Showing posts with label Prohibition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Prohibition. Show all posts

Thursday, February 15, 2024

Friday, February 15, 1924. Gun fire and back pay.

U.S. Marines landed at Ampala, Honduras, during the Honduran Civil War.

U.S. Senator Frank L. Greene was wounded by a stray bullet when he was walking on Pennsylvanian Avenue in Washington, D. C.  The shot had been fired in a shootout between bootleggers and Federal agents.  He never fully recovered.

The jury in Joe Jackson's case against the White Sox awarded him $16,000 in back pay.   The Judge, however, decreed that the award was based on perjured testimony and set the verdict aside.  Jackson nonetheless felt himself vindicated.

German emergency powers, which had existed since December 8, lapsed, returning the government to its normal procedures.

Tuesday, January 23, 2024

Wednesday, January 23, 1924. Red Dead Relocation.


Mexican rebels decided to forego a blockade, but they took Saltillo and Monterrey.

Lenin's body was transported to the House of Unions.  Architect Alexey Shchusev was given the task of constructing a tomb for Lenin within three days.  He would accomplish the task, with the structure being obviously temporary.

Shchusev was originally a church architect, so his rise in the new Communist establishment is not admirable in any sense.  They should tear the crap he's responsible for after 1917 down, including the ice box that Lenin is kept in.

The US and UK entered into a treaty allowing the US to search British ships suspected of rum running.

Convention between the United States of America and Great Britain, Signed at Washington, January 23, 192437

The President of the United States of America;

And His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India;

Being desirous of avoiding any difficulties which might arise between them in connection with the laws in force in the United States on the subject of alcoholic beverages;

Have decided to conclude a Convention for that purpose;

And have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America:

Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State of the United States;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

The Right Honorable Sir Auckland Campbell Geddes, G. C. M. G., K. C. B., His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America;

Who, having communicated their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I

The High Contracting Parties declare that it is their firm intention to uphold the principle that 3 marine miles extending from the coastline outwards and measured from low-water mark constitute the proper limits of territorial waters.

Article II

(1) His Britannic Majesty agrees that he will raise no objection to the boarding of private vessels under the British flag outside the limits of territorial waters by the authorities of the United States, [Page 159]its territories or possessions in order that enquiries may be addressed to those on board and an examination be made of the ship’s papers for the purpose of ascertaining whether the vessel or those on board are endeavoring to import or have imported alcoholic beverages into the United States, its territories or possessions in violation of the laws there in force. When such enquiries and examination show a reasonable ground for suspicion, a search of the vessel may be instituted.

(2) If there is reasonable cause for belief that the vessel has committed or is committing or attempting to commit an offense against the laws of the United States, its territories or possessions prohibiting the importation of alcoholic beverages, the vessel may be seized and taken into a port of the United States, its territories or possessions for adjudication in accordance with such laws.

(3) The rights conferred by this article shall not be exercised at a greater distance from the coast of the United States its territories or possessions than can be traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected of endeavoring to commit the offense. In cases, however, in which the liquor is intended to be conveyed to the United States its territories or possessions by a vessel other than the one boarded and searched, it shall be the speed of such other vessel and not the speed of the vessel boarded, which shall determine the distance from the coast at which the right under this article can be exercised.

Article III

No penalty or forfeiture under the laws of the United States shall be applicable or attach to alcoholic liquors or to vessels or persons by reason of the carriage of such liquors, when such liquors are listed as sea stores or cargo destined for a port foreign to the United States, its territories or possessions on board British vessels voyaging to or from ports of the United States, or its territories or possessions or passing through the territorial waters thereof, and such carriage shall be as now provided by law with respect to the transit of such liquors through the Panama Canal, provided that such liquors shall be kept under seal continuously while the vessel on which they are carried remains within said territorial waters and that no part of such liquors shall at any time or place be unladen within the United States, its territories or possessions.

Article IV

Any claim by a British vessel for compensation on the grounds that it has suffered loss or injury through the improper or unreasonable exercise of the rights conferred by Article II of this Treaty or [Page 160]on the ground that it has not been given the benefit of Article III shall be referred for the joint consideration of two persons, one of whom shall be nominated by each of the High Contracting Parties.

Effect shall be given to the recommendations contained in any such joint report. If no joint report can be agreed upon, the claim shall be referred to the Claims Commission established under the provisions of the Agreement for the Settlement of Outstanding Pecuniary Claims signed at Washington the 18th August, 1910, but the claim shall not, before submission to the tribunal, require to be included in a schedule of claims confirmed in the manner therein provided.

Article V

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall remain in force for a period of one year from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

Three months before the expiration of the said period of one year, either of the High Contracting Parties may give notice, of its desire to propose modifications in the terms of the Treaty.

If such modifications have not been agreed upon before the expiration of the term of one year mentioned above, the Treaty shall lapse.

If no notice is given on either side of the desire to propose modifications, the Treaty shall remain in force for another year, and so on automatically, but subject always in respect of each such period of a year to the right on either side to propose as provided above three months before its expiration modifications in the Treaty, and to the provision that if such modifications are not agreed upon before the close of the period of one year, the Treaty shall lapse.

Article VI

In the event that either of the High Contracting Parties shall be prevented either by judicial decision or legislative action from giving full effect to the provisions of the present Treaty the said Treaty shall automatically lapse, and, on such lapse or whenever this Treaty shall cease to be in force, each High Contracting Party shall enjoy all the rights which it would have possessed had this Treaty not been concluded.

The present Convention shall be duly ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by His Britannic Majesty; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible.

In Witness Whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention in duplicate and have thereunto affixed their seals.

Done at the city of Washington this twenty-third day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-four.

Charles Evans Hughes

A. C. Geddes

Heritage of the Dessert was released.  The film featured some technicolor footage.

Monday, December 18, 2023

Tuesday, December 18, 1923. Liking Prohibition.

Some news that read like news of the decade prior, and some that was truly horrific.


A murder simply over a man staying at a hotel.

Farmer James D. Cummings and draftsman J. Earl McLeod of Washington, Kansas, filed the patent application for the bulldozer.

It's amazing to think that bulldozers did not exist before that time.

The Tangier Protocol was signed between France, Spain and the United Kingdom, creating the Tangier International Zone in Morocco.  It governed the international zone of the city, and would exist until 1956 when Morocco became independent.

Andrew Volstead of Volstead Act fame told a law enforcement conference that the American public was working around towards supporting prohibition.

Wednesday, December 13, 2023

Thursday, December 13, 1923. Mexican Federals Mobilize


Ruth Muskrat presented Gustavus Elmer Emmanuel Lindquist′s book The Red Man In The United States to President Calvin Coolidge.  Highly educated, the Oklahoma native had a Cherokee father and an Irish/English American mother.  A pioneer in many ways in both societies, she was a professional educator and died in 1982 at age 84.

The Federal Government was mobilizing in Mexico. 


And booze was flowing south.

Lord Alfred Douglas was sentenced to six months in prison for libeling Winston Churchill.  He had printed a newspaper article claiming that Churchill had been paid to release a false report about the Battle of Jutland in order to cause stocks to decrease in value so that a group of Jewish investors could take advantage of it, all of which was false, as well as racist.

Lawrence Sperry, age 30, inventor of the autopilot and the artificial horizon, died in an airplane accident over the English Channel. Taking off in fog, his airplane simply disappeared.


Friday, September 22, 2023

Saturday, Sepember 22, 1923. Henning Hotel Robbed.

A major raid in Chicago on speakeasies resulted in the jails being filled to capacity.

Crime was a major story in Casper as well:


And the Governor of Oklahoma caught a dragon.

The Navy's ZR-1 dirigible flew over Washington, D. C.









Monday, August 28, 2023

Tuesday, August 27, 1923. 37 Hours.

Former Governor of Pennsylvania, William Cameron Sproul, opined that Prohibition helped kill William G. Harding, noting:

He was accustomed to an occasional drink of scotch. I was his personal friend and I know, and in that laborious task of a trip to Alaska, I'm sure he missed it.

U.S. Army pilots Lowell Smith and John Richter broke an aviation endurance record by staying aloft for 37 consecutive hours over Rockwell Field in San Diego, a feat made possible by air-to-air refueling. The accomplishment is impressive, if frankly, pointless.

German offered to end passive resistance to French occupation of the Ruhr in exchange for the release of deportees and prisoners, and the guarantee of the "safety of life and subsistence of the Ruhr population."

Japanese Crown Prince Hirohito, the future emperor, moved into Akasaka Palace.  The intended temporary state would end up bing a period of five years due to an earthquake destroying housing in Tokyo.

The patent for Lincoln longs, applied for on August 31, 1920, was granted.

Cohen in arrest after murder.

Louis Cohen, aka Louis Kushner, mob hit man, killed Nathan Kaplan, gangster, while the latter was being transferred by a police car in New York City.  

Kaplan was likely killed under orders of rival Louis Buchalter, aka Louis Lepke, aka Lepke Buchalter, who would rise up to be head of Murder Incorporated.  Buchalter would later receive the death penalty and be executed in 1944. Cohen was gunned down in a mob hit in 1939.

Of interest, these figures were all Jewish gangsters, something we've forgotten about over time, mostly remembering the Sicilian Mafia.  Indeed, Murder Inc. tended to use Jewish and Italian hitman in their role for the Mafia, which insulated the Mafia from direct involvement.

Wednesday, July 26, 2023

Thursday, July 26, 1923. Harding visits Vancouver.

President Harding disembarked at Vancouver, becoming the first U.S. President to visit Canada.   While there, he delivered this speech:

Citizens of Canada: I may as well confess to you at the outset a certain perplexity as to how I should address you. The truth of the matter is that this is the first time I have ever spoken as President in any country other than my own.

Indeed, so far as I can recall, I am, with the single exception of my immediate predecessor (Woodrow Wilson), the first President in office even to set foot on a politically-foreign soil. True, there is no definite inhibition upon one doing so, such as prevents any but a natural born citizen from becoming President, but an early prepossession soon developed into a tradition and for more than a hundred years held the effect of unwritten law. I am not prepared to say that the custom was not desirable, perhaps even needful, in the early days, when time was the chief requisite of travel. Assuredly, too, at present, the Chief Magistrate of a great Republic ought not to cultivate the habit or make a hobby of wandering over all the continents of the earth.

But exceptions are required to prove rules. And Canada is an exception, a most notable exception, from every viewpoint of the United States. You are not only our neighbour, but a very good neighbour, and we rejoice in your advancement.

I need not depict the points of similarity that make this attitude of the one toward the other irresistible. We think the same thoughts, live the same lives and cherish the same aspirations of service to each other in times of need. Thousands of your brave lads perished in gallant and generous action for the preservation of our Union.

Many of our young men followed Canadian colours to the battlefields of France before we entered the war and left their proportion of killed to share the graves of your intrepid sons. This statement is brought very intimately home to me, for one of the brave lads in my own newspaper office (Harding owned the Marion, Ohio Star) felt the call of service to the colours of the sons of Canada. He went to the front, and gave his life with your boys for the preservation of the American and Canadian concept of civilization.

When my mind reverts and my heart beats low to recollection of those faithful and noble companionships, I may not address you, to be sure, as “fellow citizens,” as I am accustomed to designate assemblages at home, but I may and do, with respect and pride, salute you as ”fellow men,” in mutual striving for common good.

What an object lesson of peace is shown today by our two countries to all the world! [Applause.] No grim-faced fortifications mark our frontiers, no huge battleships patrol our dividing waters, no stealthy spies lurk in our tranquil border hamlets. Only a scrap of paper, recording hardly more than a simple understanding, safeguards lives and properties on the Great Lakes, and only humble mile-posts mark the inviolable boundary line for thousands of miles through farm and forest.

Our protection is in our fraternity, our armor is our faith; the tie that binds more firmly year by year is ever-increasing acquaintance and comradeship through interchange of citizens; and the compact is not of perishable parchment, but of fair and honourable dealing which, God grant, shall continue for all time. 

An interesting and significant symptom of our growing mutuality appears in the fact that the voluntary inter-change of residents to which I have referred, is wholly free from restrictions. Our National and industrial exigencies have made it necessary for us, greatly to our regret, to fix limits to immigration from foreign countries. But there is no quota for Canada. [Applause.] We gladly welcome all of your sturdy, steady stock who care to come, as a strengthening ingredient and influence. We none the less bid Godspeed and happy days to the thousands of our own folk, who are swarming constantly over your land and participating in its remarkable development. 

Wherever in either of our countries any inhabitant of the one or the other can best serve the interests of himself and his family is the place for him to be. [Applause.] A further evidence of our increasing interdependence appears in the shifting of capital. Since the armistice, I am informed, approximately $2,500,000,000 has found its way from the United States into Canada for investment.

That is a huge sum of money, and I have no doubt is employed safely for us and helpfully for you. Most gratifying to you, moreover, should be the circumstance that one-half of that great sum has gone for purchase of your state and municipal bonds, — a tribute, indeed, to the scrupulous maintenance of your credit, to a degree equalled only by your mother country across the sea and your sister country across the hardly visible border.

These are simple facts which quickly resolve into history for guidance of mankind in the seeking of human happiness. “History, history!” ejaculated Lord Overton to his old friend, Lindsay, himself an historian; “what is the use of history? It only keeps people apart by reviving recollections of enmity.”

As we look forth today upon the nations of Europe, with their armed camps of nearly a million more men in 1923 than in 1913, we cannot deny the grain of truth in this observation. But not so here! A hundred years of tranquil relationships, throughout vicissitudes which elsewhere would have evoked armed conflict rather than arbitration, affords, truly declared James Bryce, “the finest example ever seen in history of an undefended frontier, whose very absence of armaments itself helped to prevent hostile demonstrations;” thus proving beyond question that “peace can always be kept, whatever be the grounds of controversy, between peoples that wish to keep it.” 

There is a great and highly pertinent truth, my friends, in that simple assertion. It is public will, not public force, that makes for enduring peace. And is it not a gratifying circumstance that it has fallen to the lot of us North Americans, living amicably for more than a century, under different flags, to present the most striking example yet produced of that basic fact?

If only European countries would heed the lesson conveyed by Canada and the United States, they would strike at the root of their own continuing disagreements and, in their own prosperity, forget to inveigh constantly at ours. 

Not that we would reproach them for resentment or envy, which after all is but a manifestation of human nature. Rather should we sympathize with their seeming inability to break the shackles of age-long methods, and rejoice in our own relative freedom from the stultifying effect of Old World customs and practices.

Our natural advantages are manifold and obvious. We are not palsied by the habits of a thousand years. We live in the power and glory of youth. Others derive justifiable satisfaction from contemplation of their resplendent pasts. We have relatively only our present to regard, and that, with eager eyes fixed chiefly and confidently upon our future.

Therein lies our best estate. We profit both mentally and materially from the fact that we have no “departed greatness” to recover, no “lost provinces” to regain, no new territory to covet, no ancient grudges to gnaw eternally at the heart of our National consciousness. Not only are we happily exempt from these handicaps of vengeance and prejudice, but we are animated correspondingly and most helpfully by our better knowledge, derived from longer experience, of the blessings of liberty. 

These advantages we may not appreciate to the full at all times, but we know that we possess them, and the day is far distant when, if ever, we shall fail to cherish and defend them against any conceivable assault from without or from within our borders.

I find that, quite unconsciously, I am speaking of our two countries almost in the singular when perhaps I should be more painstaking to keep them where they belong, in the plural. But I feel no need to apologize. You understand as well as I that I speak in no political sense. The ancient bugaboo of the United States scheming to annex Canada disappeared from all our minds years and years ago. [Applause.] Heaven knows we have all we can manage now, and room enough to spare for another hundred millions, before approaching the intensive stage of existence of many European states.

And if I might be so bold as to offer a word of advice to you, it would be this: Do not encourage any enterprise looking to Canada’s annexation of the United States. [Laughter.] You are one of the most capable governing peoples in the world, but I entreat you, for your own sakes, to think twice before undertaking management of the territory which lies between the Great Lakes and the Rio Grande. 

No, let us go our own gaits along parallel roads, you helping us and we helping you. So long as each country maintains its independence, and both recognize their interdependence, those paths cannot fail to be highways of progress and prosperity. Nationality continues to be a supreme factor in modern existence; make no mistake about that; but the day of the Chinese wall, inclosing a hermit nation, has passed forever. Even though space itself were not in process of annihilation by airplane, submarine, wireless and broadcasting, our very propinquity enjoins that most effective cooperation which comes only from clasping of hands in true faith and good fellowship. 

It is in precisely that spirit, men and women of Canada, that I have stopped on my way home from a visit to our pioneers in Alaska to make a passing call upon my very good neighbor of the fascinating Iroquois name, ”Kanada,” to whom, glorious in her youth and strength and beauty, on behalf of my own beloved country, I stretch forth both my arms in the most cordial fraternal greeting, with gratefulness for your splendid welcome in my heart, and from my lips the whispered prayer of our famed Rip Van Winkle: “May you all live long and prosper!” 

He gave the speech at Stanley Park, and attended a state dinner at 7:00.  After that, he reembarked on the USS Henderson and must have remained hungry, as he dined on some crab while the ship steamed to Seattle and shortly thereafter became very ill.

High waters brought disaster near Shoshoni.


The Tribune also reported that the French had lifted the blockade of the Ruhr, and they updated the curious case of Father Grace, who apparently objected to prohibition to some extent.  He had apparently forged an order for ten barrels of whiskey for the J. H. Mullen Home for the Aged in Arvada, Colorado.  He was turned over by another Priest.  Fr. Grace was the pastor at St. Anne's in Arvada, having been installed at the newly built church on July 4, 1920.

Catholic theology would hold that under some circumstances there's no obligation to comply with an unjust law and Fr. Mullen did not seem to be, at least at first, sorry for his act.  Maybe there's more to this story than it might at first seem.  This story isn't one that's easy to follow, however, so what became of him and what he later thought, we don't know.

Wednesday, June 28, 2023

Friday, June 28, 1923. Turkey's first election, Hi Power patent, Osage Murders in Oklahoma, Klan in Glenrock, Bert Cole accident.

Turkey's first general election was held, which chose secondary electors who then would choose the Grand National Assembly.  Only the Republican People's Party was allowed to exist, but the number of candidates was unlimited.

John Browning, the legendary and massively influential firearms designer, many of whose designs are still in use, unabated in their utility and not regarded as old, filed for his patent application for the Hi Power.  He would die before it was granted in 1927.

British in Oosterbeek  Left to right Pvt Ronald Philip Walker Pvt John Dugdale 10pin C.co 156 Para L.Cpt Noel Rosenberg 10 pin C.co 156 Para Pvt Alfred J Ward HQ Para Brgd. Driver for Hackett.  Dugdale carries a Hi Power.  Rosenberg might be.  The Canadian manufactured John Ingleiss Hi Powers were adopted for British and Canadian airborne, that introducing the design to British troops.

The design went on to widespread use, seeing military use with every country in the British Commonwealth or which was formerly part of the late British Empire, as well as World War Two use by China and, ironically, Nazi Germany.  Germany produced the pistol in occupied Belgian plants.  It saw very limited experimental use with the US in the 1960s.  I knew a Navy pilot, for instance, who was issued one.

Canadian troops training with Hi Power.

Regarded as obsolete, in recent years it has been phased out of British service, which commenced during World War Two with airborne troops, and most recently out of Canadian service.  Canada chose to take this step as its World War Two manufactured pistols no longer had a reliable parts source.  Ironically, just as they made their decision, a boom in manufacture of Hi Power pistols resumed, starting off a story in civilian, and perhaps military, markets much like that experienced by the M1911, which went through a similar story. The M1911 is, of course, also a Browning design.

Uruguayan marine with Hi Power.

The Hi Power is the pistol the U.S. should have adopted when it went to 9mm (and it shouldn't have gone to 9mm).  The pistol was so widely used that at one time US special forces of various types would carry it on certain missions because, if one was dropped, it was evidence of who had been there.

Osage oil millionaire George Bigheart summoned Pawhuska Oklahoma lawyer W. Watkins Vaughn to his hospital deathbed, where he was receiving treatment for poisoning.  Bigheart died the following day, and Vaughn was murdered on his way home, his body being found in Pershing, Oklahoma.

The Osage Indian Murders are the subject of the recently released movie, Killers of the Flower Moon, which is based on the 2017 book investigating the same.

The Glenrock Gazette reported on the recent KKK demonstration n that town.


The Glenrock Gazette, in its reporting, basically endorsed the racist organization as being one for law and order.

Bert Cole, famous local pilot, but one already known for a tragic airborne death in Evansville, died in an airplane accident himself.

From Reddit's 100 Years Ago sub, the inquiring photographer was out again.  I was surprised how uniform these answers were.


I would not have guessed that there would be uniform answers.  The fact that there is, speaks volumes of how women perceived their status at the time.

Indeed, in much of the US women had only recently received the vote, but it is true that they were highly restricted in what was regarded as appropriate work.  That wouldn't really start changing for another fifty years, although that's probably a topic for a separate entry.  Also clear here, however, social rules bothered some women.  The really fascinating thing here is that it seemed not to be something vaguely in the background, but something that caused a lot of women, all the women in this sample, to hold deep seated resentments.

Sunday, June 4, 2023

Monday, June 4, 2023. Frank Hayes and Sweet Kiss.

The United States Supreme Court decided in Meyer v. Nebraska that school could be conducted in languages other than the English, striking down a Nebraska law.  In so doing, it stated:
262 U.S. 390

43 S.Ct. 625

67 L.Ed. 1042

MEYER
v.
STATE OF NEBRASKA.

No. 325.

Argued Feb. 23, 1923.

Decided June 4, 1923.

Messrs. A. F. Mullen, of Omaha, Neb., C. E. Sandall, of York, Neb., and I. L. Albert, of Columbus, Neb., for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 391-393 intentionally omitted]

Messrs. Mason Wheeler, of Lincoln, Neb., and O. S. Spillman, of Pierce, Neb., for the State of Nebraska.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 393-395 intentionally omitted]

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.


Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the district court for Hamilton county, Nebraska, under an information which charged that on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German language to Raymond Parpart, a child of 10 years, who had no attained and successfully passed the eighth grade. The information is based upon 'An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the state of Nebraska,' approved April 9, 1919 (Laws 1919, c. 249), which follows:


'Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any language than the English language.

'Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in which the child resides.


'Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100), or be confined in the county jail for any period not exceeding thirty days for each offense.


'Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after its passage and approval.'


The Supreme Court of the state affirmed the judgment of conviction. 107 Neb. 657, 187 N. W. 100. It declared the offense charged and established was 'the direct and intentional teaching of the German language as a distinct subject to a child who had not passed the eighth grade,' in the parochial school maintained by Zion Evangelical Lutheran Congre ation, a collection of Biblical stories being used therefore. And it held that the statute forbidding this did not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, but was a valid exercise of the police power. The following excerpts from the opinion sufficiently indicate the reasons advanced to support the conclusion:

'The salutary purpose of the statute is clear. The Legislature had seen the baneful effects of permitting for eigners, who had taken residence in this country, to rear and educate their children in the language of their native land. The result of that condition was found to be inimical to our own safety. To allow the children of foreigners, who had emigrated here, to be taught from early childhood the language of the country of their parents was to rear them with that language as their mother tongue. It was to educate them so that they must always think in that language, and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and sentiments foreign to the best interests of this country. The statute, therefore, was intended not only to require that the education of all children be conducted in the English language, but that, until they had grown into that language and until it had become a part of them, they should not in the schools be taught any other language. The obvious purpose of this statute was that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state. The enactment of such a statute comes reasonably within the police power of the state. Pohl v. State, 102 Ohio St. 474, 132 N. E. 20; State v. Bartels, 191 Iowa, 1060, 181 N. W. 508.

'It is suggested that the law is an unwarranted restriction, in that it applies to all citizens of the state and arbitrarily interferes with the rights of citizens who are not of foreign ancestry, and prevents them, without reason, from having their children taught foreign languages in school. That argument is not well taken, for it assumes that every citizen finds himself restrained by the statute. The hours which a child is able to devote to study in the confinement of school are limited. It must have ample time for exercise or play. Its daily capacity for learning is comparatively small. A selection of subjects for its education, therefore, from among the many that might be taught, is obviously necessary. The Legislature no doubt had in mind the practical operation of the law. The law affects few citizens, except those of foreign lineage.


Other citizens, in their selection of studies, except perhaps in rare instances, have never deemed it of importance to teach their children foreign languages before such children have reached the eighth grade. In the legislative mind, the salutary effect of the statute no doubt outweighed the restriction upon the citizens generally, which, it appears, was a restriction of no real consequence.'


The problem for our determination is whether the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment:

'No state * * * shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.'

While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct. 652, 28 L. Ed. 585; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220; Minnesota v. Bar er, 136 U. S. 313, 10 Sup. Ct. 862, 34 L. Ed. 455; Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; Twining v. New Jersey 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 31 Sup. Ct. 259, 55 L. Ed. 328; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Adams v. Tanner, 224 U. S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357, 38 Sup. Ct. 337, 62 L. Ed. 772, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 593; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254; Adkins v. Children's Hospital (April 9, 1923), 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. ——; Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147. The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect. Determination by the Legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 137, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385.

The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of 1787 declares:

'Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.'

Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life; and nearly all the states, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory laws.

Practically, education of the young is only possible in schools conducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves thereto. The calling always has been regarded as useful and honorable, essential, indeed, to the public welfare. Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the amendment.

The challenged statute forbids the teaching in school of any subject except in English; also the teaching of any other language until the pupil has attained and successfully passed the eighth grade, which is not usually accomplished before the age of twelve. The Supreme Court of the state has held that 'the so-called ancient or dead languages' are not 'within the spirit or the purpose of the act.' Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod, etc., v. McKelvie et al. (Neb.) 187 N. W. 927 (April 19, 1922). Latin, Greek, Hebrew are not proscribed; but German, French, Spanish, Italian, and every other alien speech are within the ban. Evidently the Legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own.

It is said the purpose of the legislation was to promote civic development by inhibiting training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American ideals, and 'that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state.' It is also affirmed that the foreign born population is very large, that certain communities commonly use foreign words, follow foreign leaders, move in a foreign atmosphere, and that the children are thereb hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful type and the public safety is imperiled.

That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to imporve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution—a desirable and cannot be promoted by prohibited means.

For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law which should provide:

'That the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent. * * * The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be.'

In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to official guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius their ideas touching the relation between individual and state were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any Legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.

The desire of the Legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate. Unfortunate experiences during the late war and aversion toward every character of truculent adversaries were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration. But the means adopted, we think, exceed the limitations upon the power of the state and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. The interference is plain enough and no adequate reason therefor in time of peace and domestic tranquility has been shown.

The power of the state to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not questioned. Nor has challenge been made of the state's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports. Those matters are not within the present controversy. Our concern is with the prohibition approved by the Supreme Court. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 594, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973, pointed out that mere abuse incident to an occupation ordinarily useful is not enough to justify its abolition, although regulation may be entirely proper. No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed. We are constrained to conclude that the statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state.

As the statute undertakes to interfere only with teaching which involves a modern language, leaving complete freedom as to other matters, there seems no adequate foundation for the suggestion that the purpose was to protect the child's health by limiting his mental activities. It is well known that proficiency in a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed at an early age, and experience shows that this is not injurious to the health, morals or understanding of the ordinary child.

The judgment of the court belo must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Sutherland, dissent.
The US decided to ignore foreign protests on booze rules.


The now ineffective Zero Milestone in Washington D.C., intended to be the starting point for all U.S. highways, was dedicated.

Horse trainer Frank Hayes, serving as a jockey on Sweet Kiss, died during the race which the horse won.  A very lightweight individual to start with, he'd lost twelve pounds for the race and perhaps accordingly imperiled his health.

Thursday, June 1, 2023

Friday, June 1, 1923. New York calls it quits on Prohibition

The State of New York voted to cease enforcing prohibition.  This did not repeal Prohibition, which was of course a Federal law, but ceased New York's participation in the effort to enforce it.

Sunday, May 21, 2023

Monday, May 21, 1923. Delmonico's closed.

The original family owned Delmonico's restaurant closed.  The restaurant had been in business, in more than one location, since 1827 and had become one of the most famous restaurants in New York.  It was a favorite of Theodore Roosevelt.

It was not able to survive Prohibition.

Not surprisingly, the famous name had cache and there were subsequent operations that used it, having some connection with the original, but not owned by the original family.  There are plans to reopen a restaurant in the location late this year.

The restaurant is the claimed originator of a variety of famous dishes, the best known being the Delmonico's Steak.  Roosevelt favored the double lamb chops.

The  Labour and Socialist International, an organization of socialist and labor parties, was formed and became the largest organizational union of those entities.  It ceased to exist in April, 1940.

Sunday, April 30, 2023

Monday, April 30, 1923. Booze on the High Seas

 


In Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Mellon, the U.S. Supreme Court, declared that American ships could sell booze on the "high seas" more than three miles beyond U.S. territory.  Foreign ships, however, couldn't dock with it.

The decision was rendered by Justice Van Devanter, which is somewhat ironic as he was appointed to the bench from Wyoming, and it was Wyoming that had put the Volstead Act up over the top.

The decision reads:

U.S. Supreme Court

Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923)

Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Mellon

Nos. 659-662, 666-670, 678, 693, 694

Argued January 4, 5, 1923

Decided April 30, 1923

262 U.S. 100

APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

1. The words "transportation" and "importation," in the Eighteenth Amendment, are to be taken in their ordinary sense, the former comprehending any real carrying about or from one place to another, and the latter any actual bringing into the country from the outside. P. 262 U. S. 121.

2. The word "territory," in the Amendment (in the phrase "the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof") means the regional areas, of land and adjacent waters, over which the United States claims and exercises dominion and control as a sovereign power, the term being used in a physical, not a metaphorical, sense, and referring to areas and districts having fixity of location and recognized boundaries. P. 262 U. S. 122.

3. The territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States includes the land areas under its dominion and control, the ports, harbors, bays, and other enclosed arms of the sea along its coast, and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line outward a marine league, or three geographic miles, and this territory, and all of it, is that which the Amendment designates as its field of operation. P. 262 U. S. 122.

4. Domestic merchant ships outside the waters of the United States, whether on the high seas or in foreign waters, are part of the "territory" of the United States in a metaphorical sense only, and are not covered by the Amendment. P. 262 U. S. 123.

5. The jurisdiction arising out of the nationality of a merchant ship, as established by her domicile, registry, and use of the flag, partakes more of the characteristics of personal than of territorial sovereignty, is chiefly applicable to ships on the high seas where there is no territorial sovereign; and, as respects ships in foreign territorial waters, it has little application beyond what is affirmatively or tacitly permitted by the local sovereign. P. 262 U. S. 123.

6. The Amendment covers foreign merchant ships when within the territorial waters of the United States. P. 262 U. S. 124.

7. A merchant ship of one country, voluntarily entering the territorial limits of another, subjects herself to the jurisdiction of the latter. The jurisdiction attaches in virtue of her presence, just as with other objects within those limits. During her stay, she is entitled to the protection of the laws of that place, and correlatively is bound to yield obedience to them. The local sovereign may, out of considerations of public policy, choose to forego the exertion of its jurisdiction, or to exert it in a limited way only, but this is a matter resting solely in its discretion. P. 262 U. S. 124.

8. The Eighteenth Amendment does not prescribe any penalties, forfeitures, or mode of enforcement, but, by its second section, leaves these to legislative action. P. 262 U. S. 126.

9. The only instance in which the National Prohibition Act recognizes the possession of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes as lawful is where the liquor was obtained before the act went into effect and is kept in the owner's dwelling for use therein by him, his family, and his bona fide guests. P. 262 U. S. 127.

10. Examination of the National Prohibition Act, as supplemented November 23, 1921, c. 134, 42 Stat. 222, shows

(a) That it is intended to be operative throughout the territorial limits of the United States, with the single exception of liquor in transit through the Panama Canal or on the Panama Railroad,

(b) That it is not intended to apply to domestic vessels when outside the territorial waters of the United States,

(c) That it is intended to apply to all merchant vessels, whether foreign or domestic, when within those waters, save as the Panama Canal Zone exception provides otherwise. Pp. 262 U. S. 127-129.

11. Congress, however, has power to regulate the conduct of domestic merchant ships when on the high seas, or to exert such control over them when in foreign waters as may be affirmatively or tacitly permitted by the territorial sovereign. P. 262 U. S. 129.

12. The antiquity of the practice of carrying intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes as part of a ship's sea stores, the wide extent of the practice, and its recognition in a congressional enactment, do not go to prove that the Eighteenth Amendment and the Prohibition Act could not have been intended to disturb that practice, since their avowed and obvious purpose was to put an end to prior practices respecting such liquors. P. 262 U. S. 129.

13. After the adoption of the Amendment and the enactment of the National Prohibition Act, Congress withdrew the prior statutory recognition of liquors as legitimate sea stores. Rev.Stats., § 2775; Act of September 21, 1922, c. 356, Tit. IV, and § 642, 42 Stat. 858, 948, 989. P. 262 U. S. 130.

14. The carrying of intoxicating liquors, as sea stores, for beverage purposes, through the territorial waters or into the ports and harbors of the United States by foreign or domestic merchant ships is forbidden by the Amendment and the act. P. 262 U. S. 130.

284 F. 890 affirmed.

285 F. 79 reversed.

Appeals from decrees of the district court dismissing, on the merits, as many suits brought by the appellant steamship companies for the purpose of enjoining officials of the United States from seizing liquors carried by appellants' passenger ships as sea stores and from taking other proceedings against the companies and their vessels, under the National Prohibition Act.

MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

These are suits by steamship companies operating passenger ships between United States ports and foreign ports to enjoin threatened application to them and their ships of certain provisions of the National Prohibition Act. The defendants are officers of the United States charged with the act's enforcement. In the first ten cases, the plaintiffs are foreign corporations and their ships are of foreign registry, while in the remaining two the plaintiff's are domestic corporations, and their ships are of United States registry. All the ships have long carried and now carry, as part of their sea stores, intoxicating liquors intended to be sold or dispensed to their passengers and crews at meals and otherwise for beverage purposes. Many of the passengers and crews are accustomed to using such beverages and insist that the ships carry and supply liquors for such purposes. By the laws of all the foreign ports at which the ships touch, this is permitted, and by the laws of some it is required. The liquors are purchased for the ships and taken on board in the foreign ports and are sold or dispensed in the course of all voyages, whether from or to those ports.

The administrative instructions dealing with the subject have varied since the National Prohibition Act went into effect. December 11, 1919, the following instructions were issued (T.D. 38218):

"All liquors which are prohibited importation, but which are properly listed as sea stores on vessels arriving in ports of the United States, should be placed under seal by the boarding officer and kept sealed during the entire time of the vessel's stay in port, no part thereof to be removed from under seal for use by the crew at meals or for any other purpose."

"Excessive or surplus liquor stores are no longer dutiable, being prohibited importation, but are subject to seizure and forfeiture."

"Liquors properly carried as sea stores may be returned to a foreign port on the vessel's changing from the foreign to the coasting trade, or may be transferred under supervision of the customs officers from a vessel in foreign trade, delayed in port for any cause, to another vessel belonging to the same line or owner."

January 27, 1920, the first paragraph of those instructions was changed (T.D. 38248) so as to read:

"All liquors which are prohibited importation, but which are properly listed as sea stores on American vessels arriving in ports of the United States, should be placed under seal by the boarding officer and kept sealed during the entire time of the vessel's stay in port, no part thereof to be removed from under seal for use by the crew at meals or for any other purpose. All such liquors on foreign vessels should be sealed on arrival of the vessels in port, and such portions thereof released from seal as may be required from time to time for use by the officers and crew."

October 6, 1922, the Attorney General, in answer to an inquiry by the Secretary of the Treasury, gave an opinion to the effect that the National Prohibition Act, construed in connection with the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, makes it unlawful (a) for any ship, whether domestic or foreign, to bring into territorial waters of the United States, or to carry while within such waters, intoxicating liquors intended for beverage purposes, whether as sea stores or cargo, and (b) for any domestic ship, even when without those, waters to carry such liquors for such purposes either as cargo or sea stores. The President thereupon directed the preparation, promulgation, and application of new instructions conforming to that construction of the act. Being advised of this and that, under the new instructions, the defendants would seize all liquors carried in contravention of the act as so construed and would proceed to subject the plaintiffs and their ships to penalties provided in the act, the plaintiffs brought these suits.

The hearings in the district court were on the bills or amended bills, motions to dismiss, and answers, and there was a decree of dismissal on the merits in each suit. 284 F. 890; International Mercantile Marine v. Stuart, 285 F. 79. Direct appeals under Judicial Code § 238 bring the cases here.

While the construction and application of the National Prohibition Act is the ultimate matter in controversy, the act is so closely related to the Eighteenth Amendment, to enforce which it was enacted, that a right understanding of it involves an examination and interpretation of the amendment. The first section of the latter declares, 40 Stat. 1050, 1941:

"Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article, the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited."

These words, if taken in their ordinary sense, are very plain. The articles proscribed are intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. The acts prohibited in respect of them are manufacture, sale, and transportation within a designated field, importation into the same, and exportation therefrom, and the designated field is the United States and all territory subject to its jurisdiction. There is no controversy here as to what constitutes intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes; but opposing contentions are made respecting what is comprehended in the terms "transportation," "importation" and "territory."

Some of the contentions ascribe a technical meaning to the words "transportation" and "importation." We think they are to be taken in their ordinary sense, for it better comports with the object to be attained. In that sense, transportation comprehends any real carrying about or from one place to another. It is not essential that the carrying be for hire, or by one for another, nor that it be incidental to a transfer of the possession or title. If one carries in his own conveyance for his own purposes, it is transportation no less than when a public carrier, at the instance of a consignor, carriers and delivers to a consignee for a stipulated charge. See United States v. Simpson, 252 U. S. 465. Importation, in a like sense, consists in bringing an article into a country from the outside. If there be an actual bringing in, it is importation, regardless of the mode in which it is effected. Entry through a custom house is not of the essence of the act.

Various meanings are sought to be attributed to the term "territory" in the phrase "the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof." We are of opinion that it means the regional areas -- of land and adjacent waters -- over which the United States claims and exercises dominion and control as a sovereign power. The immediate context and the purport of the entire section show that the term is used in a physical, and not a metaphorical, sense -- that it refers to areas or districts having fixity of location and recognized boundaries. See United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 16 U. S. 390.

It now is settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land areas under its dominion and control, the ports, harbors, bays, and other enclosed arms of the sea along its coast, and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line outward a marine league, or three geographic miles. Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187, 6 U. S. 234; The Ann, 1 Fed.Cas., p. 926; United States v. Smiley, 27 Fed.Cas., p. 1132; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 139 U. S. 257-258; Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 202 U. S. 52; 1 Kent's Com. (12th ed.) *29; 1 Moore, International Law Digest, § 145; 1 Hyde, International Law, §§ 141, 142, 154; Wilson, International Law (8th ed.) § 54; Westlake, International Law (2d ed.) p. 187 et seq; Wheaton, International Law (5th Eng. ed. [Phillipson]) p. 282; 1 Oppenheim International Law (3d ed.) §§ 185-189, 252. This, we hold, is the territory which the amendment designates as its field of operation, and the designation is not of a part of this territory, but of "all" of it.

The defendants contend that the amendment also covers domestic merchant ships outside the waters of the United States, whether on the high seas or in foreign waters. But it does not say so, and what it does say shows, as we have indicated, that it is confined to the physical territory of the United States. In support of their contention, the defendants refer to the statement sometimes made that a merchant ship is a part of the territory of the country whose flag she flies. But this, as has been aptly observed, is a figure of speech, a metaphor. Scharrenberg v. Dollar S.S. Co., 245 U. S. 122, 245 U. S. 127; In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 140 U. S. 464; 1 Moore International Law Digest § 174; Westlake, International Law (2d ed.) p. 264; Hall, International Law (7th ed. [Higgins]) § 76; Manning, Law of Nations (Amos), p. 276; Piggott Nationality, Pt. II, p. 13. The jurisdiction which it is intended to describe arises out of the nationality of the ship, as established by her domicile, registry, and use of the flag, and partakes more of the characteristics of personal than of territorial sovereignty. See The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398, 207 U. S. 403; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 213 U. S. 355; 1 Oppenheim International Law (3d ed.) §§ 123-125, 128. It is chiefly applicable to ships on the high seas, where there is no territorial sovereign, and as respects ships in foreign territorial waters, it has little application beyond what is affirmatively or tacitly permitted by the local sovereign. 2 Moore International Law Digest, §§ 204, 205; Twiss, Law of Nations (2d ed.) § 166; Woolsey, International Law (6th ed.) § 58; 1 Oppenheim International Law (3d ed.) §§ 128, 146, 260.

The defendants further contend that the amendment covers foreign merchant ships when within the territorial waters of the United States. Of course, if it were true that a ship is a part of the territory of the country whose flag she carries, the contention would fail. But, as that is a fiction, we think the contention is right.

The merchant ship of one country voluntarily entering the territorial limits of another subjects herself to the jurisdiction of the latter. The jurisdiction attaches in virtue of her presence, just as with other objects within those limits. During her stay, she is entitled to the protection of the laws of that place, and correlatively is bound to yield obedience to them. Of course, the local sovereign may out of considerations of public policy choose to forego the exertion of its jurisdiction or to exert the same in only a limited way, but this is a matter resting solely in its discretion. The rule, now generally recognized, is nowhere better stated than in The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116, 11 U. S. 136, 11 U. S. 144, where Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for this Court, said:

"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction."

"All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source."

"* * * *"

"When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other, or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption. His subjects thus passing into foreign countries are not employed by him, nor are they engaged in national pursuits. Consequently there are powerful motives for not exempting persons of this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found, and no one motive for requiring it. The implied license, therefore, under which they enter can never be construed to grant such exemption."

That view has been reaffirmed and applied by this Court on several occasions. United States v. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 520, 92 U. S. 525-526; Wildenhus' Case, 120 U. S. 1, 120 U. S. 11; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 142 U. S. 659; Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U. S. 69, 179 U. S. 74; Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 190 U. S. 176-178; Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U. S. 348, 252 U. S. 355-356. And see Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 192 U. S. 492-493; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 324 [argument of counsel -- omitted]; Brolan v. United States, 236 U. S. 216, 236 U. S. 218. In the Patterson case, the Court added:

"Indeed, the implied consent to permit them [foreign merchant ships] to enter our harbors may be withdrawn, and if this implied consent may be wholly withdrawn it may be extended upon such terms and conditions as the government sees fit to impose."

In principle, therefore, it is settled that the amendment could be made to cover both domestic and foreign merchant ships when within the territorial waters of the United States. And we think it has been made to cover both when within those limits. It contains no exception of ships of either class, and the terms in which it is couched indicate that none is intended. Such an exception would tend to embarrass its enforcement and to defeat the attainment of its obvious purpose, and therefore cannot reasonably be regarded as implied.

In itself, the amendment does not prescribe any penalties, forfeitures, or mode of enforcement, but, by its second section, [Footnote 1] leaves these to legislative action.

With this understanding of the amendment, we turn to the National Prohibition Act, c. 85, 41 Stat. 305, which was enacted to enforce it. The act is a long one, and most of its provisions have no real bearing here. Its scope and pervading purpose are fairly reflected by the following excerpts from Title II:

"Sec. 3. No person [Footnote 2] shall on or after the date when the eighteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States goes into effect, manufacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish or possess any intoxicating liquor except as authorized in this act, and all the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented."

"* * * *"

"Sec. 21. Any room, house, building, boat, vehicle, structure, or place where intoxicating liquor is manufactured, sold, kept, or bartered in violation of this title, and all intoxicating liquor and property kept and used in maintaining the same, is hereby declared to be a common nuisance."

"* * * *"

"Sec. 23. That any person who shall, with intent to effect a sale of liquor, by himself, his employee, servant, or agent, for himself or any person, company, or corporation keep or carry around on his person, or in a vehicle, or other conveyance whatever . . . any liquor . . . in violation of this title is guilty of a nuisance. . . ."

"* * * *"

"Sec. 26. When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being transported contrary to law."

Other provisions show that various penalties and forfeitures are prescribed for violations of the act, and that the only instance in which the possession of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes is recognized as lawful is where the liquor was obtained before the act went into effect and is kept in the owner's dwelling for use therein by him, his family, and his bona fide guests.

As originally enacted, the act did not in terms define its territorial field, but a supplemental provision [Footnote 3] afterwards enacted declares that it "shall apply not only to the United States but to all territory subject to its jurisdiction," which means that its field coincides with that of the Eighteenth Amendment. There is in the act no provision making it applicable to domestic merchant ships when outside the waters of the United States, nor any provision making it inapplicable to merchant ships, either domestic or foreign, when within those waters, save in the Panama Canal. There is a special provision dealing with the Canal Zone [Footnote 4] which excepts "liquor in transit through the Panama Canal or on the Panama Railroad." The exception does not discriminate between domestic and foreign ships, but applies to all liquor in transit through the canal, whether on domestic or foreign ships. Apart from this exception, the provision relating to the Canal Zone is broad and drastic like the others.

Much has been said at the bar and in the briefs about the Canal Zone exception, and various deductions are sought to be drawn from it respecting the applicability of the act elsewhere. Of course, the exception shows that Congress, for reasons appealing to its judgment, has refrained from attaching any penalty or forfeiture to the transportation of liquor while "in transit through the Panama Canal or on the Panama Railroad." Beyond this, it has no bearing here, save as it serves to show that, where in other provisions no exception is made in respect of merchant ships, either domestic or foreign, within the waters of the United States, none is intended.

Examining the act as a whole, we think it shows very plainly, first, that it is intended to be operative throughout the territorial limits of the United States, with the single exception stated in the Canal Zone provision; secondly, that it is not intended to apply to domestic vessels when outside the territorial waters of the United States; and, thirdly, that it is intended to apply to all merchant vessels, whether foreign or domestic, when within those waters, save as the Panama Canal Zone exception provides otherwise.

In so saying, we do not mean to imply that Congress is without power to regulate the conduct of domestic merchant ships when on the high seas, or to exert such control over them when in foreign waters as may be affirmatively or tacitly permitted by the territorial sovereign; for it long has been settled that Congress does have such power over them. Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U. S. 541; The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166, 223 U. S. 176. But we do mean that the National Prohibition Act discloses that it is intended only to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment and limits its field of operation, like that of the amendment, to the territorial limits of the United States.

The plaintiffs invite attention to data showing the antiquity of the practice of carrying intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes as part of a ship's sea stores, the wide extent of the practice, and its recognition in a congressional enactment, and argue therefrom that neither the amendment nor the act can have been intended to disturb that practice. But in this they fail to recognize that the avowed and obvious purpose of both the amendment and the act was to put an end to prior practices respecting such liquors, even though the practices had the sanction of antiquity, generality, and statutory recognition. Like data could be produced and like arguments advanced by many whose business, recognized as lawful theretofore, was shut down or curtailed by the change in national policy. In principle, the plaintiffs' situation is not different from that of the innkeeper whose accustomed privilege of selling liquor to his guests is taken away, or that of the dining car proprietor who is prevented from serving liquor to those who use the cars which he operates to and fro across our northern and southern boundaries.

It should be added that, after the adoption of the amendment and the enactment of the National Prohibition Act, Congress distinctly withdrew the prior statutory recognition of liquors as legitimate sea stores. The recognition was embodied in § 2775 of the Revised Statutes, which was among the provisions dealing with customs administration, and when, by the Act of September 21, 1922, those provisions were revised, that section was expressly repealed, along with other provisions recognizing liquors as legitimate cargo. C. 356, Title IV and § 642, 42 Stat. 858, 948, 989. Of course, as was observed by the district court, the prior recognition, although representing the national policy at the time, was not in the nature of a promise for the future.

It therefore is of no importance that the liquors in the plaintiffs' ships are carried only as sea stores. Being sea stores does not make them liquors any the less; nor does it change the incidents of their use as beverages. But it is of importance that they are carried through the territorial waters of the United States and brought into its ports and harbors. This is prohibited transportation and importation in the sense of the amendment and the act. The recent cases of Grogan v. Walker & Sons and Anchor Line v. Aldridge, 259 U. S. 80, are practically conclusive on the point. The question in one was whether carrying liquor intended as a beverage through the United States from Canada to Mexico was prohibited transportation under the amendment and the act, the liquor being carried in bond by rail, and that in the other was whether the transshipment of such liquor from one British ship to another in the harbor of New York was similarly prohibited, the liquor being in transit from Scotland to Bermuda. The cases were considered together, and an affirmative answer was given in each, the Court saying in the opinion, p. 259 U. S. 89:

"The Eighteenth Amendment meant a great revolution in the policy of this country, and presumably and obviously meant to upset a good many things on, as well as off, the statute book. It did not confine itself in any meticulous way to the use of intoxicants in this country. It forbade export for beverage purposes elsewhere. True, this discouraged production here, but that was forbidden already, and the provision applied to liquors already lawfully made. See Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, 151, note 1 [argument of counsel -- omitted]. It is obvious that those whose wishes and opinions were embodied in the amendment meant to stop the whole business. They did not want intoxicating liquor in the United States, and reasonably may have though that, if they let it in, some of it was likely to stay. When, therefore, the amendment forbids not only importation into and exportation from the United States, but transportation within it, the natural meaning of the words expresses an altogether probable intent. The Prohibition Act only fortifies in this respect the interpretation of the amendment itself. The manufacture, possession, sale, and transportation of spirits and wine for other than beverage purposes are provided for in the act, but there is no provision for transshipment or carriage across the country from without. When Congress was ready to permit such a transit for special reasons in the Canal Zone, it permitted it in express words. Title III, § 20, 41 Stat. 322."

Our conclusion is that, in the first ten cases, those involving foreign ships, the decrees of dismissal were right, and should be affirmed, and in the remaining two, those involving domestic ships, the decrees of dismissal were erroneous, and should be reversed, with directions to enter decrees refusing any relief as respects the operations of the ships within the territorial waters of the United States and awarding the relief sought as respects operations outside those waters.

Decrees in Nos. 659, 660, 661, 662, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670 and 678, affirmed.

Decrees in Nos. 693 and 694, reversed.

MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS dissents.

[Footnote 1]

The second section says: "The Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." For its construction, see United States v. Lanza, December 11, 1922.

[Footnote 2]

The act contains a provision (§ 1 of Title II) showing that it uses the word "persons" as including "associations, copartnerships, and corporations" when the context does not indicate otherwise.

[Footnote 3]

Section 3, Act November 23, 1921, c. 134, 42 Stat. 222.

[Footnote 4]

The pertinent portion of § 20 of Title III, relating to the Canal Zone, is as follows:

"Sec. 20. That it shall be unlawful to import or introduce into the Canal Zone, or to manufacture, sell, give away, dispose of, transport, or have in one's possession or under one's control within the Canal Zone, any alcoholic, fermented, brewed, distilled, vinous, malt, or spirituous liquors, except for sacramental, scientific, pharmaceutical, industrial, or medicinal purposes, under regulations to be made by the President, and any such liquors within the Canal Zone in violation hereof shall be forfeited to the United States and seized: Provided, that this section shall not apply to liquor in transit through the Panama Canal or on the Panama Railroad."

MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND dissenting.

I agree with the judgment of the court insofar as it affects domestic ships, but I am unable to accept the view that the Eighteenth Amendment applies to foreign ships coming into our ports under the circumstances here disclosed.

It would serve no useful purpose to give my reasons at any length for this conclusion. I therefore state them very generally and briefly.

The general rule of international law is that a foreign ship is so far identified with the country to which it belongs that its internal affairs, whose effect is confined to the ship, ordinarily are not subjected to interference at the hands of another state in whose ports it is temporarily present, 2 Moore, Int.Law. Dig., p. 292; United States v. Rodgers, 150 U. S. 249, 150 U. S. 260; Wildenhus' Case, 120 U. S. 1, 120 U. S. 12; and, as said by Chief Justice Marshall, in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118: " . . . An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. . . ."

That the government has full power under the Volstead Act to prevent the landing or transshipment from foreign vessels of intoxicating liquors or their use in our ports is not doubted, and therefore it may provide for such assurances and safeguards as it may deem necessary to those ends. Nor do I doubt the power of Congress to do all that the Court now holds has been done by that act, but such power exists not under the Eighteenth Amendment, to whose provisions the act is confined, but by virtue of other provisions of the Constitution, which Congress here has not attempted to exercise. With great deference to the contrary conclusion of the Court, due regard for the principles of international comity, which exists between friendly nations, in my opinion, forbids the construction of the Eighteenth Amendment and of the act which the present decision advances. Moreover, the Eighteenth Amendment, it must not be forgotten, confers concurrent power of enforcement upon the several states, and it follows that, if the general government possesses the power here claimed for it under that amendment, the several states within their respective boundaries, possess the same power. It does not seem possible to me that Congress, in submitting the amendment or the several states in adopting it, could have intended to vest in the various seaboard states a power so intimately connected with our foreign relations and whose exercise might result in international confusion and embarrassment.

In adopting the Eighteenth Amendment and in enacting the Volstead Act, the question of their application to foreign vessels in the circumstances now presented does not appear to have been in mind. If, upon consideration, Congress shall conclude that, when such vessels, in good faith carrying liquor among their sea stores, come temporarily into our ports, their officers should, ipso facto, become liable to drastic punishment and the ships themselves subject to forfeiture, it will be a simple matter for that body to say so in plain terms. But interference with the purely internal affairs of a foreign ship is of so delicate a nature, so full of possibilities of international misunderstandings, and so likely to invite retaliation that an affirmative conclusion in respect thereof should rest upon nothing less than the clearly expressed intention of Congress to that effect, and this I am unable to find in the legislation here under review.

The paper also noted the death of Emerson Hough, author and conservationist.  Hough had started off as a lawyer, which had taken him to New Mexico, before becoming a professional writer, which is what he did for most of his career.

And it noted the mayor of Powder River had died.  Powder River no longer has a mayor, and is now an unincorporated very small town.

IRA Chief of Staff officially called a ceasefire in the Irish Civil War and called on his troops to relinquish their weapons, effectively amounting to a surrender.

Washington, D. C. experienced a major flood.