Saturday, December 6, 1941. The Saturday before Pearl Harbor

Washington D. C. Christmas shoppers, including a U.S. Army 1st Sergeant.

Today was the first day of a December weekend in 1941.  For Americans, it would be the last day of peace until 1945.  While, as we noted yesterday, wartime shortages and an odd employment situation existed due to the war, it would also have been a day in which most Americans, save for those who worked in some stores, restaurants and move theaters would have had off.  It was also the only day of the weekend that a person could buy gasoline, as gasoline stations were closed on Sundays.

Most people took the opportunity to relax and enjoy the day.

The Saturday Evening Post featured a cover of a young girl holding a guinea pig.  Liberty magazine featured a young cowgirl leaning on a saddle.  Popular Science had a photo of giant military listening devices that were designed to allow crewmen to hear aircraft from a long distance, an odd thing to think of at a time in which radar was just coming in, but then, it was just coming in.

As I stated yesterday, I don't know what servicemen everywhere were doing on this day.  In the continental US, where most were stationed, this was probably a day in which quite a few had day passes.  I had doubted that this was the case to a large extent in the Pacific, although I admitted that I didn't know.  Certainly, the movie depiction holds the opposite.

Well, in looking into this I've now come across a photo of three sailors in Oahu at The Monkey Bar, one of whom would be trapped in his ship the following day and ultimately parish, and the diary of a nurse recounting her December 6, 1941 Evening. That's worth noting here.

Saturday December 6, 1941

She recounted:

One of the perks of being a nurse here in Honolulu is the opportunity to meet so many nice men!
There is a ratio of 20 male officers to every nurse. Tonight, I went to the Pearl Harbor Club with Lt. Barney Benning. It was a delightful evening full of music and dancing. All of our friends were there and we had a absolutely swell time. Barne y is certainly a gentleman- he drove me back to my quarters tonight and we made plans to go Waikiki tomorrow after my shift is over.

It is getting late. More tomorrow!

Also in Hawaii were the Willamette Bearcats and San Jose State football teams.  They were there for the Shrine Bowl.

Some servicemen were just arriving at Pearl Harbor.  The USS Nevada and the USS Oklahoma arrived that day.

Texas and Oregon played, in an era when college football was what counted, in Austin. 

Not everyone took the day off, however, due to wartime conditions.  Indeed, on this day the SS Zebulon B. Vance, a liberty ship, was launched.

Some servicemen who didn't have the day off were those working at the Army's Special Intelligence Service., which included some Navy personnel.  On the night of December 6, 1941, the U.S. Army Special Intelligence Service decoded thirteen parts of a fourteen part message.  The decoded on December 6 portion of the message read:

Memorandum

1. The government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific Area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances., It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regimes. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

3. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

1. The Government of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

2. Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

3. Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

   The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

5. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between japan and China or establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

   As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

   The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constitutes an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, causes undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and impose (sic) one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

   Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual condition it seems only a utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

   Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

2. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states -- 'Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.' It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

   The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means.

3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at time more inhumane than military pressure.

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia have for the past two hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to he prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

   The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries -- Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China, and Thailand -- excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiations. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

6. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

7. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to me wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

8. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's effort toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interest by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation.

   Thus the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

They would intercept and decode the final part in the early morning hours of December 7.

That final part would read:

9.  The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

December 7, 1941.

As detailed in our Today In Wyoming's History: December 6: 1941 entry, in spite of everything, not everyone was convinced that the country was on the eve of war.

1941  Wyoming Senator Harry Schwartz stated that war with Japan was unlikely.  Given the state of relations between the United States and Japan, which were strained to the limit, and in which the Federal government regarded war as likely to break out at any time, Schwartz's opinion seems more than a little optimistic, although he certainly wasn't the only one to hold it.  Attribution:  Wyoming State Historical Society.

1941  President Roosevelt sent a telegram to Emperor Hirohito reading:

Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. These developments contain tragic possibilities.

The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let lives have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.
More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indochina for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indochina for the common defense of French Indochina. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon Indochina, nor that any has been contemplated.

During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indochina is not defensive in its character.

Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.

I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear in as much as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable. None of the peoples whom have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and. the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.

The Finns took Medvezhyegorsk on this day in 1941, and would occupy it until 1944.

In the Black Sea, the Bulgarians scored a naval victory over the Soviet Navy in the Action of 6 December 1941.  On that day Bulgarian air and naval forces destroyed the Soviet submarine Shch-204.  It was the only Soviet submarine sunk by the Bulgarian navy during the war.

Bulgaria was a member of the Tripartite Pact and had participated in the Axis occupation of Greece, but it was not at war with the Soviet Union and never declared war against the USSR during World War Two.  It oddly would end up declaring war against the UK and US, however, and it allowed Axis forces to use its Black Sea ports.  Ultimately, the Red Army would enter its territory in 1944, and it switched sides.

Closer to Home:

My father on this day would have had the day off in 1941 Scotsbluff, Nebraska.  What would that have meant?  Well, I don't know for sure, but he and his father may have enjoyed the duck hunting around there, which they both did.  In that region, moreover, it was good.  It was a warm day, with the temperature getting up to 60F, but a cold night, falling to 10F.

In Casper on that day, which they were looking to move to, it got up to 43F.  It was a pretty mild night and only fell to the upper 30s.

In St. Lambert, Quebec, it would also have been a day away from school and time off for my  mother, but I know less what she would have done.  Probably enjoy the local town with her friends or family.

Friday, December 5, 1941. A Turning Point.

It's worth noting that this day was a Friday.  For Americans, this would be the last day in which the United States was not a full belligerent in the largest war in modern history.

As a Friday, most people would have been looking forward to a weekend off, when people really did have the weekends off.  Wartime shortages were already a thing, but young adults would have been out on the town, and even older ones such as myself may have gone to the movies or the like in an era when home entertainment of the electronic type was limited to the radio.  Thousands of men, at the end of the day, would have hit bars before going home.

It's also traditionally a day when some soldiers and sailors received weekend leave, but I don't know the situation on December 5, 1941. I suspect, but don't know, that it had largely been cancelled in overseas locations, although that's certainly not the way movies depict it.  On this day the US felt that a Japanese strike was imminent, but they were still not expecting it on Hawaii.  Indeed, as recent posts and today's' make plain, the Navy was just reinforcing some outlying Northern Pacific island now.

Secretary of War Stinson criticized the leakers of Rainbow 5 to be unpatriotic and dismissed the matter as one of simple contingent preparedness.

Secretary of the Navy Knox met with Franklin Roosevelt and expressed the opinion that the Japanese Navy, which was out to sea, was going south. Roosevelt asked it could be going north, which Knox allowed for, but discounted.

As detailed Today In Wyoming's History: December 5, 1941, things were in motion all over the globe.

1941  The USS Lexington, an aircraft carrier, and the cruisers USS Indianapolis, Astoria, Chicago and Portland, together with five destroyers depart the U.S. Naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 

Their mission was to deliver Marine Corps aircraft to Wake Island, where the commander was fearing a Japanese attack.

The USS Arizona arrived at Pearl Harbor, as noted here:

Today in World War II History—December 5, 1941

1941  Japanese diplomats provided the following explanation to the U.S. Secretary of State in response to a question about Japanese ship movements in the eastern Pacific.

Reference is made to your inquiry about the intention of the Japa­nese Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indo‑china. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as follows

As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo‑china bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo‑china. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed the southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. It should be added that no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France.

 [WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. The Ambassador handed to the Secretary a paper which he said was the Japanese Government's reply to the President's inquiry in regard to Japanese troops in French Indochina. The paper reads as follows:

STATEMENT HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON DECEMBER 5, 1941

Reference is made to your inquiry about the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indo-china. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as follows

As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-china bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo-china. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed the southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. It should be added that no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France.

The Secretary read the paper and asked whether the Japanese considered that the Chinese were liable to attack them in Indochina. He said, so Japan has assumed the defensive against China. He said that he had heard that the Chinese are contending that their massing troops in Yunnan was in answer to Japan's massing troops in Indochina. Mr. Kurusu said that that is all that they have received from their Government in regard to this matter. The Ambassador said that as the Chinese were eager to defend the Burma Road he felt that the possibility of a Chinese attack in Indochina as a means of pre?venting Japan's attacking the Burma Road from Indochina could not be excluded.

The Secretary said that he had understood that Japan had been putting forces into northern Indochina for the purpose of attacking China from there. He said that he had never heard before that Japan's troop movements into northern Indochina were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack. The Secretary added that it was the first time that he knew that Japan was on the defensive, in Indochina.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese are alarmed over increasing naval and military preparations of the ABCD powers in the southwest Pacific area, and that an airplane of one of those countries had recently, flown over Formosa. He said that our military men are very alert and enterprising and are known to believe in the principle that offense is the best defense. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador's observations applied to defensive measures we are taking against Hitler. The Ambassador replied that he did not say that, but that it was because of Japan's apprehensions in regard to the situation that they had made their November 20 proposal.

The Secretary asked whether, if the Chinese are about to Japan in Indochina, this would not constitute an additional reason for Japan to withdraw her armed forces from Indochina. The Secretary said that he would be glad to get anything further which it might occur to the Japanese Government to say to us on this matter.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government was very anxious to reach an agreement with this Government and Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Government felt that we ought to be willing to agree to discontinue aid to China as soon as conversations betweem China and Japan were initiated. The Secretary pointed out that when the Japanese bring that matter up it brings up the matter of the aid Japan is giving to Hitler. He said that he did not see how Japan could demand that we cease giving aid to China while Japan was going on aiding Hitler. Mr. Kurusu asked in what way was Japan aiding Hitler. The Secretary replied that, as he had already made clear to the Japanese Ambassador, Japan was aiding Hitler by keeping large forces of this country and other countries immobilized in the Pacific area. (At this point the Ambassador uttered sotto voce an expression in Japanese which in the present context means "this isn't getting us anywhere".) The Secretary reminded the Ambassador of what the Secretary had said to the Ambassador on this point on November 22 as well as on our unwillingness to supply oil to Japan for the Japanese Navy which would enable Japan to operate against us in the southern Pacific and also on our attitude toward continuing aid to China. The Ambassador said that he recalled that the Secretary had said that he would almost incur the danger of being lynched if he permitted oil to go to Japan for her navy. The Ambassador said that he believed that if the Secretary would explain that giving of oil to Japan had been prompted by the desirability of reaching a peaceful agreement such explanation would be accepted. The Secretary replied that senators and others are not even now desisting from criticizing the Secretary for the course that he had hitherto taken.

The Secretary then recapitulated the three points on which he had orally commented to the Japanese. Ambassador on November 22, with reference to the Japanese proposal of November 20, namely one, our difficulty with reference to the Japanese request that we discontinue aid to China, two, our feeling that the presence of large bodies of Japanese troops anywhere in Indochina caused among neighboring countries apprehensions for their security, and, three, public attitude in this country toward supplying Japan with oil for military and naval needs. He asked the Ambassador whether he had not set forth clearly his position on these points to the Ambassador on November 22. The Ambassador agreed.

The Ambassador said that this Government blames Japan for its move into Indochina but that if Indochina was controlled by other powers it would be a menace to Japan. The Secretary replied that as the Ambassador was aware we could solve matters without delay if only the Japanese Government would renounce courses of force and aggression. The Secretary added that we were not looking for trouble but that at the same time we were not running away from menaces.

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that if we could only come to an agreement on temporary measures we could then proceed with our exploration of fundamental solutions. He said that such a fundamental agreement would necessarily take time and that what was needed now was a temporary expedient. The Secretary replied that the Japanese were keeping the situation confused by a malignant campaign conducted through the officially controlled and inspired press which created an atmosphere not conducive to peace. The Secretary said that we knew the Japanese Government could control the press and that therefore we did not understand what the motives are of the higher officials of the Japanese Government in promoting such a campaign. Mr. Kurusu said that on the American side we were not free from injurious newspaper propaganda. He said that for example there was the case of a newspaper report of the Secretary's interview with the press which created an unfortunate impression in Japan. The Secretary replied that he had been seeing for months and months that Japanese officials and the Japanese press had been proclaiming slogans of a bellicose character and that while all this was going on he had kept silent. He pointed out that now he was being jumped on by the Japanese if he said a single word in regard to his Government's principles. Mr. Kurusu then referred to a press report casting aspersions on Kurusu to the effect that he had been sent here to check on the Ambassador, et cetera, et cetera. The Secretary replied that he had heard only good reports in regard to Mr. Kurusu and the Ambassador. At this point the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu took their leave after making the usual apologies for taking so much of the Secretary's time when he was busy:

The United Kingdom was expanding the war, at leat on paper. 

1941  UK declares war on Finland, Hungary and Romania.

Soviet territory lost to the Axis by December 1941, from Why We Fight.

1941  Soviets launched a massive counterattack against the Germans in the Siege of Moscow.  

This attack brought Operation Typhoon to an unsuccessful end for the Germans. Indeed, while not really perceptible, with German setbacks in North Africa and the Soviet Union, and Japan about to bring the United States fully into the war, it could be argued that the war was at a turning point.

Closer to Home:

This was a Friday in 1941, so at that time both of my parents would have been experiencing a "meatless" day, meaning that they were restricted to protein other than from animals or birds. This, of course, as their families were, and ours is, Catholic.

For my father, living in the interior of the country, it's likely that meant something like macaroni and cheese, a Catholic meatless staple.  For my mother, however, living in Quebec, that likely meant some sort of ocean fish, perhaps.

My mother, being a few years older than my father, may have gone to the movies with her sisters, brothers and cousins, all of whom lived on the same block, but I don't know for certain.

Wednesday December 3, 1941. Increased speed.

Cordell Hull, the longest serving Secretary of State.

The Japanese carrier task force assigned to attack Pearl Harbor increased their speed.  On the same day, Secretary of State Cordell Hull gave a press conference expressing a gloomy view of the prospects for peace.

The Chief of Naval Operations sent the following message:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese Consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn...confidential and secret documents

A flurry of telegrams were sent between Japanese diplomatic missions.

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

3 December, 1941

(Purple)

#876

Re your 1227* (Washington to Tokyo).

 

As you are well aware, during the tenure of the previous cabinet, a meeting between the leaders of the two countries was suggested by us but the proposal failed to materialize. It is felt that it would be inappropriate for us to propose such a meeting again at this time. Please be advised of this decision.

From: Tokyo

To: Washington 

3 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#875 Chief of Office routing

Re your #1232*.

 

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

 

There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement.

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington. 

3 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#878 (In 2 parts, complete)

 

Re your #1225*.

Chief of Office routing.

1. Apparently, the United States is making much of the statements issued by our governmental organs, the trend of the public opinion, as well as of our troop movements in the south. They have used these as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in wanting to bring about a successful settlement in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations.

 

We explained the truth behind the alleged Tojo statement in my message #866**. The English translation (this was done in the offices of the Domei News agency) of that statement was very different from the original, and that was responsible for the unexpected reactions.

 

With regard to guiding general public opinion, this Minister himself has made considerable effort.

 

The State Department should be in receipt of a report from the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this point. As a matter of fact, as your report in your message #1148*** Secretary Hull has expressed his satisfaction over the change for the better along these lines.

 

In spite of this, the tone of some of the U. S. newspapers seem to be unduly ominous. Moreover, the radio (particularly those which are aired via short wave from San Francisco very recently) has been daily broadcasting in considerable detail, the progress being made in the negotiations. It is quite evident that persons who have access to the records of the meetings are acting as liaison agents for those broadcasts, for otherwise it would be impossible to obtain some of the information that is being aired. We feel that it is very inappropriate for the United States to criticize us without looking after her own house.

 

(Part 2)

 

2. Recently, Britain, the United States, and others have been making military preparations against Japan at an every increasing tempo. At the same time, they have been acting in a more and more antagonistic. manner of late. For example, on the 20th of last month, a U. S. plane made a reconnaissance flight over Garanpi in the southern part of Formosa. (We filed a protest with the U. S. Ambassador on the 27th regarding this matter). Since then, however, the British and the United States have shown no indication of ending such activities. In view of the very critical times, we cannot help but hope that such incidents would cease.

 

3. Our proposal which was submitted on 20 November was based on just principles. Will you please point out again that these principles undoubtedly offer the best chance of leading to an eventual settlement. (We assume that when the United States says in their counter proposal that our terms are not in sympathy with the existing principles, they refer to the contents of Article 4 in which it is stated that the peace between Japan and China shall not be disturbed. We are insisting that all aid to Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-Chinese negotiations, at the instigation of the President of the United States, are launched. Hence, our proposal in no way conflicts with the spirit of the so-called fundamental principles being proclaimed by the United States. Please bear that in mind.

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

3 December 1941

(Purple)

#1244

 

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

December 3, 1941

Purple (Urgent)

#1256.

 

Re your #875 [a].

 

I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this is mind and wire me at once. 

From: Rome

To: Tokyo

3 December 1941

(Purple—CA)

#985

Re your message #985* to Berlin.

 

On this day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, I, accompanied by Ando, called on Premier Mussolini, (Foreign Minister Ciano was also present). I described the developments in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #986** to Berlin.

 

Mussolini: "I have been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U. S. talks from the very beginning and therefore am not at all surprised to receive your report. As a matter of fact, in view of the utter bull-headedness of the United States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt, I should say that the outcome was nothing but what should have been expected. One of the aims of the United States is to make the Far East her own, from an economic standpoint. I have felt from the beginning that if it was the intention of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis first and then intervene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail because of Japan's loyal and sincere nature.

 

"As Your Excellency and Your Excellency's predecessor know, I wholeheartedly endorse Japan's policy of creating a New Order in East Asia. This has been true in the past, is true now and will be so in the future. I am one who is firmly convinced that Japan has every right to be the leader of the Great East Asia area."

 

I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred to in the heading, (with regard to paragraph 3 of that message, said that I had been advised that some arrangements were being made between our Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop).

 

With regard to paragraph 2, Mussolini said that should war break out, Italy would give every military aid she had at her disposal, i.e., that she would make every effort to keep the British navy checked in the Mediterranean.

 

Mussolini: "Recently, the formation of an Italian-German air force bloc was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the two to apply further pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. The negotiations on this proposal have progressed to a point where it may be signed any day now."

 

Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: "Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point."

 

With reference to paragraph 3, I submitted the French text of your message #987***, as one proposal, and asked him whether he preferred it to be separately or jointly. He replied that as long as it was done simultaneously with Germany it did not make much difference to him, but if it were done jointly he thought it would give the impression of more strength. He said he would confer with Ambassador MAKKENZEN.

 

Mussolini failed to bring up the subject of Soviet Russia, so the matter was not brought up at all.

 

In the first part of this message, please correct "N-NEEN WA" to "KINKENSHA WA".

From: Peking

To: Net

3 December 1941

(Purple)

Circular #616 (In 3 parts, complete)

Peking to Tokyo #763 (Most secret outside the Ministry).

      Kitazawa, Commander Army of North China.

      Arisue, Vice Chief of Staff.

      Nishimura, 4th Section, Staff Headquarters.

      Kazayama, Chief of Staff.

      Shiozawa, Liaison Officer, Chinese Development Board.

 

At a meeting on December 1st and 2nd, of the above five, the following conclusions and decisions were reached:

 

"If this war does start, this will be a war which will decide the rise or fall of the Japanese Empire. For this reason it goes without saying, do not have small, or local, insignificant matters, occupy you. Instead quiet such things immediately and settle in a most advantageous way to us. In addition, all administrative control of these districts should be carefully planned anew with the above in view. For example, the fact that this war is one which is unavoidable for the existence of Japan and the maintenance of peace in East Asia' should be made very clear to all foreign nations and thus internally strengthen the unity of the people while guiding the world's public opinion in a direction beneficial to Japan. Thus both during the period of war and at the end of the war during the peace negotiations the greatest benefit will accrue to Japan.

 

"Especially on the minds of the southern native peoples we must make an impression so as to draw them towards us and against the United States and Britain. For this purpose, when this war starts all district and regional authorities must as much as possible adhere to existing international laws, etc. and under no condition should any action which would look like 'stealing while the house burns' to foreign countries be taken which might result in the loss of the main issue for a small immediate local profit.

 

(Part 2)

"In order to end this affair in a profitable note for Japan, one need but remember that in the Russo-Japan war it was necessary to have President Roosevelt act as peace mediator, to appreciate that for the expected coming war the only one who can be imagined as an intermediary is the Pope. This fact should be kept in mind in any step which is taken in the occupied territory. And for this reason too the enemy's position should be considered, and the handling of enemy churches etc. in China should be carefully studied.

 

"It is evident that Japan will have to put everything that they have in the coming war, and for this reason it is only natural that our burden in China be made as light as possible, so that our strength must be saved. For this reason matters other than political or economic, that can be handled by China should as much as possible be left to China to manage and thereby get credit for this from the Chinese, too.

 

"It can be imagined that the next war is to be a longer one than the China incident, so that in this region the main issue should be the obtaining of materials. For this reason the question of closed trade and methods of gathering material should again be thoroughly studied.

 

(Part 3)

 

II "The military will of course try to handle matters as much as possible according to the International code. They will increase even more their close cooperation with the Legations, especially regarding protection of churches. In this regard they have already planned a complete education of the soldier groups stationed in the occupied territories."

 

Arisue mentioned that he was on close terms with the Vatican here _ _ _ _ _ (2 lines garbled) _ _ _ _ _ .

 

(Arisue mentioned that he had always approved of allowing the Chinese to handle their own affairs and as a matter of fact he had been acting with that in mind. However, he was only worried that by handing over the management of things to the Chinese, that they might get the mistaken idea that the Japanese had become weakened. This point should be kept in mind and any action of this kind should be done in such a way as to not let them get such a mistaken idea.)

"It is of course important to obtain materials, but regarding easing the ban on free trade in enemy territory, this subject should be studied from various angles."

 

III Shiozawa expressed his agreement with most items mentioned and declared that very close touch has been kept with military forces and different methods of leading North China politically were being studied.

Rommel's offensive towards Bardia, Sallum and Halfaya Pass were repulsed by the British.

Hitler issues an order trying to streamline German wartime production, which is noted here:

Today in World War II History—December 3, 1941

Tuesday, December 2, 1941. 新高山に登る (Climb Mount Niitaka).

The Japanese fleet was authorized to attack Pearl Harbor at any time after midnight, December 7, 1941.  This came via the coded message "Climb Mount Niitaka" (新高山に登る)

On the same day, President Roosevelt sent Japan a request for an explanation of the large Japanese troop concentrations in Indochina. Vichy France and Imperial Japan had agreed to limit the number to 25,000, which had been exceeded by the Japanese.

The Under Secretary said that the Secretary was absent from the Department because of a slight indisposition and that the President had therefore asked Mr. Welles to request the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu to call to receive a communication which the President wished to make to them. Mr. Welles then read to Their Excellencies the following statement (a copy of which was handed to the Ambassador)

"I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina.

"It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement-and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement-between Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very considerably less than the total amount of the forces already there.

"The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government.

"Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free and independent peoples through the utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government."

The Japanese Ambassador said that he was not informed by the Japanese Government of its intentions and could not speak authoritatively on the matter but that of course he would communicate the statement immediately to his Government. Mr. Kurusu said that, in view of Japan's offer of November 20 to transfer all its forces from. southern Indochina to northern Indochina, it was obvious no threat against the United States was intended. Both Mr. Kurusu and the Ambassador endeavored to explain that owing to lack of adequate land communication facilities in Indochina a rapid transfer of forces from northern to southern Indochina for purposes of aggression against countries neighboring southern Indochina could not be easily effected. Mr. Kurusu asked whether the reports to which the President referred were from our authorities. Mr. Welles said that he was not in position to say any more on that point than was contained in the statement.

The Ambassador said that it appeared to him that the measures which Japan was taking were natural under the circumstances, as the strengthening of armaments and of military dispositions by one side naturally leads to increasing activity by the other side. Mr. Welles stated that, as the Japanese Ambassador must be fully aware, this Government has not had any aggressive intention against Japan. The Ambassador said that, while he did not wish to enter into a debate on the matter, he wished to point out that the Japanese people believe that economic measures are a much more effective weapon of war than military measures; that they believe they are being placed under severe pressure by the United States to yield to the American position; and that it is preferable to fight rather than to yield to pressure. The Ambassador added that this was a situation in which wise statesmanship was needed; that wars do not settle anything; and that under the circumstances some agreement, even though it is not satisfactory, is better than no agreement at all.

Mr. Welles pointed out that the settlement which we are offering Japan is one which would assure Japan of peace and the satisfaction of Japan's economic needs much more certainly than any other alternative which Japan might feel was open to her.

Mr. Kurusu said that having just recently arrived from Japan he could speak more accurately of the frame of mind which is prevalent in Japan than could the Ambassador. He dwelt briefly upon the reaction which has been caused in Japan by our freezing measures and he said that this produces a frame of mind which has to be taken into account.

Mr. Welles pointed out that, as the Ambassadors must fully understand, there is a frame of mind in this country also which must be taken into account, and that frame of mind is produced by the effect of four years of the measures taken by Japan in China causing the squeezing out of American interests in Japanese-occupied areas. Mr. Kurusu then repeated what he had said two or three times previously about the effect of the Washington Conference treaties upon China which had caused China to flaunt Japan's rights. He said that in view of the actual situation in the Far East there were points in our proposal of November 26 which the Japanese Government would find it difficult to accept. Mr. Welles asked whether we may expect shortly a reply from the Japanese Government on our proposal. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative, but said that it might take a few days in view of the important questions which it raised for the Japanese Government. Mr. Kurusu expressed the hope that the American Government would exercise cool judgment in its consideration of questions under discussion between the two Governments. Mr. Welles said that we are asking for cool judgment on the part of Japanese statesmen.

Then Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese felt that we had made real progress in our discussions and that the Japanese Government had been hopeful of being able to work out with us some settlement of the three outstanding points on which our draft of June 21 and the Japanese draft of September 25 had not been reconciled. He asked whether the Secretary would be willing to consider resuming our efforts to reconcile our differences on those three points, in view of all the progress that had been made, instead of approaching the problem from a new angle as we had done in our latest proposal which seemed to the Japanese Government to require a completely fresh start.

Mr. Welles said that our proposal of November 26 represented an effort to restate our complete position, as it has always stood. He said, however, that he would be glad to refer to the Secretary Mr. Kurusu's suggestion.

US cryptologist intercepted and decode the Japanese diplomatic code, which instructed the Japanese embassy to destroy codes maintained there.

Closer to home, in a way, as detailed on the entry for this date on Today In Wyoming's History: December 2;

1941  As of this date, on the eve of Pearl Harbor,  Wyoming has 5,600 men in the armed forces.

The Red Army crated the Moscow Defense Zone for the defense of that city.  That day, German forces came within 19 km of the Kremlin, the closest they'd come to that mark during World War Two.

On the same day, the Finns took the Hanko Peninsula.  Hitler issued Directive No. 38 which instructed that the Luftwaffe was to be reinforced in the Mediterranean.

Friday, November 28, 1941. The USS Enterprise departs Pearl Harbor.

A task force centered on the USS Enterprise left Pearl Harbor in order to deliver twelve Marine Corps F4F aircraft to Wake Island.  But for this, the Enterprise would have been at Pearl Harbor on December 7.

The Enterprise would complete that mission on December 4, and then it turned around to return to Pearl Harbor.  It would have arrived there on December 6 but for bad weather.

The Enterprise's departure was known to the Japanese, due to reporting from a consulate based intelligence officer they had there.  At this time, this meant, due to reassignments and repairs, only one carrier remained in Pearl Harbor.

The Army concluded the Carolina Maneuvers.

A brand new, at that time, Jeep and a 37mm anti tank gun in the Carolina Maneuvers.

The maneuvers were massive in scale, involving 350,000 men.

The direction things were moving in was obvious, inside at least the Government.

German general Johann von Ravenstein was captured by New Zealanders in North Africa, making him the first German general officer to become a prisoner of war during World War Two.

The Soviets retook Rostov on Don.

The O-21 at Gibraltar.

The Dutch submarine O-21 sank the German U-95.

Thursday, November 27, 1941. War Warning

Raised anchor of the USS Arizona at Pearl Harbor.

Today In Wyoming's History: November 27, 1941:

1941     Joint Army-Navy signal to Hawaii states, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.  Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Spenavo inform British. Continental districts, Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage".

Japanese ships, of course, were already en route to their launching points for assaults across the Pacific, including Pearl Harbor, with a fast carrier task force having left the Kurile Islands the day prior.  A Japanese news agency reported that there was little hope of concluding a peace, a frank admission on the Japanese side of the direction which events were headed in.

The War Warning message is oddly a somewhat controversial part of the Pearl Harbor story as it forms the basis of questions about whether it was broad enough.  It did not list Pearl Harbor as a potential site of an upcoming attack, but it was broad enough to list every place as one.  And,in fact, Army and Navy commands at Pearl Harbor did react to the warning with precautionary measures.

On the same day, the Siege of Toburk ended when the 8th Army made contact with the garrison.  The German 15th Panzer Division, however, took Sidi Azeiz.

The Soviets concluded their defense of Rostov victoriously, a setback for the Germans.

Wedesday November 26, 1941. Japanese carriers depart the Kurile Islands.

Admiral Chūichi Nagumo's aircraft carrier task force departs for Pearl Harbor from the Kurile Islands, but with instructions that if contacted that negotiations have been successful with the U.S., it is to turn around and return.

On the same day, the US presented a proposal to Japan that it recognize the Chinese Nationalist government, withdraw from China and Indochina and agree to a multinational non-aggression pact.  The Japanese delegation asked for two weeks to study the proposal.  It stated:

Section I
Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

1. The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
4. The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

1. The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
2. The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
3. The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
4. The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
5. The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

Section II
Steps To Be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.
3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.
4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support - militarily, politically, economically - any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
5. Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including right in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.
8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.
10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

The Germans withdrew from Sidi Rezegh and the British 7th Armored Division entered it.

Gen. Geoges Catrooux of the Free French forces in the Levant declared Lebanon independent.