not need to remind you here in the City that this time last year we did not know where to turn for a dollar across the American Exchange. By very severe measures we had been able to gather together and to spend in America about £500,000,000 sterling. But the end of our financial resources was in sight; nay, had actually been reached. All we could do at that time-a year ago-was to place orders in the United States without being able to see our way through, but on a tide of hope, and not without important encouragement.

Then came the majestic policy of the President and Congress of the United States in passing the Lease-Lend Bill, under which, in two successive enactments, about £3,000,000,000 was dedicated to the cause of world freedom, without-mark this, because it is unique-without the setting up of any account in money. Never again let us hear the taunt that money is the ruling power in the hearts and thoughts of the American democracy. The Lease-Lend Bill must be regarded without question as the most unsordid act in the whole of recorded history.

We for our part have not been found unworthy of the increasing aid we are receiving. We have made unparalleled financial and economic sacrifices ourselves, and now that the Government and people of the United States have declared their resolve that the aid they are giving us shall reach the fighting lines, we shall be able to strike with all our might and main.

Thus we may, without exposing ourselves to any charge of complacency, without in the slightest degree relaxing the intensity of our war effort, give thanks to Almighty God for the many wonders which have been wrought in so brief a space of time, and we may derive fresh confidence from all that has happened and bend ourselves to our task with all the force that is in our soul and with every drop of blood that is in our veins.

We are told from many quarters that we must soon expect what is called a peace offensive from Berlin. All the usual signs and symptoms are already manifest, as the Foreign Secretary will confirm, in neutral countries, and all those signs point in one direction. They all show that the guilty men who have let Hell loose upon the world are hoping to escape with their fleeting triumphs and ill-gotten plunder from the closing net of doom.

We owe it to ourselves, we owe it to our Russian Allies and to the Government and people of the United States, to make it absolutely clear that whether we are supported or alone, however long and hard the toil may be, the British nation and his Majesty's Government at the head of that nation, in intimate concert with the Governments of the great Dominions, will never enter into any negotiations with Hitler or any party in Germany which represents the Nazi regime. In that resolve we are sure that the ancient City of London will be with us to the hilt and to the end.

Churchill's statement was no doubt true. ..  for lots of reasons, but it cannot realistically be regarded as that great of an offer of help.  The US was as far into the war in the Atlantic in aid of the British as conceivably possible and a Japanese attack on the US, while it would cause British setbacks, and it did, also just made that near belligerent status a full belligerent status.

In fact, as the item below notes, on this date the US commenced escorting a British troop convoy from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to India.  Escorting a convoy of troops at war is an act of war, irrespective of where those troops were going.

Today in World War II History—November 10, 1941

Also, according to that entry, the US adopted the famous M1 helmet and the "Parson's" field jacket on this date in 1941, which while that might not seem like much to many, actually are big events in material history.

The M1 helmet was a huge improvement over the Brodie pattern M1917 helmet that had been adopted during World War One, and which was of the type still used by the British.  The M1 had full head coverage and was a great helmet.  The M1 covered the head fully, and could be separated from its liner to be used as a basin, a not insignificant feature.

It wasn't adopted on this date, however. That date was June 6, 1941. By this date in 41, thousands had already been produced.  It was in use for decades and worn by millions of servicemen. . .including me, my father, and three of my uncles.

The M1941 field jacket, i.e., the "Parson's", was adopted, as the designation indicated, in 1941 as well.  I'd question whether it was this late in 41, but it was adopted in 41.  FWIW, this was the second model of the jacket, not the first, so this type of jacket had been in service for a while.

Based on civilian "wind breakers" the wool lined jacket was much more practical than the Army Service Coat which had replaced the Service Coat of World War One.  For nearly inexplicable reasons, the Army, in the early 1920s adopted a service coat which replaced the closed collar service coat of the Great War which soldiers wore for nearly any service. The new service coat more closely resembled an Edwardian business suit jacket, with an open collar, and was designed to be worn with a tie. It even featured brass buttons, as opposed to the earlier subdued blackened ones.  In addition, a separate distinct patter was introduced for officers of a dark green with khaki colored trousers.

This uniform doubled as a dress and field uniform, but it was completely lacking in suitability for the latter.  Indeed, it was much less suitable in this role than its predecessor.  By the late 30s this was extremely obvious, and the Army took a giant step in a more practical direction, replacing the service coat for "field" use with a "field jacket", of which the M1938 was the first.  This was, we should note, before the build up of the service for the war had commenced, as the war had not commenced.

In 1941 the new pattern was adopted with some changes that, if nothing else, made it appear a bit more military than the prior jacket had. The same year the Army adopted the M1941 Winter Coat, which was also a wool lined jacket.  This jacket became popular with armored vehicle crewman and is mistakenly associated with them.  It was in fact used by all branches.

We could go on at length, as the topic of World War Two Army coats is surprisingly complicated, but we will simply note that in 1943 the Army adopted the M1943 field jacket which became the pattern for every Army field jacket for decades and of which there is still an authorized version.  The M1943 was designed as part of a paratroopers uniform, but the Army was wisely concluding by that point that was good for paratroopers worked for everybody else.  What you can take from all of this is that things were very much in a state of uniform flux by this point in the US military, and would be throughout the rest of the war.